Mosher, Gloria J. v. Dollar Tree Stores ( 2001 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 00-1508
    GLORIA J. MOSHER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    DOLLAR TREE STORES, INC., a Virginia corporation,
    and NICK LIMO, a/k/a Michael Paul Herman,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 98 C 2295--George M. Marovich, Judge.
    Argued November 2, 2000--Decided February 16, 2001
    Before MANION, KANNE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
    EVANS, Circuit Judge. This is a he-said/she-said
    case, where one party claims they shared a
    mutually beneficial, consensual relationship and
    the other alleges sexual harassment. Gloria
    Mosher, a part-time cashier at a Dollar Bills
    store (it’s owned by the defendant, Dollar Tree
    Stores, Inc.) in Aurora, Illinois, claims she was
    sexually harassed by the store manager, Nick
    Limo, with whom she shared an apartment and a
    bed. Mosher allowed Limo to pay half her rent,
    accepted his gifts, met his parents, referred to
    him as her boyfriend, and continued their
    relationship for several months after she quit
    her job at the store. Nonetheless, she says that
    the 9-month relationship, during and after her
    employment, occurred against her will. Even
    giving credence to what she said, and viewing the
    facts in the light most favorable to her, we find
    that she fails to allege a claim for sexual
    harassment, and so we affirm the grant of summary
    judgment in favor of her employer. We also find
    Mosher’s claims that the district judge was
    biased against her and abused his discretion when
    he denied her third request to extend discovery
    to be unavailing.\1
    The tale begins in January 1997, when Mosher,
    who had not had a job for 11 years, took one as
    a part-time cashier at the Aurora store after
    being hired by Limo, the store’s manager. In her
    deposition, Mosher acknowledges that Limo helped
    her fill out the application form and handed her
    an employee handbook. However, later she contends
    that her memory grew hazy, and she could not
    recall whether or not she had actually received
    the handbook. Dollar Tree maintains that it had
    a policy and practice of distributing its
    employee handbook to all employees and that each
    store displayed an employment poster in the
    employee bathroom listing a contact number where
    employees could report harassment. Mosher denies
    ever seeing this poster.
    After her first day of work, Limo asked Mosher
    out to dinner, and she accepted his invitation.
    She claims she went only because she thought that
    if she didn’t, there might be problems on the
    job. However, she admits that at the time, Limo
    did not say anything that could be construed as
    threatening. At dinner, the two discussed job
    duties and how many hours Mosher would work.
    Mosher contends that Limo also told her that if
    she "played [her] cards right," she would "go
    places," but that he did not explain what he
    meant by this comment.
    Mosher returned to work the next day. On her
    third day at work, during a break, Mosher left
    the cash register and went to the back of the
    store. There, Limo pulled her onto his lap and
    fondled her breasts. She protested, got up, and
    returned to the cash register. In addition,
    Mosher contends that Limo continued to ask her
    out to dinner after each of her shifts and
    frequently asked her "out of the blue" how she
    liked her job./2 She believed these questions
    were asked in a threatening manner.
    Approximately 2 weeks after she started work,
    Limo asked for directions to Mosher’s home, which
    Mosher provided, although she now contends that
    she did so under duress. Nevertheless, that
    evening Limo drove to Mosher’s apartment. They
    had sex and he stayed the night. He returned the
    following evening and many nights afterwards,
    bringing with him a change of clothes. At the
    time, Limo was living at home with his parents,
    and he contends that Mosher and he agreed that he
    would start paying half her rent and would live
    with her.
    Mosher admitted that Limo paid half her rent
    from March 1997 until their relationship ended in
    October of the same year. She also conceded that
    she accepted a check from Limo for clothes and
    that he bought a microwave and air conditioner
    for her apartment, which he left with her after
    their relationship ended. Although Limo paid half
    the rent, Mosher never gave him a key to the
    apartment, but she let him in every time he
    called. The two also attended social functions
    together. Mosher acknowledged that she attended
    a birthday celebration at a local restaurant with
    Limo’s parents and afterwards went to his
    parents’ home for cake.
