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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ȱ No.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ UNITEDȱSTATESȱOFȱAMERICA,ȱ PlaintiffȬAppellant,ȱ v.ȱ LENAȱRAEȱHASLAGE,ȱ DefendantȬAppellee.ȱ ____________________ȱ AppealȱfromȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱDistrictȱCourtȱforȱtheȱ EasternȱDistrictȱofȱWisconsin.ȱ No.ȱ16ȬCRȬ40ȱ—ȱCharlesȱN.ȱClevert,ȱJr.,ȱJudge.ȱ ____________________ȱ ȱ No.ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ UNITEDȱSTATESȱOFȱAMERICA,ȱ PlaintiffȬAppellant,ȱ v.ȱ TAUNGRAȱNICOLEȱTONEY,ȱ DefendantȬAppellee.ȱ ____________________ȱ AppealȱfromȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱDistrictȱCourtȱforȱtheȱ EasternȱDistrictȱofȱWisconsin.ȱ No.ȱ16ȬCRȬ43ȱ—ȱJ.P.ȱStadtmueller,ȱJudge.ȱ 2ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ ________________ȱ ARGUEDȱDECEMBERȱ6,ȱ2016ȱ—ȱDECIDEDȱAPRILȱ3,ȱ2017ȱ ____________________ȱ BeforeȱWOOD,ȱChiefȱJudge,ȱ andȱ ROVNERȱandȱSYKES,ȱCircuitȱ Judges.ȱ WOOD,ȱChiefȱJudge.ȱInȱNicholsȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ136ȱS.Ct.ȱ1113ȱ (2016),ȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ heldȱ thatȱ aȱ sexȱ oěenderȱ wasȱ notȱ requiredȱ underȱ theȱ Sexȱ Oěenderȱ Registrationȱ andȱ NotięcaȬ tionȱActȱ(SORNA),ȱ18ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ2250,ȱtoȱupdateȱhisȱregistrationȱ inȱtheȱstateȱwhereȱheȱhadȱbeenȱresiding,ȱafterȱheȱleftȱhisȱhomeȱ andȱmovedȱtoȱaȱnewȱplace.ȱInȱNichols,ȱtheȱnewȱplaceȱwasȱoutȬ sideȱtheȱUnitedȱStates,ȱinȱtheȱPhilippines.ȱTheȱtwoȱcasesȱweȱ haveȱconsolidatedȱforȱdispositionȱonȱappealȱpresentȱtheȱmoreȱ conventionalȱscenarioȱofȱaȱpersonȱwhoȱmovesȱfromȱoneȱstateȱ inȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱtoȱanother—inȱLenaȱRaeȱHaslage’sȱcase,ȱ fromȱWisconsinȱtoȱWashingtonȱState,ȱandȱinȱTaungraȱNicoleȱ Toney’sȱcase,ȱfromȱWisconsinȱtoȱMinnesota.ȱInȱbothȱcases,ȱtheȱ districtȱcourtsȱdismissedȱtheȱindictmentsȱforȱimproperȱvenue.ȱ Theȱ governmentȱ hasȱ appealed.ȱ Weȱ conclude,ȱ however,ȱ thatȱ theȱ districtȱ courtsȱ properlyȱ appliedȱ Nicholsȱ andȱ thatȱ theirȱ judgmentsȱmustȱbeȱaĜrmed.ȱ Iȱ LiĴleȱmoreȱneedȱbeȱsaidȱaboutȱtheȱunderlyingȱfactsȱofȱtheȱ twoȱcases.ȱHaslageȱhadȱbeenȱlivingȱinȱWisconsin,ȱwhereȱsheȱ wasȱregisteredȱasȱaȱsexȱoěenderȱbasedȱonȱaȱ2006ȱconvictionȱ forȱtwoȱoěenses.ȱAfterȱherȱinitialȱregistration,ȱsheȱupdatedȱherȱ ęleȱatȱleastȱeightȱtimesȱinȱWisconsin.ȱSheȱwasȱreleasedȱonȱpaȬ roleȱinȱFebruaryȱ2015.ȱNotȱlongȱthereafter,ȱinȱMay,ȱsheȱcutȱoěȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ 3 herȱ electronicȱ monitoringȱ braceletȱ andȱ tookȱ aȱ trainȱ toȱ SpoȬ kane,ȱWashington.ȱSheȱdidȱnotȱregisterȱasȱrequiredȱbyȱSORNAȱ andȱstateȱlawȱinȱWashington.ȱȱ Toney’sȱstoryȱisȱsimilar.ȱSheȱwasȱconvictedȱinȱ1999ȱinȱMinȬ nesotaȱforȱprostitutionȬrelatedȱoěenses.ȱTheseȱrequiredȱherȱtoȱ registerȱunderȱSORNAȱasȱaȱsexȱoěender.ȱByȱ2015,ȱsheȱwasȱlivȬ ingȱ inȱ Wisconsin,ȱ whereȱ sheȱ wasȱ registered.ȱ Inȱ Februaryȱ ofȱ thatȱyear,ȱhowever,ȱsheȱleftȱWisconsinȱandȱtraveledȱtoȱMinneȬ sota,ȱwhereȱsheȱtookȱupȱresidence.ȱInȱviolationȱofȱSORNA,ȱsheȱ failedȱtoȱregisterȱinȱMinnesota.ȱ InȱMarchȱ2016,ȱaȱfederalȱgrandȱjuryȱinȱtheȱEasternȱDistrictȱ ofȱWisconsinȱindictedȱbothȱwomenȱinȱseparateȱcases,ȱeachȱofȱ whichȱcontainedȱoneȱcountȱofȱfailureȱtoȱregisterȱasȱaȱsexȱofȬ fenderȱinȱviolationȱofȱSORNA.ȱEachȱmovedȱtoȱdismissȱonȱtheȱ groundȱ thatȱ Nicholsȱ establishedȱ thatȱ theȱ governmentȱ couldȱ notȱestablishȱvenueȱinȱWisconsin,ȱbecauseȱnoȱoěenseȱorȱpartȱ ofȱanȱoěenseȱwasȱcommiĴedȱinȱWisconsin.