Praxair Inc v. Hinshaw & Culbertson ( 2000 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 00-1960
    Praxair, Inc.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    Hinshaw & Culbertson,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 97 C 3079--Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.
    Argued September 27, 2000--Decided December 20, 2000
    Before Posner, Coffey, and Kanne, Circuit Judges.
    Posner, Circuit Judge. Praxair, the plaintiff in
    this diversity suit for legal malpractice
    governed by Illinois law, appeals from the grant
    of summary judgment to the defendant, Hinshaw &
    Culbertson ("Hinshaw" for short), its former law
    firm. Praxair (actually a predecessor
    corporation, but we’ll suppress that detail for
    the sake of simplicity) was the defendant in a
    breach of contract suit brought by Credit
    Agricole, a French bank. That suit, in which
    Praxair was represented by Hinshaw, ended in a
    judgment for Credit Agricole of almost $4
    million, which we affirmed in Caisse Nationale de
    Credit Agricole v. CBI Industries, Inc., 
    90 F.3d 1264
     (7th Cir. 1996). In granting summary
    judgment in the present case, the district judge
    ruled that Praxair had failed to show that, had
    it not been for Hinshaw’s alleged malpractice,
    Caisse Nationale would have been decided
    differently. In other words, Praxair had failed
    to show that the malpractice had made it any
    worse off, and if that is right then of course
    the Hinshaw firm has no tort liability.
    Credit Agricole’s suit had grown out of a swap
    contract that it had made with Praxair on
    February 18, 1991. The contract was negotiated by
    the New York and Illinois offices of Credit
    Agricole and the Illinois office of Praxair.
    During the term of the contract, which was to
    expire on January 16, 1994, Praxair was to pay
    Credit Agricole interest at a fixed rate on $35
    million (Canadian, not U.S., dollars), while
    Credit Agricole was to pay Praxair interest at a
    variable rate, to be reset every three months,
    tied to the interest rate on Canadian bankers’
    acceptances (notes). The principal amount was
    purely notional; that is, it was not transferred,
    but was simply the base for calculating how much
    interest each party owed the other. The parties
    periodically netted their mutual obligations: if
    the variable rate had risen above the fixed rate,
    Credit Agricole paid Praxair; if the fixed rate
    had risen above the variable rate, Praxair paid
    Credit Agricole. Thus the swap shifted from
    Praxair to Credit Agricole the risk, both upside
    and downside, of interest-rate changes during the
    three-month periods between resettings of the
    variable rate.
    Simultaneous with the swap, Praxair granted
    Credit Agricole an option, "exercisable between
    9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST up to and including
    January 16, 1994," to extend the swap for an
    additional two years on the basis of the Canadian
    bankers’ acceptance rate on that day. We must
    mention one more wrinkle. To hedge the interest-
    rate risk that it was assuming, Credit Agricole
    made a swap with another bank, Bankers Trust. In
    that swap Credit Agricole committed to the fixed
    rate and Bankers Trust to the variable rate.
    Credit Agricole gave Bankers Trust an option to
    renew the swap that was essentially identical to
    the option that Praxair had given Credit
    Agricole; it too could be exercised up to and
    including January 16, 1994.
    That day was a Sunday. The next day was a
    business day in Canada but a public holiday under
    both Illinois and New York law, and both states
    provide that a contractual obligation which comes
    due on a holiday may be performed on the next
    business day without loss of contract rights
    unless the parties provide otherwise either
    expressly or by implication. N.Y. General
    Construction Law sec. 25(1); 5 ILCS 70/1.11. The
    next business day was Tuesday, January 18. Credit
    Agricole attempted to exercise the option that
    day. Praxair took the position that this was too
    late, thus precipitating the suit by Credit
    Agricole that Praxair lost.
    In that suit Hinshaw had moved for summary
    judgment on Praxair’s behalf without conducting
    any discovery, discovery that would have brought
    to light documents suggestive that Credit
    Agricole itself may have believed that the
    swaption expired on January 16, not January 18.
    In support of the motion Hinshaw had submitted
    merely a skimpy memorandum of law that said
    little more than that "the Option Agreement
    expresses the intent that The Option be exercised
    by 5:00 p.m. EST on January 16, 1994. It wasn’t."
