A.B. Ex Rel. Kehoe v. Housing Authority , 683 F.3d 844 ( 2012 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 11-2581
    A.B., a child by his next friend, L INDA K EHOE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    H OUSING A UTHORITY OF S OUTH B END ,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
    No. 3:11-cv-00163-PPS-CAN—Philip P. Simon, Chief Judge.
    A RGUED JANUARY 10, 2012—D ECIDED JUNE 27, 2012
    Before B AUER, R OVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    B AUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant A.B. and his
    mother Autumn Oliver (“Oliver”) lived in public housing
    owned by the Housing Authority of South Bend (“the
    Housing Authority”), which administers public housing
    for low-income residents in South Bend, Indiana. On
    February 28, 2011, Oliver was arrested and charged with
    possession of cocaine and resisting law enforcement
    officers; she later pleaded guilty to both charges. Less
    2                                               No. 11-2581
    than one month later, on March 22, Oliver received a
    notice from the Housing Authority informing her that
    by her February arrest, she had violated the terms of
    her lease agreement, that she had 30 days to vacate the
    premises, and that she could contest the termination of
    her lease during the eviction procedure.
    On April 27, the Housing Authority filed an action in
    Indiana state court, seeking enforcement of the eviction
    and immediate possession of the property; a state court
    eviction hearing was scheduled for June 24, 2011. Prior
    to that hearing, on June 6, A.B. filed a request for a pre-
    liminary injunction in the Northern District of Indiana
    to prevent the Housing Authority from pursuing the
    eviction in Indiana state court. Shortly thereafter, the
    district court judge conducted a telephonic hearing at
    which time he denied A.B.’s motion for injunctive
    relief, based mainly on the Anti-Injunction Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 2283
    , and in consideration of “the principles of equity,
    comity, and federalism that restrain a federal court,
    while recognizing the respect due the courts of a
    sovereign state.” (A.B., ex rel., Linda Kehoe v. Housing
    Authority, No. 3:11 CV 163 PPS, 
    2011 WL 26929966
    , at *8,
    (N.D. Ind. July 8, 2011), citing Zurich American Ins. Co. v.
    Sup. Ct. Of State of California, 
    326 F.3d 816
    , 824 (7th Cir.
    2003) (internal quotations omitted).
    The scheduled state court hearing took place on June 24
    and the court ruled in favor of the Housing Authority,
    issuing an order for immediate possession of the prop-
    erty and eviction of A.B. and Oliver. On July 12, A.B. filed
    this appeal of the district court’s order denying injunc-
    tive relief.
    No. 11-2581                                                3
    I. DISCUSSION
    The singular question before this Court concerns A.B.’s
    appeal of the July 8, 2011 district court order denying
    A.B.’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent
    the Housing Authority from pursuing the eviction in the
    Indiana state court. But due to its current procedural
    posture, we will not review the district court’s ruling
    on the merits. Since the Indiana state court has already
    entered a June 24, 2011 final order evicting A.B., this
    Court lacks jurisdiction for review; there no longer
    remains a live controversy. Thus, we cannot grant the
    relief that A.B. seeks and the appeal is dismissed for
    mootness.
    Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution
    grants jurisdiction to federal courts to adjudicate only
    live cases and controversies. U.S. C ONST. art. III, § 2. It
    has been firmly established that an appeal should be
    “dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening
    event, a court of appeals cannot grant ‘any effectual relief
    whatever’ in favor of the appellant.” Dorel Juvenile Group,
    Inc. v. DeMartinis, 
    495 F.3d 500
    , 503 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing
    Calderon v. Moore, 
    518 U.S. 149
    , 150 (U.S. 1996); see also
    Worldwide St. Preachers’ Fellowship v. Peterson, 
    388 F.3d 555
    , 558 (7th Cir. 2004) (when a court can no longer
    affect the rights of the litigants, the appeal should be
    dismissed as moot); Orion Sales, Inc. v. Emerson Radio
    Corp., 
    148 F.3d 840
    , 842 (7th Cir. 1998) (the court of
    appeals is without power to decide questions which
    cannot affect the rights of the litigants in the case before
    the court); North Carolina v. Rice, 
    404 U.S. 244
    , 246 (1971)
    4                                               No. 11-2581
    (a case becomes moot when a court’s decision can no
    longer affect the rights of litigants in the case before
    them and simply would be an opinion advising what
    the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts)
    (internal quotations omitted). As of June 24, 2011, A.B.
    was evicted. For a preliminary injunction to be effective,
    it must be issued prior to the event the movant wishes
    to prevent. Once the event in question occurs, any
    possible use for a preliminary injunction is expired.
    II. CONCLUSION
    This appeal is moot and is hereby D ISMISSED.
    6-27-12