Amadio, Thomas v. Ford Motor Company ( 2001 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 99-3728
    Thomas Amadio,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    Ford Motor Company,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 98 C 7810--George W. Lindberg, Judge.
    Argued September 6, 2000--Decided February 1, 2001
    Before Cudahy, Coffey, and Ripple, Circuit Judges.
    Cudahy, Circuit Judge. Thomas Amadio was an
    hourly employee on the assembly line at Ford
    Motor Company’s Chicago Assembly Plant from June
    9, 1986, to March 8, 1995, the date of his
    termination by Ford Motor Company (Ford). In the
    three years prior to his termination, Amadio
    suffered from a variety of ailments that led him
    to take a total of approximately 70 weeks of sick
    leave. Because Amadio allegedly failed to fully
    comply with Ford’s sick leave policy, Ford
    terminated Amadio’s employment. Following his
    termination, Amadio filed this suit against Ford
    under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
    42 U.S.C. sec.sec. 12101-12213, claiming that
    Ford discriminated against him because of his
    disability or, in the alternative, because it
    regarded him as having a disability. The district
    court granted summary judgment in favor of Ford.
    We affirm.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    A.   Facts
    In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we
    set forth the facts in a light most favorable to
    the non-moving party (here, Amadio), drawing all
    reasonable inferences in its favor. See Anderson
    v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986).
    1.
    Amadio started at Ford’s assembly plant on June
    9, 1986, working, as he would until his
    termination, on the assembly line. Amadio began
    his career as an assembler, but later graduated
    to the general utility position in the chassis
    division, a position that qualified Amadio to be
    assigned to any duty on the assembly line
    involving the production of the car chassis.
    Amadio was a member of the International Union
    of the United Automobile Workers of America
    (UAW), Local 551, as well as of the international
    union. The UAW was the certified collective
    bargaining representative for all hourly
    employees at the assembly plant, and a collective
    bargaining agreement (CBA) between Ford and the
    UAW governed the terms and conditions of Amadio’s
    employment.
    The CBA specifically provides for employee sick
    or medical leaves. A medical leave under the CBA
    is requested from, and granted by, the medical
    staff employed at the assembly plant. Generally,
    Ford’s medical staff does not conduct an
    independent examination of the employee, but
    instead decides the propriety of a medical leave
    based solely upon documents submitted by the
    employee in support of the request. Ford Form
    5166, "Medical Leave Authorization for Hourly
    Employees," is generally used by employees in
    submitting a required physician’s statement and
    an anticipated return to work date.
    Under the CBA, an employee who does not report
    to work after the expiration of his medical leave
    is mailed what is known as a "five-day quit"
    letter. This letter requires the employee to
    report to work or, if unable to do so, to report
    to the company medical section, or mail in a form
    completed by the employee’s doctor or phone the
    assembly plant with an expected return date. If
    an employee fails to respond adequately to a
    five-day quit letter, the employee may be
    terminated.
    2.
    Amadio appears to have gained an intimate
    familiarity with the CBA’s sick leave provisions
    in the last three years of his employment.
    Indeed, the record indicates that Amadio took 23
    medical leaves, and was absent for no less than
    70 weeks during this time period. In addition,
    Amadio was also subject to several disciplinary
    lay-offs during this time period, apparently for
    failure to adequately comply with Ford’s sick
    leave procedures.
    During Amadio’s last three years of employment
    with Ford, he suffered from several ailments,
    including illnesses (such as an upper respiratory
    infection, a cold and similar afflictions), an
    occupational back injury, hepatitis B, Brown’s
    Syndrome,/1 high blood pressure, a liver
    disorder and a urinary tract infection. While
    Amadio’s liver disorder and urinary tract
    infection were apparently the result of his
    hepatitis, the remaining ailments appear to have
    been unrelated to one another.
    Amadio’s ailments resulted in several extended
    absences from work. For example, Amadio was on
    continuous medical leave from May 9, 1994 to
    October 28, 1994. Amadio was again on leave from
    November 2, 1994 to November 21, 1994. And, of
    most importance to this case, Amadio was once
    again on leave from December 2, 1994 to the date
    of his termination on March 8, 1995.
    Amadio’s last extended absence from work began
    with the diagnosis of Brown’s Syndrome in
    November 1994. While being treated for Brown’s
    Syndrome, Amadio was diagnosed with hepatitis B.
