Nanda, Navreet v. Bd Trustees Univ IL ( 2002 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Seventh Circuit
    No. 01-3448
    NAVREET NANDA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
    UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS,
    BELLUR PRABHAKAR,
    GERALD MOSS, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 00 C 4757--Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.
    ON MOTION TO STAY THE MANDATE
    DECEMBER 3, 2002*
    *
    This opinion is being initially released in typescript form.
    No. 01-3448                                                    Page 2
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge (in chambers). This matter is before
    me on the application of the Trustees of the University of Illinois for
    a stay of this court’s mandate pending its petition for a writ of
    certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Familiarity
    with this court’s opinion in the underlying litigation is presumed.
    See Nanda v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 
    303 F.3d 817
    (7th Cir. 2002).
    The appropriate judicial inquiry in considering an application
    such as the one before me today has been set forth on numerous
    occasions. A party seeking a stay of mandate pending the filing of
    a petition for writ of certiorari must establish that the petition will
    present a substantial question and that there is good cause for a
    stay. See Fed. R. App. P.41(d)(2)(A). We therefore ask whether the
    applicant has a reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits
    and whether the applicant will suffer irreparable injury. See
    Williams v. Chrans, 
    50 F.3d 1358
    , 1360 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
    To demonstrate a reasonable chance of success on the merits,
    the applicant must show a reasonable probability that at least four
    Justices will vote to grant certiorari and a reasonable possibility
    that at least five Justices will vote to reverse the judgment of this
    court. This task requires that I view the case from a different
    perspective than I ordinarily would take in deciding a case in the
    regular course of business. In deciding a case, a circuit judge must
    not anticipate future changes in jurisprudential course by the
    Supreme Court of the United States; it is the task of a circuit judge
    to apply established doctrine. See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 
    522 U.S. 3
    ,
    20 (1997). The present situation, by contrast, requires that I
    perform the predictive function of attempting to determine the
    future course of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
    Even taking into account this different perspective, I cannot
    say that the University has met its burden. The Supreme Court has
    No. 01-3448                                                       Page 3
    held that various statutory schemes are infirm because they are not
    premised on an appropriate exercise of Congressional power under
    Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 However, my colleagues
    and I, after careful study, have concluded that Congress’ exercise of
    its legislative power in enacting Title VII is based on far firmer
    footing. We have determined that Title VII’s disparate treatment
    provision is a legislative measure well-tailored to address the same
    sort of intentional discrimination that the Fourteenth Amendment
    itself forbids. Like our colleagues in the Eighth Circuit, see
    Okruhlik v. Univ. of Arkansas, 
    255 F.3d 615
    (8th Cir. 2001), we also
    determined that Congress had ample evidence of discrimination
    when it enacted this legislation.2 Indeed, in Varner v. Illinois State
    University, 
    226 F.3d 927
    (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    533 U.S. 902
    (2001), another panel of this court noted that this well-documented
    history of discrimination is embodied in the jurisprudence of the
    Supreme Court itself.
    Under these circumstances, I cannot say that the Supreme
    Court, faced with unanimity among the circuits that have decided
    the issue, nevertheless will determine that this case is worthy of a
    grant of certiorari. Nor can I say that there is a reasonable
    possibility that the Supreme Court ultimately would decide to
    reverse the judgment of this court.
    1
    See, e.g., Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 
    531 U.S. 356
    (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 
    528 U.S. 62
    (2000).
    2
    Therefore, this is not a case, such as many of those cited by
    the University in support of its motion to stay, which involves or
    creates a conflict among the circuits. Cf. United States v. Holland,
    
    1 F.3d 454
    , 456 (7th Cir. 1993) (in chambers) (“A conflict among the
    circuits is an accepted basis for the granting of a writ of certiorari.”).
    No. 01-3448                                               Page 4
    Accordingly, the application for stay of mandate is denied.
    APPLICATION FOR STAY DENIED