United States v. Schaefer, Ronald T. ( 2002 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 01-1837
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Ronald T. Schaefer,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. IP99-CR-109-01 D/F--S. Hugh Dillin, Judge.
    Argued October 23, 2001--Decided May 28, 2002
    Before Harlington Wood, Jr., Cudahy, and
    Kanne, Circuit Judges.
    Cudahy, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted
    Ronald Schaefer of three counts of mail
    fraud and two counts of wire fraud, 18
    U.S.C. sec.sec. 1341, 1343, arising from
    the sale of Walt Disney animation art.
    One count of wire fraud was subsequently
    thrown out by the district court. The
    convictions carry a six (6) Base Offense
    Level under U.S.S.G. sec. 2F1.1(a)
    (2000). The district court adopted the
    Pre-Sentence Report, which prescribed
    several upward adjustments, and sentenced
    Schaefer to 37 months on each count, to
    be served concurrently. Schaefer now
    appeals, claiming that the district judge
    improperly calculated the amount of the
    financial loss under sec. 2F1.1(b)(1).
    Because the district court did not make
    specific findings of fact that would
    allow us to conclude with confidence that
    the relevant conduct relied upon to make
    the sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) calculation of loss
    consisted of unlawful conduct, we vacate
    and remand for further proceedings.
    I.
    On August 25, 1999, a federal grand jury
    indicted Ronald Schaefer on eight counts
    of mail fraud and six counts of wire
    fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec.sec.
    1341, 1343. The alleged crimes occurred
    through Schaefer’s business activities as
    an art dealer, though he often presented
    himself to his customers as a collector
    who did not derive his livelihood from
    the sale of art. Schaefer’s specialty was
    animation art associated with the
    production and promotion of various Walt
    Disney movies. At issue in all of the
    charges are "cels," which are painted
    drawings of popular cartoon characters on
    clear plastic or acetates. The most
    valuable of these for collectors are
    "production cels." These pieces are one-
    of-a-kind artwork that are photographed
    and used as actual frames in an animation
    film. There are various other categories
    of cels, such as limited edition,
    publicity and sericels, which command
    less money than production cels as
    collectibles. Whether the cels are matted
    and framed may also affect their value.
    Because the true market value of his
    wares varied according to their specific
    characteristics, Schaefer made it a habit
    to be purposefully ambiguous about the
    proper classification of his cels, often
    referring to publicity cels as "original
    hand-painted cels." He also boasted about
    the windfalls they would generate for
    their buyers as investments. On some
    occasions, he actually reduced to writing
    claims that certain publicity or
    counterfeit cels were production cels.
    Moreover, he often resorted to the ruse
    that he was selling art from his dead
    mother’s estate at below-market prices
    that were mandated by her will, a story
    that was found to be a total fabrication
    at trial. Schaefer’s deceptive business
    practices eventually included a scheme
    that involved an Indianapolis school
    teacher, Greg Shelton, who created cels
    depicting Mickey Mouse drawing a picture
    of Walt Disney. Schaefer portrayed
    Shelton to his customers as a former
    Disney animator and persuaded Shelton to
    author a letter that falsely touted the
    distribution and value of these
    paintings.
    Eventually, Schaefer’s sharp business
    practices attracted the attention of
    federal investigators, including the
    Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
    Indianapolis office of the FBI.
    Conversations recorded by undercover
    agents revealed additional lies and
    misrepresentations by Schaefer. Federal
    authorities subsequently seized
    Schaefer’s art inventory. In turn,
    Schaefer sought relief through an action
    filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
    Although Schaefer has often presented
    himself as a private collector, or as a
    faithful son discharging duties for his
    dead mother’s estate, he submitted
    documents to federal officials as
    evidence that selling art was his
    "business" and that he earned between
    $5,000 and $10,000 per month through this
    activity. These figures were relied on by
    the government in making the sec.
    2F1.1(b)(1) loss calculation, which was
    included in the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR)
    and later adopted by the district court.
    The present case is not Schaefer’s first
    run-in with the law. In 1992, the FTC
    filed a complaint against Schaefer and
    others, alleging that they engaged in
    deceptive practices in the promotion and
    sale of collectibles. The Final Judgment
    and Order for Permanent Injunction
    arising out of those proceedings
    prohibited Schaefer from engaging in
    deceptive practices in the sale of
    "investment offerings," including
    animation art. See Federal Trade
    Commission v. World Wide Classics, Inc.,
    Civ. No. 92-3363TJH (EEX), at 4-6 (C.D.
    Cal., Dec. 15, 1993) (hereinafter the
    "1993 Order"). The 1993 Order also
    required that Schaefer post a $200,000
    bond before engaging in the "business of
    telemarketing," which was broadly defined
    as any business that employed telephone
    presentations, "either exclusively or in
    conjunction with the use of the mails or
    any commercial parcel delivery service."
