United States v. Boyd, Jeff ( 2000 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Nos. 98-2035, 98-2036, 98-2037, 98-2038 & 98-2060
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Jeff Boyd, Charles Green, Sammy Knox,
    Noah R. Robinson, and Melvin Mays,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 89 CR 908--James B. Zagel, Judge.
    Argued September 27, 1999--Decided April 3, 2000
    Before Posner, Chief Judge, and Ripple and Rovner,
    Circuit Judges.
    Posner, Chief Judge. The defendants, members of
    Chicago’s "El Rukn" street gang, were indicted
    along with other members of the gang in 1989 on a
    variety of serious federal charges. They were
    tried before a jury in 1991 (all but appellant
    Mays) and convicted; but the trial judge (Judge
    Aspen) ordered a new trial because the government
    had knowingly used false testimony to convict
    them and had failed to disclose materials that
    the defendants could have used to impeach the
    government’s witnesses. After we affirmed his
    order, 
    55 F.3d 239
    (7th Cir. 1995), the
    defendants were retried, this time before Judge
    Zagel, and at the end of the 12-week trial the
    jury again convicted the defendants (now
    including Mays) of multiple crimes--mainly
    narcotics violations, and murders committed in
    the course of turf wars with rival drug gangs--
    all pursuant to a continuing and wide-ranging
    conspiracy reaching back to the mid-1960s. All
    five defendants were sentenced to life
    imprisonment except Boyd, who was sentenced to 50
    years.
    The appeals present almost 20 separate issues,
    but we confine our discussion to those that have
    at least colorable merit. Although all the
    appellants are represented by counsel, Robinson
    has filed a pro se supplemental brief. Earlier
    motions by him to file such a brief were
    repeatedly denied. Eventually the presiding judge
    of this panel allowed it to be filed; but on
    further consideration, given the lateness of the
    filing (long after the case was argued), we have
    decided to vacate the order allowing the brief to
    be filed. It goes without saying that a
    represented litigant has no right to file a pro
    se brief, e.g., United States v. Gwiazdzinski,
    
    141 F.3d 784
    , 787 (7th Cir. 1998), and although
    we can permit such a filing in appropriate
    circumstances, e.g., Hayes v. Hawes, 
    921 F.2d 100
    , 101-02 (7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), given
    the lateness of the filing and the repetitive
    character of the motion the circumstances are not
    appropriate.
    At the first trial--the one set aside because of
    prosecutorial misconduct--Edgar Cooksey was a
    defendant and he was convicted with the others.
    But after the new trial was ordered, he pleaded
    guilty, and he testified for the government at
    the second trial. The examination of Cooksey both
    by the government’s lawyer and by one of the
    defense lawyers, which was conducted over a
    period of three days, brought out the fact that
    Cooksey had been a codefendant of at least some
    of the current defendants, that they had been
    indicted in 1989, that he had testified at a
    previous jury trial in 1991 called "United States
    v. Boyd" (which the current jury knew, of course,
    was the title of the case it was hearing), that
    he had spoken to the judge in that trial in
    "allocution" and had "accepted responsibility"
    for his acts, that he had pleaded guilty shortly
    before the beginning of the current trial, and
    that he had been in prison continuously since
    1991. The lawyers for the other defendants thrice
    objected to the questions that elicited this
    information, and moved for a mistrial on the
    ground that the jury was bound to infer that the
    defendants had been convicted by a previous jury.
    The government concedes that it can be a
    reversible error to disclose to the jury (or
    allow the jury to discover) that a defendant was
    previously convicted by another jury, see, e.g.,
    United States v. O’Keefe, 
    722 F.2d 1175
    , 1179
    (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Attell, 
    655 F.2d 703
    , 705-06 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
    v. Williams, 
    568 F.2d 464
    , 470-71 (5th Cir.
    1978), though reversal is not automatic. Patton
    v. Yount, 
    467 U.S. 1025
    , 1031-35 (1984); United
    States v. Keating, 
    147 F.3d 895
    , 900 (9th Cir.
    1998); cf. United States v. Bruscino, 
    687 F.2d 938
    , 940 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc); United States
    v. Plescia, 
    48 F.3d 1452
    , 1464-65 (7th Cir.
    1995). And reversal is out of the question--no
    possible prejudice is shown--if the damning fact
    is not actually disclosed. Judge Zagel refused to
    grant a mistrial, saying he thought it unlikely
    that the jury would infer that the defendants had
    previously been found guilty; if he was right,
    the question whether the jury could have set
    aside their knowledge of the fact would not even
    arise.
    The question of what the jury is likely to have
    inferred from statements made in its presence,
    like the question whether the jury is likely to
    have been prejudiced by hearing things they
    shouldn’t have, Marshall v. United States, 
    360 U.S. 310
    , 312 (1959) (per curiam); United States
    v. 
    Bruscino, supra
    , 687 F.2d at 940-41; United
    States v. Zizzo, 
    120 F.3d 1338
    , 1349 (7th Cir.
    1997), is quintessentially one for the trial
    judge to answer, subject only to light appellate
    review. Because he has his finger on the pulse of
    the trial and monitors the alertness and
    attentiveness of the jury, he is in a better
    position than the appellate judges to determine
    whether prejudicial matter presented at the trial
    is likely to have affected the outcome. Judge
    Zagel could tell how the jurors seemed to be
    "taking" the revelations concerning Cooksey’s
    previous trial. In the circumstances, we do not
    think he abused his discretion in refusing to
    grant a mistrial. The revelations had been
    scattered over three days of examination and
    cross-examination of Cooksey and, since they
    employed technical legal terminology (such as
    "allocution") and were thus susceptible of other
    interpretations by a jury of lay persons, did not
    compel an inference that the current defendants
    had previously been convicted.
