United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, Al ( 2002 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 01-4234
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    ALFREDO MARTINEZ-JIMENEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 01 CR 426—Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED APRIL 19, 2002—DECIDED JUNE 27, 2002
    ____________
    Before BAUER, POSNER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
    BAUER, Circuit Judge. The appellant, Alfredo Martinez-
    Jimenez, was indicted for illegal re-entry into the United
    States. Martinez-Jimenez entered a guilty plea, which
    was accepted by the district court, and was sentenced to
    21 months imprisonment with three years supervised re-
    lease, a fine of $2000 and a $100 assessment. On appeal,
    Martinez-Jimenez argues that the district court improp-
    erly calculated his sentence under the United States
    Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). Because the appellant has
    waived any claim of error in the calculation of his sentence,
    we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
    2                                                     No. 01-4234
    Background
    On August 23, 1993, a Cook County grand jury indicted
    Martinez-Jimenez in two counts of violating the Illinois
    Child Abduction statute. 720 ILCS 5/10-5(10). Martinez-
    Jimenez pled guilty and was convicted for attempting to
    lure a child into a motor vehicle for an unlawful purpose.
    He was sentenced to three years imprisonment in the Illi-
    nois Department of Corrections. As part of the sentencing
    process, the state advised the judge of the circumstances
    surrounding the crimes at issue, including that Martinez-
    Jimenez, while exposing himself and masturbating, told
    two young girls to get into his van and not to tell their
    mother. Following his release from custody, Martinez-
    Jimenez was deported. On April 1, 2001, Martinez-Jimenez
    was found in Chicago without permission to re-enter the
    United States. He was arrested and thereafter charged
    with illegal re-entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
    Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Martinez-Jimenez
    pled guilty to the charge of unlawfully entering or being
    found in the United States after deportation. Prior to sen-
    tencing, both Martinez-Jimenez and the government sub-
    mitted arguments regarding the appropriate offense level
    calculation under the USSG. Specifically, the parties ad-
    dressed and disputed whether Martinez-Jimenez’ prior
    state conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” and thus
    an “aggravated felony”1 justifying an eight point enhance-
    1
    Application Note 2 of section 2L1.2 in the 2001 USSG, which
    were used because they were more favorable to the defendant,
    adopts the definition of “aggravated felony” set forth in 8 U.S.C.
    § 1101(a)(43), which in turn incorporates the definition of “crime
    of violence” set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Section 1101(a)(43)(F)
    defines an aggravated felony as “a crime of violence . . . for which
    the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” Section 16(b)
    provides that a crime of violence is an “offense that is a felony and
    (continued...)
    No. 01-4234                                                       3
    ment to the base offense level of eight under the USSG. At
    sentencing, the district court adopted the probation offi-
    cer’s supplemental report, which included an eight level
    increase for Martinez-Jimenez’ prior conviction for an “ag-
    gravated felony.” Accordingly, the district court added
    eight levels to the base offense level of eight and subtracted
    three levels pursuant to USSG § 3E1.1 and the plea agree-
    ment, thereby producing an adjusted offense level of 13.
    When asked whether he disputed the adjusted offense level
    of 13, Martinez-Jimenez, by way of counsel, voiced no ob-
    jection and responded, “We do not.”
    Discussion
    The government argues that Martinez waived any claim
    of error in the calculation of his offense level. Waiver oc-
    curs when a defendant intentionally relinquishes a known
    right. United States v. Staples, 
    202 F.3d 992
    , 995 (7th Cir.
    2000) (citations omitted). Waiver operates to extinguish the
    claim of error and precludes appellate review. Id.; United
    States v. Harris, 
    230 F.3d 1054
    , 1058-59 (7th Cir. 2000)
    (“[W]e cannot review waived issues at all because a valid
    waiver leaves no error for us to correct on appeal.”) (cita-
    tions omitted).
    When asked whether he had any dispute with the court’s
    conclusion that his offense be categorized as a level 13,
    Martinez stated that he did not. By such statement,
    Martinez plainly communicated an intention to relinquish
    and abandon any arguments related to his offense level
    calculation. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 
    238 F.3d 1
      (...continued)
    that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
    against the person . . . may be used in the course of committing
    the offense.”
    4                                              No. 01-4234
    837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001) (answering no to question of wheth-
    er there was any objection to a two-level sentencing en-
    hancement was a waiver in the strict sense of the term,
    thereby barring further judicial consideration); 
    Harris, 230 F.3d at 1059
    (finding that by affirmatively declining
    to object at sentencing, defendant extinguished sentenc-
    ing issue); United States v. Redding, 
    104 F.3d 96
    , 99 (7th
    Cir. 1996) (holding statements in transcript evidencing
    acceptance of sentencing calculations constituted waiver)
    (citing United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732 (1993)).
    Martinez-Jimenez argues that the court and/or the govern-
    ment were confused and that, as a result, it was unclear
    what was being waived. After reviewing the record, we find
    this argument unpersuasive. Further, Martinez-Jimenez
    can hardly claim ignorance on the part of himself or any-
    one else where, as here, he and the government submitted
    arguments concerning the very sentencing calculation is-
    sue for which he now seeks appellate review, and the pro-
    bation officer prepared a supplemental report outlining and
    explaining the offense level computations of which all par-
    ties and the court were aware. Cf. United States v. Staples,
    
    202 F.3d 992
    , 995 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that where the
    defendant knew he had a right to object to the calcula-
    tion of his criminal history, knew the contents of the pre-
    sentencing report, and affirmatively decided not to object
    despite such knowledge, his right to appeal calculation
    issue was waived). Martinez-Jimenez has waived any chal-
    lenge to the district court’s offense level calculation and
    appellate review is precluded.
    Even if we were to disregard the contents of the record
    and assume that Martinez-Jimenez’ relinquishment of his
    sentencing argument was unintentional, resulting in a for-
    feiture rather than a waiver, we still would not disturb the
    sentence imposed by the district court. The court’s allow-
    ance of an “aggravated felony” enhancement for a crime
    that entailed the luring or enticement of a child into a ve-
    No. 01-4234                                              5
    hicle for an unlawful purpose is simply not clear error
    when such deviant conduct by its nature involves a sub-
    stantial risk that in the course of such offense, force may
    be used against the young victim. The eight level increase
    in Martinez-Jimenez’ offense level computation provides
    no grounds for reversal.
    Conclusion
    The appellant’s conviction and sentence is hereby
    AFFIRMED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-97-C-006—6-27-02