    In the current action, Schaefer was
    indicted on charges of federal mail and
    wire fraud. Although Schaefer was
    released on his own recognizance, his
    pretrial release stipulated that he could
    not travel outside the Southern District
    of Indiana. On December 22, 1999, the
    U.S. Parole and Probation Office filed a
    Notice of Violation of Order Setting
    Release Conditions, alleging that
    Schaefer had violated the terms of his
    release. In fact, Schaefer had traveled
    to Nashville, Tennessee and sold an
    animation cel for $27,000. In addition,
    Schaefer had also contacted other
    potential customers and advised them of
    the dates he planned to be in their area.
    On January 4, 2000, a federal magistrate
    judge ruled that Schaefer had violated
    the terms of his release and further
    restricted Schaefer’s ability to travel.
    Schaefer then made a motion to the court
    requesting that the new pretrial terms be
    modified in order to permit him to make
    artwork sales though reputable gallery
    and auction houses. After another hearing
    on February 9, 2000, the magistrate judge
    denied Schaefer’s motion. The magistrate
    judge also noted the likelihood that
    Schaefer had lied under oath during the
    earlier January 4, 2000 proceedings.
    At the subsequent criminal trial,
    Schaefer was convicted on five counts of
    mail and wire fraud and acquitted on nine
    others. One count of conviction was
    eventually vacated by the district court
    for a possible retrial because there was
    some reason to believe that the
    government had improperly withheld
    exculpatory evidence in violation of
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963). Of
    the four remaining counts, both mail and
    wire fraud qualify as a six (6) Base
    Offense Level under U.S.S.G. sec. 2F1.1
    (1997)./1 The PSR recommended a two (2)
    level increase for "more than minimal
    planning," see sec. 2F1.1(b)(2)(A); a two
    (2) level increase for violation of a
    judicial order, see sec. 2F1.1(b)(3)(B);
    a two (2) level increase for obstruction
    of justice, see sec. 3C1.1; and an eight
    (8) level increase for a total loss to
    victims in excess of $200,000, see sec.
    2F1.1(b)(1)(I). The specific loss
    calculation provided in the PSR is
    $231,000, which was based on a
    purportedly representative sample of
    Schaefer’s business activities that was
    then extrapolated over a five-year
    period. The district court adopted the
    PSR recommendations and sentenced
    Schaefer to thirty-seven months of
    incarceration. The court also ordered
    Schaefer to pay restitution in the amount
    of $41,574.
    On a motion for reconsideration,
    Schaefer requested that the district
    court substantially reduce its loss
    calculation. Although Schaefer submitted
    a verified statement, which was offered
    to rebut the government claims that
    Schaefer knowingly deceived a large
    number of his customers, the district
    court ruled that Schaefer’s past
    courtroom testimony demonstrated that he
    was not a credible witness. The district
    court’s sentencing order did not,
    however, include any specific findings
    that Schaefer, under a more lenient
    preponderance of evidence standard,
    committed most or all of the crimes
    charged in the indictment, or was guilty
    of other uncharged criminal conduct.
    Schaefer now appeals only from the
    $231,000 calculation of loss. Schaefer
    contends that the maximum loss stemming
    from the crimes of which he was convicted
    amounts to $1,875. This relatively small
    sum would not warrant any increase from
    the Base Offense Level. Under Schaefer’s
    method of calculation, he would receive a
    six to twelve month sentence.
    II.
    The sole issue in this case is whether
    the district court erred in adopting the
    loss calculation of the PSR. The meaning
    of "loss" under sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) presents
    a question of law that is subject to de
    novo review. See United States v. Lopez,
    
    222 F.3d 428
    , 436 (7th Cir. 2000).
    However, when analyzing the district
    court’s calculation of loss caused by a
    defendant’s fraudulent conduct, we review
    the calculations for clear error. See
    United States v. Vivit, 
    214 F.3d 908
    , 914
    (7th Cir. 2000). Reversal is warranted
    only if the district court’s loss
    calculation evokes a "definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been made."
    
    Id.
     (citing United States v. Strache, 
    202 F.3d 980
    , 984-85 (7th Cir. 2000)).
    In order to support the calculation of
    a $231,000 loss from fraudulent activity,
    the PSR estimated that approximately 55
    percent of Schaefer’s $420,000 in
    business receipts from 1994 to 1999 was
    attributable to fraudulent sales
    practices. The 55 percent figure was
    derived from a sample of three sales made
    to customers in which 55 percent of the
    purchase price was attributable to false
    representations made by Schaefer. Since
    these sales provided approximately 20
    percent of Schaefer’s total receipts
    during this five-year period and were
    therefore asserted to be representative
    of the total, and since there was reason
    to believe that all of Schaefer’s sales
    of animated art were shot through with
    deceptive business practices, the
    government reasoned that approximately 55
    percent of all of Schaefer’s receipts was
    attributable to an ongoing fraudulent
    scheme (i.e., 55% x $420,000 =
    $231,000)./2
    The government maintains that the
    entirety of Schaefer’s artwork business
    represents "relevant conduct" under
    U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(2); it therefore
    argues that all of Schaefer’s business
    receipts from 1994 to 1999 can be relied
    upon to support the $231,000 loss
    calculation. Under U.S.S.G. sec.