ȱBothȱdistrictȱcourtsȱ grantedȱtheȱmotionȱandȱdismissedȱforȱimproperȱvenue,ȱandȱ theseȱappealsȱonȱbehalfȱofȱtheȱgovernmentȱfollowed.ȱ IIȱ Weȱbeginȱwithȱsomeȱbasics.ȱTheȱSixthȱAmendmentȱtoȱtheȱ U.S.ȱConstitutionȱguaranteesȱaȱdefendantȱtheȱrightȱtoȱtrialȱbyȱ “anȱimpartialȱjuryȱofȱtheȱstateȱandȱdistrictȱwhereinȱtheȱcrimeȱ shallȱ haveȱ beenȱ commiĴed.”ȱ ReĚectingȱ thisȱ constitutionalȱ command,ȱtheȱFederalȱRulesȱofȱCriminalȱProcedureȱalsoȱstateȱ thatȱ“theȱgovernmentȱmustȱprosecuteȱanȱoěenseȱinȱaȱdistrictȱ whereȱtheȱoěenseȱwasȱcommiĴed.”ȱFED.ȱ R.ȱ CRIM.ȱP.ȱ18.ȱThisȱ doesȱnotȱmeanȱthatȱthereȱisȱoneȱandȱonlyȱoneȱdistrictȱinȱwhichȱ aȱparticularȱcrimeȱmayȱbeȱprosecuted.ȱAsȱweȱhaveȱrecognized,ȱ 4ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ “[m]anyȱoěensesȱtouchȱmoreȱthanȱoneȱdistrict.ȱForȱthese,ȱConȬ gressȱ may,ȱ consistentlyȱ withȱ theȱ Constitution,ȱ authorizeȱ venueȱinȱanyȱdistrictȱwhereȱconductȱthatȱisȱpartȱofȱtheȱoěenseȱ occurred.”ȱ Unitedȱ Statesȱ v.ȱ OronaȬIbarra,ȱ 831ȱ F.3dȱ 867,ȱ 872ȱ (7thȱCir.ȱ 2016).ȱ Theȱ questionȱ beforeȱ usȱ isȱ thusȱ whetherȱ anyȱ conductȱthatȱisȱpartȱofȱtheȱoěenseȱdeęnedȱbyȱ18ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ2250ȱ occurredȱinȱtheȱEasternȱDistrictȱofȱWisconsin.ȱIfȱyes,ȱthenȱtheȱ districtȱcourtsȱerred;ȱifȱno,ȱthenȱtheirȱjudgmentsȱwereȱcorrect.ȱ SORNAȱ statesȱ thatȱ “[a]ȱ sexȱ oěenderȱ shallȱ register,ȱ andȱ keepȱ theȱ registrationȱ current,ȱ inȱ eachȱ jurisdictionȱ whereȱ theȱ oěenderȱ resides,ȱ whereȱ theȱ oěenderȱ isȱ anȱ employee,ȱ andȱ whereȱtheȱoěenderȱisȱaȱstudent.”ȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ16913(a).ȱInȱorderȱ toȱkeepȱherȱregistrationȱcurrent,ȱtheȱoěenderȱmust:ȱ notȱ laterȱ thanȱ 3ȱ businessȱ daysȱ afterȱ eachȱ changeȱ ofȱ name,ȱ residence,ȱ employment,ȱ orȱ studentȱ status,ȱ apȬ pearȱinȱpersonȱinȱatȱleastȱ1ȱjurisdictionȱinvolvedȱpursuȬ antȱtoȱsubsectionȱ(a)ȱofȱthisȱsectionȱandȱinformȱthatȱjuȬ risdictionȱofȱallȱchangesȱinȱtheȱinformationȱrequiredȱforȱ thatȱoěenderȱinȱtheȱsexȱoěenderȱregistry.ȱȱ Id.ȱ§ȱ16913(c).ȱTheȱnotięedȱjurisdictionȱthenȱhasȱtheȱresponsiȬ bilityȱtoȱprovideȱthatȱinformationȱtoȱallȱotherȱjurisdictionsȱinȱ whichȱtheȱoěenderȱisȱrequiredȱtoȱregister.ȱȱ Failureȱtoȱregisterȱasȱrequiredȱisȱaȱcrime,ȱpunishableȱbyȱaȱ ęneȱorȱaȱprisonȱtermȱofȱupȱtoȱ10ȱyears.ȱ18ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ2250(a).ȱTheȱ statuteȱcoversȱ(1)ȱanyȱsexȱoěenderȱrequiredȱtoȱregisterȱunderȱ SORNA,ȱ whoȱ (2)ȱ travelsȱ inȱ interstateȱ orȱ foreignȱ commerce,ȱ andȱwhoȱ(3)ȱknowinglyȱfailsȱtoȱregisterȱorȱupdateȱaȱregistraȬ tionȱ asȱ requiredȱ byȱ SORNA.ȱ Inȱ anȱ earlierȱ SORNAȱ case,ȱ theȱ SupremeȱCourtȱheldȱthatȱliabilityȱunderȱsectionȱ2250ȱcannotȱ beȱ predicatedȱ onȱ preȬSORNAȱ travel.ȱ Carrȱ v.ȱ Unitedȱ States,ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ 5 560ȱU.S.ȱ438ȱ(2010).ȱTheȱkeyȱtoȱourȱcase,ȱhowever,ȱisȱtheȱthirdȱ element.ȱToȱunderstandȱthatȱbeĴer,ȱweȱtakeȱaȱcloserȱlookȱatȱ Nichols.ȱ Theȱ questionȱ beforeȱ theȱ Courtȱ inȱ Nicholsȱ wasȱ “whetherȱ federalȱ lawȱ requiredȱ Nicholsȱ toȱ updateȱ hisȱ registrationȱ inȱ Kansasȱ toȱ reĚectȱ hisȱ departureȱ fromȱ theȱ State.”ȱ 136ȱ S.Ct.ȱ atȱ 1115.ȱTheȱCourtȱobservedȱthatȱanȱearlierȱstatuteȱhadȱimposedȱ theȱ dutyȱ toȱ reportȱ aȱ changeȱ ofȱ addressȱ toȱ theȱ responsibleȱ agencyȱinȱtheȱstateȱfromȱwhichȱtheȱoěenderȱwasȱleaving,ȱbutȱ thatȱSORNAȱrepealedȱthatȱpartȱofȱtheȱlawȱandȱreplacedȱitȱwithȱ theȱlanguageȱweȱquotedȱearlier.