Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc. , 276 F.3d 270 ( 2001 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Seventh Circuit
    No. 00-1860
    PHILIP E. BLOEDORN, Regional Director
    of Region 30 of the National Labor Relations
    Board, for and on behalf of the
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    FRANCISCO FOODS, INC.,
    d/b/a PIGGLY WIGGLY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 99 C 1402--Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 21, 2000--DECIDED DECEMBER 28, 2001
    Before ROVNER, DIANE P. WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Until 1999, the employees of the
    Piggly Wiggly grocery store in Ripon, Wisconsin, were represented
    by the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 73A,
    AFL-CIO-CLC (the "Union"). When the owner of the store announced
    his intent to sell the franchise to Francisco Foods, Inc.
    ("FFI"), FFI invited store employees to submit applications to
    work for the new owner. Fewer than half of the employees that
    joined the FFI workforce had previously worked for the prior
    owner, however, so that when the store reopened under FFI’s
    ownership, a majority of the store’s employees were not Union
    members and consequently FFI was not obliged to recognize and
    bargain with the Union.
    The Regional Director (the "Director") of the National Labor
    Relations Board (the "NLRB" or the "Board") filed an
    administrative complaint charging that FFI had deliberately
    refused to hire a number of people who had worked for the store’s
    previous owner in order to avoid having to bargain with the
    Union, in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National
    Labor Relations Act (the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a)(1), (3).
    The Director also asserted that FFI’s refusal to recognize and
    bargain with the Union, and its failure to adopt and enforce the
    terms of the collective bargaining agreement that the Union had
    entered into with FFI’s predecessor, constituted unfair labor
    practices that were contrary to section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
    Act, 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a) (1), (5). While the complaint was
    pending before an administrative law judge, the Director filed
    this action seeking interim injunctive relief pursuant to section
    10(j) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. sec. 160(j). Specifically, the
    Director asked the district court to enter an order requiring FFI
    to offer employment to the employees of the prior owner that FFI
    had refused to hire, to recognize and bargain with the Union, and
    to restore employee working conditions (including wages and
    hours) to their state prior to FFI’s takeover of the store, until
    such time as the Director’s complaint was finally resolved by the
    Board. The district court denied the Director’s request,
    concluding that he was unlikely to prevail on the merits of the
    complaint and that he had not established the prospect of
    irreparable harm to the Union. R. 23.
    The Director appeals the denial of his request for interim
    relief. Because we conclude that the Director has a "better than
    negligible" chance of prevailing on the merits of his complaint,
    that the unfair labor practices charged in the complaint do pose
    a threat of irreparable harm to the Union which outweighs the
    harm that interim relief poses to FFI, and that interim
    injunctive relief is in the public interest, we reverse the
    district court’s judgment.
    I.
    We have derived the factual summary that follows from the
    record of the evidentiary hearing conducted before the Board’s
    administrative law judge ("ALJ") on the Director’s complaint. The
    Director submitted the record of that hearing to the district
    court in support of his petition for interim relief.
    For more than twenty-five years prior to 1999, the Union
    represented all non-supervisory employees of the Piggly Wiggly
    store in Ripon. Ripon Supermarkets, Inc. ("RSI") owned the Piggly
    Wiggly franchise in the years immediately preceding the events
    underlying this action; Ron and Carol Bayer were the principals
    of RSI. The final collective bargaining agreement entered into by
    RSI and the Union covered the period beginning on February 1,
    1996 and ending on January 31, 1999. General Counsel Exhibit ("GC
    Ex.") 2. However, in the final days of January 1999, RSI and the
    Union agreed to extend the term of this agreement until such time
    as they entered into a new contract. GC Ex. 3. The 1996 agreement
    contained no successor clause requiring anyone who purchased the
    store from RSI to recognize the Union.
    Pam Francisco had worked at the Ripon Piggly Wiggly for
    twenty-five years and had served as the store manager for the
    last six and one-half years prior to 1999. When the Bayers
    decided to sell the store, Francisco and her husband Tom formed
    FFI for the purpose of buying the store. (Francisco is the
    president and secretary of FFI.) FFI and RSI entered into a
    purchase and sale agreement on March 10, 1999. GC Ex. 11. Because
    the final collective bargaining agreement between RSI and the
    Union contained no successor clause, FFI would not be required to
    recognize the Union if a majority of its employees were not
    already members of the bargaining unit--i.e., if they had not
    worked for RSI./1
    On March 12, 1999, Ron Bayer informed Grant Withers, the
    Union’s business representative, that he was selling the Piggly
    Wiggly to Francisco. Bayer asked Withers to keep this information
    under his hat for a few days until Bayer had a chance to announce
    the sale to store employees. Three days later, on March 15,
    Withers telephoned Francisco to follow up on Bayer’s disclosure.
    According to Withers’ notes of the conversation, the following
    exchange took place:
    Withers: Have you and Ron informed the employees yet?
    Francisco: Yes, we did.
    Withers: Well Pam, the reason I’m calling is I’d like to know if
    you would be available for a meeting tomorrow[.]
    Francisco: No, I have two appointments already.
    Withers: Well Pam, we need to know what your intentions are as far
    as recognizing the Union[.]
    Francisco: At this time, I don’t think we[’]re going to.
    Withers: Really? Are you sure?
    Francisco: I may let my new employees decide what to do.
    Withers: By your statement, "my new employees," am I to assume you
    won’t be keeping the current employees?
    Francisco: No, I’m not going to keep the bargaining unit.
    Withers: Is this for sure or would you like a few days to think
    about it?
    Francisco: No, at this point, I’m sure.
    Withers: Well that’s unfortunate. I’m sure Ron could tell you, and
    you probably recall, how much the turmoil cost Ron in business
    when he bought the store [--] sales that he never recovered. That
    is unfortunate[.] I’m sure you understand that we’ll have to take
    whatever action we need to, to protect these jobs.
    Francisco: Sigh.
    Withers: Okay, Bye.
    GC Ex. 4. In her own testimony, Francisco acknowledged telling
    Withers that "I was taking a new direction and there would be a
    lot of new faces," but she denied saying anything about whether
    she would retain RSI’s employees, recognize the Union, or assume
    the collective bargaining agreement. Tr. 72; see also Tr. 633-35.
    According to assistant store manager Michael Ritchay,
    Francisco likewise told him on March 15 that "she was going
    around to the people that she wanted to hire and . . . it
    wouldn’t be a union . . . ." Tr. 432-33. Joann Schrader, manager
    of the bakery/deli section of the store, recalled Francisco
    remarking that same day, at a meeting of store managers and other
    employees, "that not everyone would be hired back." Tr. 340.
    In a letter dated March 16, 1999, one day after and
    apparently in reference to Withers’ conversation with Francisco,
    FFI’s attorney, James Macy, wrote the following letter to
    Withers:
    This letter is to notify you that we represent Francisco Foods,
    Inc., and are assisting them in regards to the transition and
    purchase of the Piggly Wiggly store in Ripon, Wisconsin. As noted
    by Ms. Francisco, they anticipate considerable changes in regards
    to the operation of this store upon the completion of this asset
    purchase. In that regard, the Company does not anticipate
    assuming the collective bargaining agreement.
    While disappointed in your initial comments to the Company, we do
    anticipate a positive and professional transition. We
    respectfully request that if you have any further questions in
    regards to this transition, you direct them to our attention.
    GC Ex. 5.
    Also on March 16, Bayer and Francisco each posted notices at
    the store formally advising employees of the forthcoming sale.
    Bayer’s notice read as follows:
    This posting is to advise you that effective May 15, 1999, the
    entire assets of [the] Piggly Wiggly store operated by Ripon
    Supermarket Inc. at 111 E. Fond du Lac St., Ripon, Wisconsin
    54971 will be sold to another company.
    Soon you will receive a letter from the Company describing any
    severance benefits you may have available under the collectively
    bargained labor agreement.
    I would like to take this opportunity to thank you all for your
    past efforts on behalf of the Company and, also wish each and
    every one the best for you in the future.
    If you have any questions please be sure to ask. We would like
    this transition to be as smooth as possible.
    GC Ex. 13. As Bayer’s reference to severance benefits suggests,
    all RSI employees were to be terminated as of May 15. However,
    Francisco’s notice invited the employees of RSI to apply for
    employment with FFI:
    Tom and I are in the process of negotiating the purchase of
    Piggly Wiggly. We are both very excited about the prospect of
    owning the store.
    We anticipate that there will be a number of restructuring and
    reorganization changes made here at the store.
    Everyone who is presently employed now should please consider
    reapplying for employment at our store. By law, anyone
    interesting in working for Francisco Foods Inc. must fill out a
    new application.
    GC Ex. 12.
    In the weeks following the announcement of the forthcoming
    sale, Francisco had a number of conversations with store
    personnel regarding her intent vis a vis the Union. According to
    these individuals, although Francisco allowed for the possibility
    that the new employees might opt for Union representation, she
    did not plan to recognize the bargaining unit at the outset of
    her tenure as store owner:
    1.   As we noted above, Francisco on March 15 had
    purportedly told Ritchay--who was offered but did not accept a
    job with FFI--that "it wouldn’t be a union . . . ." Tr. 432-33.
    According to Ritchay, a couple of days later, Francisco qualified
    that remark by saying that "there wouldn’t be a union, but if the
    employees wanted a union--the new employees wanted a union they
    could vote on it," Tr. 433. Ritchay testified that he
    subsequently told Francisco "if [fellow RSI employee] Bob
    Schumacher is going to be out there picketing that I wouldn’t be
    able to cross the line." Tr. 434. His conversation with Francisco
    "kind of went back and forth," Ritchay testified, and then "I
    kind of mentioned that you know Bob really wants the Union in
    here. She says that’s not going to happen." Tr. 435.
    2.   According to RSI utility employee Adam Simonis-- whom
    FFI hired--Francisco said to him between one and two weeks after
    the sale was announced that "she was going to let the employees
    decide whether or not they wanted" a union rather than
    recognizing the Union "right away." Tr. 497.
    3.   Bakery/deli manager Schrader--whom FFI also hired--
    testified that Francisco likewise told her that she did not then
    intend to recognize the Union, but "[f]urther down the road if
    the employees wanted the union, you know, then she would go from
    there." Tr. 341.
    4.   RSI employee Cari Wittchow likewise testified that when
    Francisco approached her a week or two after the sale was
    announced and offered her a job with FFI, Francisco mentioned
    that "she didn’t want to acknowledge [the Union] at that time,"
    Tr. 490, and that it would be up to FFI employees to decide
    whether they wished to be represented by the Union, Tr. 492.
    5.   Evonne Everson gave a written statement to the Union
    (dated April 6) stating that on or about March 24, she had asked
    Francisco whether FFI would hire all of RSI’s employees.
    According to Everson’s statement, Francisco "stated only 50% of
    the employees [would be hired,] because she wouldn’t have the
    Union. Pam Francisco stated that she couldn’t have the Union
    because she couldn’t afford it." GC Ex. 29. Francisco
    subsequently hired Everson just days before FFI assumed ownership
    of the store. At the hearing before the ALJ, Everson identified
    her written statement but claimed it was inaccurate. Tr. 279-81.
    "I didn’t write this right," she said. Tr. 303./2
    Although Francisco denied making most of the remarks
    attributed to her by store employees, e.g., Tr. 638, 640, 645,
    646, 647-48, 649-50, 655-66, she concedes that she told staff
    that she "would not recognize the union automatically and [she]
    felt that it should be an employee decision." Tr. 646; see also
    GC Ex. 33 at 1.
    In mid-April 1999, FFI began to run advertisements in four
    local newspapers for numerous positions at the Piggly Wiggly; and
    on April 21, 1999, Francisco began to interview candidates for
    hire by FFI.
    Francisco made offers to many, but not all, of the RSI
    employees who wished to stay on at the store. Thirty-four of
    RSI’s employees sought either supervisory or non-supervisory
    positions with FFI. Francisco ultimately hired three RSI
    employees for supervisory roles and extended offers of employment
    to another twenty RSI employees for non-supervisory positions.
    As April gave way to May, however, a number of positions
    with FFI remained unfilled, and a number of RSI employees who had
    applied for jobs with FFI had not yet been told whether or not
    FFI planned to hire them. On May 11, 1999, just five days before
    FFI took over the store, the following language began to appear
    in FFI’s hiring advertisements in the local papers:
    No Experience Necessary
    We Will Train You!!
    GC Ex. 17. On the same date, Francisco telephoned the local
    police and informed them that she expected there to be as many as
    200 people picketing in front of the store on May 16--the first
    day of store operations under FFI ownership. GC Ex. 26. Francisco
    could not recall having telephoned the police, Tr. 189-91, but
    when confronted with a police log documenting the fact and
    substance of the conversation, she allowed that "[i]f they say I
    did," she might have placed the call. Tr. 190.
    Meanwhile, in the weeks immediately preceding FFI’s takeover
    of the store, Francisco allegedly had a number of additional
    conversations with RSI employees that again touched upon the
    prospective status of the Union with FFI. The testimony of these
    employees suggests that Francisco was making hiring decisions
    with an eye to avoiding an obligation to recognize the Union.
    (Again, Francisco denies the substance of these conversations.)
    1.   Valerie Clark was an RSI employee who did not apply for
    work with FFI. However, her daughter Carrie--also an RSI
    employee--did seek employment with FFI. On May 1, 1999, Valerie
    Clark asked Francisco about her daughter’s status. She testified
    as follows regarding her conversation with Francisco:
    Q. Okay. And how did the conversation come about or where did it
    take place?
    A. I approached her because I was in the store for other reasons
    and I saw her in aisle five working and I approached her and I
    asked her if she knew yet if Carrie would have a job when she
    took over.
    Q. Did Ms. Francisco give you an answer?
    A. Yeah. She said she did not know yet.
    Q. Did she say anything else?
    A. She said she had to be very careful and get rid of fifty
    percent of the workers and she would make a decision as to Carrie
    probably in the next week.
    Q. When she talked about fifty percent of the workers did she say
    anything else that you recall?
    A. She--when she said she had to get rid of fifty percent of the
    workers I made some goofy comment. I think I said, "Oh God,
    that’s like about everybody." And she said this was not going to
    be a unioned [sic] store."
    Tr. 393-94.
    2.   Four days later, on May 5, Carrie Clark herself asked
    Francisco about her prospects.
    Well, I asked her if she knew whether or not I was going to be
    rehired and she said she didn’t know. She said I wasn’t at the
    top of her firing list and if I were to reapply later on down the
    line that she would rehire me and she’d write me a good
    recommendation. She also said that she wasn’t going to keep a lot
    of the students and there was going to be a lot of new faces
    because she wanted to keep the union out, but she told me that
    information was not supposed to leave the office.
    Tr. 362.
    3.   Head cashier Tina Warriner had worked at the Piggly
    Wiggly for twelve and one-half years. She testified that on or
    about May 8, she asked Francisco whether FFI would hire her. As
    Warriner recounted the conversation, Francisco commented that
    Warriner was "good in the front end" (i.e., good with customers)
    and had a strong attendance record, but "[her] downfall was the
    schedule." Tr. 252. (In addition to her other duties, Warriner
    prepared the initial draft of the weekly employee work schedule
    for Francisco’s review and revision.) Francisco then proceeded to
    inquire whether Warriner, who was a Union steward, would be
    willing to work in a nonunion shop:
    Well, when we were talking about if I had a job or not and she
    was telling me if--you know, that I did have a lot of good
    qualities out there and she would ask me how I could work for--if
    I could work for a nonunion store and I told her I had to get all
    my priorities in order but I probably could.
    Tr. 253. Francisco did not tell Warriner whether she would be
    hired.
    4.   Shortly after the sale of the store was announced,
    Francisco indicated to RSI meat wrapper Joe Curtis that if he
    wanted his job "back," he would have to complete an application.
    Tr. 542. Curtis testified twice on consecutive days before the
    ALJ. According to Curtis’s initial testimony, Francisco went on
    to remark "that she could hire back 50 percent of each--in each
    department [but] if she took the union back, and which would have
    been--I would have been fired." Tr. 543. FFI’s lawyer asked
    Curtis on cross-examination whether it might have been Paul
    Maxwell, the meat manager, who made the latter remark to him
    rather than Francisco. Curtis, however, was firm: "No, it was
    Pam." Tr. 545. Curtis testified that at a later date, Francisco
    informed him that she was able to hire him: "She said we can--now
    I’m able to work . . . ." Tr. 544. Curtis, incidentally, agreed
    that he was not a fan of unions. 
    Id. Notwithstanding his
    initial confidence that it was
    Francisco, and not Maxwell, who had spoken of a fifty-percent
    hiring cap, Curtis was recalled to the stand by FFI on the
    following day to say that he had been mistaken. Tr. 581-82.
    Curtis testified that FFI’s cross-examination on this point had
    started him wondering, and that after extensive reflection, he
    had decided that it was actually Maxwell who had mentioned the
    fifty-percent quota to him. Tr. 585. Once he came to this
    realization, Curtis explained, he had telephoned FFI’s attorney
    at home to alert him to the mistake. Tr. 587-88. When asked on
    cross-examination how he had obtained the attorney’s home
    telephone number, Curtis said that he had looked it up in the
    Ripon telephone directory. 
    Id. It turned
    out, however, that FFI’s
    attorney, James Macy, lived in Oshkosh, Tr. 589, and when Curtis
    was handed a copy of the local telephone directory and asked to
    locate Macy’s number, he spent fifteen minutes trying to do so to
    no avail. Tr. 594-96. When asked to spell Macy’s name, Curtis
    ventured a guess that was incorrect: M-A-S-A-S-E-Y. Tr. 593.
    Curtis eventually conceded that someone may have given him Macy’s
    telephone number. Tr. 596./3
    5.   Night stocker Robert Schumacher was a longtime RSI
    employee to whom Francisco had extended a job offer. As FFI’s
    takeover of the store approached, however, Schumacher grew
    concerned and frustrated about the fate of other RSI employees to
    whom Francisco had not yet extended offers. In early May,
    Schumacher summoned Francisco to the produce room of the store
    and, in front of RSI employee Pat Ritchay, confronted her with a
    series of questions about the impending takeover. According to
    Schumacher, when he asked Francisco why FFI did not simply hire
    all of RSI’s employees, she told him that "she’d hire us all back
    if we would vote out the union." Tr. 412.
    6.   On May 1, Francisco interviewed Jamie Harttert, a
    college student, for a position with FFI. Harttert was not an
    employee of RSI. Harttert told Francisco that she viewed
    employment with FFI as "mainly a summer job" and that once her
    studies resumed in the autumn, she would only be able to work
    every other weekend. Tr. 481. Harttert testified that in
    response, Francisco "explained to me that under the union that
    people would have to work a certain amount of hours per week and
    that I wouldn’t be able to do every other weekend under the
    union. But since she was changing it to a nonunion, that she, you
    know I could work every other weekend." Tr. 481. Francisco hired
    Harttert. According to Harttert, at a meeting for new employees
    that took place at least a week before FFI took over the store,
    Francisco warned them to expect picketing when they started work.
    Tr. 482-83.
    As of May 12, 1999, four days before the change in store
    ownership took effect, seven RSI employees who had applied for
    jobs with FFI still had not been told whether they would be
    hired./4 Two of these people had long affiliations with the
    store: Janet Simmons had worked at the Piggly Wiggly for eleven
    years,/5 while Tina Warriner had worked there for twelve and one-
    half years. The remaining five were employees who had worked at
    the store for relatively short periods of time prior to the sale.
    At approximately 4:00 p.m. on that day, Bob Schumacher led a
    delegation of eight RSI employees to Francisco’s office to ask
    for the return of their job applications. Two of these
    individuals, Schumacher and Penny Pipping--along with Pipping’s
    husband Alan, who was not present--had received offers of
    employment from FFI. The other six individuals-- Tina Warriner,
    Robert Birkrem, Carrie Clark, Jamie Kotlowski, Ryan Sasada, and
    Janet Simmons--had not yet heard whether they would be offered a
    job with FFI. "[I]t [was] a situation where no one really knew
    whether they were hired or not or what kind of games [Francisco]
    was playing because everybody was being told one by one,"
    Schumacher testified. Tr. 414-15. Anticipating that Francisco
    would not recognize the Union, Schumacher and Penny Pipping had
    decided to decline the offers they had received. At the same
    time, a rumor apparently had been circulating among RSI employees
    that none of them would be eligible for unemployment if they
    still had a job application pending with FFI. Wishing to preserve
    that eligibility, the eight members of the group asked Francisco
    to return their applications. Penny Pipping asked for her
    husband’s application back as well. Francisco agreed to return
    all of the applications save that of Alan Pipping, who was not
    present, and went home to retrieve them. After unsuccessfully
    trying to locate the applications, Francisco returned to the
    store and promised the employees that she would bring them with
    her on the following day.
    Separately on that same day, high school student and RSI
    employee Tara Manthei also asked Francisco to return her
    application. Manthei testified that she had asked Francisco about
    her prospects a week earlier, and that Francisco had told her she
    was "not on the top of the firing list." Tr. 532. However,
    Manthei’s mother, Susan, had learned from someone who had seen a
    draft FFI work schedule that Manthei’s name was not on it; and
    she therefore assumed that Francisco was not going to hire her
    daughter. Tr. 474, 533-34. Francisco returned the application to
    Manthei, who eventually discarded it./6
    The Union held a meeting on the evening of May 12. Union
    officials were "flabbergasted" to learn about the withdrawals.
    Tr. 38. They proceeded to admonish RSI employees that it was a
    mistake for them to withdraw their job applications, because a
    pending application with FFI would not, in fact, disqualify them
    from receiving unemployment compensation in the event they were
    not hired. Officials told the employees who had withdrawn their
    applications to resubmit them.
    On the following day, May 13, Francisco arrived at the store
    with the applications whose return had been requested. Penny
    Piping, Carrie Clark, and Jamie Kotlowski accepted their
    applications back and tore them up in front of Francisco. Alan
    Pipping, Ryan Sasada, and Janet Simmons each indicated to
    Francisco that she should keep his or her application. Tina
    Warriner, after receiving her application, returned it to
    Francisco’s desk. Neither Robert Birkrem nor Bob Schumacher ever
    received his application from Francisco, and neither of them
    asked Francisco again for its return. None of these employees
    expressly told Francisco that they still wished to be considered
    for employment with FFI. Francisco testified that she was under
    the impression they were no longer interested: "Well, I assumed
    they didn’t want jobs. They were pulling their applications." Tr.
    641. None of these individuals subsequently received an offer of
    employment from FFI.
    RSI ceased operations and closed several hours early on
    Saturday, May 15, and on the following morning, the Piggly Wiggly
    reopened under FFI’s management./7 As of May 16, FFI had a
    complement of forty-five employees, excluding Francisco. Six of
    the forty-five employees were supervisors or managers; the
    remaining thirty-nine held non-supervisory positions. Of FFI’s
    thirty-nine non-supervisory workers, sixteen had worked for RSI,
    whereas the other twenty-three were "new" hires. The six
    supervisors included three individuals who had formerly worked
    for RSI. Because the former employees of RSI constituted a
    minority of FFI’s non-supervisory workforce, FFI neither
    recognized the Union nor assumed RSI’s obligations under the
    collective bargaining agreement with the Union. The Union
    immediately commenced picketing of the Piggly Wiggly.
    The fact that FFI hired most of its non-supervisory
    employees from outside of the RSI labor pool give rise to
    proceedings before the NLRB. On May 17, 1999, the Union filed a
    charge with the Board asserting that FFI had refused to hire a
    number of RSI’s employees in order to avoid an obligation to
    recognize and bargain with the Union. R. 1 Ex. A. After
    investigating the charge, the Director, on August 30, filed the
    complaint we described at the outset of this opinion. 
    Id. Ex. B.
    An administrative law judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on
    that complaint which concluded on October 1, 1999. On November
    30, the Director petitioned the district court for interim
    injunctive relief. R. 1. The Director’s request was submitted to
    the court along with the record of the evidentiary hearing before
    the ALJ.
    The district court denied the Director’s petition for two
    principal reasons. First, the court concluded that the Director
    had not shown that the Union faced irreparable harm in the
    absence of interim injunctive relief. Although the Director
    argued that the Union’s status among store employees would erode
    while awaiting relief from the Board, the court characterized
    this as nothing more than speculation. R. 23 at 5. As the court
    viewed the record, FFI had not engaged in the kinds of unfair
    practices that would convey to employees an intolerance of Union
    activity or that would otherwise chill support for the Union. 
    Id. at 5-6.
    The court pointed out that Francisco had invited
    applications from RSI’s employees; had actively recruited several
    of those individuals, including one whom she knew to be an active
    Union supporter; had ultimately hired nineteen of the thirty-four
    RSI employees who sought employment with FFI; and had indicated
    to a number of store employees that unionization would be up to
    them. These facts revealed no propensity on the part of FFI to
    engage in coercive acts in order to evade an obligation to
    bargain with the Union. 
    Id. at 6.
    At the same time, should the
    Board ultimately find in the Director’s favor, the Union would be
    reinstated as the employees’ representative, giving it the
    opportunity to re-establish support among store employees. 
    Id. at 6-7.
    Second, the court believed that the Director had no better
    than a negligible chance of prevailing on the merits of his
    complaint. In order to impose a duty on FFI to recognize and
    bargain with the Union, the Director would have to show both that
    FFI qualified as RSI’s successor and that FFI had made
    discriminatory hiring decisions in order to avoid having a union-
    dominated workforce. The court thought it likely that the
    Director would succeed on the first of these points: FFI, like
    RSI, operated a grocery store, sold similar products, and, like
    RSI, marketed those products primarily to consumers. 
    Id. at 8-9.
    But the court did not think it likely that the Director would
    convince the Board that FFI’s hiring decisions were
    discriminatory. FFI had conducted an open hiring process and had
    invited RSI’s employees to apply for jobs with FFI; Francisco had
    recruited a known Union advocate along with several other RSI
    employees; and FFI had extended offers to all but eleven of the
    thirty-four RSI employees who had submitted applications. 
    Id. at 11.
    All of the eleven RSI workers to whom FFI did not offer jobs,
    the court explained, "had demonstrated legitimate performance or
    employability concerns." 
    Id. at 11.
    Four of them had problems in
    their work histories. 
    Id. at 11
    n.17. The remaining seven were
    among the ten RSI employees who had asked Francisco to return
    their applications on May 12. 
    Id. at 11
    -12. In doing so, those
    seven employees had genuinely put their interest in employment
    with FFI, and their desirability as prospective hires, into
    doubt. 
    Id. at 12.
    Consequently, even if the Director were able to
    prove that anti-union animus played a role in Francisco’s hiring
    decisions, the court was convinced that FFI would still be able
    to show that it wouldn’t have hired the eleven individuals to
    whom it did not extend offers for legitimate, non-discriminatory
    reasons. 
    Id. at 12-13.
    Nearly two months after the district court denied the
    Director’s petition for interim relief, the ALJ who heard the
    Director’s complaint issued an order which concluded, in relevant
    part, that FFI had declined to hire certain RSI employees in
    order to avoid having to recognize and bargain with the Union.
    Francisco Foods, Inc. and United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
    Local No. 73A, AFL-CIO, No. 30-CA-14738 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges
    Mar. 31, 2000) (hereinafter, "ALJ Decision")./8 The ALJ found
    that the Director’s witnesses had credibly testified to a variety
    of statements by Francisco to the effect that FFI did not plan to
    recognize the Union, and that she was making hiring decisions in
    such a way as to keep former RSI employees in the minority of
    FFI’s workforce so as to avoid a duty to recognize and bargain
    with the Union. 
    Id. at 13-14.
    Consistent with those statements,
    the ALJ went on to find, Francisco had purposely delayed action
    on the employment applications of a number of RSI workers:
    The employees of the Bayers were treated like puppets on a
    string. Francisco didn’t want to recognize the union and
    refrained from offering jobs to employees of the Bayers until she
    was sure that less than a majority of Respondent’s employees
    would be former employees of the predecessor. At the same time
    employees are waiting to see if they had a job Francisco is
    advertising for employees and advising prospective employees that
    no experience is required.
    Based on the entire record it is crystal clear to me and I
    believe would be to anyone who saw and heard the witnesses in
    this case that to avoid successorship status Respondent did not
    hire a number of employees.
    