    2F1.1(b)(1) of the sentencing guidelines,
    which deals with loss arising from fraud
    or deceit, this amount of financial harm
    warrants an eight-level increase. Under
    the prevailing case law of this circuit,
    a determination of relevant conduct is a
    finding of fact disturbed only if clearly
    erroneous. United States v. Ofcky, 
    222 F.3d 428
    , 438 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.
    denied, 
    121 S. Ct. 1601
     (2001). In the
    present case, the PSR relies on an
    estimate of Schaefer’s artwork
    transactions from 1994 to 1999 to
    calculate the sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) loss; the
    district court in turn adopted the
    recommendations of the PSR.
    To attack the government’s loss
    calculation, Schaefer makes three
    arguments on appeal. First, the
    government failed to prove that any of
    the losses incurred by Schaefer’s
    customers were the result of criminal
    conduct, and therefore these losses
    cannot be considered relevant conduct
    under the Sentencing Guidelines. Second,
    the government improperly relied on
    unreliable hearsay to determine the scope
    of the relevant conduct that allegedly
    produced the $231,000 loss. Third, the
    government’s methodology for
    extrapolating the loss was improper and
    grossly inflates the victim impact that
    can be fairly attributed to Schaefer.
    Each of these arguments will be addressed
    in order.
    A.
    Schaefer claims that "relevant conduct"
    under sec. 1B1.3, which specifies the
    conduct to be relied upon for sentencing
    determinations under the Guidelines, is
    necessarily limited to criminal conduct.
    To buttress this assertion, he cites case
    law from the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
    Eight Circuits that have adopted this
    standard. See, e.g., United States v.
    Dove, 
    247 F.3d 152
    , 155 (4th Cir. 2001)
    (rejecting argument that "non-benign"
    rather than illegal conduct "may properly
    be considered as relevant conduct");
    United States v. Peterson, 
    101 F.3d 375
    ,
    385 (5th Cir. 1996) ("For conduct to be
    considered ’relevant conduct’ for the
    purpose of establishing one’s offense
    level that conduct must be criminal.");
    United States v. Dickler, 
    64 F.3d 818
    ,
    830 (3d Cir. 1995) (agreeing with other
    circuits that relevant conduct must be
    criminal); United States v. Sheahan, 
    31 F.3d 595
    , 600 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting
    that government has burden of proving by
    a preponderance of evidence that
    defendant’s conduct was criminal in
    nature before the district court can rely
    on it as relevant conduct). To further
    support his position, Schaefer points to
    the commentary to sec. 2F1.1, which
    states that "loss is the value of the
    money, property, or services unlawfully
    taken." sec. 2F1.1, comment. (n. 8)
    (emphasis added).
    In deciding whether conduct under the
    Sentencing Guidelines to be relevant must
    be criminal or unlawful, we have not been
    much helped by the government. In its
    brief, the government has failed to cite,
    let alone distinguish, the cases on the
    criminal nature of relevant conduct from
    the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
    Circuits. Instead, the government has
    attempted to justify the loss calculation
    by relying on generalized allegations of
    continuing fraud. While we agree with the
    government’s comment that Schaefer’s
    entire artwork business was "permeated
    with fraud," that characterization may
    have both civil and criminal aspects. As
    the cases cited by Schaefer make clear,
    only the latter category implicates sec.
    1B1.3 of the Guidelines. The simplest and
    most direct way for the government to
    support its theory of the case is to
    point out how the specific elements of
    mail and wire fraud, which were the
    crimes specified in the fourteen-count
    indictment, were an integral part of
    Scheafer’s artwork business from 1994 to
    1999. It might also be possible to
    justify the $231,000 loss calculation by
    demonstrating that Schaefer’s business
    practices routinely violated other
    criminal statutes (e.g., the criminal
    fraud provisions of Indiana law).
    However, the government has failed to
    direct this court, or the district court,
    to any additional statutory authority
    criminalizing Schaefer’s conduct. Here,
    the government’s briefing style is a bit
    long on evidence, but a bit short on
    analysis./3
    In addition, the district court
    summarily adopted the PSR without making
    any specific findings with respect to the
    relevant conduct relied on to make the
    sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) loss calculation. Here,
    a fourteen-count indictment resulted in
    an acquittal on nine charges and a
    conviction on only four. One count was
    set aside for retrial because of a
    possible Brady violation. Although
    relevant conduct for sentencing purposes
    can certainly include uncharged conduct,
    see United States v. Smith, 
    218 F.3d 777
    ,
    782 (7th Cir. 2000), and even conduct
    that forms the basis of an acquittal, see
    United States v. Banks, 
    964 F.2d 687
    , 692
    (7th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v.
    Fonner, 
    920 F.2d 1330
    , 1333 (7th Cir.
    1990)), the district court must still
    make findings clearly identifying the
    relevant conduct and explaining how that
    conduct leads to a particular sentencing
    determination. The transparency of this
    process is especially important in a case
    such as this one, where the $231,000 loss
    calculation adopted by the district court
    is far in excess of the $1,875 loss that
    flows from the counts of conviction.
    While it is certainly possible that the
    PSR contains sufficient evidence of
    uncharged and acquitted conduct to
    support the much larger loss calculation,
    it is very difficult for us to sift
    through the contents of the PSR to
    determine whether there is a sufficient
    legal and factual basis for a particular
    criminal sentence. Although a district
    court’s findings as to relevant conduct
    are reviewed for clear error, see Ofcky,
    22 F.3d at 438, even such deference will
    not cure an absence of findings.
