United States v. Tiffney Hampton , 552 F. App'x 587 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted February 6, 2014
    Decided February 6, 2014
    Before
    DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
    MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
    JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge
    No. 13-2948
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                          Court for the Central District of Illinois.
    v.                                          No. 11-cr-40108-003
    TIFFNEY MICHAEL HAMPTON                           Michael M. Mihm,
    Defendant-Appellant.                         Judge.
    ORDER
    Tiffney Hampton pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine.
    See 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1). Hampton’s plea agreement includes a stipulation that the
    conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of actual methamphetamine and a waiver of her
    right to appeal or challenge collaterally her conviction and any sentence within the
    statutory maximum. In light of the statutory minimum for offenses involving at least 50
    grams, 
    id.
     § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), the district court calculated a guidelines imprisonment
    range of 120 to 121 months. The government asserted that Hampton had not provided
    substantial assistance in prosecuting other persons and thus declined to move for a
    sentence below the statutory minimum. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (e); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The
    district court sentenced Hampton to 120 months. She filed a notice of appeal, but her
    appointed attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under
    No. 13-2948                                                                            Page 2
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967). Hampton opposes her counsel’s motion. See CIR.
    R. 51(b). We confine our review to the potential issues identified in counsel’s facially
    adequate brief and Hampton’s response. See United States v. Schuh, 
    289 F.3d 968
    , 973–74
    (7th Cir. 2002).
    Counsel first assesses whether Hampton could challenge the voluntariness of her
    guilty plea but neglects to say whether he discussed this possibility with Hampton.
    See United States v. Konczak, 
    683 F.3d 348
    , 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 
    287 F.3d 667
    , 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that lawyer should not discuss potential
    challenge to guilty plea in Anders submission without knowing that defendant wants
    plea set aside). Hampton is silent about the plea in her Circuit Rule 51(b) response.
    Counsel’s omission does not require that we deny the Anders motion, though, because
    the lawyer’s discussion and our review of the record convince us that a challenge to the
    voluntariness of Hampton’s plea would be frivolous. See Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349.
    During the plea colloquy the district court substantially complied with Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 11. The judge identified the elements of the charged offense, and
    Hampton said unequivocally that she understood those elements. See FED. R. CRIM.
    P. 11(b)(1)(G). The government proffered a factual basis for the conspiracy, which
    Hampton acknowledged as correct, including the drug quantity. See FED. R. CRIM.
    P. 11(b)(3). Hampton said she understood the statutory minimum and maximum
    penalties. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(H), (I). She also expressed her understanding of
    the consequences of her appeal waiver and of the rights she would lose by pleading
    guilty, including her right to a jury trial with the assistance of counsel. See FED. R. CRIM.
    P. 11(b)(1)(B), (C), (F), (N). A challenge to the voluntariness of her plea therefore would
    be frivolous.
    We also agree with counsel that Hampton could not challenge her sentence.
    Although Hampton points out that the district judge expressed his displeasure about
    applying the statutory minimum, her appeal waiver forecloses any claim of error,
    including the suggestion in her Rule 51(b) response that her lack of cooperation was not
    her fault. An appeal waiver stands or falls with the guilty plea. United States v. Kilcrease,
    
    665 F.3d 924
    , 929 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Linder, 
    530 F.3d 556
    , 561 (7th Cir. 2008).
    We would be constrained, therefore, to enforce Hampton’s appeal waiver.
    Accordingly, counsel’s motion is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-2948

Citation Numbers: 552 F. App'x 587

Judges: PerCuriam

Filed Date: 2/6/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024