    The memorandum acknowledged, contradicting the
    flat statement that January 16 was the deadline,
    that the underlying swap agreement (as opposed to
    the swaption, that is, the option agreement)
    defined a "business day," as opposed to a
    holiday, for obligations denominated in Canadian
    dollars as any day that was a business day in
    Toronto, which January 17 was but January 16, a
    Sunday, was not. So any payments or resets
    scheduled for January 16 would not have to be
    made until the next day. But, Hinshaw argued,
    they could not be made any later than that. And
    so the specification of Toronto business days in
    the underlying swap contract was irrelevant
    because Credit Agricole had not attempted to
    exercise the option on January 17 but had waited
    until the next day. The district court, seconded
    by a panel of this court, found this argument
    unpersuasive because "the terms of the option
    contract evince no intent-- express or implied--
    to alter the weekend/holiday rule" of New York
    and Illinois. Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole
    v. CBI Industries, Inc., 
    supra,
     
    90 F.3d at 1274
    .
    Given the location of the offices in which the
    swaption was negotiated and signed, the governing
    rule had to be the law of one of these two states
    and it didn’t matter which one because they had
    the same rule. 
    Id.
     at 1271 n. 3.
    Praxair argues that Hinshaw could have made a
    much better argument for a January 16 or January
    17 deadline and that had it done so this court
    would have reached a different result in the
    previous case. It is only the second proposition
    that is in issue here; the district court did not
    decide whether Hinshaw had actually been
    negligent. Negligent legal representation is a
    failure to meet minimum professional standards,
    e.g., Transcraft, Inc. v. Galvin, Stalmack,
    Kirschner & Clark, 
    39 F.3d 812
    , 815 (7th Cir.
    1994); Bonhiver v. Rotenberg, Schwartzman &
    Richards, 
    461 F.2d 925
    , 928 (7th Cir. 1972), and
    is thus equivalent to what in Sixth Amendment
    cases is called ineffective assistance of
    counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    ,
    688 (1984); Lear v. Cowan, 
    220 F.3d 825
    , 829 (7th
    Cir. 2000); Hernandez v. Cowan, 
    200 F.3d 995
    , 999
    (7th Cir. 2000); People v. Kluppelberg, 
    628 N.E.2d 908
    , 917 (Ill. App. 1993). It is not
    merely undistinguished representation.
    Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 299A, comment
    e (1965). The summary judgment memorandum that
    Hinshaw filed in Caisse Nationale was that, and
    the failure to conduct any discovery may have
    been a worse lapse. If Praxair’s allegations are
    credited, moreover, as the procedural posture of
    the case requires us to do, Hinshaw represented
    itself as expert in complex financial matters. A
    law firm or other professional entity that
    represents itself to have special competence in a
    particular matter commits itself to a standard of
    care above the average for the profession as a
    whole. E.g., Transcraft, Inc. v. Galvin,
    Stalmack, Kirschner & Clark, 
    supra,
     
    39 F.3d at 815
    ; Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 
    847 F.2d 412
    ,
    419 (7th Cir. 1988); Sparks v. NLRB, 
    835 F.2d 705
    , 707 (7th Cir. 1987); Restatement (Second) of
    Torts, supra, sec. 299A, comment d; 2 Ronald E.
    Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice sec.
    18.4 (4th ed. 1996). That is arguably what
    happened here, and we’ll assume it is what
    happened here. A lawyer is not negligent for
    failing to make sophisticated economic arguments;
    few lawyers are capable of making such arguments.
    But a lawyer who holds himself out to his clients
    as being capable of making such arguments is
    bound to the standard of care of a lawyer having
    that capability. It is a case of tort law merging
    into contract law.
    We shall thus assume that Hinshaw was negligent
    and pass on to the issue of causation on which
    the decision of the district court and the appeal
    to this court are based. We’ll also brush by
    Hinshaw’s alternative ground for affirmance--that
    the two-year statute of limitations for bringing
    a suit for legal malpractice in Illinois (whose
    law the parties acknowledge governs the
    limitations issue) ran not from the judgment
    against Praxair in Caisse Nationale but from the
    grant of summary judgment against Praxair in that
    suit, which presaged its doom, or at the latest
    from the denial of Praxair’s motion for
    reconsideration, filed by new counsel; for by
    that time it was apparent both that Hinshaw had
    fallen down on the job and that a final judgment
    adverse to Praxair was going to be entered. The
    general rule regarding malpractice claims based
    on the mishandling of litigation--and we consider
    it a sound rule as well as one binding on us in
    this diversity suit--is that the statute of
    limitations does not begin to run until the trial
    court enters a final judgment. Kaplan v. Shure
    Brothers, Inc., 
    153 F.3d 413
    , 420-21 (7th Cir.