    The next issue concerns the admissibility of
    tape recordings of telephone conversations in
    1985 and 1986 in which the defendants made
    incriminating admissions. The defendants argue
    that the reliability of the recordings was never
    adequately determined, that some may have been
    tampered with, and that the government violated
    the Brady rule by failing to disclose a specific
    problem with the accuracy of the tapes that could
    have been used to impeach the government’s
    evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963).
    Because tape recordings at once are devastatingly
    effective evidence and are susceptible to
    tampering that is very difficult to discover,
    Title III--the federal statute that regulates
    electronic surveillance--requires that recordings
    "be done in such way as will protect the
    recording from editing or other alterations." 18
    U.S.C. sec. 2518(8)(a). To this end, the section
    requires that the recordings be judicially sealed
    as soon as the interception order pursuant to
    which they were made expires. Id.; United States
    v. Ojeda Rios, 
    495 U.S. 257
    , 263 (1990); United
    States v. Jackson, No. 98-2696, 
    2000 WL 248575
    ,
    at *3 (7th Cir. March 23, 2000); United States v.
    
    Plescia, supra
    , 48 F.3d at 1463; United States v.
    Wong, 
    40 F.3d 1347
    , 1375 (2d Cir. 1994). This was
    done here, back in 1985 and 1986. The original
    recordings were placed in sealed envelopes, and
    the envelopes in sealed boxes. Some of the seals,
    both on boxes and on envelopes, were later
    broken, and anyway the recordings that were
    actually placed in evidence were not the original
    recordings. They were copies of duplicate
    originals made at the same time as the original
    recordings and intended to be identical to them.
    They differed--or at least were supposed to
    differ--only in having been made on a different
    machine, recording the same conversations.
    Neither the duplicate originals nor the copies
    made from them were secured against tampering.
    The admissibility of the copies was not
    challenged at the first trial, and the district
    judge ruled that this waived the issue as to all
    the appellants but Mays, who was not a defendant
    at that trial. The judge was wrong. Rulings made
    at a previous trial of the same case only
    presumptively control the second trial, under the
    doctrine of law of the case, Alston v. King, 
    157 F.3d 1113
    , 1116 (7th Cir. 1998), and when the
    ruling concerns the admissibility of evidence the
    presumption is either nonexistent, Tang v. Rhode
    Island, 
    163 F.3d 7
    , 11 (1st Cir. 1998); United
    States v. Akers, 
    702 F.2d 1145
    , 1147-48 (D.C.
    Cir. 1983), or weak, Menzer v. United States, 
    200 F.3d 1000
    , 1004-05 (7th Cir. 2000); United States
    v. Williams, 
    2000 WL 204531
    , at *11 (2d Cir. Feb.
    23, 2000); United States v. Todd, 
    920 F.2d 399
    ,
    403 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Birney, 
    686 F.2d 102
    , 107 (2d Cir. 1982), since issues of
    admissibility are often highly contextual and
    evidence at a second trial will often deviate
    significantly from that at the first. See, e.g.,
    Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf & Western
    Industries, Inc., 
    954 F.2d 1263
    , 1265-66 (6th
    Cir. 1992). (The presumption is strongest when
    the ruling concerns a rule of law, and some cases
    might be taken to suggest that it operates only
    then. Arizona v. California, 
    460 U.S. 605
    , 618
    (1983); Payne v. Churchich, 
    161 F.3d 1030
    , 1037
    n. 8 (7th Cir. 1998).) Even the Ninth Circuit,
    which takes a harder line on the binding effect
    of evidentiary rulings made in the first trial,
    United States v. Tham, 
    960 F.2d 1391
    , 1397-98
    (9th Cir. 1991), does not regard failure to
    object at the first trial as an irrevocable
    waiver. 
    Id. at 1398;
    United States v. Seidman,
    
    503 F.2d 1027
    (9th Cir. 1974). The judge’s error
    in supposing the defendants absolutely precluded
    from challenging the admissibility of the copies
    at the second trial was peculiarly harmless,
    however, since he had to discuss the merits of
    the issue of admissibility with regard to Mays,
    and that discussion is equally applicable to the
    admissibility of the tape recordings against the
    other defendants. And so let us turn to those
    merits.
    The fact that the recordings used at the trial
    had not been sealed was not, as the defendants
    argue, fatal; nor the fact that the seals had
    been broken (the seals have to be broken at some
    point, if the recordings are to be placed in
    evidence). Neither Title III nor the case law
    places specific restrictions on the manner in
    which the contents of tape-recorded conversations
    can be communicated to the jury at trial. See 18
    U.S.C. sec. 2517(3); United States v. Rivera, 
    153 F.3d 809
    , 812 (7th Cir. 1998). The relevant
    issues are, rather, whether Title III permitted
    the disclosure of the contents of the
    conversations at all, and whether (if so) the
    particular evidence conveying those contents to
    the jury was adequately authenticated.
    The contents of a recorded communication
    governed by Title III can lawfully be disclosed
    even if the recording was not under seal,
    provided the absence of the seal is
    satisfactorily explained. 18 U.S.C. sec.
    2518(8)(a); cf. United States v. 
    Jackson, supra
    ,
    at *3. The usual satisfactory explanation is a
    judicial order unsealing the recording so that it
    can be used in evidence, and such orders were
    indeed issued here for both sets of tapes that
    are at issue. In the case of successive trials,
    as we have here, the recording should be resealed
    after the first trial, United States v. Long, 
    917 F.2d 691
    , 699-700 (2d Cir. 1990); United States
    v. Scopo, 
    861 F.2d 339
    , 347 (2d Cir. 1988)--and
    promptly, too. But this was done. Although
    defendants argue--belatedly, in their reply
    brief, Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 
    52 F.3d 656
    , 665-66 (7th Cir. 1995)--that one set of
    tapes had been unsealed for the nine years since
    the first trial, the trial judge was entitled to
    and did credit the contrary testimony of the
    government agent who examined them in preparation
    for the second trial.