    In attempting to distill what must be
    determined here, we turn first to the
    text of sec. 1B1.3, which is entitled
    "Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine
    the Guideline Range)." Section sec.
    1B1.3(a) defines relevant conduct for the
    purposes of Chapters Two and Three./4
    Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of sec.
    1B1.3 refer to activity that is clearly
    criminal in nature./5 Subsection (a)(3)
    includes as relevant conduct all harm
    that flows from the criminal activities
    described in subsections (a)(1) and
    (a)(2). Finally, subsection (a)(4)
    defines as relevant conduct "any other
    information specified in the applicable
    guideline." In short, sec. 1B1.3(a)
    explicates the fundamental rule that
    relevant conduct must be criminal in
    nature, though subsection (a)(4)
    indicates that each applicable guideline
    may also specify additional relevant fac
    tors.
    Since sec. 2F1.1 is in Chapter Two, this
    framework necessarily applies to a sec.
    2F1.1(b)(1) loss calculation. Therefore,
    in addition to crimes that were committed
    in connection with the offense of
    conviction, see sec. 1B1.3(a)(1), or
    criminal acts or omissions that were part
    of the same course of conduct or common
    scheme as the offense of conviction, see
    sec. 1B1.3(a)(2), a loss calculation
    under sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) also involves "the
    value of the money, property, or services
    unlawfully taken." sec. 2F1.1, comment.
    (n. 8). Arguably, there may be instances
    in which "unlawful" conduct is a slightly
    broader category than criminal conduct,
    but neither Schaefer nor the government
    has attempted to claim or explain such a
    distinction.
    Although the government in this case has
    convincingly demonstrated that Schaefer’s
    routine dealings were, at a minimum,
    disreputable and unethical, the plain
    terms of the Guidelines make clear that
    such a showing is not enough. For all of
    Schaefer’s business receipts to be
    included in a sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) loss
    calculation, the government must
    demonstrate, by a preponderance of
    evidence, that all of Schaefer’s business
    activities were unlawful. Moreover, if
    the loss calculation is not based
    entirely on the counts of conviction, the
    district court must make specific
    findings on the relevant conduct (i.e.,
    unlawful conduct) on which it relies to
    make its sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) calculation of
    loss.
    Our holding that relevant conduct under
    sec. 1B1.3 of the Guidelines is limited
    to criminal conduct is amply supported by
    the case law in other circuits. For
    example, in Petersen, supra, the Fifth
    Circuit vacated a sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) loss
    calculation in a securities fraud case
    because the district court "made no
    determination as to whether the
    defendant’s conduct with regard to the
    $1.3 million loss to the ABFL was
    actually criminal conduct rather than a
    violation of the fiduciary agreement
    making the defendant civilly liable." 
    101 F.3d at 385
    . The Fifth Circuit expressed
    concern that if relevant conduct were not
    limited to criminal conduct, defendants
    could be more severely punished by
    "having their guideline range increased
    for activity which is not prohibited by
    law but merely morally distasteful or
    viewed as simply wrong by the sentencing
    court." Id.; accord United States v.
    Dove, 
    247 F.3d 152
    , 155 (4th Cir. 2001)
    (rejecting argument that "non-benign"
    conduct "may properly be considered as
    relevant conduct" and following
    Petersen).
    Similarly, in Dickler, 
    supra,
     the Third
    Circuit reviewed a sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) loss
    calculation that was based on a long-
    running scheme to submit false bids for
    the purchase of repossessed cars. The
    defendants had submitted false bids to
    the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC),
    which had been appointed custodian of two
    failed banks. The defendants were
    subsequently charged with concealing
    assets from the RTC, in violation of 18
    U.S.C. sec. 1032(2). However, this
    statute was not enacted until November
    29, 1990. From 1985 to 1990, the
    defendants had been submitting false bids
    to the predecessor banks. Without citing
    any statutory basis to demonstrate that
    the defendant’s pre-1990 conduct was
    unlawful, the government attempted to
    include at sentencing the 1985 to 1990
    time period as relevant conduct. Although
    the Third Circuit observed that "it is
    highly likely that the defendants’
    conduct during the challenged period did
    violate some criminal statute," it
    determined that "[d]ue process requires
    that the defendants have fair notice of
    exactly why the government believes their
    conduct during this period was criminal
    and a fair opportunity to counter the
    government’s case on that score." 
    64 F.3d at 831
    . It therefore remanded the matter
    to the district court with instructions
    to require the government to identify
    "the statute or statutes its relies upon
    and to identify the record evidence that
    satisfies each element of the offense
    proscribed." 
    Id.
    Finally, in Sheahan, 
    supra,
     the Eighth
    Circuit upheld a sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) loss
    calculation in a case involving bank
    fraud despite the fact that a substantial
    portion of the total loss was attributed
    to nine criminal counts that had been
    dismissed as part of the defendant’s plea
    bargain. 