ȱTheȱCourtȱthusȱreformulatedȱ itsȱquestionȱtoȱbeȱ“whetherȱtheȱStateȱaȱsexȱoěenderȱleaves— thatȱis,ȱtheȱStateȱwhereȱheȱformerlyȱresided—qualięesȱasȱanȱ ‘involved’ȱjurisdictionȱunderȱ§ȱ16913.”ȱId.ȱatȱ1116.ȱȱ TheȱCourtȱstressedȱtheȱfactȱthatȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ16913(a),ȱwhichȱ identięesȱ“involved”ȱjurisdictions,ȱusesȱtheȱpresentȱtense:ȱ“reȬ sides,”ȱ “isȱ anȱ employee,”ȱ andȱ “isȱ aȱ student.”ȱ Itȱ pointedȱ outȱ thatȱ aȱ personȱ (suchȱ asȱ Nichols)ȱ whoȱ movesȱ fromȱ LeavenȬ worth,ȱ Kansas,ȱ toȱ Manila,ȱ inȱ theȱ Philippines,ȱ noȱ longerȱ “reȬ sides”ȱ (presentȱ tense)ȱ inȱ Kansas.ȱ Itȱ follows,ȱ theȱ Courtȱ said,ȱ “thatȱ onceȱ Nicholsȱ movedȱ toȱ Manila,ȱ heȱ wasȱ noȱ longerȱ reȬ quiredȱtoȱappearȱinȱpersonȱinȱKansasȱtoȱupdateȱhisȱregistraȬ tion,ȱforȱKansasȱwasȱnoȱlongerȱaȱ‘jurisdictionȱinvolvedȱpursuȬ antȱtoȱsubsectionȱ(c)’ȱofȱ§ȱ16913.”ȱId.ȱatȱ1117.ȱTheȱCourtȱfoundȱ furtherȱsupportȱforȱitsȱconclusionȱinȱtheȱfactȱthatȱanȱoěenderȱ whoȱmovesȱtoȱaȱnewȱplaceȱhasȱthreeȱbusinessȱdaysȱafterȱeachȱ changeȱofȱresidenceȱtoȱregisterȱinȱtheȱnewȱplace.ȱ“SORNA’sȱ plainȱtestȱ…ȱthereforeȱdidȱnotȱrequireȱNicholsȱtoȱupdateȱhisȱ registrationȱinȱKansasȱonceȱheȱnoȱlongerȱresidedȱthere.”ȱId.ȱatȱ 1118.ȱ Inȱ short,ȱ Nicholsȱ commiĴedȱ noȱ oěenseȱ inȱ Kansas,ȱ beȬ causeȱhisȱtravelȱaloneȱdidȱnotȱviolateȱSORNA.ȱItȱisȱtheȱchangeȱ 6ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ ofȱresidenceȱthatȱresultsȱfromȱtheȱtravel,ȱcoupledȱwithȱtheȱfailȬ ureȱtoȱregisterȱinȱtheȱnewȱplaceȱwithinȱtheȱalloĴedȱthreeȱdays,ȱ thatȱSORNAȱreaches.ȱȱ Likeȱ theȱ twoȱ districtȱ courtsȱ whoseȱ decisionsȱ weȱ areȱ reȬ viewing,ȱweȱreadȱNicholsȱtoȱholdȱthatȱtheȱactȱofȱleavingȱone’sȱ homeȱinȱStateȱAȱandȱtravelingȱtoȱStateȱBȱisȱnotȱaȱseparableȱpartȱ ofȱtheȱoěenseȱdeęnedȱinȱsectionȱ2250ȱforȱpurposesȱofȱcriminalȱ venue.ȱ Indeed,ȱ inȱ countlessȱ casesȱ theȱ actȱ ofȱ travelingȱ fromȱ StateȱAȱtoȱStateȱBȱwillȱnotȱbeȱtheȱpredicateȱforȱanyȱoěenseȱatȱ all.ȱSORNAȱdoesȱnotȱprohibitȱallȱinterstateȱtravel;ȱitȱdoesȱnotȱ requireȱregistrationȱbyȱanȱoěenderȱwhoȱtravelsȱfromȱChicagoȱ toȱHammond,ȱIndiana,ȱtoȱaĴendȱaȱSaturdayȱwedding;ȱandȱitȱ placesȱnoȱobligationȱonȱtheȱoěenderȱtoȱdoȱanythingȱinȱtheȱstateȱ ofȱorigin.ȱ(TheȱSupremeȱCourtȱnotedȱthatȱstateȱlawȱoftenȱreȬ quiresȱmoreȱofȱanȱoěender,ȱbutȱthatȱisȱofȱnoȱimportanceȱforȱ purposesȱofȱfederalȱcriminalȱvenue;ȱitȱjustȱmeansȱthatȱSORNAȱ hasȱnotȱleftȱaȱgapingȱloopholeȱinȱtheȱregistrationȱsystem.)ȱȱ Byȱcontrast,ȱthereȱareȱstatutesȱinȱwhichȱtheȱactȱofȱtravelingȱ fromȱoneȱstateȱtoȱanotherȱisȱtheȱpredicateȱforȱanȱoěense.ȱTheȱ TravelȱAct,ȱforȱexample,ȱmakesȱitȱaȱcrimeȱtoȱtravelȱinterstateȱ withȱtheȱintentȱtoȱcommitȱaȱcrimeȱorȱotherȱunlawfulȱactivity.ȱ Seeȱ 18ȱ U.S.C.ȱ §ȱ 1952;ȱ Unitedȱ Statesȱ v.ȱ O’Hara,ȱ 301ȱ F.3dȱ 563ȱ (7thȱCir.ȱ2002).ȱTheȱMannȱAct,ȱ18ȱU.S.C.ȱ§§ȱ2421–2424,ȱcrimiȬ nalizesȱinterstateȱtravelȱorȱtransportationȱwithȱtheȱintentȱtoȱenȬ gageȱinȱcriminalȱsexualȱactivity.ȱInȱcasesȱinvolvingȱviolationsȱ ofȱthoseȱstatutes,ȱtheȱcrimeȱbeginsȱinȱtheȱstateȱwhereȱtheȱdeȬ fendantȱsetȱoutȱwithȱtheȱintentȱtoȱcrossȱaȱstateȱlineȱandȱcommitȱ theȱcrime.ȱȱ Butȱsectionȱ2250ȱisȱdiěerent;ȱtheȱpremiseȱofȱNicholsȱisȱthatȱ itȱ doesȱ notȱ criminalizeȱ travelȱwithȱ intentȱ toȱ commitȱ aȱcrimeȱ (i.e.,ȱtoȱfailȱtoȱregister),ȱbutȱratherȱtheȱfailureȱtoȱregisterȱafterȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ 7 traveling.