    But it is not the case that these recordings
    were merely removed from the boxes and envelopes
    pursuant to judicial order and played to the
    jury; they were not played to the jury at all;
    copies were played to the jury and the second and
    separate issue concerning their admissibility is
    whether the copies were adequately authenticated.
    On this issue two types of evidence were
    presented that the judge found convincing. First,
    one of the turncoat witnesses, Jackie Clay,
    testified that a recording of a telephone
    conversation that he had participated in back in
    1986 was accurate. Although testifying ten years
    later Clay could hardly have been certain about
    the matter--any pretense of certainty would
    merely have cast doubt on his credibility--
    participants in other recorded conversations who
    testified for the government were not asked by
    the defendants’ lawyers whether the recordings
    were accurate. The district judge inferred from
    testimony by government agents that the other
    conversations had been recorded in like manner to
    the one Clay testified about and, from the
    absence of any contrary evidence, that the
    recordings of those conversations were probably
    accurate too. Second, a government agent
    testified that he opened some of the sealed
    evidence envelopes pursuant to an unsealing order
    by the district judge and compared the tapes in
    them to the tapes played at trial, and found no
    discrepancies.
    Clay’s testimony was weak because of the lapse
    of time. The agent’s was stronger, although not
    airtight. For one thing, he didn’t compare all
    the tapes played at trial with the originals.
    Rather, he conducted a spot check, and having
    discovered no discrepancies in the tapes that he
    sampled decided not to check further. For
    another, there is an unexplained discrepancy
    between one of the original recordings and its
    duplicate original, which although supposed to be
    identical contained conversations not audible on
    the original. The expert who examined the two
    tapes could not determine the cause of the
    discrepancy. It could have been a malfunction, or
    it could have been a bit of creative editing, but
    the latter inference, as the judge determined,
    was the less likely, precisely because the
    duplicate contained more conversation than the
    original. It was the duplicate that was used in
    evidence, and if the government had edited out
    portions that favored the defendants, the
    original would have had more conversation than
    the duplicate. Although it is possible in
    principle that the government "edited in"
    additional conversation to the duplicate, there
    is no indication at all of this more elaborate
    form of tampering. Similarly, while it would have
    been preferable had the agent checked all the
    tapes, no reasons have been suggested for
    doubting either the good faith or the adequacy of
    his sampling.
    It is essential to distinguish between excluding
    evidence for want of adequate authentication, and
    challenging its weight. The defendants were
    entitled to and did question the weight that the
    jury should give the tape recordings in light of
    the possibility of tampering, but questions of
    authentication are governed by Fed. R. Evid.
    901(a), which merely requires "evidence
    sufficient to support a finding that the matter
    in question is what its proponent claims," that
    is, that the recordings played to the jury were
    in fact recordings of the defendants’
    conversations. Testimony by an "ear" witness,
    such as Clay, is sufficient, United States v.
    Brown, 
    136 F.3d 1176
    , 1182 (7th Cir. 1998); there
    is more here; and we have said in previous cases
    that only in "extraordinary" circumstances will
    we reverse the trial judge’s decision to admit
    tape recordings over objections based on lack of
    authentication. United States v. Magana, 
    118 F.3d 1173
    , 1207 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
    Welch, 
    945 F.2d 1378
    , 1383 (7th Cir. 1991);
    United States v. Vega, 
    860 F.2d 779
    , 788 (7th
    Cir. 1988). That high standard is not met here.
    The Brady rule requires the government to
    disclose evidence it knows about that would be
    helpful to the defense, whether because the
    evidence is exculpatory or because it could be
    used to impeach the government’s evidence. Brady
    v. 
    Maryland, supra
    , 373 U.S. at 87; Strickler v.
    Greene, 
    119 S. Ct. 1936
    , 1948 (1999). The
    discrepancy between one of the original tapes and
    its duplicate, a discrepancy that could have been
    used to some effect to impeach the government’s
    taped evidence, may have arisen as early as 1986,
    when the two recordings were made; in any event
    it was not recent, and the defendants ask us to
    infer from this that the government must have
    known about it. But of this there is no other
    evidence and the inference is implausible because
    the government prepared its case from the
    duplicate originals while the "original
    originals" remained in storage. So far as
    appears, the discrepancy was first discovered by
    the defendants, who thought they heard something
    odd on one of the tapes; they drew this to the
    judge’s attention and then the comparison was
    conducted, which confirmed the existence of the
    anomaly. Brady liability is not strict; the
    government does not violate Brady by failing to
    disclose information that it (or its agents,
    e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 
    514 U.S. 419
    , 437 (1995)-
    -a category that doesn’t include the criminal
    defendants whom it prosecutes!) doesn’t know
    about. United States v. Bhutani, 
    175 F.3d 572
    ,
    577 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Earnest,
    
    129 F.3d 906
    , 910 (7th Cir. 1997); United States
    v. Avellino, 
    136 F.3d 249
    , 255 (2d Cir. 1998).
    The discrepancy between the tapes is such
    information.
    We come last to the most troubling issue in the
    case--whether Judge Zagel should have
    disqualified himself from presiding at this
    trial. We have already held, in another case
    involving the El Rukns, that Judge Zagel’s
    refusal to disqualify himself was not a plain
    error, United States v. Franklin, 
    197 F.3d 266
    ,
    270 (7th Cir. 1999), but the question remains
    whether it was error. There is a threshold
    procedural question, which is both novel and
    unnecessary to resolve. Section 144 of the
    Judicial Code entitles a party to disqualify a
    judge (only once per case, however) on the basis
    just of an affidavit sufficiently alleging the
    existence of a personal bias or prejudice in
    favor of an adverse party or against the affiant;
    but the affidavit must be "accompanied by a
    certificate of counsel of record stating that it
    is made in good faith." Defendant Robinson filed
    a section 144 affidavit against Judge Zagel, but
    without the required certificate, because
    Robinson was proceeding pro se. The judge ruled
    that the absence of the certificate was fatal.