    Id. at 14
    (emphasis in original).
    Against this backdrop, the ALJ did not find it fatal to the
    Director’s case that ten RSI workers had asked Francisco to
    return their applications on May 12. The ALJ concluded that FFI
    was not going to hire seven of these individuals in any event.
    One of them, Tara Manthei, had already learned (through her
    mother) that she would not be hired. The return of her
    application, therefore, was merely a nod to the inevitable. 
    Id. at 14
    , 16. Six other employees had still not been told whether
    FFI planned to hire them, notwithstanding the fact that FFI’s
    takeover of the store was just days away. "Again, puppets on a
    string." 
    Id. at 14
    . Although the applications of these six
    employees nominally remained under consideration, the evidence
    suggested to the ALJ that Francisco was not going to hire them.
    On the day prior to the withdrawals, Francisco had telephoned the
    Ripon police to inform them that she expected up to 200 picketers
    when the store reopened under FFI ownership on May 16. Because
    the Union would have no reason to picket the store if a majority
    of FFI’s workforce were former RSI employees-- thus obligating
    FFI to recognize the Union--the ALJ construed Francisco’s
    telephone call as confirmation that Francisco had no intent to
    extend offers to the six individuals who, as of the time they
    withdrew their applications, had not yet been told whether or not
    FFI would hire them. 
    Id. at 15.
    Accordingly, the ALJ found it
    appropriate to treat these six individuals, along with Manthei,
    as victims of discrimination:
    To hold it against Birkrem, Clark, Kotlowski, Manthei, Sasada,
    Simmons, and Warriner that they withdrew their applications and
    [to say that they] weren’t hired for that reason when they had no
    chance to be hired in any event would be horribly unfair.
    