    31 F.3d at 600
    . The court
    emphasized that the dismissed counts
    "clearly alleged offenses that are
    subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
    sec.sec. 1344 and 1346." 
    Id.
     The sole
    remaining issue, therefore, was whether
    the government had demonstrated the
    unlawfulness of the defendant’s relevant
    conduct by a preponderance of the
    evidence. The Eighth Circuit went on to
    rule that the government had met this
    burden. See 
    id.
    Limiting sec. 1B1.3 relevant conduct to
    criminal activity, with appropriate
    modifications based on specific
    provisions contained elsewhere in the
    Guidelines, can be easily reconciled with
    the single case in this circuit which has
    touched on the distinction between
    illegal and legal conduct for sentencing
    purposes. In United States v. Marvin, 
    28 F.3d 663
     (7th Cir. 1994), the defendant
    in a wire fraud scheme argued that the
    district court erred when it refused to
    grant him a sec. 3E1.1 sentence reduction
    for acceptance of responsibility. After
    the defendant entered a guilty plea but
    before his sentence was imposed, the
    district court determined that the
    defendant had engaged in several acts of
    deceit, including renting a residence
    under a false name and writing checks
    from an overdrawn account, which were
    inconsistent with acceptance of
    responsibility. 
    Id. at 665
    . On appeal,
    the defendant contended that this
    activity could not be relied upon for a
    sentencing determination because it could
    not be properly characterized as
    "illegal." 
    Id. at 666
    . Relying on the
    commentary to sec. 3E1.1, we ruled:
    A sentencing judge may properly consider
    any "conduct of the defendant that is
    inconsistent with such acceptance of
    responsibility" which would outweigh the
    defendant’s earlier guilty pleas as a
    proxy for acceptance of responsibility.
    U.S.S.G. sec. 3E1.1, comment. (n. 3).
    Therefore, although possibly relevant, it
    is not necessary that the sentencing
    judge consider only illegal or criminal
    activity. The sentencing judge may
    consider other conduct which is
    inconsistent with the defendant’s
    acceptance of responsibility.
    
    Id. at 666
    .
    Marvin is entirely consistent with the
    framework that we have discussed. The
    language of sec. 1B1.3 clearly limits
    relevant conduct, for the purposes of
    Chapters Two and Three sentencing
    determinations, to criminal conduct.
    However, an additional relevant criterion
    is "any other information specified in
    the application guideline." sec.
    1B1(a)(4). Therefore, in Marvin, this
    court properly looked to the commentary
    to sec. 3E1.1 to determine the range of
    evidence, beyond sec. 1B1.3 relevant
    conduct, that could be considered in an
    acceptance of responsibility ruling. As a
    result, Marvin is distinguishable from
    the rulings by the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
    and Eight Circuits that have limited sec.
    1B1.3 relevant conduct to criminal
    activities.
    In the case now before us, the
    government has provided us with no basis
    for departing from the clear weight
    ofauthority. Under the circumstances, we
    must remand to the district court with
    instructions to require the government to
    identify the specific unlawful conduct
    relied upon to justify the sec.
    2F1.1(b)(1) loss calculation. In
    addition, to justify the $231,000 loss
    calculation recommended by the PSR, the
    district court must make specific
    findings, based on a preponderance of
    evidence, that all of Schaeffer’s artwork
    business from 1994 to 1999 constituted
    unlawful conduct.
    B.
    In this case, there is a significant gap
    between the loss that flows from the
    counts of conviction ($1,875) and the
    loss calculated by the PSR ($231,000),
    which was subsequently adopted by the
    district court. In order to support this
    much larger loss calculation, the
    government submitted a sworn affidavit
    from FBI Special Agent Robert Brouwer
    (Brouwer declaration), which provided a
    detailed summary of a lengthy joint
    investigation of Schaeffer conducted by
    the FBI, the Federal Trade Commission
    (FTC) and the Department of Justice
    (DOJ). The Brouwer declaration recounted
    the facts and circumstances surrounding a
    variety of attempted and completed
    artwork sales by Schaefer, including
    several transactions that did not form
    the basis of the criminal indictment.
    Although the district court never made
    any explicit findings on relevant
    conduct, the order rejecting Schaefer’s
    motion for reconsideration of the loss
    calculation ruled that it had relied, in
    part, on the Brouwer declaration. This
    document arguably provides the district
    court with a basis to expand the scope of
    Schaefer’s relevant (unlawful) conduct
    beyond the counts of conviction.
    Schaefer argues that the district court
    erred when it relied on the Brouwer
    declaration to adopt the loss calculation
    in the PSR. Schaefer states that some of
    the information in the declaration was
    based on evidence collected by other
    government investigators, which in turn
    was summarized by Brouwer. Schaefer
    asserts that this evidence constitutes
    highly unreliable "hearsay on hearsay"
    testimony. Although this case will be
    vacated and remanded to the district
    court for further proceedings, we will
    address the hearsay issue now because it
    is also relevant to a proper resolution
    of the loss calculation.
    As a threshold matter, Schaefer
    correctly observes that hearsay testimony
    can be utilized for sentencing purposes
    if it is "reliable." United States v.
    Morrison, 
    207 F.3d 962
    , 967 (7th Cir.