    Shortly thereafter, he was further diagnosed with
    liver disease and a urinary tract infection. In
    order to tend to this last round of ailments,
    Amadio properly secured a medical leave, which he
    began on December 2, 1994. This leave expired on
    February 26, 1995. Because Amadio had still not
    returned to work on February 28, 1995, Louis
    Lafayette, a human resource representative in the
    labor relations department at the assembly plant,
    mailed a five-day quit letter (February 28
    Letter) to Amadio. This letter required Amadio to
    respond on or before March 7, 1995, by reporting
    either to work or to the assembly plant’s medical
    section for an evaluation. The letter further
    required Amadio to bring "satisfactory medical
    evidence" covering his entire period of absence.
    On March 6, Amadio chose to report to the
    medical section, where he discussed his medical
    status with a clerk and a nurse. During his
    visit, Amadio provided Ford’s medical staff with
    a Ford Form 5166, documenting his absence from
    February 27, 1995, to March 6, 1995, but failing
    to document his absence prior to February 27,
    1995, as requested by the February 28 Letter.
    Amadio indicated that he had an upcoming
    appointment with a specialist regarding his
    urinary tract infection and that he would bring
    additional medical leave paperwork after this
    appointment. Amadio alleges that Ford’s medical
    personnel responded by telling him "no problem,
    when you get your information from the specialist
    come back and see us."
    3.
    Lafayette terminated Amadio’s employment on
    March 8, 1995, allegedly because Amadio failed to
    adequately document his entire medical leave when
    he visited the assembly plant’s medical section
    on March 6, as required by his February 28
    Letter. Consistent with assembly plant custom,
    Lafayette sent a memorandum to assembly plant
    personnel, informing them of Amadio’s termination
    and instructing them that Amadio was to be
    referred to the assembly plant’s labor relations
    department before going to work or having further
    contact with assembly plant medical personnel.
    Later in the day on March 8, and subsequent to
    Lafayette’s termination of Amadio, Richard
    Jordan, another human resources representative at
    the assembly plant, mailed a second five-day quit
    letter (March 8 Letter) to Amadio. This letter
    indicated that Amadio’s medical leave expired on
    March 5, and not on February 26, as stated in the
    February 28 Letter. The March 8 Letter gave
    Amadio until March 15 to return to work./2
    Amadio attempted to return to the assembly
    plant medical section on March 9, 1995. He had
    seen a medical specialist and was hoping to
    submit a Ford Form 5166 that indicated an
    expected return to work date of March 17, 1995.
    However, upon Amadio’s arrival at the medical
    section, the medical personnel refused to accept
    Amadio’s new Ford Form 5166. Instead, as
    instructed by Lafayette’s memorandum, they
    referred Amadio to the assembly plant labor
    relations department, which informed Amadio of
    his termination.
    Following an unsuccessful appeal of his
    discharge through the CBA’s grievance procedure,
    Amadio filed this action against Ford. In this
    action, Amadio alleges for the first time that
    Ford discriminated against him in violation of
    the ADA because Ford knew that he had a
    disability or regarded him as having a
    disability.
    B.   District Court Proceedings
    The district court issued a one-page order
    granting summary judgment in favor of Ford,
    finding that Amadio was not a "qualified
    individual with a disability" under the ADA. The
    district court expressed doubt that Amadio had a
    "disability" as defined by the ADA because it
    believed that Amadio’s medical conditions were
    temporary. The district court also determined
    that Amadio was unable to perform all of the
    essential functions of his job because he was
    unable to come to work on a regular basis. He had
    missed approximately 70 weeks of work during the
    preceding three years. In addition, the court
    found that Ford was not required to continue
    granting medical leaves as a reasonable
    accommodation of Amadio’s inability to appear for
    work. Accordingly, the court held that Amadio was
    unable to prove a prima facie case of disability
    discrimination under the ADA. Lastly, the court
    stated that, even if Amadio had been able to
    establish a prima facie case under the ADA, Ford
    had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
    reason for Amadio’s termination--that Amadio
    failed to adequately document his absence as
    required by the February 28 Letter.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of Review
    We review de novo the district court’s
    disposition of this case on summary judgment. See
    Cengr v. Fusibound Piping Sys., Inc., 
    135 F.3d 445
    , 450 (7th Cir. 1998). In so doing, we bear in
    mind that summary judgment is only proper when
    the "pleadings, depositions, answers to
    interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
    with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
    no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
    the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
    matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also
    Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322-23
    (1986). We, of course, view the record in a light
    most favorable to the non-moving party. See
    Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    ,
    255 (1986).