    The ruling denies pro se parties the benefit of
    the statute, a result that might be thought an
    undue burden on the constitutional right of a
    criminal defendant to proceed pro se. Faretta v.
    California, 
    422 U.S. 806
    , 834, 836 (1975); United
    States v. Brock, 
    159 F.3d 1077
    , 1079 (7th Cir.
    1998); see also 28 U.S.C. sec. 1654. Yet the
    requirement of the certificate is salutary, given
    that the statute makes the party’s affidavit
    conclusive for recusal provided it alleges the
    requisite bias or prejudice. The obvious
    solution, suggested by Robinson himself but
    opposed by the government and rejected by the
    judge, is to appoint a lawyer for the pro se
    defendant for the limited purpose of enabling him
    to determine whether to file the certificate. The
    rejection of this measure--a measure we commend
    to the district courts in future cases--turns out
    to have been harmless, however, because the
    relevant facts in Robinson’s affidavit were
    conceded.
    Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code requires a
    judge to disqualify himself "in any proceeding in
    which his impartiality might reasonably be
    questioned." Our cases hold that appellate review
    of a judge’s refusal to disqualify himself under
    this section is possible only by petitioning the
    appellate court for mandamus before trial. E.g.,
    In re Hatcher, 
    150 F.3d 631
    , 637 (7th Cir. 1998);
    United States v. Horton, 
    98 F.3d 313
    , 316-17 (7th
    Cir. 1996); Taylor v. O’Grady, 
    888 F.2d 1189
    ,
    1201 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
    Balistrieri, 
    779 F.2d 1191
    , 1204-05 (7th Cir.
    1985). This is a minority position, see, e.g., In
    re Cargill, Inc., 
    66 F.3d 1256
    , 1264 and n. 10
    (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Cooley, 
    1 F.3d 985
    , 996 n. 9 (10th Cir. 1993); In re School
    Asbestos Litigation, 
    977 F.2d 764
    , 777 n. 12 (3d
    Cir. 1992); Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws
    Co., 
    690 F.2d 1157
    , 1164 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1982),
    but the defendants do not ask us to reexamine it.
    On the contrary, they expressly waive any
    challenge to the rule by stating in their
    consolidated brief that "the motion for recusal
    under 28 U.S.C. sec. 455(a) could only be, and
    was, appealed by mandamus." Given this express
    waiver by experienced counsel, it would be
    inappropriate for us to reexamine the rule in
    this case.
    Because the rule forecloses appellate review at
    the conclusion of the case, we review a petition
    for mandamus to enforce section 455(a) under the
    normal appellate standard. Hook v. McDade, 
    89 F.3d 350
    , 353-54 and n. 3 (7th Cir. 1996). Such a
    petition was filed here, and another panel of
    this court denied it, but in an unpublished order
    with no statement of reasons, a disposition that
    we find puzzling because, as will soon become
    clear, the case for disqualification under
    section 455(a) was more than colorable, and
    indeed in our judgment was compelling. But there
    is no reason to suppose that the panel which
    denied mandamus applied the incorrect standard,
    and in the absence of such an error we cannot
    revisit the issue without abandoning the rule
    that makes mandamus the exclusive route for
    challenging a judge’s refusal to disqualify
    himself under section 455(a).
    The defendants also argue, however, that Judge
    Zagel should have disqualified himself under
    either of two other subsections (or both) of
    section 455. The first is (b)(1), which so far as
    bears on this case requires disqualification if
    the judge has "personal knowledge of disputed
    evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." The
    second is (b)(3), which requires disqualification
    if the judge had, when he was a government
    employee, "participated as counsel, adviser or
    material witness concerning the proceeding or
    expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the
    particular case in controversy."
    In 1983, at which time the now-Judge Zagel was
    the head of the Illinois state police, Robinson
    opened a restaurant in Chicago. Late in 1985 or
    early in 1986, when Zagel was still head of the
    state police, Robinson hired security guards for
    his restaurant from a company called Security &
    Maintenance Service (SMS), which was owned and
    operated by El Rukn "General" Hunter, a key
    government witness at the 1996 trial here on
    appeal. These guards were unarmed but SMS had
    applied for a license that would permit them to
    be armed. The El Rukns’ purpose in operating a
    security agency whose employees were authorized
    to carry weapons was, of course, to strengthen
    the gang’s position in the endless turf wars in
    the course of which the murders with which these
    defendants were charged were committed. The
    authorities got wind of the scheme. They were
    already investigating the El Rukns (whose drug
    and related criminal activities went back to the
    1960s, remember) by means of a joint federal,
    state, and local task force that included members
    of the Illinois state police. The task force
    conducted a "sting" of SMS. An Illinois state
    police officer played a key role in the sting,
    operating undercover and dealing directly with
    Hunter and Robinson. In June of 1986, Chicago
    police officers who were members of the task
    force and who later worked on the present case
    raided SMS’s premises, which Robinson owned, and
    arrested (at another location) 18 of its
    employees. One of them, Crowder, was a defendant
    in the first trial of this case and a defense
    witness in the second trial, the trial before
    Judge Zagel.
    The day of the arrest, Director Zagel held a
    joint press conference with Richard Daley, at the
    time the Cook County prosecutor. They announced
    the arrests and explained that they had begun
    investigating SMS when they learned that Crowder,
    an El Rukn "captain," had applied for a state
    firearm identification card. Zagel remarked that
    "street gangs [such as the El Rukns] have grown
    to rival organized crime in the scope of their
    operations, and in the savagery in which they
    control entire sections of the city." The El
    Rukns task force produced the evidence that led
    to the 1989 indictments of the present
    defendants. Not only did two of the El Rukns who
    had been involved in the SMS caper testify at the
    trial before Judge Zagel, but they testified--
    Hunter extensively--about the caper, using it to
    tie Robinson to other El Rukn activities as well.
