United States v. Peterson, Scott M. ( 2001 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 01-1597
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Scott M. Peterson,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Wisconsin.
    No. 00-CR-74-C--Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.
    Argued September 19, 2001--Decided October 9, 2001
    Before Easterbrook, Diane P. Wood, and
    Williams, Circuit Judges.
    Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. As part of
    his plea agreement in this bank-fraud
    prosecution, Scott Peterson promised to
    pay restitution for "all losses relating
    to the offense of conviction and all
    losses covered by the same course of
    conduct or common scheme or plan as the
    offense of conviction." (Emphasis added.)
    Normally restitution is limited to loss
    caused by the offense of conviction. See
    18 U.S.C. sec.3663A(a); Hughey v. United
    States, 
    495 U.S. 411
    (1990); United
    States v. Behrman, 
    235 F.3d 1049
    (7th
    Cir. 2000); United States v. Martin, 
    195 F.3d 961
    , 968 (7th Cir. 1999). But "[t]he
    court shall also order, if agreed to by
    the parties in a plea agreement,
    restitution to persons other than the
    victim of the offense." 18 U.S.C.
    sec.3663A(a)(3). This clause in
    Peterson’s plea agreement is designed to
    exercise the option under subsection
    (a)(3). In exchange for promising extra
    restitution, Peterson received
    concessions. The prosecutor dismissed
    four of the six counts in the indictment,
    and the district judge imposed a sentence
    of only 14 months’ imprisonment, together
    with an order requiring Peterson to pay
    $53,491.87 to four lenders. Peterson did
    not object.
    In this court he sings a different tune,
    contending that the district judge lacked
    authority to order restitution other than
    with respect to the two counts of
    conviction. Peterson insists that the
    plea agreement is not a valid implementa
    tion of sec.3663A(a)(3). It is not clear
    that he understands the principal
    implication of this position: that his
    plea must be set aside, the four
    dismissed counts reinstated, and the
    prosecution resumed in the district
    court. He appears to believe that he can
    have the benefits of the plea agreement
    (four counts dismissed, reduced time in
    prison) without the detriments. That’s
    not an option. The whole plea agreement
    stands, or the whole thing falls. See
    United States v. Wenger, 
    58 F.3d 280
    (7th
    Cir. 1995). Peterson may find four more
    convictions and extra time in prison a
    steep price to pay--especially since
    reinstating the extra four counts could
    support the full award of restitution
    without regard to any agreement under
    sec.3663A(a)(3), and then Peterson would
    not achieve even his immediate aim of
    reducing the financial component of this
    judgment. It is unnecessary to pursue
    this, however, because there is no
    problem with the restitution order.
    Resolving the appeal in this fashion also
    makes it unnecessary to decide whether
    the failure to object in the district
    court should be viewed as a waiver or
    only as a forfeiture. Compare United
    States v. Harris, 
    230 F.3d 1054
    (7th Cir.
    2000), and United States v. Richardson,
    
    238 F.3d 837
    (7th Cir. 2001), with United
    States v. Williams, 
    258 F.3d 669
    (7th
    Cir. 2001).
    The full text of the plea agreement’s
    provision for restitution reads:
    The defendant agrees to pay restitution
    for all losses relating to the offense of
    conviction and all losses covered by the
    same course of conduct or common scheme
    or plan as the offense of conviction. The
    exact restitution figure will be agreed
    upon by the parties prior to sentencing
    or, if the parties are unable to agree
    upon a specific figure, restitution will
    be determined by the Court at sentencing.
    Negotiations between the plea and the
    sentencing did not yield agreement on a
    specific figure. The district judge
    therefore computed an amount, as the
    agreement provided. Peterson does not
    contend that the judge’s calculation was
    mistaken; he argues only that the
    district judge lacked authority to
    specify any amount. He asks us to read
    sec.3663A(a)(3) as applicable only when
    the defendant himself specifies both the
    additional victims and the precise amount
    of restitution to be paid. It is not
    possible to delegate power to the court,
    Peterson insists.
    Nothing in sec.3663A(a)(3) prescribes
    how a defendant may exercise the option
    to make restitution to persons other than
    the victims of the crimes of conviction.
    Peterson believes that this open-
    endedness, combined with the Rule of
    Lenity, equals a requirement that the
    victims and amounts be written into the
    plea agreement. This seems backward. Why
    would the lack of detail in the statute
    lead to the conclusion that only one
    means of giving assent is lawful? It
    makes more sense to infer from the lack
    of detail in the statute that any means
    acceptable to the defendant is proper. It
    is the defendant’s choice, after all. A
    defendant may volunteer details, or agree
    with the prosecutor on a formula, or
    delegate the power to the judge.
    Defendants cannot be helped by rules
    cutting off options they find useful
    (including an option that this defendant
    did find useful). If the final amount of
    restitution must be specified in the plea
    agreement, then it may prove impossible
    for the parties to reach agreement (or
    for the defendant to obtain concessions
    in exchange for his promise). Plea agree
    ments are negotiated well in advance of
    the presentence report, and prosecutors
    understandably would be reluctant to sign
    off on a deal whose final dollar amounts
    were set before the probation office
    collected details that usually are
    helpful in understanding the full scope
    of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Put
    to a choice between final details in the
    plea agreement, and no deal, the result
    often would be no deal--to the detriment
    of defendants and prosecutors alike.
    Defendants are free to waive both
    statutory and constitutional rights in
    the course of criminal prosecutions. See,
    e.g., Bousley v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 614
    (1998); United States v. Mezzanatto,
    
    513 U.S. 196
    (1995); United States v.
    Broce, 
    488 U.S. 563
    (1989); Mabry v.
    Johnson, 
    467 U.S. 504
    , 508 (1984). Even
    if sec.3663A(a)(3) favored full details
    in the plea agreement (which it does
    not), a defendant could waive that
    entitlement and choose a different
    method. Peterson did just this: he agreed
    to make restitution to all victims of his
    entire course of conduct, and agreed
    further that the district judge could
    make decisions that proved necessary to
    implement this choice. The district court
    did no more than Peterson had agreed it
    could. He has no basis for complaint.
    Affirmed