    Id. at 15.
    The ALJ also emphasized that six of the ten employees who
    had asked for their applications back had effectively reversed
    their requests. 
    Id. at 15.
    Several individuals returned their
    applications to Francisco; others never received their
    applications back from Francisco and did not ask her again to
    return them. 
    Id. Three of
    the employees who asked for their applications
    back, however, had ripped them up in Francisco’s presence. On the
    face of things, these three employees had taken themselves out of
    the running for positions with FFI. Yet, in the ALJ’s view, FFI
    had "forced [these employees] into an untenable position" by
    making its hiring decisions in such a way as to avoid having to
    recognize the Union. 
    Id. at 16.
    (The same was true of Tara
    Manthei, who had asked for her application back--and kept it--
    only after her mother learned that Manthei would not be hired.
    Id.)
    Even if these three individuals were removed from analysis,
    the ALJ pointed out, the evidence still supported the Director’s
    claim that FFI had refused employment to a number of RSI
    employees in order to avoid a union-dominated workforce. Had FFI
    hired the other seven individuals who had asked for their
    applications back, twenty-three of FFI’s thirty-nine non-
    supervisory employees would have been former employees of RSI.
    "In other words, a clear majority would [have been] employees of
    [FFI’s] predecessor." 
    Id. at 16.
         In terms of the kind of business that FFI conducted, the ALJ
    had no doubt that the new company qualified as RSI’s successor:
    The facts in this case show a "substantial continuity" between
    the predecessor and successor employers. Respondent operates a
    Piggly Wiggly franchise grocery store at the same location as the
    predecessor, utilizing the same equipment and facilities;
    attracts the same customers; offers basically the same product
    lines; employs supervisors who worked for the predecessor; and
    employs employees in the same working classifications and under
    the same working conditions as the predecessor.
    