    1998); Lucey v. Law Offices of Pretzel &
    Stouffer, Chartered, 
    703 N.E.2d 473
    , 477-79 (Ill.
    App. 1998). The reason is not that it is certain
    then that the loser (the subsequent malpractice
    plaintiff) has been hurt, because he may get the
    judgment overturned on appeal; it is that it is
    too difficult to identify an earlier point at
    which he can be said to have been injured. Was it
    when his lawyer failed to raise a dispositive
    defense in the answer to the complaint? When he
    failed to object to a crucial bit of evidence?
    When he fainted during final argument? To avoid
    these conjectures and resulting uncertainty about
    when the statute of limitations began to run, the
    courts give the malpractice plaintiff two years
    from the date on which the trial court entered
    the final judgment against him in the suit that
    he claims his lawyer booted.
    So we come at last to the critical issue of
    causation. A plaintiff in a legal malpractice
    suit is not required to prove to a certainty that
    he would have won (or lost less) had it not been
    for the negligence of its lawyer, but he must
    show that a victory of some sort, even if just
    partial, was more likely than not. Jones Motor
    Co. v. Holtkamp, Liese, Beckemeier & Childress,
    P.C., 
    197 F.3d 1190
    , 1193 (7th Cir. 1999);
    Nicolet Instrument Corp. v. Lindquist & Vennum,
    
    34 F.3d 453
    , 455 (7th Cir. 1994); Transcraft,
    Inc. v. Galvin, Stalmack, Kirschner & Clark,
    
    supra,
     
    39 F.3d at 815
    ; Glass v. Pitler, 
    657 N.E.2d 1075
    , 1081-82 (Ill. App. 1995). So we must
    consider how important the Hinshaw firm’s
    oversights were. Several were due to its failure
    to conduct any discovery. Discovery is costly and
    in cases in which the stakes are small, or there
    is a clearly dispositive legal argument,
    forbearing to conduct discovery is not
    negligence. But the stakes were large in Credit
    Agricole’s suit against Praxair, and while
    Hinshaw did make an argument that the case should
    be disposed of by reference to the "plain
    language" of the contract, which specified a
    deadline of January 16, the argument was hardly a
    killer, given the rule in force in both cities
    where the contract was negotiated that when a
    contract specifies performance on a legal holiday
    performance may be deferred to the next business
    day. 5 ILCS 70/1.11; N.Y. General Construction
    Law sec. 25(1); Caisse Nationale de Credit
    Agricole v. CBI Industries, Inc., supra, 
    90 F.3d at 1271-73
    ; Hirsch v. Lindor Realty Corp., 
    472 N.E.2d 1024
    , 1025 (N.Y. 1984) (per curiam);
    Providence Ins. Co. v. LaSalle National Bank, 
    455 N.E.2d 238
    , 240-41 (Ill. App. 1983).
    Even without conducting discovery, Hinshaw
    should have realized, as it surprisingly did not,
    that February 18, 1991, when the swap and
    swaption contracts were signed, was itself a
    holiday in New York and Illinois but a business
    day in Toronto. This fact implied, Praxair
    argues, that the parties had assumed that the
    next business day after January 16, 1994, would
    be January 17 because it would be a business day
    in Toronto albeit not in the U.S. states. And if
    even minimally sophisticated in complex financial
    transactions, rather than fully sophisticated as
    it is alleged to have told Praxair it was,
    Hinshaw would have realized that it was anomalous
    for January 17 to be a business day for purposes
    of the swap but not for purposes of the swaption.
    Remember that the critical term of the swap if it
    was renewed, the variable-interest rate that
    Credit Agricole would be committing to, would be
    determined on January 17. This would give Credit
    Agricole, if free to postpone exercise of the
    swaption to the eighteenth, 24 hours in which to
    obtain and act on additional information about
    likely interest-rate movements in the next three
    months (that is, before the first resetting of
    the variable-interest rate under the renewed
    swap), while Praxair would have no corresponding
    right. Suppose that at 5 p.m. on Monday, January
    17, the current interest rate for Canadian
    bankers’ acceptances was 6 percent and, given
    that the rate was so high, Credit Agricole would
    not consider exercising the option to renew the
    swap, but that the next morning the rate plunged
    to 5 percent, at which level Credit Agricole
    would want to exercise; under its interpretation
    of the swaption it could do so because January 18
    was the first business day after January 16. Now
    suppose the interest rate was only 5 percent on
    January 17 and rose the next morning to 6
    percent; presumably Credit Agricole would not
    exercise the option. Credit Agricole, then, under
    its interpretation of the swaption, was in a
    heads I win, tails you lose position. It could,
    without any cost to itself, delay for 24 hours to
    see whether the interest rate fell. If it did
    fall, Credit Agricole would be better off if the
    swap was renewed; if the rate rose, it would be
    no worse off because it would be free to refuse
    to renew. Conversely, Praxair would be worse off
    if the interest rate fell but no better off if it
    rose. How likely is it that the parties would
    have agreed to so one-sided a deal?