    While at the Dollar Bills store, neither
    Mosher’s work responsibilities, schedule, nor
    salary changed. Although Mosher alleges that she
    was forced to resign due to the harassment, she
    concedes that she never reported the situation to
    Limo’s superior, the district manager Bill Rice.
    Early in her tenure, in February 1997, Mosher did
    speak with a new assistant manager, Richard
    Martin. She told Martin that she was upset and
    did not like her working conditions. Although she
    did not provide details, she did state that Limo
    was "after her."/3 Four months later, in the end
    of May, Mosher left her job at the Dollar Bills
    store. However, her sexual relationship with Limo
    continued for another 5 months, and he continued
    to pay rent.
    After she resigned, Mosher accepted a higher-
    paying position at a clothing store a few blocks
    from the Dollar Bills store. Although she
    continued to work in the same shopping plaza,
    Mosher testified that Limo did not visit her in
    her new place of employment, nor did he attempt
    to contact her after their relationship ended in
    October.
    From March 1997 onwards, while she was employed
    at the Dollar Bills store, Mosher was seeing two
    physicians, one for medication, Dr. Kris
    Gururajan, and the other for counseling, Dr.
    Stephen De Jaynes./4 Both doctors testified that
    during her visits Mosher reported that she had
    found employment, stated that she was quite happy
    with her new job, and that she had a new
    boyfriend./5 She did not tell either physician
    that she was afraid of losing her job or that she
    was subject to a harassing work environment.
    We review the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Dollar Tree de novo. Doe v.
    Howe Military Sch., 
    227 F.3d 981
    , 990 (7th Cir.
    2000). Summary judgment should be granted if the
    pleadings, depositions, answers to
    interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits leave
    no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    In recent cases the Supreme Court abandoned the
    commonly used categories of quid pro quo and
    hostile work environment harassment, opting
    instead to distinguish between cases based on
    whether the supervisor took a tangible employment
    action against the complaining subordinate and
    those cases in which no such action was taken.
    Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 
    524 U.S. 742
    , 760-
    65 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
    524 U.S. 775
    , 807 (1998). In establishing the
    standards that govern vicarious liability of an
    employer for the harassing actions of an
    employee, we look to the agency principles
    developed by the Court. Ellerth, at 754-55; see
    also Molnar v. Booth, 
    229 F.3d 593
    , 600 (7th Cir.
    2000).
    Here, Mosher contends both that she suffered a
    tangible employment action and that she was
    subjected to a sexually harassing work
    environment. "A tangible employment action
    constitutes a significant change in employment
    status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
    promote, reassignment with significantly
    different responsibilities, or a decision causing
    a significant change in benefits." 
    Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761
    . Mosher was not fired. She quit and
    now claims to have been constructively
    discharged.
    First, it should be noted that we have yet to
    determine whether a constructive discharge is a
    tangible employment action within the meaning of
    Ellerth and Faragher. Cf. Caridad v. Metro-North
    Commuter R.R., 
    191 F.3d 283
    , 294 (2nd Cir. 1999)
    ("[C]onstructive discharge does not constitute a
    ’tangible employment action,’ as that term is
    used in Ellerth and Faragher.")./6 However, we
    need not settle that issue today, for we find
    that Mosher did not raise a genuine issue of
    material fact that she was constructively
    discharged.
    An employee can assert a claim of constructive
    discharge when she is forced to resign because
    her working conditions, from the standpoint of
    the reasonable employee, have become unbearable.
    Lindale v. Tokheim Corp., 
    145 F.3d 953
    , 955 (7th
    Cir. 1998). Although an employee facing a
    discriminatory or harassing work environment is
    not required to file suit before resigning,
    failure to object to egregious conditions or to
    seek some form of redress is compelling evidence
    that the employee, or any reasonable worker,
    would not find the conditions intolerable. 
    Id. Absent extraordinary
    conditions, "a complaining
    employee is expected to remain on the job while
    seeking redress." Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc.,
    
    126 F.3d 1010
    , 1015 (7th Cir. 1997).