ȱToȱillustrateȱthisȱdistinction,ȱimagineȱaȱhypotheticalȱ caseȱinȱwhichȱanȱoěenderȱlivingȱinȱMadison,ȱWisconsin,ȱpacksȱ upȱallȱofȱherȱbelongingsȱandȱdrivesȱtoȱtheȱruralȱupperȱpeninȬ sulaȱofȱMichiganȱwithȱtheȱintentȱtoȱstayȱandȱliveȱthereȱ“oěȱtheȱ grid”ȱ withoutȱ registering.ȱ Butȱ imagineȱ that,ȱ onceȱ sheȱ hasȱ crossedȱtheȱborder,ȱsheȱhearsȱaȱradioȱreportȱaboutȱnewȱsightȬ ingsȱofȱwolverinesȱand,ȱterrięed,ȱreturnsȱtoȱherȱpreviousȱresiȬ denceȱinȱMadisonȱtheȱfollowingȱday.ȱSheȱhasȱcommiĴedȱnoȱ crimeȱunderȱsectionȱ2250.ȱȱ Onȱtheȱotherȱhand,ȱifȱthisȱhypotheticalȱoěenderȱhadȱalsoȱ takenȱherȱminorȱnephewȱalongȱwithȱherȱwithȱtheȱintentȱthatȱ heȱengageȱinȱprostitution,ȱsheȱwouldȱhaveȱcommiĴedȱaȱcrimeȱ underȱ theȱ Mannȱ Actȱ asȱ soonȱ asȱ sheȱ crossedȱ theȱ border,ȱ whetherȱ orȱ notȱ sheȱ followedȱ throughȱ onȱ thatȱ plan.ȱ Seeȱ 18ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ2423(a).ȱItȱthereforeȱmakesȱsenseȱtoȱunderstandȱtheȱ MannȱActȱ violationȱ asȱ beginningȱ inȱ Wisconsin.ȱ Butȱ whenȱ itȱ comesȱ toȱ SORNA,ȱ Nicholsȱ tellsȱ usȱ thatȱ noȱ criminalȱ conductȱ evenȱbeginsȱuntilȱsheȱfailsȱtoȱregisterȱinȱMichigan,ȱevenȱifȱherȱ travelȱbeganȱinȱWisconsin.ȱ Anotherȱexampleȱmayȱalsoȱhelp.ȱAsȱweȱhaveȱnoted,ȱsectionȱ 2250ȱcriminalizesȱaȱsexȱoěender’sȱfailureȱtoȱupdateȱhisȱregisȬ trationȱasȱrequiredȱinȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ16913(a).ȱTheȱlaĴerȱstatuteȱ includesȱaȱdutyȱtoȱupdateȱeachȱchangeȱinȱemploymentȱorȱstuȬ dentȱstatus.ȱImagineȱthatȱanȱoěenderȱisȱsubjectȱtoȱSORNA’sȱ registrationȱ requirements.ȱ Heȱ thenȱ movesȱ acrossȱ stateȱ linesȱ fromȱIndianaȱtoȱ Kentuckyȱwithȱtheȱintentȱtoȱlookȱforȱaȱnewȱ job,ȱ andȱ registersȱ inȱ Kentuckyȱ withȱ hisȱ newȱ addressȱ withinȱ twoȱdays.ȱButȱwhenȱheȱgetsȱaȱnewȱjobȱaȱweekȱlater,ȱheȱfailsȱtoȱ updateȱ hisȱKentuckyȱregistration.ȱPresumably,ȱheȱwouldȱbeȱ subjectȱtoȱprosecutionȱunderȱsectionȱ2250ȱforȱthisȱfailure,ȱbutȱ 8ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ itȱisȱaȱstrainȱtoȱimagineȱthatȱhisȱcrimeȱhadȱanythingȱtoȱdoȱwithȱ Indiana.ȱȱ TheȱgovernmentȱarguesȱthatȱvenueȱisȱappropriateȱinȱWisȬ consinȱbecauseȱtheȱSupremeȱCourt’sȱdecisionȱinȱUnitedȱStatesȱ v.ȱRodriguezȬMorenoȱinstructsȱthatȱvenueȱisȱproperȱwhereȱtheȱ distinctȱ partsȱ orȱ conductȱ ofȱ criminalȱ conductȱ occurred.ȱ 526ȱU.S.ȱ275,ȱ279–82ȱ(1999).ȱButȱRodriguezȬMorenoȱinvolvedȱaȱ diěerentȱ statute,ȱ andȱ theȱ diěerenceȱ maĴers.ȱ There,ȱ theȱ deȬ fendantȱ wasȱ chargedȱ withȱ violatingȱ 18ȱ U.S.C.ȱ §ȱ 924(c)(1),ȱ whichȱprohibitsȱusingȱorȱcarryingȱaȱęrearmȱduringȱandȱinȱreȬ lationȱtoȱanyȱcrimeȱofȱviolence.ȱTheȱdefendantȱhadȱkidnappedȱ aȱvictimȱinȱTexasȱandȱcarriedȱhimȱthroughȱnumerousȱstates,ȱ includingȱNewȱJerseyȱandȱMaryland,ȱbutȱhadȱusedȱaȱgunȱonlyȱ whileȱinȱMaryland.ȱId.ȱatȱ276–77.ȱTheȱCourtȱemphasizedȱthatȱ sectionȱ924(c)ȱcontainedȱtwoȱdistinctȱconductȱelements:ȱ(1)ȱusȬ ingȱandȱcarryingȱaȱgunȱandȱ(2)ȱtheȱcommissionȱofȱaȱkidnapȬ ping.ȱId.ȱatȱ280.ȱBecauseȱtheȱunderlyingȱandȱdistinctȱcrimeȱofȱ violenceȱ(kidnapping)ȱspannedȱtheȱentireȱgeographicȱareaȱofȱ travel,ȱ venueȱ wasȱ properȱ forȱ theȱ sectionȱ924(c)ȱ oěenseȱ anyȬ whereȱtheȱkidnappingȱhadȱcontinued.ȱ Asȱ weȱ knowȱ fromȱ theȱ Court’sȱ guidanceȱ inȱ Carr,ȱ theȱ eleȬ mentsȱofȱaȱsectionȱ2250ȱviolationȱforȱfailureȱtoȱregisterȱareȱseȬ quential,ȱ notȱ distinctȱ orȱ independent.ȱ Seeȱ Unitedȱ Statesȱ v.ȱ Sanders,ȱ 622ȱ F.3dȱ 779,ȱ 783ȱ (7thȱ Cir.ȱ 2010).ȱ Aȱ sectionȱ 2250ȱ SORNAȱviolationȱforȱfailureȱtoȱregisterȱinȱoneȱstateȱdoesȱnotȱ spanȱ theȱ entireȱ geographicȱ rangeȱ ofȱ statesȱ theȱ oěenderȱ hasȱ traversed,ȱevenȱthoughȱitȱmightȱhaveȱbeenȱnecessaryȱtoȱpassȱ throughȱseveralȱstatesȱbeforeȱreachingȱtheȱdestination.