    2000). However, his underlying argument
    is flawed because the legal authorities
    he relies on to impugn Brouwer’s
    declaration as unreliable hearsay are a
    series of Seventh Circuit cases in which
    the amount of drugs for sentencing
    purposes was adduced from the hearsay
    testimony of other criminal defendants
    who failed to testify at trial. See,
    e.g., United States v. Palmer, 
    248 F.3d 569
    , 571 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
    hearsay statements made by individual two
    years after the alleged drug transaction;
    noting that no testimony was available at
    the sentencing hearing because the
    declarant cited his Fifth Amendment
    rights); United States v. Robinson, 
    164 F.3d 1068
    , 1071 (7th Cir. 1999)
    (rejecting hearsay statements made by
    another criminal defendant involved in
    the same drug transaction because
    statements were internally inconsistent
    and lacked "the kind of ’indicia of
    reliability’ upon which a sentencing
    judge could comfortably rely").
    In contrast, the information collected
    by Special Agent Brouwer was obtained
    from several of Schaefer’s customers who
    did not testify at trial. In addition,
    many the transactions included in the
    Brouwer declaration did not serve as the
    basis for the fourteen-count federal
    indictment. Nonetheless, the examples of
    fraud and misrepresentation summarized by
    Brouwer were consistent with live
    testimony from other Schaefer customers
    that described Schaefer’s modus operandi.
    The Brouwer declaration therefore further
    corroborated the overall picture of
    Schaefer’s conduct that emerged at trial.
    Schaefer also claims that Brouwer relied
    on the work of other FBI agents in
    preparing his declaration, thus resulting
    in "hearsay on hearsay." Our review of
    Brouwer declaration suggests that Special
    Agent Brouwer conducted many of these
    interviews personally, and that during
    this process, the FBI was working closely
    with other investigators from the FTC and
    the DOJ./6 But Brouwer states the basis
    for his information in considerable
    detail, which conveys a strong impression
    of exhaustive and well-documented police
    work. Although the declaration does
    constitute hearsay, it nonetheless
    appears to have sufficient indicia of
    reliability to permit its use for
    sentencing purposes.
    Schaefer’s "hearsay on hearsay" argument
    also falters for lack of legal support.
    Schaefer has failed to direct this court
    to any legal authority which suggests
    that more than one layer of hearsay in an
    affidavit by a law enforcement agent
    summarizing the findings of a
    comprehensive investigation conducted by
    himself and other agents (1) precludes
    its use for sentencing purposes, or (2)
    is of dubious reliability and, therefore,
    should be weighed accordingly. Certainly,
    Schaefer’s counsel had the opportunity to
    make the latter case. Brouwer was present
    during Schaefer’s sentencing hearing. If
    Schaefer wanted to impeach Brouwer’s
    methods of investigation or his
    truthfulness, Schaefer was free to put
    him on the stand, but he elected not to
    do so. Hence, we see no error in reliance
    on Special Agent Brouwer’s statements.
    Finally, Schaefer’s Verified Statement,
    which was submitted to the district court
    for sentencing purposes, attacks the
    accuracy of the Brouwer declaration.
    However, in denying Schaefer’s motion for
    reconsideration of the sec. 2F1.1(b)(1)
    loss calculation, the district court
    specifically determined that Schaefer’s
    Verified Statement could not be relied
    upon. Based on Schaefer’s pretrial
    testimony and overwhelming evidence from
    the government that Schaefer committed
    perjury, the district court ruled that
    "the defendant is not a credible
    witness." In contrast, the district court
    noted that Special Agent Brouwer
    "testified at the trial of this cause,
    and is a credible witness." Assessing the
    credibility of witnesses is a matter
    uniquely within the province of the fact
    finder. Absent a showing of clear error,
    we will not reverse a district court on
    matters that hinge on the credibility of
    witnesses. See United States v. Lindsey,
    
    123 F.3d 978
    , 980 (7th Cir. 1997).
    Schaefer’s hearsay argument is therefore
    unavailing because it is inextricably en
    meshed with issues of credibility. On
    remand, the district court may rely on
    Brouwer’s testimony and affidavit in
    making its loss calculation.
    C.
    Schaefer’s last argument in challenging
    his sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) loss calculation is
    that the extrapolation method followed in
    the PSR is flawed to the point of being
    clearly erroneous. Part of this argument
    is essentially a rehash of the relevant
    conduct and hearsay issues we have
    already discussed. However, Schaefer adds
    the additional claim that the
    government’s loss calculation failed to
    consider that the majority of Schaefer’s
    artwork was sold at fair market value.
    Even if the value of this work had been
    misrepresented to his customers, Schaefer
    asserts that the district court erred in
    accepting the testimony of expert witness
    Lentz, who assigned a value of zero to
    many pieces of art despite the fact that
    they had been professionally matted and
    framed. Schaefer also points out that he
    was acquitted on nine out of fourteen
    counts of the indictment. Since these
    acquittals suggest that many of his
    artwork transactions were untainted by
    fraud, Schaeffer argues that a loss
    calculation based on all of his business
    receipts is over-inclusive and grossly
    inflates the total amount of the loss.