    B.   ADA Claim
    The ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall
    discriminate against a qualified individual with
    a disability because of the disability of such
    individual in regard to . . . discharge of
    employees . . . ." 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a). When,
    as here, there is no direct evidence of
    discrimination, a plaintiff must instead attempt
    to prove a prima facie case under the familiar
    scheme of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973). See DeLuca v. Winer Indus., 
    53 F.3d 793
    , 797 (7th Cir. 1995).
    A prima facie case under the ADA is established
    when a plaintiff proves that: (1) he belongs to
    the protected group; (2) he performed his job
    satisfactorily; (3) he was subjected to an
    adverse employment action; and (4) similarly
    situated employees received more favorable
    treatment. See DeLuca, 
    53 F.3d at 797
    . If the
    plaintiff fails to prove any of these elements,
    his claim fails. See 
    id.
     However, if the
    plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
    burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
    legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
    defendant’s employment action. See 
    id.
     If the
    defendant clears this hurdle, the burden once
    again shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
    defendant’s offered reason is merely pretextual.
    See 
    id.
    Here, there is no need to reach the later
    inquiries of the McDonnell Douglas analysis
    because Amadio has failed to prove even the first
    element of a prima facie case--that he is a
    member of the protected group. For the purpose of
    showing that he is a member of the ADA’s
    protected group, a plaintiff must establish that
    he is "an individual with a disability who, with
    or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
    the essential functions of the employment
    position that such individual holds or desires."
    42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(8). Stated another way, to
    prove membership in the ADA’s protected class, a
    plaintiff must establish up to three elements:
    (1) a disability; (2) the ability to perform the
    essential functions of the employment position;
    and (3) if unable to perform the essential
    functions without accommodation, the existence of
    a reasonable accommodation that would allow
    performance of the position’s essential
    functions. Amadio fails to establish even one of
    these three elements, and he thus fails to prove
    any part of the first requirement of a prima
    facie ADA claim.
    1.
    We first address Amadio’s claim that he has a
    "disability" as that term is employed by the ADA.
    The ADA defines "disability" to include: "(A) a
    physical or mental impairment that substantially
    limits one or more of the major life activities
    of such individual; (B) a record of such an
    impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such
    an impairment." 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2); see also
    29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(g). Amadio concedes that he
    does not meet the first two definitions of a
    disability but vigorously contends that he
    satisfies the third definition--that Ford
    regarded him as having an impairment that
    substantially limits one or more of his major
    life activities.
    The purpose of the "regarded as" definition of
    a "disability" is to "cover individuals ’rejected
    from a job because of the ’myths, fears and
    stereotypes’ associated with disabilities.’"
    Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 
    527 U.S. 471
    ,
    489-90 (1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App.
    sec. 1630.2(l)). An individual may prove a
    "regarded as" claim by showing that either "(1)
    a covered entity mistakenly believes that a
    person has a physical impairment that
    substantially limits one or more major life
    activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly
    believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment
    substantially limits one or more major life
    activities." Sutton, 
    527 U.S. at 489
    ; see also 29
    C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(l).
    It is important to note that, in order to
    establish a "regarded as" claim, it is not enough
    for a plaintiff to show that the employer knew of
    the plaintiff’s impairment. See Davidson v.
    Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 
    133 F.3d 499
    , 510 (7th
    Cir. 1998). The plaintiff must also show that the
    employer believed that one or more of the
    plaintiff’s major life activities were
    substantially limited by the plaintiff’s
    impairment. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. sec.
    1630.2(l). Such major life activities include,
    for example, "caring for oneself, performing
    manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
    breathing, learning, and working." Sinkler v.
    Midwest Prop. Mgmt. Ltd. Partnership, 
    209 F.3d 678
    , 683-84 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing 29 C.F.R.
    sec. 1630.2(i)). The plaintiff must select the
    major life activities that he will attempt to
    prove the employer regarded as being
    substantially limited by his impairment. See
    Bragdon v. Abbott, 
    524 U.S. 624
    , 637-38 (1998);
    Sinkler, 
    209 F.3d at 683
    .