    Also without need to conduct discovery, but
    merely by reviewing Praxair’s own records,
    Hinshaw would have discovered, first, that the
    original draft of the swaption, which had been
    drafted by Credit Agricole, had specified "NY
    Banking Day" but that Credit Agricole had deleted
    this in the draft it sent Praxair, and also that
    the original draft of the swap agreement had
    carried an expiration date of January 18 and this
    had been changed in the final draft to January
    16.
    Had Hinshaw conducted discovery, it would
    further have learned that when Bankers Trust had
    tried on January 18 to exercise the identical
    option to renew its swap with Credit Agricole,
    Credit Agricole, which had the same position in
    that swap as Praxair had in this one, had
    asserted that Bankers Trust was too late, though
    later it relented because Bankers Trust was a
    steady customer and Praxair was not.
    Praxair argues that if all this evidence (and
    some other bits that we haven’t mentioned but
    that would make no difference to our decision)
    had been presented to the courts in Caisse
    Nationale, they would have ruled that a trial was
    necessary in order to determine whether the
    swaption allowed Credit Nationale to defer
    exercise to January 18. We disagree. When a
    contract specifies a day for performance that
    happens to be a Sunday or other legal holiday,
    performance can be deferred to the next business
    day in accordance with the law of the
    jurisdiction applicable to the contract. Nothing
    in the swaption itself or in the evidence
    painstakingly gathered by Praxair in this
    malpractice suit suggests that Credit Agricole
    thought it had to exercise the option by the
    close of business on January 17. True, Credit
    Agricole took this position when Bankers Trust
    tried to exercise its own option on the
    eighteenth. But that was because it didn’t want
    to renew its swap with Bankers Trust if, as
    Praxair was asserting, Credit Agricole had lost
    the right to renew the swap with Praxair, the
    swap for which Credit Agricole’s swap with
    Bankers Trust was a hedge. Praxair does not argue
    that Credit Agricole was barred by the doctrine
    of "mend the hold" from changing its position.
    Gibson v. Brown, 
    73 N.E. 578
    , 582 (Ill. 1905);
    Herremans v. Carrera Designs, Inc., 
    157 F.3d 1118
    , 1123 (7th Cir. 1998); Harbor Insurance Co.
    v. Continental Bank Corp., 
    922 F.2d 357
    , 362-63
    (7th Cir. 1990); Robert H. Sitkoff, Comment,
    "’Mend the Hold’" and Erie: Why an Obscure
    Contracts Doctrine Should Control in Federal
    Diversity Cases," 
    65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1059
     (1998).
    Nor is this a case of extrinsic ambiguity, that
    is, a case in which knowledge of the real-world
    context of a contract shows that the parties did
    not mean what the contract, read acontextually,
    seems to mean. Allendorf v. Daily, 
    129 N.E.2d 673
    , 680 (Ill. 1955); Interim Health Care of
    Northern Illinois, Inc. v. Interim Health Care,
    Inc., 
    225 F.3d 876
    , 879, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2000);
    Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 
    217 F.3d 539
    , 542-
    43 (7th Cir. 2000); AM Int’l, Inc. v. Graphic
    Management Associates, Inc., 
    44 F.3d 572
    , 575
    (7th Cir. 1995); International Union, United
    Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
    Workers v. Skinner Engine Co., 
    188 F.3d 130
    , 145-
    46 (3d Cir. 1999); Charter Oil Co. v. American
    Employers’ Insurance Co., 
    69 F.3d 1160
    , 1167-68
    (D.C. Cir. 1995). It was to Credit Agricole’s
    advantage to be able to exercise the swaption as
    late as January 18, given that the Toronto
    exchange would be open the previous day. Its
    interpretation is thus concordant with the real-
    world setting of the contract.
    Specifically, it is not a case of mutual mistake
    (on which see, e.g., Barker v. Fitzgerald, 
    68 N.E. 430
     (Ill. 1903); Grun v. Pneumo Abex Corp.,
    
    163 F.3d 411
    , 421 (7th Cir. 1998)), a subdivision
    of extrinsic ambiguity well illustrated by the
    famous case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C.