    Id. at 16.
    In sum, the ALJ concluded that but for its discriminatory
    hiring decisions, FFI would have been obliged to recognize and
    bargain with the Union. He therefore ordered FFI, inter alia, to
    offer jobs to the ten employees who had withdrawn their
    applications and, on request, to recognize and bargain with the
    Union. 
    Id. at 17-18.
    II.
    Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act authorizes
    a district court to enter "just and proper" injunctive relief
    pending the final disposition of an unfair labor practices claim
    by the Board. 29 U.S.C. sec. 160(j). We review the district
    court’s decision to grant or deny interim injunctive relief for
    abuse of discretion. NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc., 
    83 F.3d 1559
    ,
    1566 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 1055
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 683
    (1997).
    The familiar factors that courts reference in weighing the
    propriety of preliminary injunctive relief in other contexts--the
    lack of an adequate remedy at law, the balance of potential harms
    posed by the denial or grant of interim relief, the public
    interest, and the petitioner’s likelihood of success on the
    merits of its complaint--apply to requests for relief pursuant to
    section 10(j) as well. Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 
    881 F.2d 485
    , 490
    & n.3, 493 (7th Cir. 1989); see also 
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1566
    . Thus, the Director will be entitled to interim relief when:
    (1) the Director has no adequate remedy at law;
    (2) the labor effort would face irreparable harm without interim
    relief, and the prospect of that harm outweighs any harm posed to
    the employer by the proposed injunction;
    (3) "public harm" would occur in the absence of interim relief;
    (4) the Director has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the
    merits of his complaint.
    
    Id. at 1567-68.
    The Director bears the burden of establishing the
    first, third, and fourth of these circumstances by a
    preponderance of the evidence. 
    Id. The strength
    of the Director’s case on the merits affects
    the court’s assessment of the relative harms posed by the grant
    or denial of injunctive relief: the greater the Director’s
    prospects of prevailing are, the less compelling need be his
    showing of irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.   
    Id. at 1568.
    But, in evaluating the likelihood of success, it is   not
    the district court’s responsibility, nor is it ours, to rule   on
    the merits of the Director’s complaint; that is the Board’s
    province. The court’s inquiry is confined to the probability   that
    the Director will prevail. See 
    id. at 1570.
    In making this assessment, we must keep in mind that the
    district court rejected the Director’s petition for relief under
    section 10(j) based solely on the written record of the evidence
    presented before the ALJ. The district judge heard no testimony
    himself, and consequently had no occasion to assess the
    credibility of witnesses or to resolve conflicts in the evidence.
    Under these circumstances, we owe the Director a favorable
    construction of the evidence, much as we would if he were a
    plaintiff appealing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
    defendant. See 
    Kinney, 881 F.2d at 489
    ; see also 
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1566
    n.15. We will therefore credit the Director’s
    factual averments so long as they are plausible in light of the
    record evidence. See 
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1570
    ./9
    We must also bear in mind that it is the Board, and not this
    court, which is principally charged with the administration and
    enforcement of the Act. See United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc.,
    
    145 F.3d 850
    , 861 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    525 U.S. 949
    , 119 S.
    Ct. 375, 376 (1998). If and when we are called upon to review the
    Board’s final order in this case, we will owe the Board’s
    judgment considerable deference. E.g., Multi-Ad Servs., Inc. v.
    NLRB, 
    255 F.3d 363
    , 370-71 (7th Cir. 2001). In view of our
    limited role, and given the Board’s expertise in matters of labor
    relations, we must be "hospitable" to the General Counsel’s view
    of the law. Miller v. California Pacific Med. Ctr., 
    19 F.3d 449
    ,
    460 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), quoting Danielson v. Joint Bd. of
    Coat, Suit & Allied Garment Workers’ Union, 
    494 F.2d 1230
    , 1245
    (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.); see also Pattern Makers’ League of
    N.A., AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 
    473 U.S. 95
    , 114, 
    105 S. Ct. 3064
    , 3075
    (1985); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 
    441 U.S. 488
    , 497, 
    99 S. Ct. 1842
    , 1849 (1979); NLRB v. Manitowoc Eng’g Co., 
    909 F.2d 963
    , 971
    n.10 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Clipper City Lodge
    No. 516 v. NLRB, 
    498 U.S. 1083
    , 
    111 S. Ct. 954
    (1991).
    Finally, although we do not sit in review of the ALJ’s
    decision--which the parties have cross-appealed to the Board--his
    opinion is nonetheless relevant to the propriety of section 10(j)
    relief. Assessing the Director’s likelihood of success calls for
    a predictive judgment about what the Board is likely to do with
    the case. The ALJ is the Board’s first-level decisionmaker.
    Having presided over the merits hearing, the ALJ’s factual and
    legal determinations supply a useful benchmark against which the
    Director’s prospects of success may be weighed. See, e.g.,
    Hoffman v. Inn Credible Caterers, Ltd., 
    247 F.3d 360
    , 367 (2d
    Cir. 2001); Silverman v. J.R.L. Food Corp., 
    196 F.3d 334
    , 337-38
    (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Rivera-Vega v. ConAgra, Inc., 
    70 F.3d 153
    , 161 (1st Cir. 1995); Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 
    517 F.2d 33
    , 37 n.7 & 40 n.11 (2d Cir. 1975).
    With these principles in mind, we turn to the Director’s
    case, considering each of the elements set forth above. We begin
    with the Director’s likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his
    complaint against FFI.
    A.   Likelihood of success
    One of the prospects that confronted FFI when it decided to
    acquire the Ripon Piggly Wiggly franchise from RSI was the
    potential obligation, as RSI’s successor, to bargain with the
    Union. The Supreme Court has recognized that when "[a] new
    employer makes a conscious decision to maintain generally the
    same business and to hire a majority of its employees from [its]
    predecessor," it must bargain with the union that represented the
    predecessor’s employees. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v.
    NLRB, 
    482 U.S. 27
    , 41, 
    107 S. Ct. 2225
    , 2234 (1987); see also
    NLRB v. Burns Int’l Security Servs., Inc., 
    406 U.S. 272
    , 280-81,
    
    92 S. Ct. 1571
    , 1578-79 (1972). When FFI opened for business,
    only a minority of its non-supervisory employees (sixteen of
    thirty-nine) formerly had worked for RSI./10 Nominally, then, it
    had no obligation to bargain with the Union. It is the Director’s
    theory, however, that FFI made its hiring decisions in a
    calculated manner aimed at ensuring that the former employees of
    RSI did not constitute a majority of the FFI workforce. Of
    course, FFI bore no obligation to hire any of RSI’s employees.
    Fall 
    River, 482 U.S. at 40
    , 107 S. Ct. at 2234, citing 
    Burns, 406 U.S. at 280
    & 
    n.5, 92 S. Ct. at 1578
    & n.5. Yet, FFI was not free
    to make discriminatory hiring decisions with the purpose of
    avoiding a duty to bargain with the representative of RSI’s
    workforce. 
    Ibid. Of course, it
    is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
    discriminate in hiring or retention of employees on the basis of
    union membership or activity under sec. 8(a)(3) of the National
    Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a)(3). Thus, a new owner
    could not refuse to hire the employees of his predecessor solely
    because they were union members or to avoid having to recognize
    the union.
    Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Join Executive Bd., AFL-CIO,
    
    417 U.S. 249
    , 262 n.8, 
    94 S. Ct. 2236
    , 2243 n.8 (1974). That is
    precisely what the Director believes that FFI did in this case;
    and in doing so, he asserts, FFI violated not only section
    8(a)(3) but also section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Section 8(a)(3) bars
    an employer from making discriminatory employment decisions in
    order "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
    organization . . . ." 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a)(3). Section 8(a)(5)
    provides that an employer commits an unfair labor practice when
    he "refuse[s] to bargain collectively with the representatives of
    his employees . . . ." 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a)(5).
    To prevail on the merits of his complaint, the Director will
    have to prove two key propositions. Preliminarily, he will have
    to establish that FFI is RSI’s successor--that is, that FFI has
    made "a conscious decision to maintain generally the same
    business" as RSI. Fall 
    River, 482 U.S. at 41
    , 107 S. Ct. at 2234.
    Second, because only a minority of FFI’s employees formerly
    worked for RSI, the Director will have to prove that FFI refused
    to make job offers to a number of RSI employees in order to keep
    former RSI employees in the minority and thus avoid the duty to
    bargain with the Union. See id. at 
    40, 107 S. Ct. at 2234
    . For
    purposes of the request for interim injunctive relief, the
    Director must demonstrate that his chances of proving these
    points are "better than negligible." 
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1568
    .
    1.
    FFI contends for a variety of reasons that there is no
    substantial continuity of enterprise between RSI and FFI. First,
    FFI’s organizational structure differs from RSI’s in a number of
    respects: department heads have been given more supervisory
    authority, including the right to hire, discipline, and terminate
    employees (Tr. 83, 617); positions have been created for a
    customer service manager, a maintenance manager, and a
    bookkeeper, none of which existed under RSI’s ownership (Tr. 167,
    629-30); new job descriptions have been written (Tr. 627-28); and
    employees have been cross-trained so that they can handle a
    variety of assignments (Tr. 167, 629). Second, FFI has stopped
    using some of RSI’s vendors and has begun using others that RSI
    had not used. Tr. 631-32. Third and finally, FFI has purchased
    new equipment (including checkout equipment and thermal printers)
    and changed its way of doing business to the extent that it no
    longer maintains handwritten customer accounts. Tr. 630-31. The
    record also reveals certain other changes: the store’s floral
    department has been eliminated (Tr. 631); its offering of bakery
    goods has expanded (Tr. 618-19); and in general Francisco is
    attempting to update the store (Tr. 618).
    These changes notwithstanding, we think it likely that the
    Board will find there to be a substantial continuity between RSI
    and FFI. The continuity assessment takes into account several
    factors, including "whether the business of both employers is
    essentially the same; whether the employees of the new company
    are doing the same jobs in the same working conditions under the
    same supervisors; and whether the new entity has the same
    production process, produces the same products, and basically has
    the same body of customers." Fall 
    River, 482 U.S. at 43
    , 107 S.
    Ct. at 2236. These factors tilt rather strongly in favor of a
    finding of substantial continuity. FFI operates the same Piggly
    Wiggly grocery store that RSI did. There was virtually no hiatus
    between RSI’s departure as the owner and FFI’s assumption of
    control. Cf. 
    id. at 45,
    107 S. Ct. at 2237. With the exception of
    the new positions that FFI has created, FFI employees appear to
    be performing largely the same tasks, under comparable
    conditions, and under a number of the same supervisors, as RSI
    employees did; they are simply doing it under new ownership.
    Obviously the basic nature of the products that the store sells
    has not changed--notwithstanding the changes in FFI’s vendors--
    nor has the store’s customer base. Given these material
    similarities between the two enterprises, it is highly likely
    that the Director will succeed in providing that FFI is RSI’s
    successor. See R. 23 at 8-9.
    2.
    The critical question, then, is whether the hiring decisions
    that FFI made with respect to RSI workers were motivated by a
    desire to avoid having to bargain with the Union. See R. 23 at 9.
    An employer’s motive is a factual matter which, like any other
    fact, may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. U.S.
    Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 
    944 F.2d 1305
    , 1315 (7th Cir. 1991) (en
    banc), cert. denied, 
    503 U.S. 936
    , 
    112 S. Ct. 1474
    (1992). The
    Director may establish that FFI acted with an unlawful motive by
    presenting substantial evidence that the company harbored an
    anti-union animus; that it lacked convincing reasons not to hire
    RSI’s employees; that it made inconsistent hiring decisions or
    engaged in other conduct evincing a discriminatory motive; and/or
    that FFI staffed its store in such a way as to preclude former
    RSI employees from forming a majority of the FFI workforce. See
    