    In this case, Amadio has alleged that Ford
    regarded his hepatitis as limiting only his major
    life activity of working. However, before we can
    decide whether Ford regarded Amadio’s hepatitis
    as limiting his ability to work, we must first
    take a detour to decide what facts may inform our
    analysis of Amadio’s "regarded as" claim. Perhaps
    the best evidence that exists to support Amadio’s
    claim resides in the affidavit that he submitted
    in response to Ford’s motion for summary
    judgment. In his affidavit, Amadio alleged that
    in February 1995 he told Lafayette, "I’m blind in
    one eye, I just learned that I have hepatitis B
    so come on, give me a break and quit riding me
    about the medical leaves." Amadio further alleged
    that Lafayette replied by saying that he had
    "heard hepatitis B was contagious and maybe
    [Amadio] should not come around the Plant."
    Amadio’s affidavit statements directly
    contradict the testimony he gave at an earlier
    deposition, during which he was asked, "Was there
    any point in time when you told a Ford employee,
    a management person, that you were handicapped or
    disabled?" To this question, Amadio simply
    responded, "No." Further, at his deposition
    Amadio was asked at length about conversations he
    had with Lafayette, and not once did Amadio
    disclose the conversation he alleged in his
    affidavit. He even answered in the negative after
    being asked, "Just for the sake of completeness
    can you remember at all any other difficult
    conversations with Lou Lafayette other than
    anything you’ve testified to so far?"
    Amadio responds to the contradictions in his
    testimony by arguing that Ford should have asked
    more specific questions at his deposition. It is,
    however, difficult to imagine how Ford could have
    been more specific. At the very least, being told
    that one’s ailment is contagious and that one is
    no longer welcome around the plant certainly
    seems to qualify as a "difficult conversation."
    Amadio should have mentioned it as such during
    his deposition, especially given his detailed
    recollection of other conversations with
    Lafayette. For example, Amadio was asked the
    following questions during his deposition:
    Then I believe you said that Lou Lafayette gave
    you a hard time and said things along the lines
    of you need to show up to work; is that a fair
    characterization of your testimony? [affirmative
    response omitted] . . . Can you tell me as
    specifically as you can exactly what he said in
    that regard?
    In response, Amadio remembered that sometime
    between January 27, 1995 and February 3, 1995,
    Lafayette told him "to get your ass back to work
    or you’re going to get your ass fired."
    It is by now well-settled that a party may not
    attempt to survive a motion for summary judgment
    by manufacturing a factual dispute through the
    submission of an affidavit that contradicts prior
    deposition testimony. Consequently, "[w]here a
    deposition and affidavit are in conflict, the
    affidavit is to be disregarded unless it is
    demonstrable that the statement in the deposition
    was mistaken, perhaps because the question was
    phrased in a confusing manner or because a lapse
    of memory is in the circumstances a plausible
    explanation for the discrepancy." Russell v.
    Acme-Evans Co., 
    51 F.3d 64
    , 67-68 (7th Cir. 1995)
    (citing Slowiak v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 
    987 F.2d 1293
    , 1297 (7th Cir. 1993)). As already noted,
    Amadio provided no acceptable explanation for his
    failure to describe Lafayette’s alleged
    statements during his deposition. As such,
    because Amadio’s affidavit directly contradicts
    his prior deposition testimony, the affidavit is
    inadmissible, and we will only consider Amadio’s
    deposition testimony. See Piscione v. Ernst &
    Young, L.L.P., 
    171 F.3d 527
    , 532-33 (7th Cir.
    1999); Slowiak, 
    987 F.2d at 1295
    .
    Amadio rightly points out that Lafayette’s
    testimony is seemingly contradictory as well. In
    Lafayette’s affidavit in support of Ford’s motion
    for summary judgment, Lafayette maintained that,
    at the time of his decision to terminate Amadio
    he did not know that Amadio had been suffering
    from blindness in his left eye, had hepatitis or
    had any other infection. On the other hand,
    Lafayette testified at his deposition that he was
    of the "opinion" that he was aware of Amadio’s
    medical information prior to terminating Amadio.
    Just as a non-moving party may not use a
    contradictory affidavit to manufacture a factual
    dispute for the purpose of surviving summary
    judgment, a moving party may not rely on a
    contradictory affidavit to negate the existence
    of a factual dispute for the purpose of winning
    summary judgment. As a result, and because we
    view the record in a light most favorable to
    Amadio, we assume that Lafayette was aware of
    Amadio’s hepatitis at the time Lafayette
    terminated Amadio’s employment.