ȱTheȱinȬ terstateȱtravelȱisȱaȱnecessaryȱprecursor,ȱbutȱitȱisȱneitherȱaȱdisȬ tinctȱ crimeȱ norȱ anȱ elementȱ ofȱ theȱ crime.ȱ Ifȱ itȱ were,ȱ andȱ weȱ thereforeȱconceivedȱofȱtheȱcrimeȱasȱbeginningȱinȱWisconsin,ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ 9 weȱcouldȱęndȱourselvesȱfacedȱwithȱtheȱabsurdȱconclusionȱthatȱ venueȱcouldȱbeȱlaidȱanywhereȱtheȱtravelȱoccurredȱorȱevidenceȱ ofȱtheȱtravelȱwasȱlocatedȱ(i.e.,ȱinȱHaslage’sȱcase,ȱperhapsȱinȱaȱ stateȱ suchȱ asȱ Montanaȱ orȱ Idaho;ȱ inȱ Nichols’sȱ case,ȱ perhapsȱ California).ȱ Theȱgovernmentȱurgesȱthatȱtravelȱisȱpartȱandȱparcelȱofȱthisȱ crime,ȱandȱsoȱanȱessentialȱ(ifȱnotȱdistinct)ȱpartȱofȱtheȱprohibȬ itedȱconductȱtookȱplaceȱinȱWisconsin.ȱItȱwouldȱlikeȱusȱtoȱexȬ amineȱtheȱcontactsȱwithȱWisconsinȱtoȱseeȱhowȱsubstantialȱtheyȱ areȱ(i.e.ȱwhereȱdidȱ theȱ defendant’sȱactsȱ takeȱ place;ȱwhatȱ areȱ theȱ elementsȱ ofȱ theȱ crime;ȱ whatȱ isȱ theȱ locusȱ ofȱ theȱ criminalȱ activity;ȱ howȱ suitableȱ wouldȱ eachȱ districtȱ beȱ forȱ trial).ȱ Theȱ glaringȱproblemȱwithȱthisȱapproachȱisȱthatȱitȱstartsȱfromȱtheȱ propositionȱ thatȱ thereȱ areȱ atȱ leastȱ twoȱ permissibleȱ venues.ȱ Theseȱconsiderationsȱareȱofȱnoȱhelpȱifȱtheȱquestionȱonȱtheȱtableȱ isȱwhetherȱoneȱplaceȱisȱpermissibleȱatȱall.ȱItȱisȱtrueȱthatȱCarrȱ heldȱthatȱtheȱactȱofȱtravelȱisȱ“theȱveryȱconductȱatȱwhichȱConȬ gressȱtookȱaim.”ȱ560ȱU.S.ȱatȱ454.ȱButȱNicholsȱtellsȱusȱthatȱtravelȱ evenȱtoȱaȱplaceȱoutsideȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱdidȱnotȱtransformȱtheȱ defendant’sȱ actȱ ofȱ leavingȱ Kansasȱ intoȱ aȱ KansasȬbasedȱ SORNAȱviolation.ȱFurthermore,ȱaȱcloserȱlookȱatȱCarrȱrevealsȱ thatȱitȱisȱnotȱdiscussingȱtravelȱalone;ȱrather,ȱitȱisȱtalkingȱaboutȱ thoseȱ “whoȱ eludeȱ SORNA’sȱ registrationȱ requirementsȱ byȱ travelingȱ inȱ interstateȱ commerce.”ȱ Id.ȱ atȱ 456.ȱ Thatȱ takesȱ usȱ rightȱbackȱtoȱtheȱquestionȱofȱtheȱplaceȱwhereȱthatȱactȱofȱeludȬ ingȱtakesȱplace.ȱNicholsȱanswersȱit:ȱinȱtheȱplaceȱofȱtheȱnewȱresȬ idence.ȱȱ HaslageȱandȱToneyȱstandȱaccusedȱofȱcommiĴingȱoěensesȱ underȱSORNA,ȱbutȱtheȱchargesȱshowȱthatȱifȱtheyȱdid,ȱtheyȱdidȱ soȱinȱWashingtonȱStateȱandȱMinnesota,ȱnotȱinȱWisconsin.ȱWeȱ seeȱ nothingȱ toȱ preventȱ theȱ governmentȱ fromȱ alertingȱ theȱ 10ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ U.S.ȱAĴorneysȱinȱtheȱEasternȱDistrictȱofȱWashingtonȱandȱtheȱ Districtȱ ofȱ Minnesotaȱ toȱ theseȱ violations,ȱ andȱ leavingȱ itȱ toȱ thoseȱauthoritiesȱtoȱprosecute.ȱOnlyȱinȱthatȱsenseȱareȱtheȱpreȬ sentȱcasesȱdiěerentȱfrom,ȱandȱeasierȱthan,ȱNichols,ȱbecauseȱinȱ Nicholsȱ theȱ oěenderȱ leftȱ theȱ Unitedȱ Statesȱ andȱ aĴemptedȱ toȱ ęndȱrefugeȱinȱaȱplaceȱbeyondȱtheȱreachȱofȱSORNA.ȱHere,ȱtheȱ violationsȱofȱsectionȱ2250ȱbegan,ȱwereȱcarriedȱout,ȱandȱendedȱ inȱtheȱplaceȱofȱtheȱnewȱresidence.ȱIfȱeitherȱdefendantȱwereȱtoȱ changeȱ residenceȱ again,ȱ weȱ wouldȱ haveȱ aȱ diěerentȱ case,ȱ inȱ whichȱweȱcanȱassumeȱatȱleastȱtwoȱvenuesȱwouldȱbeȱpossible.ȱ Evenȱ then,ȱ however,ȱ Wisconsinȱ wouldȱ notȱ beȱ aȱ permissibleȱ choiceȱbasedȱsolelyȱonȱtheȱfactȱthatȱtheyȱlivedȱthereȱbeforeȱfailȬ ingȱtoȱregisterȱinȱaȱnewȱplace.ȱ TheȱjudgmentsȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtsȱareȱAFFIRMED.ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ 11 SYKES,ȱ Circuitȱ Judge,ȱ dissenting.ȱ Iȱ disagreeȱ thatȱ Nicholsȱ v.ȱ Unitedȱ States,ȱ 136ȱ S.ȱ Ct.ȱ 1113ȱ (2016),ȱ precludesȱ theȱ governȬ mentȱfromȱprosecutingȱtheseȱSORNAȱoěensesȱinȱtheȱEasternȱ Districtȱ ofȱ Wisconsin.