    id. at 1316-19.
    If the Director succeeds in establishing that
    FFI’s hiring decisions were motivated by an anti-union animus,
    the burden shifts to FFI to prove that irrespective of that
    animus, it would have turned away the RSI employees that it
    refused to hire for legitimate reasons. 
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1568
    . The district court found that the Director’s chances of
    prevailing on this aspect of its case were no more than
    negligible. R. 23 at 10-13. Having reviewed the record, however,
    we conclude that the Director’s prospects are much better than
    that.
    To begin with, reading the record favorably to the Director,
    FFI signaled repeatedly during the two-month period between the
    announcement and the completion of the sale that it did not plan
    to bargain with the Union when it assumed ownership of the store.
    According to Withers, when he and Francisco spoke on March 15,
    Francisco told him that FFI did not intend to recognize the
    Union, although she might "let [her] new employees decide what to
    do." GC Ex. 4. When Withers asked Francisco whether the reference
    to her "new employees" meant that she did not plan to retain the
    employees of RSI, Francisco confirmed that she was "not going to
    keep the bargaining unit." 
    Id. That same
    day, Francisco allegedly
    told another employee, assistant store manager Michael Ritchay,
    that "it wouldn’t be a union"--a remark that Francisco later
    qualified, according to Ritchay, by saying that the new employees
    could vote for union representation if that was what they wanted.
    Tr. 432-33. RSI employees Joann Schrader and Adam Simonis
    testified that Francisco likewise remarked to them she did not
    plan to recognize the Union at the outset, but that FFI employees
    could always vote in favor of union representation. Tr. 340, 497.
    Indeed, Francisco herself acknowledges having told store
    employees that she would not recognize the Union automatically
    but instead would leave the decision up to her employees. Tr.
    646. Even FFI’s attorney candidly wrote to Withers on March 16
    stating that "the Company does not anticipate assuming the
    collective bargaining agreement." GC Ex. 5; see also GC Ex. 33 at
    1. At least one week before the store changed hands, Francisco
    allegedly told Jamie Harttert and other newly hired individuals
    to expect picketing when they began work. Tr. 482-83. And on May
    11, Francisco telephoned local police to inform them that she
    expected picketing in front of the store when FFI assumed
    ownership on May 16. GC Ex. 26. All of this suggests that FFI
    never intended to have a workforce dominated by the union-
    affiliated employees of RSI. Even Francisco’s allowance that she
    might let her employees decide about union representation is
    telling, for if a majority of FFI’s hires had been RSI employees,
    the company would have had no choice but to recognize and bargain
    with the Union. See Eldorado, Inc., 335 NLRB No. 76, 
    2001 WL 1083271
    , at *6 n.4 (Aug. 27, 2001); Bay Area Mack, 
    293 N.L.R.B. 125
    ,
    125 & n.5 (1989).
    In addition to these signals, of course, there are other
    remarks attributed to Francisco indicating that she was
    determined to keep former RSI employees in the minority in the
    FFI workforce. According to the written statement of RSI employee
    Evonne Everson, Francisco told her that she planned to hire only
    fifty percent of RSI’s employees, "because she wouldn’t have the
    Union." GC Ex. 29. When Valerie Clark inquired about her
    daughter’s prospects for employment with FFI, Francisco allegedly
    told her "she had to be very careful and get rid of fifty percent
    of the workers . . . ," Tr. 393-94, because "this was not going
    to be a unioned store." Tr. 394. Carrie Clark herself later spoke
    with Francisco and purportedly was told that "there was going to
    be a lot of new faces because she wanted to keep the union out."
    Tr. 362. When RSI cashier and Union steward Tina Warriner
    inquired about the chances of FFI hiring her, Francisco,
    according to Warriner, complimented her on her attendance and her
    positive interaction with store customers, but asked her whether
    she was willing to work "for a nonunion store." Tr. 253.
    Francisco told meat wrapper Joe Curtis, according to Curtis’s
    initial testimony, that she was able to take back fifty percent
    of the employees from each department, but that if she "took the
    union back," he would be fired. Tr. 543. And when stocker Robert
    Schumacher asked Francisco why she didn’t simply hire all of
    RSI’s employees, Francisco, according to Schumacher, replied that
    she would be willing to do so "if we would vote out the union."
    Tr. 412. If one credits this testimony (as the ALJ ultimately
    did), one can readily infer that Francisco conducted the hiring
    process with the paramount goal of keeping the percentage of
    former RSI employees below the fifty percent mark, so that FFI
    would not be obligated to deal with the Union. And if one credits
    the testimony regarding Francisco’s remarks about the picketing
    she expected when the store reopened under FFI ownership, one can
    reasonably infer that Francisco fully intended to meet that goal.
    There is, in short, ample evidence that FFI’s hiring
    decisions were animated by an intent to avoid a duty to recognize
    and bargain with the Union. The remarks that the Director relies
    upon amount to direct, rather than circumstantial evidence of an
    anti-union animus, see generally Venters v. City of Delphi, 
    123 F.3d 956
    , 972-73 (7th Cir. 1997), and in contrast to the stray
    remarks we often see in employment cases, e.g., Schaffner v.
    Glencoe Park Dist., 
    256 F.3d 616
    , 623 (7th Cir. 2001),
    Francisco’s alleged statements reflect the thoughts of a
    decisionmaker regarding the very employment decisions that the
    Director has challenged. If credited, this evidence would raise a
    presumption that FFI used the hiring process to stack the deck
    against the Union and to avoid any obligation to bargain with it.
    The district court acknowledged this evidence, R. 23 at 10,
    but emphasized other facts which, in the court’s view, were
    inconsistent with the notion that FFI was discriminating against
    union members. Among other things, the court noted that all RSI
    employees were notified of change of ownership and encouraged to
    apply for employment with FFI; the hiring process in fact was
    open to all RSI employees; Francisco actively recruited several
    RSI employees, including one who was known to be a Union
    supporter; only eleven of the thirty-four RSI employees
    (including supervisors) who sought employment with FFI did not
    receive job offers; and it was undisputed that four of those
    eleven employees were not hired for legitimate, performance-
    related reasons. See R. 23 at 11 & n.17, 13 & n.21.
    Certainly those circumstances are consistent with a hiring
    process untainted by discrimination, but by no means do they
    foreclose the possibility that FFI was choosing its employees so
    as to obviate the need to bargain with the Union when it took
    over the store. It was entirely possible for FFI to encourage and
    accept job applications from RSI workers, and indeed to hire a
    substantial number of RSI employees, and still avoid having to
    recognize the Union, so long as former RSI employees comprised
    less than half of its workforce. Proceeding in that fashion was
    arguably the smarter course if, indeed, FFI’s goal was to
    displace the Union. Refusing to hire anyone at RSI would have
    been an obvious sign of discrimination and would have deprived
    FFI of employees with valuable experience. By instead following a
    more selective path, FFI might appear to be conducting the hiring
    process in a non-discriminatory manner, yet still achieve what
    the Director believes was its illicit goal. See ALJ Decision at
    15.
    In fact, the testimony of the Director’s witnesses is
    entirely consistent with the latter scenario. Although Francisco
    invited RSI workers to apply for employment with FFI, both she
    and FFI’s counsel indicated early on that FFI did not anticipate
    automatic recognition of the Union--an announcement which
    implicitly, but unmistakably, suggests that FFI expected most of
    its employees to be new, i.e., not from RSI’s unionized
    workforce. Indeed, if the testimony and notes of Union official
    Grant Withers are believed, Francisco told Withers expressly that
    she would not be retaining the employees of RSI. Again crediting
    the Director’s witnesses, Francisco then embarked on a careful
    course of picking and choosing among RSI’s employees, all the
    while keeping in the forefront of her mind that RSI employees had
    to remain in the minority of FFI’s workforce or FFI would have to
    bargain with the Union--a criterion that she mentioned to several
    RSI employees. Francisco’s fidelity to the fifty-percent cap on
    RSI employees is arguably borne out by the fact that as FFI’s
    takeover of the store approached in May, FFI still had not told a
    number of applicants from RSI, including two longtime store
    employees, whether they would be hired, even as FFI was placing
    the "No Experience Necessary" ads in the local papers in an
    effort to fill its remaining positions. When RSI head cashier
    Tina Warriner asked Francisco, one week before FFI assumed
    ownership of the store, whether she would have a job with FFI,
    Francisco was largely complimentary of her skills but was curious
    about whether Warriner would be willing to work "for a nonunion
    store." Tr. 253. One may reasonably infer from this evidence that
    Francisco was sitting on the applications of a number of RSI
    applicants, rather than rejecting them outright, so as to
    maintain the appearance of a non-discriminatory hiring process
    while ensuring, in the end, that less than fifty percent of FFI’s
    hires were RSI workers./11
    An important wrinkle in the Director’s case is the fact
    Francisco did make offers to twenty RSI employees for non-
    supervisory positions with FFI./12 When FFI assumed ownership of
    the store, it did so with a complement of thirtynine non-
    supervisory employees. Had twenty of those employees been Union
    members, FFI would have been obliged to recognize the Union. As
    FFI sees things, then, the fact that FFI extended offers to
    twenty of RSI’s non-supervisory employees is wholly inconsistent
    with the notion that the new company was attempting to dodge a
    duty to bargain with the Union. The Director, on the other hand,
    suggests that Francisco likely was staggering her hiring
    decisions, keeping careful track of how many RSI employees
    accepted employment with FFI, so as to avoid the possibility of
    having a union-dominated workforce. We must point out, however,
    that the record does not fully disclose the chronology of the
    offers that Francisco made to RSI employees./13
    Like the other facts that the district court highlighted,
    the fact that Francisco extended offers to twenty RSI workers for
    non-supervisory posts with FFI certainly is consistent with a
    hiring process untainted by any unlawful motive; but again we
    believe that the record leaves ample room for a contrary
    conclusion. There is, for example, evidence that Francisco was
    postponing action on the applications of some RSI workers,
    including two longtime employees of RSI whose credentials would
    have been well known to Francisco. Francisco’s conversation with
    one of those two employees, Tina Warriner, suggests that
    Francisco was as concerned about her ability to work "for a
    nonunion store" as she was about Warriner’s qualifications, Tr.
    253, and that she may have been delaying action on the
    application for that reason. Similarly, when Francisco first
    spoke with meat wrapper Joe Curtis about his likelihood of being
    hired, she indicated that she would "fire" him if she were
    obligated to recognize the Union. Tr. 543. In a later
    conversation, however, Francisco told Curtis that "now" she could
    hire him. Tr. 544. That remark can be construed as evidence that
    Francisco was carefully timing her employment decisions, as the
    Director suggests. Francisco’s conversation with Carrie Clark
    supports a similar inference. Francisco purportedly told Clark, a
    student worker, that "she wasn’t going to keep a lot of the
    students and there was going to be a lot of new faces because she
    wanted to keep the union out," Tr. 362; but she also told Clark
    that if "[she] were to reapply later on down the line that
    [Francisco] would rehire [her]," 
    id. Moreover, although
    the store
    opened on May 16 with a complement of thirty-nine non-supervisory
    workers, nothing in the record suggests that this number was ever
    written in stone. FFI, obviously, could hire as many employees as
    it wished. Indeed, for more than two months after it assumed
    ownership of the store, FFI continued to advertise for additional
    employees. See GC Ex. 17. Consequently, even if all twenty of the
    individuals who received job offers from Francisco had accepted
    them, it was not a foregone conclusion that they would have
    constituted more than fifty percent of FFI’s employees./14
    Francisco’s many alleged references to the need to hire less than
    fifty percent union-affiliated workers suggest that she might
    have avoided that eventuality by hiring additional employees not
    affiliated with RSI. And Francisco’s anticipation--announced to
    both Harttert (and other new hires) as well as the Ripon police--
    that there likely would be large-scale picketing when the store
    opened under FFI management on May 16, suggests that she never
    made room for the possibility of a union-dominated workforce.
    The fact that seven of the RSI applicants who had not yet
    received offers asked Francisco to return their job applications
    on May 12 presents a second wrinkle in the Director’s case. Had
    one or more of these individuals received and accepted offers
    (along with, or in addition to the three other RSI workers who
    had already received offers but who likewise asked for their
    applications back), Union members might have constituted a
    majority of FFI’s workforce. The district court was of the belief
    that the withdrawals were important for two reasons. First, the
    withdrawals deprived FFI of the opportunity to actually make an
    employment decision with respect to the seven individuals who had
    not yet received offers. R. 23 at 11-12. This in turn rendered
    any assessment as to the company’s intent vis a vis these
    individuals speculative. 
    Id. at 11.
    It was unlikely, the district
    court added, that these individuals could show their withdrawals
    were precipitated by Francisco’s allegedly discriminatory intent,
    because "none state that they were aware of any anti-union
    animus." 
    Id. at 12.
    Second, the withdrawals in and of themselves
    constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for FFI not
    to hire these applicants and thus rebutted any inference of
    discrimination that might arise from other evidence. 
    Id. In short,
    "[i]t was the employees’ own action which legitimately put
    their interest and desirability in doubt." 
    Id. Although the
    withdrawals do complicate the Director’s case,
    they do not impose an obstacle so great as to render his chances
    of prevailing on the merits negligible. The district court’s
    assessment that FFI was "deprived" of the opportunity to make a
    decision with respect to these candidates not only overlooks the
    fact that several of the employees returned their applications to
    Francisco (in effect rescinding the withdrawals) but, more
    importantly, assumes that FFI had not already made its decision
    with respect to these employees. Perhaps FFI did have each of
    these applicants under active consideration and was willing to
    hire all of them even if it meant having to bargain with the
    Union. Yet, as we have already emphasized, there is a wealth of
    evidence permitting a contrary inference: (1) Francisco had told
    RSI employees and the Union from the start that FFI did not
    intend to recognize the Union automatically. (2) She allegedly
    told several individuals that she was taking care not to hire a
    staff comprised of more than fifty percent former RSI employees,
    so that FFI would not have to recognize the Union. (3) As of May
    12, the date on which the withdrawals occurred and just four days
    before FFI assumed ownership of the store, FFI had still not told
    these seven employees whether they would be hired, even though
    two of them had worked at RSI for more than a decade. (4) On May
    11, five days before FFI assumed ownership and one day prior to
    the withdrawals, FFI began to include the "No Experience
    Necessary--We Will Train You!" language in its newspaper
    advertisements. That language reasonably suggests that FFI was
    actively soliciting applications from outside of the RSI labor
    pool, even as the applications of seven RSI employees nominally
    were still under consideration. (5) Finally, before the
    withdrawals occurred on May 12, Francisco allegedly had already
    told new hires (at least one week before the takeover) and the
    local police (on May 11) that she expected picketing in front of
    the store on May 16. Arguably, Francisco would not have expected
    picketing, and would not have alerted the police to that
    possibility, unless she were confident that a majority of FFI’s
    workforce would not be Union members and that she would therefore
    have no obligation to recognize the Union. All of this evidence,
    if credited, suggests that the rejection of some, if not all, of
    these seven applicants was a foregone conclusion. One may further
    infer from that same evidence that the employees who withdrew
    their applications believed they were all but certain to be
    rejected: (1) Francisco’s unwillingness to recognize the Union
    was not only communicated to numerous RSI employees but was,
    according to the Union business representative, openly discussed
    at the very first Union meeting called to discuss FFI’s takeover
    of the store. Tr. 36. (2) No action had been taken on the job
    applications of these employees even as the reopening of the
    store under FFI was just days away. (3) These individuals
    withdrew their applications based on an erroneous belief that a
    pending job application might disqualify them from receiving
    unemployment benefits. It is at least a fair inference that they
    would not have been concerned about unemployment compensation
    unless they expected Francisco not to hire them. That is, in
    point of fact, the precise inference that the ALJ drew from the
    evidence. ALJ Decision at 8, 15.
    With respect to the three individuals who had received
    offers of employment from FFI, the Director has a plausible
    argument that FFI constructively discharged them. Francisco had
    allegedly remarked to a number of RSI employees that FFI would be
    a nonunion store long before she hired a full complement of
    workers. Employees throughout the store were aware of those
    remarks, as we have noted. By allegedly making plain her
    discriminatory intent, Francisco put the Union members to whom
    she extended offers in the untenable position of forgoing
    employment or foregoing their right to representation by the
    Union. The Board, with our endorsement, has found similar facts
    to constitute a constructive discharge. See Canteen Co., 
    317 N.L.R.B. 1052
    , 1068 (1995), enf’d, 
    103 F.3d 1355
    , 1365-66 (7th Cir.
    1997).
    Even if these three individuals are excluded from the
    analysis, however, we are still left with the seven individuals
    who had not yet received offers. Had they been hired, these seven
    individuals would have been more than sufficient to place Union
    members in the majority of FFI’s complement of employees. One may
    readily infer, then, as the ALJ in fact did, that but for FFI’s
    allegedly discriminatory hiring decisions, FFI would have been
    obliged to recognize and bargain with the Union. See ALJ Decision
    at 16.
    We conclude, in sum, that the Director has a better than
    negligible chance of establishing that FFI chose its employees so
    as to avoid any obligation to bargain with the Union. Although
    the evidence may permit the conclusion that FFI did not, in fact,
    discriminate against RSI applicants, there is ample evidence that
    FFI never intended to recognize the Union and made its hiring
    decisions accordingly. Indeed, given the direct, and rather
    extensive, evidence that Francisco was making hiring decisions so
    as to keep Union members in the minority among her employees, we
    rate the Director’s chances of succeeding as strong.
    Finally, although the ALJ did not decide whether any of
    Francisco’s alleged remarks about the prospective status of the
    Union constituted violations of section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as
    the Director asserts, because these remarks are relevant to the
    asserted need for interim relief, we think it useful to point out
    that the Board repeatedly has found that comparable remarks
    indeed do run afoul of this provision. Section 8(a)(1) provides
    that it is an unlawful labor practice for an employer "to
    interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of
    their rights under the Act. 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a)(1). As the
    Board has recognized, until a successor employer has hired its
    entire complement of employees, it does not know how many of the
    unionized employees of its predecessor will be in that
    complement, and so it cannot know whether it will be obligated to
    recognize and bargain with the union. Thus, "[w]hen an employer
    tells applicants that the company will be nonunion before it
    hires its employees, the employer indicates to the applicants
    that it intends to discriminate against the [predecessor’s]
    employees to ensure its nonunion status." Kessel Food Mkts, Inc.,
    