    In denying the motion to recuse, Judge Zagel
    said that the SMS investigation had had nothing
    to do with the current trial, but this is
    incorrect. The creation of SMS was part of the
    drug and incidental murder conspiracy for which
    the defendants in the present case were tried and
    convicted before Judge Zagel, although SMS’s
    activities were not charged as overt acts of the
    conspiracy. The judge was involved in the
    investigation of activities at issue in the
    trial, and the press conference shows that he had
    personal, extrajudicial knowledge of those
    activities. But SMS’s activities were not at
    issue in this case except insofar as they
    connected Robinson to the El Rukns. Had Judge
    Zagel learned of this connection from the 1986
    investigation of SMS, Robinson would be entitled
    to a new trial before a different judge. But
    Zagel did not mention Robinson at the press
    conference, and there is no basis in the record
    for Robinson’s claim that Zagel was the "point
    man" for the investigation and had "full
    knowledge" of its details. The judge denied this
    charge on the record, and in the absence of
    contrary evidence (Robinson’s mere assertion not
    being evidence), we must credit the denial.
    United States v. 
    Balistrieri, supra
    , 779 F.2d at
    1202.
    This conclusion is only superficially in tension
    with our (and Judge Zagel’s) crediting the facts
    alleged in Robinson’s affidavit in support of his
    motion to recuse Judge Zagel under 28 U.S.C. sec.
    144. The only facts in such an affidavit that
    must be credited, and plainly the only facts in
    Robinson’s affidavit that Judge Zagel did credit,
    are those that are "sufficiently definite and
    particular to convince a reasonable person that
    bias exists; simple conclusions, opinions, or
    rumors are insufficient." United States v. Sykes,
    
    7 F.3d 1331
    , 1339 (7th Cir. 1993); see also
    United States v. 
    Balistrieri, supra
    , 779 F.2d at
    1199; Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 
    899 F.2d 1350
    , 1356 (3d Cir. 1990); 13A Charles Alan
    Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper,
    Federal Practice and Procedure sec. 3551, pp.
    634-37 (2d ed. 1984). Robinson’s assertions that
    Zagel was the "point man" of the investigation
    and had "full knowledge" of the details of the
    investigation don’t count as factual assertions;
    they are conclusions.
    Section 455(b)(3) is also inapplicable. Zagel
    did not participate other than as judge in the
    present case and did not, back when he was head
    of the state police, express an opinion about it.
    The case was then, of course, years in the
    future. There is a pregnant difference in wording
    between the participation and expression-of-
    opinion clauses of 455(b)(3). The former refers
    to participation in "the proceeding," the latter
    to expressing an opinion on the merits of "the
    particular case in controversy," and we have held
    that the use of the word "particular" narrows the
    clause to the situation in which the judge
    expressed his opinion in "the present case, not a
    related former case." Russell v. Lane, 
    890 F.2d 947
    , 948 (7th Cir. 1989); cf. Rice v. McKenzie,
    
    581 F.2d 1114
    , 1116 (4th Cir. 1978). In any
    event, since nothing Zagel said at the press
    conference could reasonably be construed as an
    expression of opinion on the merits of the case
    that he presided over, we need not pursue this
    novel and interesting interpretive question.
    The cases interpreting the participation clause
    do not require a formal identity between the
    proceeding in which the government employee who
    is now a judge participated or expressed an
    opinion about; it is enough if they overlap
    significantly. See, e.g., United States v.
    Outler, 
    659 F.2d 1306
    , 1312-13 (5th Cir. 1981);
    Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 
    611 F.2d 162
    , 166 (6th
    Cir. 1979); Mixon v. United States, 
    608 F.2d 588
    ,
    591-92 (5th Cir. 1979). And there was an overlap
    here, in the part of the SMS investigation that
    linked Robinson to the El Rukns. But Director
    Zagel never expressed an opinion about that
    aspect of the investigation, and the requisite
    "participation" is not imputed to a supervisor by
    virtue of his supervisory authority; it must be
    personal, and it was not. E.g., Mangum v.
    Hargett, 
    67 F.3d 80
    , 83 (5th Cir. 1995); Kendrick
    v. Carlson, 
    995 F.2d 1440
    , 1444 (8th Cir. 1993);
    United States v. Di Pasquale, 
    864 F.2d 271
    , 279
    (3d Cir. 1988). The exception noted in the last-
    two cited cases for where the supervisor is the
    U.S. Attorney is not applicable here.
    Recurring briefly to section 455(a), we wish to
    emphasize our belief that compliance with it is
    essential to the perceived legitimacy of the
    judicial process, especially when the defendants
    are vicious criminals facing long sentences and
    the prosecution has been marred by
    irregularities. It would have been far, far
    better for Judge Zagel to have recused himself in
    light of his earlier involvement with the
    parallel proceeding against the El Rukns and the
    fact that two of the El Rukns involved in that
    proceeding testified in the present case. But the
    panel that considered the petition for mandamus
    ruled that there was no violation of section
    455(a), and while we disagree with the ruling,
    the issue of its soundness is not before us.
    Several sentencing issues remain to be
    discussed. Green and Mays argue that their
    sentences violate the ex post facto clause, U.S.
    Const., art. I, sec. 9, cl. 3, because the
    conspiracies did not persist beyond the date on
    which the statutes under which they were
    sentenced were enacted or because they had
    withdrawn from the conspiracies prior to that
    date. The first claim is just wrong, for although
    there wasn’t a great deal of evidence of
    continued drug dealing by the El Rukns subsequent
    to the crucial dates (November 1, 1987, for one
    of the statutes under which these defendants were
    sentenced and November 18, 1988, for another),
    there was enough to place the district judge’s
    finding beyond possibility of reversal for clear
    error. Withdrawal from a conspiracy requires a
    definitive break, rather than mere cessation of
    activities even when combined with a subjective
    determination not to resume; otherwise a
    conspirator could sit back and wait to see
    whether the conspiracy had succeeded or failed
    and only then decide whether to announce that he
    had withdrawn. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 
    134 F.3d 855
    , 863 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
    Williams, 
    81 F.3d 1434
    , 1442 (7th Cir. 1996);
    United States v. Diaz, 
    176 F.3d 52
    , 98 (2d Cir.
