United States v. Thomas Stanton ( 2014 )


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  •                          NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued April 29, 2014
    Decided May14, 2014
    Before
    WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
    JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
    MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
    No. 13-3739
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                     Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                      Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
    v.                                      No. 3:13-cr-30066-DRH-1
    THOMAS L. STANTON,                            David R. Herndon,
    Defendant-Appellant.                      Chief Judge.
    ORDER
    Thomas Stanton appeals his 30-month sentence for possessing unregistered
    destructive devices, 
    26 U.S.C. § 5861
    (d). He insists that his within-guidelines prison
    term is excessive because, he asserts, the district court erroneously concluded that he
    intended to commit harm with the devices. But the court’s finding is supported by
    evidence introduced at sentencing by the government, plus the court adequately
    considered the factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) and explained its reasons for imposing the
    sentence. We thus affirm Stanton’s sentence.
    In March 2013 authorities received an anonymous letter warning that Stanton
    (who was 18 years old at the time) was building bombs at his house in Lebanon, Illinois.
    No. 13-3739                                                                           Page 2
    The following month authorities searched the house and discovered various
    bomb-making materials. Stanton was charged with violating § 5861(d), and he pleaded
    guilty in August 2013.
    At the sentencing hearing in December 2013, the district court calculated a total
    offense level of 19, which includes upward adjustments of 2 levels because the offense
    involved a destructive device, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B), and 2 more levels because
    the number of devices was at least 3 but fewer than 8, see id. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), less
    3 levels for accepting responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1. After taking into account Stanton’s
    criminal history category of I, the district court calculated an imprisonment range of
    30 to 37 months.
    In advocating a within-guidelines sentence, the government called an FBI agent
    to testify at sentencing about the anonymous letter and the items discovered at
    Stanton’s house. The letter, sent by a resident of Lebanon, describes Stanton as a
    “mentally disturbed teenager” who had “booby-trapped” his bedroom, and flaunted
    “hand grenade” type objects on his front lawn. The writer asked police to intervene to
    “prevent a potential violent crime” like the shooting in Newtown, Connecticut.
    According to the agent, authorities searched Stanton’s home with his father’s
    permission while Stanton was at school. The agent testified that authorities had found
    in Stanton’s bedroom instructions on utilizing nails in making explosive devices plus, in
    the basement, a number of rusty nails. The search also had unearthed documents that
    discussed “Specific Ideas of Where and How to Hide Things From Your Parents” and
    “The Ten Commandments of Revenge.” Another document lists essential items for an
    “anarchy bag,” including bombs made from empty CO2 cartridges.
    Authorities discovered in Stanton’s house several notebooks filled with sketches
    and handwritten notes. Although Stanton did not tell investigators that he wrote what
    is in the notebooks, his attorney conceded the point. Writings in one notebook explain
    how to “send a car to hell” using “CO2 bombs” and gasoline-soaked rags stuffed into
    the exhaust pipe. That same notebook includes instructions on making “mailbox
    bombs,” exploding light bulbs, fertilizer bombs, Molotov cocktails, napalm, bottle
    bombs, “nail grenades,” and “tennis ball bombs.” Many of these handwritten
    instructions include pointers on maximizing the shrapnel and other means of harming
    people with homemade bombs. Authorities also discovered a handgun and
    ammunition in the basement, a large machete in Stanton’s bedroom, and elsewhere in
    No. 13-3739                                                                         Page 3
    the house, empty CO2 cartridges, gunpowder, fuses, metal shavings, and two Molotov
    cocktails.
    According to the FBI agent, another of Stanton’s notebooks, which is titled
    “Death Attack,” includes this handwritten note: “You stabbed me in the back, wearing
    my dog like a pelt. I didn’t want to say this but I’m going to kill you anyway.” In a third
    notebook Stanton had sketched swastikas and written homophobic, anti-Semitic, and
    other hateful language.
    In the presentence investigation report, the probation officer recounts the events
    after Stanton’s house was searched. The authorities placed Stanton’s high school on
    lockdown after discovering the explosive devices at his house but found nothing more
    on campus. Stanton was transported to the police station, and during an interview he
    described himself as a “mad man.” Stanton admitted making CO2 bombs, napalm, and
    Molotov cocktails and detonating the explosive devices outside his house. He also
    conceded interacting with white supremacist organizations from age 15 until he was 18.
    Six of Stanton’s classmates confirmed that he had made bombs, sometimes in ways
    intended to increase the shrapnel. They noted Stanton’s dislike for minority groups but
    opined that he had not intended to hurt anyone. Stanton’s father reported to authorities
    that his son and his friends often played video games, shot firearms, and dismantled
    ammunition to make bombs. Stanton’s former step-mother told authorities that he had
    gotten “out of control with his racist beliefs” after meeting a former member of a white
    supremacist organization.
    The probation officer also related that, according to a classmate, Stanton had
    warned repeatedly in the fall of 2012 that he “would kill O’Fallon High School
    students.” Although Stanton never disclosed a specific plan, he had bragged that his
    part-time job as a school janitor gave him access to the school’s ventilation system and
    roof. The student had reported Stanton’s statements to the school counselor.
    After defense counsel had conceded the accuracy of the presentence report and
    the government had highlighted the items discovered at Stanton’s house, the
    government argued for a prison sentence of 33 months. Although Stanton had not
    harmed anyone, the prosecutor asserted that his intent to do so was evident from the
    record. Stanton’s attorney countered that the defendant should be sentenced to time
    served plus supervised release or probation. The lawyer disputed that Stanton had
    intended harm and claimed instead that the defendant had become obsessed with the
    fantasy warfare video games he played with his friends and had tried to replicate
    devices seen in those games. And though acknowledging Stanton’s description of
    No. 13-3739                                                                          Page 4
    himself as a “mad man,” his attorney opined that Stanton had meant he was “intensely
    enthusiastic about his interests and hobbies.” Stanton’s attorney also asserted that the
    notebook containing racial epithets was four years old, and that, “because of his stage of
    life,” the defendant’s “ability to make good decisions was not fully developed when he
    committed his offense, although his ability will improve with age.” His attorney
    insisted that Stanton does not exhibit the typical personality traits associated with
    criminal behavior; he enjoyed a stable relationship with his father, worked two
    part-time jobs, and planned to marry his girlfriend, who recently had given birth to
    their child. But nothing the lawyer said to explain Stanton’s bomb-making activities is
    supported by evidence, not even testimony from the defendant. Stanton did speak at
    sentencing and said he regretted his actions, but he did not offer a motive or
    corroborate anything his lawyer had said in his sentencing memorandum or in court.
    Before announcing Stanton’s sentence the district court discussed the nature and
    circumstances of the offense. The judge highlighted evidence that Stanton possessed
    instructions for making destructive devices and using them against people, harbored
    hatred for minority groups, and had unrestricted access to his high school through his
    janitorial position. That evidence, the court reasoned, allowed a reasonable inference
    that Stanton “planned to do something destructive with these materials rather than
    simply blowing them up to watch them.” The district court concluded that Stanton had
    intended to cause harm with the destructive devices and sentenced him to 30 months’
    imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release with a special condition mandating
    mental-health treatment.
    On appeal Stanton first contends that the district court committed clear error in
    finding that he intended to commit harm with his homemade devices. Stanton asserts
    that the only reasonable inference from the entirety of the evidence is that he possessed
    the destructive devices for recreational purposes. The district court’s conclusion rests on
    speculation, Stanton insists, because his father and former step-mother had told
    authorities that he and his friends regularly played video games and participated in
    military-style exercises, and his friends had opined that Stanton did not intend harm.
    But district courts have “‘discretion to draw conclusions about the testimony
    given and evidence introduced at sentencing,’” United States v. Halliday, 
    672 F.3d 462
    ,
    475 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Bradley, 
    628 F.3d 394
    , 400 (7th Cir. 2010)),
    and we reverse only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
    has been made,” United States v. White, 
    737 F.3d 1121
    , 1142 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal
    citation and quotation marks omitted); United States v. Cruz-Rea, 
    626 F.3d 929
    , 938 (7th
    No. 13-3739                                                                            Page 5
    Cir. 2010). The government presented sufficient evidence at sentencing to support the
    district court’s conclusion that Stanton intended harm. Although authorities did not
    uncover a specific plot to harm others, Stanton’s notebooks describe how to use the
    destructive devices against individuals. In one notebook Stanton explains how to build
    a bomb with a tennis ball and adds, “[W]hen you see a geek walking down the street,
    give it a good throw, he will have a blast.” In that same notebook Stanton explains how
    to fill a light bulb with napalm and recommends inserting it “into a socket frequently
    used by the victim” so that when he “flips the switch, he will be in for a big surprise.”
    None of this sounds “recreational,” and yet Stanton did not testify at sentencing or offer
    any other evidence concerning his motivation for making destructive devices or his
    handwritten ideas for what to do with those devices.
    Stanton’s notebooks reflect that he harbored hatred toward several minority
    groups. He not only referred to these groups in derogatory terms but also wrote about
    causing them harm. And though Stanton’s attorney insisted in the district court, and
    repeats to us, that Stanton’s hateful thoughts of hurting minorities had been written
    several years earlier, Stanton himself did not back up his lawyer’s claim about the age of
    his disparaging writings. Again, what is missing is evidence. See United States v. Vidal,
    