    287 N.L.R.B. 426
    , 429 (1987), enf’d, 
    868 F.2d 881
    (6th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    493 U.S. 820
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 76
    (1989). Remarks to this
    effect are deemed to be "blatantly coerc[ive]," in the sense that
    they discourage union-represented employees from seeking
    employment with the successor and in this way abet the
    successor’s effort to avoid having to recognize and bargain with
    the union. Eldorado, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    2001 WL 1083271
    , at *1, quoting
    Advanced Stretchforming Int’l, Inc., 
    323 N.L.R.B. 529
    , 530 (1997),
    enforced in relevant part, 
    233 F.3d 1176
    (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
    denied, 
    122 S. Ct. 341
    (2001); see also Bay Area 
    Mack, supra
    , 293
    NLRB at 125 & n.5; Kessel Food 
    Mkts., 287 N.L.R.B. at 429
    ; State
    Distributing Co., 
    282 N.L.R.B. 1048
    , 1059 (1987). So, if Francisco
    told Michael Ritchay that the new store "wouldn’t be a union,"
    Tr. 432-33; if she told Joann Schrader that she might recognize
    the Union "down the road" but not right away, Tr. 340; if she
    told Evonne Everson that "only 50 percent of the employees [would
    be hired,] because she wouldn’t have the Union," GC Ex. 29; if
    she told Carrie Clark that "there was going to be a lot of new
    faces because she wanted to keep the union out," Tr. 362; if she
    complemented Tina Warriner on her skills but queried whether
    Warriner could work "for a nonunion store," Tr. 253; if she told
    Joe Curtis that he would be fired if she were forced to take the
    Union back, Tr. 543; and if she told Robert Schumacher that
    "she’d hire us all back if we would vote out the union," Tr. 412,
    then Francisco signaled to RSI employees that she did not plan to
    hire enough of them to make recognition of the Union compulsory.
    To that extent, she engaged in coercive conduct that violated
    section 8(a)(1).
    B.   Adequate Remedy at Law and the Balance of Harms
    "Section 10(j) relief is an extraordinary remedy," Szabo v.
    P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 
    878 F.2d 207
    , 209 (7th Cir. 1989)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), reserved for
    "those situations in which the effective enforcement of the NLRA
    is threatened by the delays inherent in the NLRB dispute
    resolution process," 
    id. In assessing
    the propriety of interim
    relief in this case, we must focus on the collective bargaining
    rights of the store’s employees and what belated relief may mean
    to the future exercise of those rights. Hoffman v. Inn Credible
    Caterers, 
    Ltd., supra
    , 247 F.3d at 369; see also 
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1567
    , 1572. As summarized above, the Director has
    presented evidence which, if believed, indicates that FFI refused
    to hire a number of RSI employees so as to avoid a duty to
    bargain with the Union. Based on that evidence, the Director has
    asked for an order requiring FFI, inter alia, to offer employment
    to the RSI employees that FFI failed to hire and to recognize and
    bargain with the Union. We must consider whether, in the absence
    of the relief that the Director has requested, the right of store
    workers to organize, and to reap the benefits of collective
    bargaining, will be irreparably undermined. See 
    id. at 1572-73;
    Inn Credible 
    Caterers, 247 F.3d at 369
    .
    The district court was not persuaded that the Union faced
    the prospect of irreparable harm in the absence of interim
    injunctive relief. This was not a case like Electro-Voice, the
    court reasoned, in which there was "persuasive" and "egregious"
    evidence that the employer had committed unfair labor practices
    that had a chilling effect upon the union’s efforts to organize.
    R. 23 at 5-6. On the contrary, FFI had solicited applications
    from all of RSI’s employees; it had made offers to twenty non-
    supervisory RSI employees and three supervisors; and Francisco
    had actively recruited several RSI employees, including one who
    was an active Union supporter. 
    Id. at 6.
    The court also noted
    that several FFI employees had acknowledged in testimony that
    they would be allowed to determine the matter of unionization
    themselves. 
    Id. In short,
    "the alleged facts do not indicate that
    Francisco Foods has a propensity for coercive acts which would
    severely harm future Union efforts." 
    Id. Even if
    FFI did engage
    in unfair labor practices, the court concluded, the Board had the
    ability to order FFI to bargain with the Union and to hire any
    employees who were improperly refused employment with FFI to be
    hired. 
    Id. at 6-7.
    In defense of these findings, FFI makes one point that we
    must address at the outset--that the Director put on no evidence
    of irreparable harm that will occur in the absence of an
    injunction, and that he necessarily failed as a consequence to
    carry his burden to establish such harm. We do not know why the
    Director chose not to make an independent case on irreparable
    harm, but we do not agree that the omission left the record
    devoid of evidence from which the prospect of an irreparable
    injury may be inferred. In appropriate circumstances, the same
    evidence that establishes the Director’s likelihood of proving a
    violation of the NLRA may provide evidentiary support for a
    finding of irreparable harm. Pye v. Excel Case Ready, 
    238 F.3d 69
    , 74 (1st Cir. 2001). At the same time, as we mentioned at the
    outset, a strong showing as to the Director’s likelihood of
    success will permit a weaker showing as to the balance of harms
    posed by the grant or denial of interim injunctive relief.
    