ȱ Nicholsȱ addressedȱ theȱ scopeȱ ofȱ theȱ registrationȱdutyȱsetȱforthȱinȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ16913,ȱwhichȱestabȬ lishesȱ SORNA’sȱ basicȱ registrationȱ requirementsȱ forȱ sexȱ oěenders.ȱ Theȱ decisionȱ didȱ notȱ addressȱ theȱ elementsȱ ofȱ theȱ criminalȱoěenseȱunderȱ18ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ2250(a),ȱwhichȱmakesȱitȱaȱ crimeȱtoȱtravelȱinȱinterstateȱcommerceȱandȱfailȱtoȱregisterȱasȱ requiredȱbyȱSORNA.ȱNorȱdidȱtheȱCourtȱtouchȱonȱtheȱvenueȱ questionȱpresentedȱhere.ȱ LesterȱRayȱNichols,ȱaȱfederalȱsexȱoěender,1ȱwasȱindictedȱ byȱaȱfederalȱgrandȱjuryȱinȱKansasȱforȱviolatingȱ§ȱ2250(a)ȱafterȱ heȱ movedȱ fromȱ Leavenworth,ȱ Kansas,ȱ toȱ Manila,ȱ PhilipȬ pines,ȱ withoutȱ updatingȱ hisȱ sexȬoěenderȱ registrationȱ inȱ Kansas.ȱ 136ȱS.ȱCt.ȱ atȱ 1117.ȱ Heȱ movedȱ toȱ dismissȱ theȱ indictȬ ment,ȱ arguingȱ thatȱ SORNAȱ didȱ notȱ requireȱ himȱ toȱ updateȱ hisȱKansasȱregistrationȱbecauseȱheȱnoȱlongerȱresidedȱinȱthatȱ jurisdictionȱ andȱ wasȱ neitherȱ anȱ employeeȱ norȱ aȱ studentȱ there.ȱ Id.ȱ Theȱ motionȱ wasȱ deniedȱ andȱ heȱ conditionallyȱ pleadedȱguilty.ȱTheȱTenthȱCircuitȱaĜrmed,ȱagreeingȱwithȱtheȱ districtȱcourtȱthatȱNicholsȱwasȱrequiredȱtoȱupdateȱhisȱKansasȱ registration.ȱId.ȱ Theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ reversed.ȱ Theȱ questionȱ beforeȱ theȱ Courtȱ wasȱ oneȱ ofȱ statutoryȱ interpretation:ȱ Doesȱ theȱ textȱ ofȱ SORNAȱrequireȱaȱsexȱoěenderȱwhenȱheȱmovesȱoutȱofȱstateȱtoȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ 1ȱ Heȱ wasȱ convictedȱ inȱ 2003ȱ ofȱ travelingȱ inȱ interstateȱ commerceȱ withȱ intentȱ toȱ engageȱ inȱ illicitȱ sexualȱ conductȱ withȱ aȱ minorȱ inȱ violationȱ ofȱ 18ȱU.S.C.ȱ §ȱ 2423(b).ȱ Nicholsȱ v.ȱ Unitedȱ States,ȱ 136ȱ S.ȱ Ct.ȱ 1113,ȱ 1116–17ȱ (2016).ȱ ȱ 12ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ returnȱtoȱtheȱdepartureȱstateȱtoȱupdateȱhisȱregistrationȱthere?ȱ Theȱ specięcȱ languageȱ ofȱ theȱ relevantȱ SORNAȱ provision,ȱ §ȱ16913(c),ȱstates:ȱ“[N]otȱlaterȱthanȱ3ȱbusinessȱdaysȱafterȱeachȱ changeȱ ofȱ name,ȱ residence,ȱ employment,ȱ orȱ studentȱ status”ȱ theȱoěenderȱmustȱ“appearȱinȱpersonȱinȱatȱleastȱ1ȱjurisdictionȱ involvedȱ pursuantȱ toȱ subsectionȱ (a)ȱ ofȱ thisȱ section”ȱ andȱ provideȱthatȱjurisdictionȱwithȱallȱchangesȱinȱhisȱregistrationȱ information.ȱAȱ “jurisdictionȱ involved”ȱ underȱ subsectionȱ (a)ȱ isȱ aȱ “jurisdictionȱ whereȱ theȱ oěenderȱ resides,ȱ whereȱ theȱ oěenderȱ isȱ anȱ employee,ȱ andȱ whereȱ theȱ oěenderȱ isȱ aȱ stuȬ dent.”ȱ§ȱ16913(a).ȱTheȱuseȱofȱtheȱpresentȱtenseȱwasȱdecisive.ȱ TheȱCourtȱheldȱthatȱȱ [a]ȱ personȱ whoȱ movesȱ fromȱ Leavenworthȱ toȱ Manilaȱ noȱ longerȱ ‘resides’ȱ (presentȱ tense)ȱ inȱ Kansas;ȱalthoughȱheȱonceȱresidedȱinȱKansas,ȱafȬ terȱ hisȱ moveȱ heȱ ‘resides’ȱ inȱ theȱ Philippines.ȱ Itȱ followsȱthatȱonceȱNicholsȱmovedȱtoȱManila,ȱheȱ wasȱnoȱlongerȱrequiredȱtoȱappearȱinȱpersonȱinȱ Kansasȱ toȱ updateȱ hisȱ registration,ȱ forȱ Kansasȱ wasȱnoȱlongerȱaȱ‘jurisdictionȱinvolvedȱpursuantȱ toȱsubsectionȱ(a)’ȱofȱ§ȱ16913.ȱ Nichols,ȱ 136ȱ S.ȱ Ct.ȱ atȱ 1117.ȱ Inȱ otherȱ words,ȱ ifȱ aȱ sexȱ oěenderȱ movesȱ toȱ aȱ newȱ outȬofȬstateȱ residence,ȱ §ȱ 16913(c)ȱ doesȱ notȱ requireȱ himȱ toȱ appearȱ inȱ theȱ departureȱ stateȱ toȱ updateȱ hisȱ registrationȱthere.ȱ Asȱ appliedȱ here,ȱ Nicholsȱ meansȱ onlyȱ thatȱ Haslageȱ andȱ Toneyȱ hadȱ noȱ legalȱ obligationȱ toȱ updateȱ theirȱ Wisconsinȱ registrationsȱafterȱtheyȱmovedȱoutȱofȱstate.2ȱButȱNicholsȱdoesȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ 2ȱ Thoughȱ theyȱ didȱ haveȱ aȱ legalȱ dutyȱ toȱ appearȱ inȱ Washingtonȱ andȱ Minnesota,ȱrespectively,ȱforȱthatȱpurpose.