    1999). Mays’s argument that he withdrew when he
    became a fugitive from justice borders on the
    frivolous, United States v. Pandiello, 
    184 F.3d 682
    , 687 (7th Cir. 1999), as it would merely
    reward fugitives; and anyway there is nothing
    about hiding to suggest withdrawal--Mays was
    hiding from the police rather than from the El
    Rukns.
    Green has a better argument, that he could not
    be given a sentencing enhancement for having been
    a leader of the conspiracy (U.S.S.G. sec.
    3B1.1(a)) when his leadership role had--and this
    the government acknowledges--ended with his
    demotion from El Rukn "General" to private before
    the guideline under which his sentence was
    enhanced went into effect (as one of the original
    guidelines) on November 1, 1987. The conspiracy
    of which he was a member straddled the date of
    promulgation, and a crime that straddles can be
    punished under a guideline promulgated after the
    straddle date. E.g., United States v. Kramer, 
    955 F.2d 479
    , 485 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
    Hargus, 
    128 F.3d 1358
    , 1365 (10th Cir. 1997), and
    United States v. Smith, 
    46 F.3d 1223
    , 1239 (1st
    Cir. 1995). The straddle rule implies punishment
    for conduct committed before the date of the
    guideline that determined the severity of the
    punishment, and we cannot see what difference it
    can make whether the pre-guideline conduct was
    the sale of a quantity of drugs perhaps much
    greater than any that occurred after the critical
    date or the exercise of leadership
    responsibilities relinquished by that date.
    Green’s best case is United States v. Torres,
    
    901 F.2d 205
    , 226-27 (2d Cir. 1990), which held
    that the ex post facto clause forbids punishing
    the defendants as "principal administrators,
    organizers, or leaders" of a continuing criminal
    enterprise if their leadership role did not
    continue after the enactment of the statute
    creating the offense, even though the enterprise
    itself did continue past that date. See also
    United States v. Williams-Davis, 
    90 F.3d 490
    ,
    510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (acknowledging but
    distinguishing Torres). The statute at issue in
    Torres created a new substantive offense that
    required as one of its elements that the
    defendant have had a leadership role, and so
    punished Torres for engaging in conduct before
    the statute was passed. In our case the defendant
    committed all the elements of the offense after
    the change in the sentencing guideline and by
    doing so became responsible for the conduct in
    which he had engaged before the change. Torres
    was not a straddle case; ours is; if the
    difference seems tenuous, then we must reject
    Torres, as we are committed to the straddle
    doctrine--and so, for that matter, is the Second
    Circuit, which reaffirmed the straddle doctrine
    in Torres itself. We add that Green could have
    avoided the new guideline by quitting the
    conspiracy when the guideline was announced but
    before it took effect.
    Last, we note some clerical mistakes in the
    judgments. Mays’s judgment should reflect a
    guidelines life sentence on count 3 and 60 months
    on count 4, rather than vice versa, and Green’s
    judgment should reflect a life sentence on counts
    1 and 3 and concurrent 10-year terms on counts 4
    and 5, rather than a life sentence on counts 1,
    4, and 5 and a 10-year sentence on count 3. As
    modified to correct these mistakes, the judgments
    are
    Affirmed.
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The panel is
    unanimous in its view that the trial judge should
    have recused himself under sec. 455(a), which
    requires a judge to "disqualify himself in any
    proceeding in which his impartiality might
    reasonably be questioned." Under the
    circumstances set forth in detail by the majority
    here, in any other circuit a new trial would be
    ordered. In this circuit, however, we can only
    review the trial judge’s decision against recusal
    when the issue is presented in a petition for a
    writ of mandamus. The defendants did file a
    petition for mandamus relief from the trial
    judge’s decision not to recuse himself, and
    another panel of this court denied that petition
    without opinion.
    The rule that mandamus is the only avenue by
    which a party can seek review of a ruling under
    sec. 455(a) is well-established in this circuit.
    See United States v. Horton, 
    98 F.3d 313
    , 316-17
    (7th Cir. 1996); Hook v. McDade, 
    89 F.3d 350
    , 353
    n.2 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Towns, 
    913 F.2d 434
    , 443 (7th Cir. 1990). This circuit’s
    view has been that sec. 455(a) is intended to
    protect against the appearance of impropriety,
    and that, once the proceedings in the district
    court have been completed, the harm sec. 455(a)
    seeks to prevent has already occurred. See United
    States v. Troxell, 
    887 F.2d 830
    , 833 (7th Cir.
    1989). Thus, we have required litigants to bring
    mandamus petitions to cure potential problems
    under sec. 455(a) and to prevent a potentially
    tainted trial from ever taking place. See 
    id. No other
    court of appeals has followed our
    approach. See Kenneth M. Fall, Note, Liljeberg v.
    Health Services Acquisition Corp.: The Supreme
    Court Encourages Disqualification of Federal
    Judges Under Section 455(a), 
    1989 Wis. L
    . Rev.
    1033, 1056. Some circuits have rejected
    explicitly our position. The Third Circuit has
    said that mandamus is the preferred method of
    appeal, but allows review on direct appeal
    because it may provide a "partial cure" to any
    harm to the public perception of the judiciary.
    See In re School Asbestos Litig., 
    977 F.2d 764
    ,
    777 n.12 (3d Cir. 1992). The Tenth Circuit has
    held that, although sec. 455(a) is concerned with
    the rights of the public, the parties do retain
    some rights thereunder, and direct appeal may
    therefore be appropriate. See United States v.