    The primary defect in the district
    court’s loss calculation is that it
    failed to make explicit findings
    identifying with specificity the relevant
    unlawful conduct that allegedly caused
    the $231,000 loss. However, Schaefer’s
    argument with respect to the actual
    mechanics of the loss calculation lacks
    merit. Since sentencing determinations,
    as opposed to criminal convictions, are
    made under the preponderance of evidence
    standard, see United States v. Gee, 
    226 F.3d 885
    , 898 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing
    United States v. Watts, 
    519 U.S. 148
    , 157
    (1997)), the district court may consider
    uncharged conduct or even conduct that
    was acquitted. Moreover, the commentary
    to the Guidelines specifically addresses
    the use of estimates in making loss
    calculations:
    For the purposes of subsection (b)(1),
    the loss need not be determined with
    precision. The court need only make a
    reasonable estimate of the loss, given
    the available information. This estimate,
    for example, may be based on the
    approximate number of victims and an
    estimate of the average loss to each
    victim, or on more general factors, such
    as the nature and duration of the fraud
    and the revenues generated by similar
    operations.
    U.S.S.G. sec. 2F1.1(b)(1), comment. (n.
    9). In this case, the $231,000 loss
    figure was determined by multiplying
    total business receipts during the last
    five years ($420,000) by 55 percent. The
    figure of 55 percent is derived from
    sales to three of Schaefer’s customers
    that formed the basis for the indictment
    on multiple counts of wire and mail
    fraud. As discussed earlier, these three
    customers accounted for approximately 20
    percent of Schaefer’s total receipts from
    1994 to 1999. If the district court
    concludes, under a preponderance of
    evidence standard, that all of Schaefer’s
    artwork business was unlawful, this
    extrapolation method may not be
    unreasonable.
    The sampling technique set forth in the
    PSR and adopted by the district court
    also finds support in the case law. In
    United States v. Austin, 
    54 F.3d 394
    , 402
    (7th Cir. 1995), this court upheld a loss
    calculation for the sale of art forgeries
    despite the fact that government experts
    inspected only a fraction of the artwork
    involved in the disputed sales. In
    Austin, a value of zero was imputed to
    every sale of art made by the defendant
    over a six-year period, since government
    experts determined that his current
    inventory was comprised entirely of
    counterfeits. We concluded that, even if
    the pieces Austin sold between 1984 and
    1990 were not completely worthless, as
    the defendant maintained, $0 was the best
    estimate of their worth. See 
    id.
    Here, the loss calculation adopted by
    the district court was based on the
    apparently reasonable premise that 55
    percent of Schaefer’s business receipts
    were tainted with fraudulent
    misrepresentations. Although this
    sampling method did not "credit" Schaefer
    for the value of misrepresented artwork
    that had been matted and framed, the dec
    laration by expert witness Lentz
    concluded that "the frame and matting
    surrounding counterfeit or misrepresented
    cheap cels have no market value other
    than scrap value." In denying Schaefer’s
    motion to reconsider the loss
    calculation, the district court cited
    both Lentz’s testimony at trial and his
    declaration submitted during the
    sentencing proceeding to conclude that
    Lentz was a credible witness. As stated
    earlier, this court will not reverse a
    credibility finding by a district court
    absent a showing of clear error. See
    Lindsey, 
    123 F.3d at 980
    . Schaefer has
    not undermined Lentz’s credibility in any
    way. Moreover, there is no basis for
    demanding that Schaefer be given full
    credit for the cost of matting and
    framing artwork, when the art itself has
    been misrepresented to the consumer. Cf.
    United States v. Saykhom, 
    186 F.3d 928
    ,
    947 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing that
    defendant should not be given credit for
    business services that were merely part
    of a fraudulent scheme).
    Finally, Schaefer maintains that $1,875
    is the proper loss calculation because
    this is the amount that can be attributed
    to the counts of conviction, and the nine
    acquittals cast doubt on Schaefer’s
    overall culpability. However, the
    commentary to the Guidelines specifically
    states that the "offender’s gain from
    committing the fraud is an alternative
    estimate that ordinarily will
    underestimate the loss." U.S.S.G. sec.
    2F1.1(b)(1), comment. (n. 9) (emphasis
    added). In the present case, if the
    district court determines by a
    preponderance of the evidence that all of
    Schaefer’s transactions from 1994 to 1999
    were tainted with unlawful conduct, there
    is ample evidence that a loss calculation
    limited to the counts of conviction would
    substantially understate the total loss
    to Schaefer’s customers.
    Finally, the district court may have
    been correct when it characterized its
    loss estimate as "conservative." The loss
    calculation did not include any "intended
    loss" that might be ascribed to
    Schaefer’s entire $500,000 art inventory
    that was seized by government officials.
