Dormeyer, Jennifer v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. ( 2000 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Nos. 99-1089 and 99-3252
    Jennifer Dormeyer,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    Comerica Bank-Illinois, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 96 C 4805--David H. Coar, Judge.
    Submitted August 7, 2000--Decided August 30, 2000
    Before Posner, Manion, and Kanne, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam. In our opinion of July 24, 2000,
    affirming the district court’s decision, we
    ordered the plaintiff-appellant’s counsel, Ernest
    T. Rossiello, to show cause why he should not be
    sanctioned for having taken a frivolous appeal
    (Fed. R. App. P. 38) from the district court’s
    order cutting down the attorneys’ fees that he
    had requested. Mr. Rossiello has submitted his
    response and the disciplinary matter is now ripe
    for determination.
    In our opinion we had described Mr. Rossiello’s
    brief as "a remarkable document. It is only five
    pages long, of which the argument section
    occupies not quite two pages entirely given over
    to truisms and conclusions. The perfunctory
    character of the appeal, which alone would
    justify an affirmance, [citations omitted], is
    remarkable rather than merely lamentable because
    of the serious accusations made by the district
    judge against the plaintiff’s attorney, Ernest T.
    Rossiello, in support of the judge’s decision to
    cut down the fees and costs sought by some 80
    percent. Citing several previous judicial
    opinions criticizing (in one case actually
    sanctioning) Mr. Rossiello for his fee requests
    or affirming stiff cuts in the requested fees,
    [citations omitted], but missing still others
    (again including one case in which he was
    actually sanctioned), [citations omitted], the
    judge accused Rossiello, just as the judge in
    [citation omitted] had done, of engaging in the
    dishonest practice of joining to small valid
    claims, here the plaintiff’s FLSA claim, large
    invalid and even frivolous claims, and seeking a
    large award of attorneys’ fees for services
    ostensibly devoted to the small claim but
    actually devoted to the large." We pointed out
    that "in his application for fees, Rossiello
    allocated 124 hours, constituting half the total
    time that he and his associates put in on the
    plaintiff’s entire case, to the FLSA claim, even
    though it was a tiny claim which required little
    more than the record of the days and hours worked
    by the plaintiff and which the defendant did not
    resist. The defendants had made an offer of
    judgment for the full amount sought before trial,
    which the plaintiff accepted. And before the
    offer was made the parties had engaged in only
    the most limited discovery on the claim,
    consisting of one request for documents, a single
    interrogatory, and ten or so minutes of
    deposition time. The judge was rightly aghast at
    the allocation of half the total lawyer time to
    the FLSA claim. A similar problem attended
    Rossiello’s allocation of costs. In his appeal
    brief, Rossiello (who signed the brief) does not
    deny the judge’s accusations. Although he
    complains without elaboration that the judge
    should have allowed him a higher hourly fee, he
    says nothing about the judge’s accusing him of
    submitting what amounts to a fraudulent claim of
    attorneys’ fees and of doing this, moreover, in
    case after case."
    We are dismayed, in light of the detailed
    recitation of our concerns in the original
    opinion, that Mr. Rossiello, in his response to
    the order to show cause, does not forthrightly
    confront the charge of fraudulent billing. Except
    for a single footnote, his response is devoted to
    repeating his complaint that he should have been
    allowed a higher hourly fee and to trying to
    explain away some of the criticisms made of his
    billing practices by other judges in other cases.
    The footnote does not attempt to justify the
    absurd claim that he devoted 124 hours to the
    overtime claim. It suggests confusedly that he
    had to prepare to go to trial on that claim,
    ignoring the statement in our opinion that the
    defendant had made an offer of judgment for the
    full amount before trial which the plaintiff had
    accepted. The response is totally inadequate. Mr.
    Rossiello stands convicted of having attempted to
    defraud the district court and his opponent and
    of having defended this attempt shamelessly in
    this court. The appeal he took from the district
    court’s order on fees and costs was not only
    frivolous but outrageous. We assess damages of
    $10,000 under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
    Appellate Procedure, which are to be paid by
    Rossiello personally (not his client) to the
    defendants-appellees within 14 days of the date
    of this order. Berwick Grain Co. v. Illinois
    Dept. of Agriculture, 
    217 F.3d 502
    , 506 (7th Cir.
    2000) (per curiam); Hill v. Norfolk & Western
    Railway Co., 
    814 F.2d 1192
    , 1201-02 (7th Cir.
    1987); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 
    809 F.2d 419
    , 425 (7th Cir. 1987); Thornton v. Wahl,
    
    787 F.2d 1151
    , 1154 (7th Cir. 1986); Natasha,
    Inc. v. Evita Marine Charters, Inc., 
    763 F.2d 468
    , 472 (1st Cir. 1985).
    So Ordered.