    Cooley, 
    1 F.3d 985
    , 996 n.9 (10th Cir. 1993).
    Other circuits have entertained sec. 455(a)
    arguments on direct appeal and, indeed, have
    addressed the merits or found the issue waived
    because it was not raised in the district court.
    See, e.g., United States v. Mosby, 
    177 F.3d 1067
    ,
    1068-69 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v.
    Morrison, 
    153 F.3d 34
    , 48-49 (2d Cir. 1998);
    United States v. Barrett, 
    111 F.3d 947
    , 951-53
    (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Sturman, 
    951 F.2d 1466
    , 1481-82 (6th Cir. 1991); Diversified
    Numismatics, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 
    949 F.2d 382
    , 384-85 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); United
    States v. Arache, 
    946 F.2d 129
    , 140 (1st Cir.
    1991); United States v. Payne, 
    944 F.2d 1458
    ,
    1476-77 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Wade,
    
    931 F.2d 300
    , 302-05 (5th Cir. 1991); United
    States v. Mitchell, 
    886 F.2d 667
    , 671 (4th Cir.
    1989).
    Moreover, we not only stand alone among the
    circuits in our approach to this question, but we
    also have taken a position in considerable
    tension with the decisions of the Supreme Court
    of the United States. Indeed, the Supreme Court
    appears to have taken a different path. Although
    the Court has not rejected explicitly that
    mandamus is the only avenue of review for sec.
    455(a) matters, it has twice interpreted that
    section in cases brought to it in the manner of
    an appeal from final judgment. See Liteky v.
    United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    (1994); Liljeberg v.
    Health Services Acquisition Corp., 
    486 U.S. 847
    (1988). These cases, especially Liljeberg’s
    approval of vacatur of a trial court’s judgment,
    clearly cast significant doubt on our view that
    mandamus is the only appropriate remedy under
    sec. 455(a). Nevertheless, we never have
    considered whether these decisions of the Supreme
    Court make our approach untenable; we have
    continued to follow our same approach even after
    the announcement of those Supreme Court
    decisions.
    This case points out one of the pitfalls of our
    approach. As the Third Circuit has suggested, a
    trial judge well might appear unbiased at the
    outset of a trial, but later events might cause a
    judge’s impartiality to be reasonably questioned
    and thus make appropriate the "partial cure" of
    reversing the improperly obtained verdict.
    Asbestos 
    Litig., 977 F.2d at 777-78
    . Indeed, in
    one recent case, the First Circuit, although
    denying mandamus relief, specifically left open
    the possibility that further development of the
    record could lead to a different conclusion on an
    appeal from final judgment. See In re Martinez-
    Catala, 
    129 F.3d 213
    , 221 (1st Cir. 1997).
    Regardless of whether this panel would have
    issued the same ruling as the earlier motions
    panel if it had been presented with the record
    available at that early stage of the litigation,
    the record made at trial has convinced us that
    recusal is necessary. There must be public
    confidence in a judgment that incarcerates
    defendants, in some cases for the rest of their
    lives. The trial of this matter was a difficult
    task. It required that the trial court make many
    rulings, both with respect to the admissibility
    of evidence and the enhancement of sentences,
    that required the exercise of a great deal of
    discretion.
    After thorough review of the record, this panel
    believes that the district judge should have
    recused himself under 28 U.S.C. sec. 455(a). Only
    our rigid adherence to a procedural rule not
    followed in any other circuit and in significant
    tension with the decisions of the Supreme Court
    of the United States prevents our giving the
    relief that, under the prevailing national
    standards, would be granted. See, e.g., United
    States v. Bremers, 
    195 F.3d 221
    (5th Cir. 1999)
    (vacating conviction because trial judge should
    have recused himself under sec.455(a)); 
    Cooley, 1 F.3d at 998
    (same); United States v. Brown, 
    539 F.2d 467
    (5th Cir. 1976) (same). See also United
    States v. Waskom, 
    179 F.3d 303
    , 315-16 (5th Cir.
    1999) (vacating sentence in guilty plea case even
    in the absence of specific allegation of
    sentencing error because trial judge should have
    recused himself); United States v. Reyes, 
    160 F.3d 258
    , 259 (5th Cir. 1998) (vacating sentence
    in guilty plea case because of failure to
    recuse).
    The majority characterizes the defendants’
    reference to the earlier mandamus proceeding as a
    waiver of the argument that mandamus should not
    be the only available remedy. The defendants
    state: "Defendants appeal the denial of recusal
    under 28 U.S.C. sec.sec. 144 and 455(b). The
    motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. sec. 455(a)
    could only be, and was, appealed by mandamus."
    Appellant’s br. at 49. This was sufficient to put
    this court on notice of our rule that only
    mandamus relief is available under sec. 455(a).
    It is indeed a parsimonious reading of this
    statement to characterize it as a knowing and
    intelligent waiver. Far from ignoring the issue,
    the defendants specifically brought it to our
    attention. Because the defendants raised the
    matter, and clearly have maintained throughout
    this litigation that recusal under sec. 455(a)
    was required, this court should not be restrained
    from reconsidering in this case our position on
    the issue./1
    Moreover, even if the defendants did not raise
    this issue, we are in no way precluded from
    raising it on our own in the interests of
    justice. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
    it often decides cases on issues other than those
    argued fully by the parties:
    "On a number of occasions, this Court has
    considered issues waived by the parties below and
    in the petition for certiorari because the issues
    were so integral to decision of the case that
    they could be considered ’fairly subsumed’ by the
    actual questions presented." Gilmer v.
    Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
    500 U.S. 20
    , 37,
    
    111 S. Ct. 1647
    , 
    114 L. Ed. 2d 26
    (1991) (Stevens,
    J., dissenting) (citing cases). The court has not
    always confined itself to the set of issues
    addressed by the parties.