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1568
    .
    In this case, the Director presented relatively compelling
    evidence that FFI made a calculated decision to evade the
    obligation to bargain with the Union as RSI’s successor by hiring
    only a minority of RSI’s employees. As the Director points out,
    the harms posed to a union and its members in this situation are
    well-recognized. A union finds itself "in a peculiarly vulnerable
    position" in the transition from predecessor to successor. Fall
    
    River, 482 U.S. at 39
    , 107 S. Ct. at 2234. "It has no formal and
    established bargaining relationship with the new employer, is
    uncertain about the new employer’s plans, and cannot be sure if
    or when the new employer must bargain with it." 
    Ibid. The workers represented
    by the union face a similar vulnerability: "If the
    employees find themselves in a new enterprise that substantially
    resembles the old, but without their chosen bargaining
    representative, they may well feel that their choice of a union
    is subject to the vagaries of an enterprises’s transformation."
    Id. at 39-
    40, 107 S. Ct. at 2234
    . Given the uncertainties that
    both the union and its members face during the transition, a
    successor’s refusal to recognize the union or, as allegedly was
    the case here, its refusal to hire a majority of the
    predecessor’s employees so as to escape that obligation, inflicts
    a particularly potent wound on the union and its members. "Having
    the new employer refuse to bargain with the chosen representative
    of the[ ] employees [who worked for the predecessor] ’disrupts
    the employees’ morale, deters their organizational activities,
    and discourages their membership in unions.’" 
    Id. at 49-50,
    107
    S. Ct. at 2239, quoting Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 
    321 U.S. 702
    ,
    704, 
    64 S. Ct. 817
    , 818 (1944).
    There can be little doubt that these oft-cited harms are
    presented here. If one credits the Director’s evidence, FFI
    succeeded in displacing a union that had represented store
    employees for more than twenty-five years. It made no secret of
    its intent, declaring from the beginning of the transition that
    it would not recognize the Union when it assumed ownership of the
    store. Over the course of the hiring process, Francisco’s stated
    goal of keeping RSI employees in the minority, her remark to
    Schumacher that "she’d hire us all back if we would vote out the
    union," Tr. 421, her remark to Curtis that he would have been
    fired if she had to take the Union back, Tr. 543, and her inquiry
    as to whether long-time cashier Warriner could work "for a
    nonunion store," Tr. 253, conveyed an unmistakable message that
    union representation jeopardized the hiring prospects of RSI
    employees. True, Francisco did allow for the possibility that
    FFI’s employees might, at a later date, vote for union
    representation. But the successor’s duty is to recognize and
    bargain with the union from the outset, not simply to permit a
    new vote on the matter. See Eldorado, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    2001 WL 1083271
    , at *6 n.4; Bay Area 
    Mack, supra
    , 293 NLRB at 125 & n.5.
    It is difficult to construe remarks akin to "I may let my new
    employees decide what to do," GC Ex. 4, as support for the Union,
    when the remark simply highlights the successor’s ongoing efforts
    to displace the "old" employees along with the union that
    represented them. Indeed, as we discussed in the previous
    section, many of Francisco’s alleged remarks predicting that the
    Piggly Wiggly would not be a union store when FFI took over
    constitute coercive remarks in violation of section 8(a)(1) under
    Board jurisprudence. 
    See supra
    at 41-42. The district court’s
    finding that FFI had not engaged in coercive activity, R. 23 at
    5-6, is therefore inconsistent with the record evidence.
    In this setting, the remedial authority of the Board cannot
    entirely cure the harms that will occur in the interim. Although
    the Board can order FFI to "reinstate" any RSI employee that it
    refused to hire for inappropriate reasons, the reality is that
    the rejected employees are moving on to other jobs; as additional
    time passes, the likelihood that they will be interested in or
    able to accept a position with FFI lessens. See 
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1573
    . Meanwhile, the RSI employees whom FFI did hire are
    working without the advocacy of their chosen representative.
    Assuming that the Board ultimately orders FFI to bargain with the
    Union, such a forward-looking order cannot fully compensate the
    employees of FFI for the variety of benefits that good-faith
    collective bargaining with the Union might otherwise have secured
    for them in the present. Squillacote v. U.S. Marine Corp., 116
    LRRM 2663, 2665 (E.D. Wis. 1984); accord Rivera-Vega v. ConAgra,
    Inc., 
    876 F. Supp. 1350
    , 1371 (D. P.R.), aff’d, 
    70 F.3d 153
    (1st
    Cir. 1995). Indeed, the longer that the Union is kept out of the
    store and from working on behalf of FFI’s employees, the less
    likely it is to be able to organize and represent those employees
    effectively if and when the Board orders the company to commence
    bargaining. 
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1573
    . In sum, the district
    court’s assertion that any wrong that occurred can be compensated
    by way of the Board’s remedial authority "turns a blind eye to
    the effect of the passage of time." 
    Id. More than
    two years have
    already passed since FFI assumed ownership of the store, and
    years more may pass before this case is finally resolved.
    The deprivation to employees from the delay in bargaining and the
    diminution of union support is immeasurable. That loss, combined
    with the likelihood that the Board’s ability to rectify the harm
    is diminishing with time, equals a sufficient demonstration of
    irreparable harm to the collective bargaining process. . . .
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    On the other side of the ledger, a grant of interim relief
    will impose obvious burdens on FFI, albeit ones that are only
    cursorily noted by the company on appeal. See FFI Br. at 40.
    Reinstatement of the ten RSI applicants whom FFI did not hire/15
    will likely cause some displacement among FFI’s current
    employees, although we note that five of those ten employees had
    relatively short tenures with RSI, which makes it less likely
    that they would accept jobs if offered them at this date.
    Moreover, requiring FFI to bargain with the Union will
    effectively unionize FFI’s workforce for the first time. This
    will certainly mark a significant change for the employees who
    never worked for RSI and consequently were not represented by the
    Union.
    However, the Director has presented a strong case on the
    merits and has already secured a favorable ruling from the ALJ
    who conducted the merits hearing. The Director’s case, and the
    ALJ’s findings, both suggest that FFI displaced the Union as the
    representative of the store’s employees by means of
    discriminatory hiring decisions. In other words, FFI dramatically
    shifted the status quo in its favor through illegal means. See
    Inn Credible 
    Caterers, 247 F.3d at 369
    ("By its own violation of
    the Act, [the successor] was able to hire a non-union workforce
    and thereby threaten to weaken severely, if not destroy, the
    power of the predecessor’s employees to assert their collective
    bargaining rights."). The longer that the successor employer is
    permitted to benefit from a state of affairs that its own
    wrongdoing has brought about, the less likely it is that a final
    order in the Board’s favor will be able to redress the wrongs
    that have been done and to restore the status quo ante. Electro-
    