    906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864). The contract
    in that case referred to the ship Peerless and
    each party had a different ship of that name in
    mind. The ambiguity was not on the face of the
    contract but in the relation between the words of
    the contract and the world of ships. Litigation
    might have established that the parties had in
    fact the same ship in mind. In that event there
    would have been no mutual mistake, in fact no
    mistake at all.
    The doctrine of mutual mistake is limited to
    cases in which both parties were reasonable in
    their inconsistent interpretations; cases, in
    other words, of irremediable ambiguity; more
    precisely, cases in which neither party is more
    at fault than the other. "If neither party can be
    assigned the greater blame for the
    misunderstanding, there is no nonarbitrary basis
    for deciding which party’s understanding to
    enforce," so either party is allowed to abandon
    the contract without liability. Colfax Envelope
    Corp. v. Local No. 458-3M, Chicago Graphic
    Communication Int’l Union, 
    20 F.3d 750
    , 753 (7th
    Cir. 1994); see also Miller v. Taylor Insulation
    Co., 
    39 F.3d 755
    , 760 (7th Cir. 1994). But a
    party whose interpretation is a product of
    carelessness cannot obtain relief unless the
    other party was equally careless, for without an
    equality of blame there is no basis for shifting
    the loss by permitting rescission. Id.; Colfax
    Envelope Corp. v. Local No. 458-3M, Chicago
    Graphic Communication Int’l Union, supra, 
    20 F.3d at 754
    . Professor Farnsworth cites authority that
    lack of care does not bar a claim of mutual
    mistake. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts sec. 9.3,
    p. 630 (3d ed. 1999). But an asymmetrical lack of
    care does. If one party is careless and the other
    is not, the careless party cannot rescind,
    because he has offered no reason why the court
    should make him better off than his opponent.
    Praxair was careless. It had only to look at the
    calendar and know a minimum amount of choice of
    law and of contract holiday-performance law in
    order to realize that Credit Agricole could
    exercise the swaption on January 18. It failed to
    ascertain when it entered into the swaption
    contract back in 1991 that January 16, 1994,
    would be a Sunday and January 17 a holiday and
    failed (whether through ignorance of what day of
    the week that date was or through some other lack
    of care) to insist that the swaption nevertheless
    specify a deadline of January 17 for its
    exercise.
    In contrast, Credit Agricole was not careless.
    Indeed, it may well have thought it had until
    January 18 to exercise, in which event this is
    not a case of mutual mistake for a more
    fundamental reason than any we have touched upon.
    When only one of the contracting parties was
    mistaken, we have a case of unilateral rather
    than mutual mistake. And unilateral mistake is
    generally not a ground for rescinding or
    reforming a contract. Tony Downs Foods Co. v.
    United States, 
    530 F.2d 367
    , 373 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
    Anderson Brothers Corp. v. O’Meara, 
    306 F.2d 672
    ,
    676-77 (5th Cir. 1962). That is implicit in the
    doctrine of mutual mistake as we have explained
    it. Exceptions are cropping up, as discussed in
    Farnsworth, supra, sec. 9.4, but are inapplicable
    when the other party reasonably relied on the
    mistaken interpretation of the party seeking
    rescission. Id., sec. 9.4, pp. 632-33. Credit
    Agricole reasonably relied on its right to
    exercise on January 18. The contract seemed
    clearly to confer that right upon it. In any
    event, Illinois flatly bars rescission on the
    basis of a careless mistake. Rakowski v. Lucente,
    
    472 N.E.2d 791
    , 794 (Ill. 1984); John J. Calnan
    Co. v. Talsma Builders, Inc., 
    367 N.E.2d 695
    , 698
    (Ill. 1973); Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 
    80 N.E. 564
     (Ill. 1907).
