Robert Yates v. United States , 842 F.3d 1051 ( 2016 )

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No.  16-­‐‑3048
ROBERT  YATES,
Petitioner-­‐‑Appellant,
v.
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA,
Respondent-­‐‑Appellee.
____________________
Appeal  from  the  United  States  District  Court
for  the  Western  District  of  Wisconsin.
No.  16-­‐‑cv-­‐‑207-­‐‑bbc  —  Barbara  B.  Crabb,  Judge.
____________________
ARGUED  NOVEMBER  29,  2016  —  DECIDED  DECEMBER  2,  2016
____________________
Before  POSNER,  EASTERBROOK,  and  SYKES,  Circuit  Judges.
EASTERBROOK,   Circuit   Judge.   Thirteen   years   ago,   Robert
Yates   was   sentenced   as   an   armed   career   criminal   under   18
U.S.C.   §924(e).   The   district   court   concluded   that   he   had   six
qualifying   prior   convictions;   the   statute   provides   that   three
or   more   require   an   enhanced   sentence.   After   the   Supreme
Court  held  in  Samuel  Johnson  v.  United  States,  135  S.  Ct.  2551(2015),  that  the  “residual  clause”  in  §924(e)(2)(B)(ii)  is  uncon-­‐‑
stitutionally   vague,   and   made   that   decision   retroactive,
2   No.  16-­‐‑3048
Welch  v.  United  States,  136  S.  Ct.  1257  (2016),  Yates  filed  this
collateral  attack.  He  contends  that  after  Samuel  Johnson  only
two   qualifying   convictions   remain,   so   that   28   U.S.C.
§2255(f)(3)  restarts  the  time  for  collateral  review.  The  prose-­‐‑
cutor   concedes   that   the   petition   is   timely   and   that   Samuel
Johnson  knocks  out  three  of  the  six  convictions  but  maintains
that   Yates’s   conviction   of   battery   by   a   prisoner,   in   violation
of   Wis.   Stat.   §940.20(1),   qualifies   as   a   violent   felony   under
the  “elements  clause”  of  §924(e)(2)(B)(i)  because  it  “has  as  an
element  the  use,  attempted  use,  or  threatened  use  of  physical
force  against  the  person  of  another”.  Samuel  Johnson  does  not
affect  the  elements  clause  of  §924(e).  See,  e.g.,  Stanley  v.  Unit-­‐‑
ed   States,   827   F.3d   562   (7th   Cir.   2016).   The   district   court
agreed   with   the   prosecutor   and   dismissed   this   proceeding.
2016  U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS  79058  (W.D.  Wis.  June  17,  2016).
Under  Taylor  v.  United  States,  495  U.S.  575  (1990),  and  its
successors,  such  as  Descamps  v.  United  States,  133  S.  Ct.  2276(2013),   and   Mathis   v.   United   States,   136   S.   Ct.   2243   (2016),   a
court   must   determine   whether   a   conviction   satisfies   §924(e)
or   a   similar   recidivist   statute   by   looking   at   the   elements   of
the  crime,  no  matter  what  the  accused  did  in  fact.  We  do  not
know  what  he  did  that  led  to  the  battery  conviction,  but  the
Supreme  Court  has  held  that  the  facts  do  not  matter—indeed
that  we  are  usually  forbidden  to  know.  See  Shepard  v.  United
States,  544  U.S.  13  (2005).  The  elements  of  the  offense,  not  the
facts  of  the  crime,  control.  And  the  elements  that  matter  are
those   applicable   when   the   person   committed   the   earlier   of-­‐‑
fense.   The   elements   of   Wis.   Stat.   §940.20(1)   and   associated
provisions  have  changed  since  Yates’s  conviction  for  battery
by   a   prisoner,   so   like   the   district   court   we   refer   to   the   state
law  in  force  at  the  time  of  his  conviction.
No.  16-­‐‑3048   3
Yates   maintains   that   Wisconsin   law   did   not   make   “the
use,   attempted   use,   or   threatened   use   of   physical   force
against  the  person  of  another”  an  element  of  the  crime,  given
how  the  Supreme  Court  understood  “force”  in  Curtis  Johnson
v.   United   States,   559   U.S.   133   (2010).   The   Florida   offense   at
issue  in  Curtis  Johnson  prohibited  “actually  and  intentionally
touching”   another   person   without   consent   and   causing
alarm  or  offense—a  form  of  simple  battery.  Under  that  stat-­‐‑
ute   throwing   a   Nerf   ball   at   someone   who   was   hit   and   be-­‐‑
came   frightened   could   be   penalized.   The   Court   held   that
such  acts  do  not  entail  the  use  of  “force”  within  the  meaning
of  §924(e)(2)(B)(i)  even  though  the  impact  of  a  Nerf  ball  con-­‐‑
veys   some   “force”   according   to   the   laws   of   physics.   Curtis
Johnson  stated  that  the  sort  of  “force”  that  comes  within  the
elements  clause  is  “force  capable  of  causing  physical  pain  or
injury  to  another  person.”  559  U.S.  at  140.  Yates  tells  us  that
Wisconsin’s   battery-­‐‑by-­‐‑prisoner   statute   does   not   (well,   did
not)  require  the  prosecutor  to  demonstrate  that  sort  of  force.
The  statute  on  the  books  at  the  time  provided:
Any  prisoner  confined  to  a  state  prison  or  other  state,  county  or
municipal   detention   facility   who   intentionally   causes   bodily
harm   to   an   officer,   employee,   visitor   or   another   inmate   of   such
prison   or   institution,   without   his   or   her   consent,   is   guilty   of   a
Class  D  felony.
And   Wis.   Stat.   §939.22(4)   added   that   bodily   harm   means
“physical  pain  or  injury,  illness,  or  any  impairment  of  physi-­‐‑
cal   condition”.   That   definition   tracks   what   Curtis   Johnson
said   would   suffice:   “force   capable   of   causing   physical   pain
or   injury   to   another   person.”   This   led   the   district   court   to
hold   that   Yates’s   battery   conviction   satisfies   the   elements
clause  of  §924(e).
4   No.  16-­‐‑3048
Yates   asks   us   not   to   take   the   statutory   language   at   face
value—because,  he  says,  the  state  judiciary  does  not.  He  re-­‐‑
lies  principally  on  State  v.  Higgs,  230  Wis.  2d  1  (App.  1999),
which  affirmed  a  conviction  under  this  statute  of  a  prisoner
who   threw   a   cup   of   urine   at   a   guard.   Yet   the   ground   on
which   the   court   sustained   this   conviction—that   the   urine
had  in  fact  caused  pain  to  the  guard  when  it  got  into  his  eyes
and   nose—comes   within   the   language   of   Curtis   Johnson,
which  said  that  it  is  enough  if  the  force  is  “capable  of”  caus-­‐‑
ing  pain.  Yates  has  not  identified  any  case  in  which  Wiscon-­‐‑
sin’s  judiciary  affirmed  a  battery-­‐‑by-­‐‑prisoner  conviction  that
penalized  acts  that  caused  neither  pain  nor  injury.  This  state
law   therefore   categorically   is   a   crime   of   violence   under   the
elements   clause,   and   Yates   was   properly   sentenced   as   a   ca-­‐‑
reer  criminal.
AFFIRMED