    See United States v. Strozier, 
    981 F.2d 281
    , 284-85 (7th Cir. 1992) (ruling that
    a loss calculation can be based on
    probable losses that would have occurred
    but for the intervention of law
    enforcement). The loss calculation also
    did not include any adjustment for the
    appreciation in value that Schaefer told
    his consumers they would enjoy because he
    was selling his artwork at below-market
    prices under the requirements of his dead
    mother’s estate. As the district court
    correctly observed, such amounts can be
    considered in a sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) loss
    calculation. See United States v. Porter,
    
    145 F.3d 897
    , 901 (7th Cir. 1998) (ruling
    that misrepresentations of a rate of
    return made in furtherance of fraudulent
    scheme can under some circumstances be
    included in a loss calculation). However,
    before the district court can rely on
    these additional approaches to justify
    its loss calculation, it must make
    specific findings as to how much of
    Schaefer’s business was tainted by
    unlawfulness.
    III.
    The relevant conduct relied upon by the
    district court to make its loss
    calculation under sec. 2F1.1(b)(1) has
    not been adequately articulated and
    justified. Therefore, we VACATE and REMAND
    to the district court for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    FOOTNOTES
    /1 The district court adopted the findings and
    recommendations of the PSR. Paragraph 51 of the
    PSR states that its recommendations were based on
    the 1997 Guidelines Manual because the offenses
    predated Nov. 1, 1998. According to the PSR, the
    1998 edition contained a special offense enhance-
    ment that was unfavorable to the defendant.
    Although this provision is not specifically
    identified by the PSR or the district court, the
    version of sec. 2F1.1(b)(3) in effect at the time
    of Schaefer’s sentencing authorized a new 2-level
    upward adjustment for an "offense committed
    through mass-marketing," which Schaefer may have
    been qualified for. In addition, the text of the
    obstruction of justice enhancement under sec.
    3C1.1 was revised some time between the 1997 and
    the 2000 Guidelines Manual. Ordinarily, "a court
    imposes a sentence based upon the guidelines in
    effect as of the date of sentencing." United
    States v. Kosmel, 
    272 F.3d 501
    , 507 (7th Cir.
    2001) (citing U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.11(a); United
    States v. Hall, 
    212 F.3d 1016
    , 1022 (7th Cir.
    2000)). In this case, the 2000 Guidelines Manual
    was in effect at the time of sentencing. However,
    ifapplying the current guidelines would violate
    the ex post facto clause of the Constitution,
    "the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in
    effect on the date that the offense of conviction
    was committed." sec. 1B1.11(b)(1); accord Kosmel,
    
    272 F.3d at 507
    ; United States v. Booker, 
    70 F.3d 488
    , 490 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995). The PSR appeared to
    flag a possible ex post facto problem and there-
    fore relied on the 1997 Guidelines Manual. The
    district court then adopted the PSR. Because
    neither party has raised this issue on appeal, we
    will confine our review to the 1997 Guidelines.
    The loss calculation provision which is relevant
    to this appeal--sec. 2F1.1(b)(1)--is the same
    under both the 1997 and 2000 Guidelines Manual.
    /2 The remaining 45 percent of each transaction
    would therefore represent fair market value of
    the goods sold.
    /3 One sentence in the government’s brief seems to
    suggest that the $230,000 loss calculation is
    appropriate because all of Schaefer’s business
    dealings from 1994 to 1999 were in violation of
    the 1993 Order. Appellee’s Br. at 35. However,
    premising Schaefer’s loss calculation on the
    violation of the 1993 Order raises serious issues
    of double counting. See United States v. Parolin,
    
    239 F.3d 922
    , 928 (7th Cir. 2001) ("’Double
    counting occurs when identical conduct is de-
    scribed in two different ways so that two differ-
    ent adjustment apply.’" (quoting United States v.
    Haines, 
    32 F.3d 290
    , 293 (7th Cir. 1994))).
    Schaefer has received a two-level enhancement
    under sec. 2F1.1(b)(4)(C) for violation of the
    1993 Order, which he has not contested on appeal.
    In addition, the PSR states that the U.S. Dis-
    trict Court for the Central District of Califor-
    nia has issued an Order to Show Cause why Schaef-
    fer should not be held in criminal contempt of
    the 1993 Order. A contempt trial was supposedly
    set for July 5, 2000. Because of the possible
    double-counting problem and the fact that the
    government did not adequately develop this argu-
    ment in its brief, this court will not consider
    it as a basis for affirming the district court.
    /4 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the chapter is
    denoted by the first number, followed by a let-
    ter, which denotes the part. Thus, sec. 1B1.1
    denotes chapter one, part B, subsection 1.1.
    /5 For example, sec. 1B1.3(a)(1) states that rele-
    vant conduct includes "all acts and omissions
    committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
    induced, procured, or willfully caused by the
    defendant" that occurred "during the commission
    of the offense of conviction, in preparation for
    that offense, or in the course of attempting to
    avoid detection or responsibility for that act."
    If the character of the offense requires grouping
    of multiple counts, sec. 1B1.3(a)(2) includes as
    relevant conduct "all acts or omissions . . .
    that were part of the same course of conduct or
    common scheme or plan as the offense of convic-
    tion."
    /6 Paragraph One of the Brouwer declaration reads in
    part: "I have worked with other FBI Agents, and
    officials from the Office of the United States
    Attorney, the Department of Justice, and the
    Federal Trade Commission . . . concerning the
    subject matter of this affidavit. This affidavit
    is based on my personal knowledge and information
    and belief."