    Mosher admits that she never confided in anyone
    at the store. She never reported the situation to
    Rice, Limo’s supervisor. At most, we can find
    that she spoke rather obliquely to a newly
    appointed assistant manager, Martin, early in her
    tenure in February 1997. However, she did not
    resign until 4 months later in May. Thus, Mosher
    is unable to claim that incidents occurring in
    February-- such as being asked to dinner,
    questioned, or fondled-- were the triggering
    events that made it impossible for her to remain
    at the store. Rather, she bases her constructive
    discharge claim on a patchwork of contributing
    factors, including her living arrangement with
    Limo.
    Mosher and Limo entered into a living
    arrangement and an ongoing sexual relationship
    shortly after she began working at the store.
    Mosher contends that this situation was entirely
    involuntary and that she agreed to it only
    because she needed to keep her job. However, the
    facts surrounding Mosher’s relationship with Limo
    do not suggest an objectively hostile or abusive
    situation.
    Mosher allowed Limo to pay half her rent for 9
    months and regularly had sex with him. She never
    gave him a key, but rather allowed him into her
    apartment during each visit. She accepted his
    gifts, met his parents, and referred to him as
    her boyfriend. Although Mosher contends that
    subjectively she was afraid of Limo and had sex
    with him only in order to keep her job, her
    allegations are inconsistent with her actions.
    Not only did she not report the situation to
    management, but she never alerted her own
    counselor or physician. Rather, her report to
    both treating physicians was positive, indicating
    that she was engaged in a consensual
    relationship. Moreover, she did not attempt to
    rid herself of Limo. After she quit her job she
    took a new one only blocks away and continued to
    see Limo and have sex with him for another 5
    months until their relationship ended in October.
    Finally, although Mosher contends that Limo was
    pertinacious, once their relationship ended,
    Mosher admitted that he never came to visit her
    in her new place of work or made any other
    attempt to contact her by phone or in person.
    Overall, Mosher’s passivity, her unwillingness
    to alert anyone or to change her living
    arrangement with Limo, are inconsistent with her
    claim that she was subject to an unbearable work
    environment and that her only option was to flee
    Limo by quitting her job. Thus, we find that
    Mosher was not constructively discharged.
    Next, Mosher contends that she was subject to a
    hostile work environment. Because this claim does
    not involve a tangible employment action, Dollar
    Tree contends that in keeping with Ellerth and
    Faragher it is entitled to assert the affirmative
    defense that it exercised reasonable care to
    prevent and correct any sexually harassing
    behavior and that Mosher unreasonably failed to
    take advantage of preventive or corrective
    opportunities. 
    Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765
    ;
    
    Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807
    . However, Dollar Tree’s
    request is untimely. It failed to assert this
    defense below and cannot do so now. "We have long
    refused to consider arguments that were not
    presented to the district court in response to
    summary judgment motions." Cooper v. Lane, 
    969 F.2d 368
    , 371 (7th Cir. 1992). Thus, we consider
    only whether Mosher alleges facts consistent with
    a claim of hostile work environment and find that
    she does not as a matter of law.
    In order to be actionable under Title VII, "a
    sexually objectionable environment must be both
    objectively and subjectively offensive, one that
    a reasonable person would find hostile or
    abusive, and one that the victim in fact did
    perceive to be so." Faragher, 
    524 U.S. 775
    , 787.
    In determining whether an environment is
    sufficiently hostile or abusive we look at the
    totality of the circumstances, including but not
    limited to the "frequency of the discriminatory
    conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
    threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
    utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
    with an employee’s work performance." 
    Id. at 787-
    88 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
    510 U.S. 17
    , 23 (1993)).
    The most significant and disturbing incident
    recalled by Mosher occurred on her third day of
    work when she says Limo pulled her onto his lap
    and fondled her breasts. While this readily could
    be considered a severe incident, Mosher’s
    reaction suggests that she did not perceive it as
    such. At the time, she reported the incident to
    no one and within weeks was involved in what can
    only be reasonably described as a consensual
    sexual relationship with Limo which continued for
    many months. See Dey v. Colt Const. & Dev. Co.,
    
    28 F.3d 1446
    , 1454 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[I]f the
    victim does not subjectively perceive the
    environment to be abusive, the conduct has not
    actually altered the conditions of the victim’s
    employment, and there is not a Title VII
    violation.") (quoting 
    Harris, 510 U.S. at 370
    ).