    Perhaps the strongest evidence that the mistake
    may have been mutual rather than unilateral is
    that an early draft of the proposed swaption
    agreement, submitted by Credit Agricole, set the
    expiration date at January 18. Praxair objected,
    insisting that the contract expire on Sunday the
    sixteenth. Credit Agricole relented, and the
    contract as finally executed listed that date. We
    say it is "perhaps" the strongest evidence
    because the record does not contain that early
    draft, only a description of it by an employee of
    Praxair in his deposition. But, if true, it
    implies that both parties thought they were
    choosing a date other than the eighteenth. That
    they knowingly chose a Sunday for expiration
    implies that they either wanted it to expire then
    or thought it would expire the next day, the
    seventeenth, perhaps overlooking the fact that
    the seventeenth was a public holiday in the
    United States. If both parties thought the
    contract would expire on either the sixteenth or
    the seventeenth but overlooked the fact that the
    seventeenth was a holiday, this would be a case
    like Raffles, where the contract though seemingly
    clear is actually incurably ambiguous because its
    unambiguous language fails to distinguish between
    two states of the world (business days and
    holidays). And then Hinshaw’s negligence in
    failing to conduct discovery that would have
    brought these facts to light would be causally
    related to Praxair’s loss of its lawsuit with
    Credit Agricole.
    The difficulty with this argument for reversal
    is that Praxair hasn’t made it. As noted earlier,
    it argues only that the parties changed the
    expiration date of the swap from January 16 to
    18, not the swaption. If anything, that change,
    with no corresponding change in the expiration
    date of the swaption, would imply that the latter
    date was indeed the eighteenth, and not the
    seventeenth or sixteenth. Now in fact the
    expiration date of the swaption was changed too.
    But Praxair does not argue this. Even its
    argument, in any event unconvincing, about the
    change in the expiration date of the swap comes
    too late to be considered. It was not made in the
    district court or in Praxair’s opening brief in
    this court. It was first made in Praxair’s reply
    brief. For all we know, Credit Agricole has a
    compelling response. It has not had a chance to
    respond. Foreclosing the opponent’s possibility
    to refute an argument by failing to present the
    argument in the trial court is one reason why an
    argument must, with exceptions not applicable
    here (jurisdictional arguments, comity arguments,
    and, very occasionally, arguments of pure law,
    Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 
    2 F.3d 746
    , 749 (7th Cir. 1993)), be made in the
    district court to be preserved in the court of
    appeals. E.g., Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc.,
    
    2000 WL 1648903
    , at *5 n. 2 (7th Cir. Nov. 3,
    2000); Herremans v. Carrera Designs, Inc., supra,
    
    157 F.3d at 1122
    ; Wikberg v. Reich, 
    21 F.3d 188
    ,
    191 (7th Cir. 1994); Clauson v. Smith, 
    823 F.2d 660
    , 666 (1st Cir. 1987).
    Praxair argues rather pathetically that as this
    was its first swap it should be excused by its
    lack of the relevant commercial sophistication
    from bearing the responsibility for the disaster
    it failed to foresee. But a contracting party,
    here Credit Agricole, is not to be penalized for
    knowing more about the business that is the
    subject matter of the contract than the other
    party. A newcomer to a market is responsible for
    learning enough about the market to be able to
    survive in it; he cannot force his contracting
    partners to educate him. See Sun Oil Co. v.
    Wortman, 
    486 U.S. 717
    , 731 n. 4 (1988); Western
    Industries, Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd., 
    739 F.2d 1198
    , 1202 (7th Cir. 1984); Gord Industrial
    Plastics, Inc. v. Aubrey Manufacturing, Inc., 
    469 N.E.2d 389
    , 392 (Ill. App. 1984); Farnsworth,
    supra, sec. 7.13, p. 486; Restatement (Second) of
    Contracts sec. 221 and comment a (1981);
    Elizabeth Warren, "Trade Usage and Parties in the
    Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible
    Rule," 
    42 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 515
     (1981). This rule
    makes especially good sense when it is obvious
    that the market is a complicated one. Everyone
    knows or should know that swaps are not for
    novices. Praxair was careless in thinking it
    could negotiate the shoals of swapdom without
    bothering to acquaint itself with the norms and
    customs, the traps and pitfalls, of the market
    into which it had wandered. Failing to exercise
    due care, Praxair had no basis in law for
    shifting the consequences of that failure to
    Credit Agricole. Better representation would not
    have saved it from a judgment in Credit
    Agricole’s favor for breach of contract.
    Praxair argues alternatively that at the very
    least Hinshaw should have advised it that it had
    no defense against Credit Agricole in time to
    allow Praxair to settle the suit, at a lower cost
    than it incurred by going all the way to
    judgment, simply by allowing Credit Agricole to
    exercise the option, which it turns out would
    have been worth less than the judgment that
    Credit Agricole obtained. But Praxair had refused
    to allow that exercise before it even hired
    Hinshaw. The refusal was a repudiation of the
    contract, entitling Credit Agricole to sue.
    Having broken the contract, Praxair had no right
    to insist that Credit Agricole comply with it.
    Affirmed.