    705 F.3d 742
    , 744 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that sentencing courts need not respond to
    arguments in mitigation which lack factual basis); United States v. Chapman, 
    694 F.3d 908
    , 914 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that attorney’s representations are not evidence);
    United States v. Diaz, 
    533 F.3d 574
    , 578 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). Moreover, counsel
    sidestepped that Stanton kept the notebook, which undercut the lawyer’s implication
    that the defendant had matured and moved beyond his offensive beliefs. Indeed,
    Stanton’s former step-mother confirmed that he was “out of control with his racist
    beliefs,” and Stanton himself admitted that he still was interacting with white
    supremacist organizations at 18 (his age at the time of his arrest).
    Stanton also contends that no matter what he intended to do with his destructive
    devices, his 30-month prison term exceeds what’s necessary to serve the sentencing
    goals under § 3553(a). But this within-guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable,
    see United States v. Cheek, 
    740 F.3d 440
    , 455 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Diekemper, 
    604 F.3d 345
    , 355 (7th Cir. 2010), and the district court adequately connected the sentence to
    the § 3553(a) factors. The district judge noted the serious nature of Stanton’s offense,
    see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1), and concluded that the defendant intended to use his
    homemade bombs to inflict harm. Discussing the need to protect the public, see 
    id.
    § 3553(a)(2)©, the district judge stated, “I simply can’t in good conscience leave this
    No. 13-3739                                                                    Page 6
    young man on the street at this point.” And the judge noted that 30 months was
    appropriate to send a “loud and clear message” to Stanton so that he could “understand
    the seriousness of all of his actions.” See id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B).
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-3739

Judges: PerCuriam

Filed Date: 5/14/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024