    Voice, 83 F.3d at 1573
    . Restoration of that status quo is a vital
    means of preserving the Board’s ultimate ability to provide
    meaningful redress for the wrongs alleged.
    Given the Director’s likelihood of prevailing on the merits,
    coupled with the recognized gravity of the harms posed to the
    collective bargaining rights of the store’s employees, we find
    that the balance of the harms favors an award of interim relief.
    See 
    id. C. Public
    Interest
    Congress authorized interim injunctive relief via section
    10(j) as a means of protecting public rather than private
    interests. Szabo v. P*I*E Nationwide, 
    Inc., supra
    , 878 F.2d at
    209-10. The NLRA embodies a public policy that aims to foster the
    free flow of commerce by promoting the collective bargaining
    process and "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
    of association, self-organization, and designation of
    representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
    negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
    mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. sec. 151. Thus, the interest
    at stake in a section 10(j) is "the public interest in the
    integrity of the collective bargaining process." Eisenberg v.
    Wellington Hall Nursing Home, Inc., 
    651 F.2d 902
    , 906-07 (3d Cir.
    1981); see also Hirsch v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 
    147 F.3d 243
    ,
    247 (3d Cir. 1998); Asseo v. Pan American Grain Co., 
    805 F.3d 23
    ,
    28 (1st Cir. 1986). That interest is placed in jeopardy when the
    protracted nature of Board proceedings threatens to circumscribe
    the Board’s ability to fully remediate unfair labor practices.
    See 
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1574
    ; see also Miller v. California
    Pacific Med. 
    Ctr., supra
    , 19 F.3d at 460.
    Given the nature of the unfair labor practices charged in
    this case and the evidence supporting the Director’s allegations,
    interim relief would serve the public interest. If, as the
    Director alleges, FFI deliberately displaced the Union by
    refusing to hire RSI employees it otherwise would have hired, it
    committed violations that strike at the heart of the collective
    bargaining process. As we have discussed, while the parties await
    the final resolution of the Director’s complaint, the likelihood
    of the Board being able to effectuate complete relief on that
    complaint is decreasing: RSI employees that FFI did not hire are
    scattering to other jobs, the RSI employees who were hired are
    left without the benefits of representation, and support for the
    Union is no doubt eroding. By halting this progression away from
    the status quo ante, interim relief will help to preserve the
    Board’s remedial authority and in that way serve the collective
    bargaining process.
    III.
    We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
    denying the Director’s petition for interim injunctive relief
    pursuant to section 10(j). A thorough review of the record
    reveals that the Director has a better than negligible-- indeed,
    strong--likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his charge that
    FFI evaded what would otherwise have been its obligation to
    recognize and bargain with the Union by conducting a
    discriminatory hiring process. That likelihood is borne out by
    the ALJ’s decision in favor of the Director. Interim relief in
    these circumstances is widely recognized as an appropriate and
    necessary means of preserving the Board’s remedial authority.
    Interim relief will also serve the public interest by fostering
    the integrity of the collective bargaining process, which FFI’s
    alleged wrongs sought to disrupt.
    We therefore REVERSE the district court’s judgment and
    REMAND with directions to grant the Director’s petition for
    relief pursuant to section 10(j) and to enter an order requiring
    FFI to (1) extend offers of interim employment to Robert Birkrem,
    Carrie Clark, Jamie Kotlowski, Tara Manthei, Alan Pipping, Penny
    Pipping, Ryan Sasada, Robert Schumacher, Janet Simmons, and Tina
    Warriner; and (2) upon request, recognize the Union as the
    bargaining representative of its employees and to engage in
    collective bargaining with the Union. The Director has requested
    that FFI also be ordered to rescind any changes in work
    conditions that it has unilaterally imposed on store employees
    since its takeover of the store. Rescission can be appropriate
    when it appears that the employer has improperly circumvented the
    collective bargaining process in order to alter working
    conditions. See, e.g., Rivera-Vega v. ConAgra, 
    Inc., supra
    , 70
    F.3d at 162. The Director has only identified two such changes
    here, however--a new health insurance plan and a tightening of
    vacation eligibility--without discussing how those particular
    changes, left in place pending a final remedial order, might
    impair the Board’s ability to effectuate complete relief. See
    Director’s Br. at 10, 38-40. On remand, the district court may
    entertain additional evidence and argument on this point and, in
    the exercise of its discretion, determine whether interim
    rescission of the changes is appropriate.
    FOOTNOTES
    /1 Paragraph 6.2j of the purchase and sale agreement entered into
    by FFI and RSI provided that, pending consummation of the sale,
    RSI would not extend any existing labor agreement with the Union
    or enter into any new agreement with the Union that contained a
    continuation clause or that would otherwise bind FFI. GC Ex. 11
    at 11, para. 6.2j.
    /2 After hearing the evidence, the ALJ credited Everson’s written
    statement over her testimony. Francisco Foods, Inc. and United
    Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 73A, AFL-CIO-CLC, No.
    30-CA-14738, Decision (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Mar. 31, 2000)
    ("ALJ Decision") at 11 para. 3. "It is obvious to me, observing
    the demeanor of the witness and the fact that she now works for
    Respondent, that the truth is in Everson’s statement on April 6
    and not in her testimony before me." 
    Id. /3 Based
    in part upon the apparent discrepancies in Curtis’s
    explanation as to how he had contacted FFI’s attorney, the ALJ
    credited his original testimony. "Suffice it to say I believe it
    was Francisco and possibly also Maxwell who mentioned the 50%
    matter to Curtis. And Curtis was trying to undo some damage from
    his testimony the day before. I am convinced that the
    Respondent’s counsel did nothing improper, however." ALJ Decision
    at 13.
    /4 Four additional individuals had applied for, but had not yet
    been offered employment with FFI. However, after hearing the
    evidence, the ALJ found that FFI had legitimate, performance-
    related reasons not to offer these four individuals employment.
    ALJ Decision at 8-10. The Director does not quarrel with that
    determination here. Director’s Br. at 10 n.7. Accordingly, we
    shall exclude these individuals from consideration.
    /5 Simmons testified that she had asked Francisco a week or so
    after the sale was announced whether she would have a job with
    FFI. According to Simmons, Francisco responded simply, "I don’t
    know." Tr. 456. Simmons went on: "I was going to walk away and
    then [Francisco] said, no wait a minute. And I went--I said that
    I had talked with other people in the store and she had told them
    that they had a job and I would like to know, yes or no, whether
    I had a job or not, and she said, I don’t know. And that’s where
    I left it." 
    Id. /6 Francisco
    testified that she had not yet prepared a work
    schedule for FFI at this point in time. Tr. 653. Penny Pipping,
    however, testified that fellow employee Ryan Sasada had found the
    schedule and had shown it to her. Tr. 688-89. According to
    Pipping, with three exceptions, the new schedule was filled with
    the names of new employees. Tr. 688.
    /7 Because May 16 was a Sunday, the sale did not actually close
    until the following day, May 17.
    /8 We may, of course, take judicial notice of the ALJ’s decision.
    See Rivera-Vega v. ConAgra, Inc., 
    70 F.3d 153
    , 157 n.3 (1st Cir.
    1995); Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 
    517 F.2d 33
    , 37 n.7 (2d Cir.
    1975).
    /9 This court has declined to articulate any rule about the
    appropriate way in which to view the facts when evaluating a
    request for interim injunctive relief pursuant to section 10(j).
    See 
    Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1567
    n.16; see also 
    Kinney, 881 F.2d at 488-89
    . Our sister circuits often observe that the
    Director is entitled to a favorable construction of the evidence
    in this context. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Inn Credible Caterers,
    Ltd., 
    247 F.3d 360
    , 365 (2d Cir. 2001); Sharp v. Webco Indus.,
    Inc., 
    225 F.3d 1130
    , 1134 (10th Cir. 2000); Arlook v. S.
    Lichtenberg & Co., 
    952 F.2d 367
    , 371-72 (11th Cir. 1992);
    Pascarell v. Vibra Screw, Inc., 
    904 F.2d 874
    , 882 (3d Cir. 1990).
    That observation is usually made, however, in the context of
    evaluating whether the Director has "reasonable cause" to believe
    that the employer has violated the NLRA. See 
    Kinney, 881 F.2d at 488-89
    & n.1. In Kinney, this court held that "reasonable cause"
    is not part of the 10(j) 
    analysis. 881 F.2d at 488-93
    . "Once the
    Board seeks injunctive relief under sec. 10(j)," we concluded,
    "the only question for the court is whether the Board has
    demonstrated that relief is ’just and proper’ under the approach
    traditionally applied to equitable cases filed by public
    agencies." 
    Id. at 493
    (footnote omitted). We do not decide here
    whether the Director is always entitled to a favorable
    construction of the evidence--even if, for example, the district
    judge has conducted a full-blown evidentiary hearing on the
    Director’s application and resolved certain credibility questions
    or other conflicts in the evidence against him. See 
    Kinney, 881 F.2d at 489
    . We decide only that when the district court decides
    the Director’s request for 10(j) relief entirely on a paper
    record, we owe the Director a favorable reading of that record.
    See 
    id. /10 The
    successorship analysis necessarily focuses on non-
    supervisory employees, given that supervisors are excluded from
    the bargaining unit. See, e.g., NLRB v. Joe B. Foods, Inc., 
    953 F.2d 287
    , 294-97 (7th Cir. 1992).
    /11 Indeed, the evidence supports the inference that Francisco’s
    failure to tell employees whether or not FFI planned to hire them
    was a signal that offers would not be extended to them. None of
    the four RSI employees whom FFI rejected, according to the ALJ,
    for legitimate, performance-related reasons, ALJ Decision at 8-
    10, was ever actually told that he or she would not be hired. See
    Tr. 246, 335, 557, 564. In fact, Francisco testified that when
    FFI decided not to hire someone, "[w]e didn’t respond" to that
    individual’s application. Tr. 619.
    /12 Recall that sixteen of FFI’s non-supervisory employees had
    formerly worked for RSI. Francisco had extended offers to four
    other RSI employees. Three of these individuals--Bob Schumacher,
    Penny Pipping, and Alan Pipping, were among the ten individuals
    whose applications Francisco was asked to return on May 12. The
    fourth employee, Peggy Koepsel, accepted a job elsewhere.
    /13 The record does reveal that Francisco made job offers to a
    number of RSI employees fairly soon after the sale to FFI was
    announced. See Tr. 432-33 (Ritchay); Tr. 489, 492 (Wittchow); Tr.
    496-97 (Simonis); see also Tr. 353-54 (Schrader). Indeed, it was
    the fact that others had already been promised a job with FFI
    that accounted for the frustration that Janet Simmons expressed
    to Francisco about her own uncertain status. Tr. 456.
    /14 We should point out that one RSI employee, Evonne Everson,
    was hired just a day or two before FFI took over the store. See
    Tr. 278. By this time, Penny Pipping, to whom Francisco had
    extended an offer, had received her application back from
    Francisco and had torn it up. Arguably, then, Francisco knew when
    she hired Everson that Pipping was not going to accept a job with
    FFI and that, at most, nineteen of FFI’s non-supervisory workers
    (just under one-half) would have been former employees of RSI.
    /15 As we noted earlier, we are excluding from consideration the
    additional four applicants whom the ALJ determined were not hired
    for legitimate, performance-related reasons. 
    See supra
    n.4.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-1860

Citation Numbers: 276 F.3d 270, 2001 WL 1658796

Judges: Rovner, Wood, Williams

Filed Date: 12/28/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (27)

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us-marine-corporation-and-bayliner-marine-corporation , 944 F.2d 1305 ( 1991 )

Franks Bros. v. National Labor Relations Board , 64 S. Ct. 817 ( 1944 )

peter-w-hirsch-regional-director-of-the-fourth-region-of-the-national , 147 F.3d 243 ( 1998 )

william-a-pascarelli-regional-director-of-the-twenty-second-region-of-the , 904 F.2d 874 ( 1990 )

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robert-h-miller-regional-director-of-region-20-of-the-national-labor , 19 F.3d 449 ( 1994 )

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rosemary-pye-regional-director-of-region-i-of-the-national-labor-relations , 238 F.3d 69 ( 2001 )

thomas-w-seeler-regional-director-of-the-third-region-of-the-national , 517 F.2d 33 ( 1975 )

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