Healix Infusion Therapy, Incor v. HHI Infusion Services ( 2014 )

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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted  June  18,  2014∗
Decided  June  23,  2014
Before
FRANK  H.  EASTERBROOK,  Circuit  Judge
ANN  CLAIRE  WILLIAMS,  Circuit  Judge
DAVID  F.  HAMILTON,  Circuit  Judge
Appeal  from  the  United
No.  14-­‐‑1410
States  District  Court  for  the
HEALIX  INFUSION  THERAPY,  INCORPORATED,   Northern  District  of  Illinois,
Plaintiff-­‐‑Appellant,   Eastern  Division.
v.     No.  10  C  3772
James  B.  Zagel,  Judge.
HHI  INFUSION  SERVICES,  et  al.,
Defendants-­‐‑Appellees.
Order
After  we  affirmed  the  district  court’s  judgment,  see  733  F.3d  700  (7th  Cir.  2013),
HHI  Infusion  Services,  the  prevailing  party,  asked  the  district  court  to  award  costs.  It
did.  Healix  Infusion  Therapy  has  appealed.  It  does  not  contend  that  any  of  the  district
∗ This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating Procedure 6(b). After
examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R.
App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
No.  14-­‐‑1410     Page  2
court’s  award  is  unsupported  by  28  U.S.C.  §1920  or  otherwise  excessive.  Instead  its  sole
argument  is  that  HHI’s  request  was  untimely.
Local  Rule  54.1(a)  of  the  Northern  District  of  Illinois  gives  the  prevailing  party  30
days  from  “the  entry  of  judgment  allowing  costs”  to  file  a  bill  of  costs.  It  adds  that  the
court  may  extend  the  time  on  motion  filed  within  those  30  days.  HHI  did  not  file  a  bill
of  costs  within  30  days  of  the  judgment.  Nor  did  it  ask  for  extra  time.  Instead  it  waited
until  this  court  had  affirmed  the  district  court’s  judgment,  then  sought  costs  as  soon  as
our  mandate  returned  the  case  to  the  district  court.
Healix  contended  that  the  bill  of  costs  was  untimely.  The  district  judge  disagreed,
stating  that  his  regular  practice  is  to  postpone  consideration  of  costs  until  any  appeal
had  been  completed.  Healix  nonetheless  insists  that,  to  take  advantage  of  the  district
judge’s  practice,  HHI  needed  to  request  more  time  by  motion  within  the  original  30
days.
But  if  such  a  motion  would  have  been  granted  as  a  matter  of  course,  where’s  the
injury?  A  district  court  can  enforce  its  rules  meticulously  but  also  has  discretion  to
extend  their  deadlines,  as  the  judge  did  here.  See  Harmon  v.  OKI  Systems,  115  F.3d  477,
481  (7th  Cir.  1997).  If  treating  one  side’s  notice  of  appeal  as  extending  the  other  side’s
time  to  seek  costs  was  an  error,  it  was  harmless—and  harmless  errors  must  be
disregarded.  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  61.  Healix  has  not  identified  any  prejudice  it  suffered  by  the
delay  in  awarding  costs  until  after  resolution  of  its  appeal.
Moreover,  Local  Rule  54.1(a)  starts  the  time  with  entry  of  a  “judgment  allowing
costs.”  The  judgment  in  this  case  did  not  speak  to  costs  one  way  or  the  other.  Silence
about  costs  appears  to  be  the  way  in  which  this  judge  implements  his  practice  of
deferral.  A  district  court  is  entitled  to  treat  a  silent  judgment  as  one  allowing  costs,
given  the  presumption  in  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  54(d)(1),  and  prudent  counsel  therefore  will
treat  a  silent  judgment  as  starting  the  time  to  seek  costs,  but  a  particular  judge  may
approach  things  otherwise,  and  a  party  who  relies  on  that  judge’s  practice  ought  not  be
penalized.  Cf.  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  83(a)(2).
AFFIRMED