    Thus, after excluding the contradictory
    affidavits, and viewing the remaining facts in
    the light most favorable to Amadio, we are left
    with the following facts against which to examine
    Amadio’s claim that Ford regarded him as
    disabled: (1) Amadio never told a Ford employee
    that he was handicapped or disabled; (2) Amadio
    never had a difficult conversation concerning his
    hepatitis with Lafayette; and (3) Lafayette knew
    of Amadio’s hepatitis before he terminated
    Amadio’s employment.
    On these facts, no reasonable jury could find
    that Ford regarded Amadio as having a disability
    that substantially impaired his ability to work.
    There is no evidence that Amadio ever discussed
    the reasons for his medical leaves with the labor
    relations department at the assembly plant, or
    with Lafayette in particular. Even though we
    assume, for purposes of reviewing a grant of
    summary judgment, that Lafayette did know of
    Amadio’s hepatitis at the time Lafayette
    terminated Amadio’s employment, this knowledge is
    insufficient, in itself, to show that Lafayette
    regarded Amadio as substantially limited in the
    life activity of working. To divine from the
    known facts the conclusion that Lafayette
    terminated Amadio’s employment out of a fear of
    Amadio’s hepatitis would require us not to draw
    a reasonable inference in Amadio’s favor, as we
    are required to do in reviewing an order of
    summary judgment, but to engage in speculation.
    It is well-settled that speculation may not be
    used to manufacture a genuine issue of fact. See
    Gorbitz v. Corvilla, Inc., 
    196 F.3d 879
    , 882 (7th
    Cir. 1999); Patterson v. Chicago Assoc. for
    Retarded Citizens, 
    150 F.3d 719
    , 724 (7th Cir.
    1998). Accordingly, Amadio has failed to show
    that Ford regarded him as being disabled.
    2.
    Even if Amadio had been able to prove that Ford
    regarded him as having a disability, Amadio would
    still need to establish that, with or without
    reasonable accommodation, he could perform the
    essential functions of his employment position.
    See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 
    142 F.3d 138
    , 140
    (3d Cir. 1998); see also 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(8);
    29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(m).
    We first recognized work attendance as an
    essential requirement of employment in Vande
    Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 
    44 F.3d 538
    , 544
    (7th Cir. 1995) (attendance required of clerical
    worker position). Since Vande Zande, the list of
    occupations in Seventh Circuit cases requiring
    attendance as an essential function has grown to
    include, in addition to clerical worker, the
    positions of teacher, Nowak v. St. Rita High
    Sch., 
    142 F.3d 999
     (7th Cir. 1998), account
    representative, Corder v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 
    162 F.3d 924
     (7th Cir. 1998), production employee,
    Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 
    169 F.3d 481
     (7th Cir.
    1999), and plant equipment repairman, Jovanovic
    v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 
    201 F.3d 894
     (7th Cir. 2000). While we will not say
    that attendance is an essential function of every
    employment position, Amadio’s position on the
    assembly line at Ford’s assembly plant can easily
    be added to the "attendance required" list.
    Indeed, the requirement that an employee be in
    attendance is "especially true in factory
    positions . . . where the work must be done on
    the employer’s premises; maintenance and
    production functions cannot be performed if the
    employee is not at work." Jovanovic, 
    201 F.3d at 900
    .
    It is clear that Amadio’s record of attendance
    does not meet even the minimum requirements of
    his position. Amadio took 23 medical leaves
    during his last three years of employment
    (totaling approximately eighteen months of
    absence) and was disciplined several times in
    connection with his absenteeism. We have
    consistently found that plaintiffs who have
    attendance records similar to or substantially
    better than Amadio’s do not qualify for
    protection under the ADA. See Jovanovic, 
    201 F.3d at 900
     (employee missing twenty-four days in past
    twelve months not qualified); Waggoner, 
    169 F.3d at 485
     (employee missing 5 months of work, and
    showing up late or not at all for forty days in
    a fourteen-month period, not qualified); Corder,
    
    162 F.3d at 928
     (employee missing eighteen months
    of work not qualified); Nowak, 
    142 F.3d at
    1003-
    04 (employee missing eighteen months of work not
    qualified). Similarly, Amadio’s lengthy absences
    from a job that requires regular attendance lead
    us to conclude that Amadio could not perform all
    essential functions of his employment position.
    3.