    Even viewing all the facts in the light most
    favorable to Mosher, no reasonable jury could
    conclude that she was anything other than a
    willing participant in a long, consensual
    relationship with her boss. Getting involved in
    a relationship like that is, for both an employee
    and a boss, usually unwise. But it happens. As
    long as men and women work together, the
    potential for sexual sparks to fly in the
    workplace will always exist. But after a long-
    time sexual relationship like this one goes sour,
    it will be only the unusual case that can escape
    summary judgment. And this one is not that
    unusual.
    AFFIRMED.
    /1 Mosher did not file a motion to have the district
    judge recused but rather appears on appeal to be
    alleging judicial bias based on a letter sent by
    Judge George M. Marovich to both litigants. The
    letter invited both parties to provide the court
    with a candid assessment of their case including:
    whether the case could be decided by dispositive
    motions, the likelihood of success on the merits,
    the scope of damages, and what legal expenses
    would be incurred. In this case, both parties
    submitted responses, and Mosher contends that
    after receiving these ex parte communications the
    judge’s attitude towards Mosher’s case changed.
    First, we note that in litigious districts such
    as the one in Chicago, federal judges carry an
    unwieldy burden. Innocuous case management
    tactics such as Judge Marovich’s letter are
    designed to help judges organize their trial
    schedules, promote settlement, and better serve
    the needs of the litigants that come before them.
    We find nothing improper in Judge Marovich’s
    letter or his receipt of responses and find he
    acted well within his discretion. Finally, the
    court gave Mosher almost a full year to conduct
    discovery. Thus, we find the judge did not abuse
    his discretion when he refused to extend
    discovery for a third time, where Mosher claimed
    to have failed to obtain all of her own medical
    records.
    /2 On appeal, Mosher submits new allegations of
    harassment which were not raised below. We limit
    our review to facts that were before the district
    court when it granted summary judgment. See
    Arendt v. Vetta Sports, Inc., 
    99 F.3d 231
    , 237
    (7th Cir. 1996) (issues not raised in the
    district court are deemed waived).
    /3 Dollar Tree’s Attorney: You said in your
    complaint that you complained about Mr. Limo to
    an assistant manager named Richard?
    Mosher: Yeah. I told him that I was
    upset, and I didn’t like working
    under the conditions and, you know.
    . . . .
    Attorney:    What did you tell Richard?
    Mosher: I just said that I was unhappy, you
    know. I just came there
    to work. I’m on Social Security. I’m a cardiac
    patient. I hadn’t worked in 11 years. I moved to
    this place. I was paying X-amount more dollars
    than I did before, so I had to work. That’s what
    it was.
    . . . .
    Attorney: So you never confided in Richard.
    You never said that he’s
    sexually harassing me, that he’s forcing me to
    have sex, nothing like that?
    Mosher:   I never confided in anybody in that store.
    Attorney:    About anything?
    Mosher:   No. It was rather embarrassing.
    /4 Mosher provided her medical records to opposing
    counsel to substantiate her claim for emotional
    damages.
    /5 Dollar Tree’s Attorney:     Do you remember what she
    said about it?
    Dr. Gururajan: She said she     got a job and
    she is quite happy about the
    work. In fact, if I remember    right, I think she
    told me she hasn’t had a job    for a long time and
    she was happy that she got a    job.
    . . . .
    Attorney: Did she ever tell you she was
    in a relationship of any kind?
    Dr. Gururajan: She did tell me that she has
    a boyfriend . . . I asked her whether
    she talked about this to her
    counselor and she said she is planning
    to talk to him.
    . . . .
    Dollar Tree Attorney:    What did she say
    [about Limo]?
    Dr. Stephen De Jaynes: In general, that
    the relationship was positive
    and at one point, I believe,
    she had planned to
    move in with him. They were going to get an
    apartment together, I believe.
    /6 The Second Circuit concluded that constructive
    discharge is not a tangible employment action, in
    part because even co-workers may be responsible
    for a constructive discharge and a constructive
    discharge is neither ratified nor approved by
    management. 
    Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294
    .