    Kolstad v. American Dental Assoc., 
    119 S. Ct. 2118
    , 2127 (1999). The Court has also
    specifically instructed the courts of appeals
    that they, too, may raise issues on their own
    initiative:
    The matter of what questions may be taken up and
    resolved for the first time on appeal is one left
    primarily to the discretion of the courts of
    appeals, to be exercised on the facts of
    individual cases. We announce no general rule.
    Certainly there are circumstances in which a
    federal appellate court is justified in resolving
    an issue not passed on below, as where the proper
    resolution is beyond any doubt, or where
    injustice might otherwise result.
    Singleton v. Wulff, 
    428 U.S. 106
    , 121 (1976)
    (citations and quotations omitted); see also
    Niedert v. Rieger, 
    200 F.3d 522
    , 527 (7th Cir.
    1999) (quoting Singleton); United States v.
    Brown, 
    739 F.2d 1136
    , 1145 (7th Cir. 1984)
    (same).
    Prior to Singleton, the Ninth Circuit explained
    the circumstances that might motivate a court of
    appeals to address a matter without the benefit
    of full briefing by the parties:
    There is . . . no rigid and undeviating
    judicially declared practice under which courts
    of review invariably and under all circumstances
    decline to consider all questions which have not
    previously been specifically urged. Indeed there
    could not be without doing violence to the
    statutes which give federal appellate courts the
    power to modify, reverse or remand decisions as
    may be just under the circumstances. Exceptional
    cases or particular circumstances may prompt a
    reviewing court, where injustice might otherwise
    result or where public policy requires, to
    consider questions neither pressed nor passed
    upon below.
    Nuelsen v. Sorensen, 
    293 F.2d 454
    , 462 (9th Cir.
    1961) (citation and quotations omitted)./2 As we
    did in Niedert and Brown, and as the Ninth
    Circuit did in Nuelsen, so too have other
    circuits acknowledged that they may, when justice
    requires it, raise critical issues of law sua
    sponte./3 The Ninth Circuit wisely cautioned
    that this power must be "exercised sparingly."
    
    Nuelsen, 293 F.2d at 462
    . This case, however, is
    the sort of exceptional case that casts new light
    on procedures previously taken for granted.
    If we may sua sponte raise and decide
    substantive questions of law, then surely we have
    the power to sua sponte alter the procedures we
    ask litigants to follow in their efforts to seek
    resolution of their substantive questions of law.
    It is well settled that stare decisis has less
    effect in the context of procedural rules, which
    do not serve as a guide to lawful behavior. See
    Hohn v. United States, 
    524 U.S. 236
    , 251-52
    (1998); United States v. Gaudin, 
    515 U.S. 506
    ,
    521 (1995).
    The prosecution of the El Rukn crime
    organization has been a deeply troubling episode.
    Chief Judge Aspen presided over the first trial
    of this particular case, and, in ordering a
    retrial, described the situation as tragic,
    noting that the prosecutorial misconduct in the
    case had wasted years of hard work by the courts,
    prosecutors, and law enforcement officers. See
    United States v. Boyd, 
    833 F. Supp. 1277
    , 1281
    (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff’d, 
    55 F.3d 239
    (7th Cir.
    1995). Two other El Rukn trials were also
    declared mistrials. See United States v. Andrews,
    
    824 F. Supp. 1273
    (N.D. Ill. 1993); United States
    v. Burnside, 
    824 F. Supp. 1215
    (N.D. Ill. 1993).
    As the judiciary was quick to correct an abuse of
    power in another branch of government after the
    first trial, it also ought to be willing to
    correct an error in its own house--even one made
    in good faith--so that the public can have
    confidence that, even in the most notorious of
    criminal cases, the evenhandedness of the
    judicial process is above reproach.
    It is time for us to join the rest of the
    Country and permit review by appeal of a failure
    to recuse under sec. 455(a). I would vacate the
    judgments of conviction and order a new trial.
    /1 When a party does not make a fully formed
    argument that we should overrule our earlier
    precedent to align ourselves with other courts,
    the court may consider the argument waived. See
    United States v. Martin, 
    195 F.3d 961
    , 967 (7th
    Cir. 1999). Waiver is not mandatory, of course,
    but instead, appellate courts have the discretion
    to find that arguments are waived. See, e.g.,
    Smith v. Freeman, 
    892 F.2d 331
    , 337 n.12 (3d Cir.
    1989) (collecting cases). We are therefore under
    no obligation to avoid this question.
    /2 See also All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda
    Mem. Hosp., 
    887 F.2d 1535
    , 1538 n.3 (11th Cir.
    1989) (quoting Nuelsen); Boals v. Gray, 
    775 F.2d 686
    , 691 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); Cohen v. West
    Haven Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 
    638 F.2d 496
    , 500
    n.6 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Nuelsen); McKissick v.
    United States, 
    379 F.2d 754
    , 759 (5th Cir. 1967)
    (quoting Nuelsen).
    /3 See Curry v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 
    67 F.3d 517
    , 522 n.8 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The normal
    rule of course is that the failure to raise an
    issue for review in the prescribed manner
    constitutes a waiver. But the rule is not an
    absolute one and review may proceed (even
    completely sua sponte) when the equities
    require." (citation omitted)); Lambert v. Genesee
    Hosp., 
    10 F.3d 46
    , 56 (2d Cir. 1993) ("However,
    we have discretion to consider and decide sua
    sponte a dispositive issue of law."); Counts v.
    Kissack Water & Oil Serv., Inc., 
    986 F.2d 1322
    ,
    1325-26 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Although it is rarely
    done an appellate court may, sua sponte, raise a
    dispositive issue of law when the proper
    resolution is beyond doubt and the failure to
    address the issue would result in a miscarriage
    of justice.").