ȱ ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ 13 notȱ meanȱ thatȱ theȱ twoȱ womenȱ cannotȱ beȱ prosecutedȱ inȱ aȱ Wisconsinȱdistrictȱcourtȱforȱviolatingȱ§ȱ2250(a).ȱ Theȱspecięcȱlanguageȱofȱ§ȱ2250(a)ȱisȱasȱfollows:ȱ (a) Inȱgeneral.—Whoever—ȱ (1) isȱ requiredȱ toȱ registerȱ underȱ theȱ Sexȱ Oěenderȱ Registrationȱ andȱ Notięcationȱ Act;ȱ (2)(A)ȱ isȱ aȱ sexȱ oěenderȱ [underȱ SORNA]ȱ byȱ reasonȱ ofȱ aȱ convictionȱ underȱ Federalȱ lawȱ …ȱ ,ȱ theȱ lawȱ ofȱ theȱ Districtȱ ofȱ CoȬ lumbia,ȱ Indianȱ tribalȱ law,ȱ orȱ theȱ lawȱ ofȱ anyȱterritoryȱorȱpossessionȱofȱtheȱUnitedȱ States;ȱorȱ (B)ȱ travelsȱ inȱ interstateȱ orȱ foreignȱ comȬ merce,ȱorȱentersȱorȱleaves,ȱorȱresidesȱin,ȱ Indianȱcountry;ȱandȱ (3)ȱ knowinglyȱ failsȱ toȱ registerȱ orȱ updateȱ aȱ registrationȱasȱrequiredȱ[byȱSORNA];ȱ shallȱbeȱęnedȱunderȱthisȱtitleȱorȱimprisonedȱnotȱ moreȱthanȱ10ȱyears,ȱorȱboth.ȱȱ Takeȱparticularȱnoteȱofȱsubsectionsȱ(2)(A)ȱandȱ(B).ȱAȱfedȬ eralȱsexȱoěenderȱisȱdirectlyȱsubjectȱtoȱfederalȱcriminalȱliabilȬ ityȱforȱaȱknowingȱfailureȱtoȱupdateȱhisȱregistration;ȱaȱstateȱsexȱ oěender,ȱ onȱ theȱ otherȱ hand,ȱ isȱ subjectȱ toȱ federalȱ criminalȱ liabilityȱonlyȱifȱheȱtravelsȱinȱinterstateȱcommerceȱandȱknowȬ inglyȱfailsȱtoȱupdateȱhisȱregistrationȱasȱrequiredȱbyȱSORNA.ȱ Haslageȱ andȱ Toneyȱ areȱ stateȱ sexȱ oěenders.ȱ Soȱ forȱ them,ȱ interstateȱ travelȱ isȱ anȱ essentialȱ elementȱ ofȱ theȱ §ȱ 2250(a)ȱ oěense.ȱCarrȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ560ȱU.S.ȱ438,ȱ445–46ȱ(2010).ȱȱ ȱ 14ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ Criminalȱ venueȱ isȱ governedȱ byȱ ruleȱ andȱ statuteȱ andȱ isȱ alsoȱ subjectȱ toȱ constitutionalȱ limits.ȱ Asȱ myȱ colleaguesȱ exȬ plain,ȱ Majorityȱ Op.ȱ atȱ p.ȱ 3,ȱ Ruleȱ 18ȱ ofȱ theȱ Federalȱ Rulesȱ ofȱ Criminalȱ Procedureȱ suppliesȱ theȱ generalȱ rule:ȱ “Unlessȱ aȱ statuteȱorȱtheseȱrulesȱpermitȱotherwise,ȱtheȱgovernmentȱmustȱ prosecuteȱ anȱ oěenseȱ inȱ aȱ districtȱ whereȱ theȱ oěenseȱ wasȱ commiĴed.”ȱRuleȱ18ȱmirrorsȱtheȱConstitution’sȱreferencesȱtoȱ criminalȱvenue.3ȱ Here,ȱ however,ȱ venueȱ isȱ governedȱ byȱ aȱ moreȱ specięcȱ provision:ȱ18ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ3237(a).ȱThatȱstatuteȱprovidesȱaȱspecialȱ venueȱruleȱforȱcrimesȱbegunȱinȱoneȱdistrictȱandȱcompletedȱinȱ another:ȱ ExceptȱasȱotherwiseȱexpresslyȱprovidedȱbyȱenȬ actmentȱ ofȱ Congress,ȱ anyȱ oěenseȱ againstȱ theȱ UnitedȱStatesȱbegunȱinȱoneȱdistrictȱandȱcompletedȱ inȱanother,ȱorȱcommiĴedȱinȱmoreȱthanȱoneȱdisȬ trict,ȱmayȱbeȱinquiredȱofȱandȱprosecutedȱinȱanyȱdisȬ trictȱinȱwhichȱsuchȱoěenseȱwasȱbegun,ȱcontinued,ȱorȱ completed.ȱ Anyȱoěenseȱinvolvingȱtheȱuseȱofȱtheȱmails,ȱtransȬ portationȱinȱinterstateȱorȱforeignȱcommerce,ȱorȱtheȱ importationȱ ofȱ anȱ objectȱ orȱ personȱ intoȱ theȱ Unitedȱ Statesȱ isȱ aȱ continuingȱ oěenseȱ and,ȱ exceptȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ 3ȱArticleȱIIIȱofȱtheȱConstitutionȱprovides:ȱ“TheȱTrialȱofȱallȱCrimesȱ…ȱshallȱ beȱ heldȱ inȱ theȱ Stateȱ whereȱ theȱ saidȱ Crimesȱ shallȱ haveȱ beenȱ comȬ miĴedȱ…ȱ.”ȱU.S.ȱ CONST.ȱart.ȱIII,ȱ§ȱ2.ȱTheȱSixthȱAmendmentȱprovides:ȱ“Inȱ allȱ criminalȱ prosecutions,ȱ theȱ accusedȱ shallȱ enjoyȱ theȱ rightȱ toȱ aȱ speedyȱ andȱpublicȱtrial,ȱbyȱanȱimpartialȱjuryȱofȱtheȱStateȱandȱdistrictȱwhereinȱtheȱ crimeȱ shallȱ haveȱ beenȱ commiĴed,ȱ whichȱ districtȱ shallȱ haveȱ beenȱ previȬ ouslyȱ ascertainedȱ byȱ lawȱ …ȱ .”ȱ U.S.ȱ CONST.ȱ amend.ȱ VI.ȱ Haslageȱ andȱ Toneyȱdoȱnotȱadvanceȱaȱconstitutionalȱargumentȱhere.ȱȱ ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ 15 asȱotherwiseȱ expresslyȱprovidedȱ byȱ enactmentȱ ofȱCongress,ȱmayȱbeȱinquiredȱofȱandȱprosecutedȱinȱ anyȱ districtȱ from,ȱ through,ȱ orȱ intoȱ whichȱ suchȱ commerce,ȱ mailȱ maĴer,ȱ orȱ importedȱ objectȱ orȱ personȱmoves.ȱȱ §ȱ 3237(a)ȱ(emphasesȱ added).ȱ Prosecutionȱ inȱ districtȱ courtȱ inȱ Wisconsinȱisȱproperȱunderȱbothȱparagraphsȱofȱ§ȱ3237(a).ȱ ȱ Asȱ I’veȱ explained,ȱ becauseȱ Haslageȱ andȱ Toneyȱ areȱ stateȱ sexȱoěenders,ȱinterstateȱtravelȱisȱanȱessentialȱelementȱofȱtheȱ §ȱ2250(a)ȱoěensesȱchargedȱinȱtheseȱcases.ȱWithoutȱitȱthereȱisȱ noȱ federalȱ crime.ȱ Althoughȱ theȱ crimesȱ wereȱ notȱ completedȱ untilȱ Haslageȱ andȱ Toneyȱ failedȱ toȱ appearȱ inȱ personȱ inȱ theirȱ newȱ homeȱ statesȱ andȱ provideȱ thatȱ jurisdictionȱ withȱ theirȱ registrationȱ information,ȱ theȱ oěensesȱ clearlyȱ beganȱ inȱ Wisconsinȱ whenȱ eachȱ womanȱ commencedȱ theȱ interstateȱ travelȱthatȱisȱaȱnecessaryȱelementȱofȱthisȱcrime.ȱ ȱ Myȱ colleaguesȱ sayȱ thatȱ “interstateȱ travelȱ isȱ aȱ necessaryȱ precursor,ȱbutȱitȱisȱneitherȱaȱdistinctȱcrimeȱnorȱanȱelementȱofȱ theȱcrime.”ȱMajorityȱOp.ȱatȱp.ȱ8.ȱInterstateȱtravelȱisȱcertainlyȱ notȱ aȱ distinctȱ crime,ȱ butȱ itȱ isȱ anȱ elementȱ ofȱ theȱ §ȱ2250(a)ȱ oěenseȱforȱaȱstateȱsexȱoěender.ȱThatȱmuchȱisȱclearȱfromȱCarr.ȱ Thereȱ theȱ Courtȱ parsedȱ “theȱ statute’sȱ threeȱ elements”:ȱ (1)ȱ aȱ qualifyingȱ sexȱ oěense,ȱ whichȱ triggersȱ theȱ registrationȱ duty;ȱ (2)ȱ interstateȱ travel;ȱ andȱ (3)ȱ aȱ failureȱ toȱ registerȱ asȱ requiredȱ byȱ SORNA.ȱ 560ȱ U.S.ȱ atȱ 446ȱ (emphasisȱ added).ȱ Nicholsȱ didȱ notȱ alterȱ theseȱ elementsȱ ofȱ theȱ crimeȱ forȱ stateȱ sexȱ oěendersȱ whoȱ areȱ subjectȱ toȱ SORNAȱ requirements.ȱ Indeed,ȱ Nicholsȱ involvedȱ aȱ federalȱ sexȱ oěender,ȱ notȱ aȱ stateȱ sexȱ oěender.ȱ Soȱ theȱ Courtȱ hadȱ noȱ occasionȱ toȱ commentȱ onȱ whetherȱ Carr’sȱ holding—thatȱ interstateȱ travelȱ isȱ aȱ requiredȱ elementȱ ofȱ theȱ §ȱ2250(a)ȱoěenseȱforȱstateȱsexȱoěenders—remainsȱgoodȱlaw.ȱ ȱ 16ȱ Nos.ȱ16Ȭ3095ȱ&ȱ16Ȭ3196ȱ NoȱSupremeȱCourtȱdecisionȱsuggestsȱthatȱitȱisȱnotȱgoodȱlaw.ȱ Carr’sȱ analysisȱ ofȱ theȱ elementsȱ ofȱ theȱ §ȱ2250(a)ȱ oěenseȱ conȬ trolsȱhere.ȱ ȱ TheȱcrimesȱchargedȱinȱtheseȱtwoȱcasesȱbeganȱinȱWisconȬ sinȱ andȱ wereȱ completedȱ inȱ theȱ statesȱ ofȱ Washingtonȱ (HasȬ lage)ȱ andȱ Minnesotaȱ (Toney).ȱ Theȱ venueȱ statuteȱ plainlyȱ permitsȱtheȱgovernmentȱtoȱprosecuteȱaȱcrimeȱ“begunȱinȱoneȱ districtȱandȱcompletedȱinȱanother”ȱinȱ“anyȱdistrict”ȱinȱwhichȱ itȱwasȱ“begun,ȱcontinued,ȱorȱcompleted.”ȱ§ȱ3237(a).ȱBecauseȱ theȱ interstateȱ travel—anȱ elementȱ ofȱ theȱ oěense—beganȱ inȱ Wisconsin,ȱvenueȱisȱproperȱinȱdistrictȱcourtȱinȱWisconsin.ȱ ȱ Asȱ additionalȱ supportȱ forȱ theȱ government’sȱ choiceȱ ofȱ venue,ȱ §ȱ 3237(a)ȱ providesȱ thatȱ anyȱ oěenseȱ involvingȱ transȬ portationȱinȱinterstateȱcommerceȱmayȱbeȱprosecutedȱ“inȱanyȱ districtȱ from,ȱ through,ȱ orȱ intoȱ whichȱ suchȱ commerceȱ …ȱ moves.”ȱ Theseȱ crimesȱ involvedȱ transportationȱ inȱ interstateȱ commerceȱ“from”ȱWisconsin,ȱsoȱtheȱgovernmentȱmayȱproseȬ cuteȱthemȱinȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱinȱWisconsin.ȱ ȱ Accordingly,ȱ Iȱ wouldȱ reverseȱ theȱ judgmentsȱ ofȱ theȱ districtȱ courtsȱ dismissingȱ theȱ indictmentsȱ forȱ improperȱ venue.ȱIȱrespectfullyȱdissent.ȱ ȱ
Document Info
Docket Number: 16-3196
Judges: Wood
Filed Date: 4/3/2017
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 4/4/2017