    When a disabled employee cannot perform the
    essential functions of a job, the court must
    consider whether any reasonable accommodation by
    the employer would help the employee to perform
    those functions. See Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co.,
    
    102 F.3d 908
    , 911 (7th Cir. 1996); see also 42
    U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA states that
    "reasonable accommodation" may include "job
    restructuring, part-time or modified work
    schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
    acquisition or modification of equipment or
    devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
    of examinations, training materials or policies,
    the provision of qualified readers or
    interpreters, and other similar accommodations
    for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.
    sec. 12111(9)(B). However, if an accommodation
    "would impose an undue hardship" on the operation
    of the employer’s business, the accommodation
    need not be made. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A).
    The facts relevant to a determination of whether
    a medical leave is a reasonable accommodation are
    the facts available to the decision-maker at the
    time of the employment decision. See Bay v.
    Cassens Transp. Co., 
    212 F.3d 969
    , 974 (7th Cir.
    2000); Nowak, 
    142 F.3d at 1003
    .
    When an employee is unable to perform the
    essential function of attending his employment,
    few, if any, reasonable accommodations exist. In
    fact, if an employee cannot regularly attend
    work, the only imaginable accommodation is an
    open-ended schedule that allows the employee to
    come and go as he pleases. This is especially
    true of employees like Amadio who seemingly take
    advantage of a company’s apparently generous
    leave policy to show up for only a few days at a
    time between absences that occasionally stretch
    over several months. We are thus led here to the
    same conclusion we reached in Jovanovic: "We
    would be hard-pressed to imagine a manufacturing
    facility that could operate effectively when its
    employees are essentially permitted to set their
    own work hours, and we thus reject such a
    schedule as an unreasonable accommodation under
    the circumstances of this case." 
    201 F.3d at
    899
    n.9.
    Amadio attempts to distinguish his case by
    arguing that his poor attendance record is not
    indicative of his ability to work at the time he
    was fired. Amadio maintains that he eventually
    would have been able to work had Ford reasonably
    accommodated him with the one week of additional
    medical leave he requested as necessary to return
    to full health. Amadio bases this argument on his
    appearance at the assembly plant medical section
    on March 9, 1995, the day after he was
    terminated, with a doctor’s note giving his
    expected date of return to work as March 17,
    1995.
    Undoubtedly, a short, one-week medical leave
    constitutes a reasonable accommodation in many
    circumstances. Here, however, we have already
    determined that Amadio is unable to regularly
    attend his job. Thus, in order to claim that a
    continued absence from his job would have been a
    reasonable accommodation, Amadio must do more
    than merely allege that he would have been able
    to return to work on a full-time basis if only he
    had been given one more week of leave. In
    Amadio’s case, Ford had every reason to believe
    that giving Amadio additional leave would be an
    ineffectual gesture. Amadio’s record of
    attendance clearly indicated that, even if he had
    returned to work in one week, he was not likely
    to remain for very long before a new ailment
    afflicted him. Amadio took 23 medical leaves, and
    was absent for more than 70 weeks during the last
    three years of his employment. In addition,
    during his employment at Ford, Amadio was
    disciplined on several occasions for absenteeism,
    including a 30-day layoff for insufficient
    documentation of a medical leave, a one-week
    layoff relating to a previous medical leave, and
    a number of three-day and one-day layoffs. In
    light of these facts, the extension of Amadio’s
    already lengthy leave by one more week would have
    been a futile concession, not a reasonable
    accommodation./3 Indeed, while we have not
    considered this fact in rendering our decision,
    we note that Ford’s suspicions were ultimately
    realized; in spite of Amadio’s contention that he
    merely needed one week before being able to
    return to work, he did not in fact find a new job
    until over one year had elapsed because his
    hepatitis remained actively symptomatic.
    Amadio makes one last attempt to show that an
    extended leave would have been a reasonable
    accommodation by arguing that Ford was bound by
    its obligations under the CBA, which explicitly
    provided for medical leaves. However, the fact
    that Ford generously granted extended leaves to
    its employees--in rare cases, up to two years--
    does not necessarily bind Ford to repeatedly
    grant successive leaves to Amadio, especially
    since Amadio had a history of abusing his medical
    leave status. Usually, an employee on medical
    leave will be absent for a determinate period of
    time. In such a circumstance, an employer can
    hire temporary help or otherwise plan to
    compensate for the employee’s absence on the
    production line. However, with a chronically
    absent employee like Amadio, the employer never
    knows when the employee’s medical leave will
    really terminate since the employee is likely to
    request yet another leave shortly after returning
    to work following the previous leave. This
    pattern of behavior prevents the employer from
    ever being able to adequately compensate for the
    missing employee’s frequent, yet unpredictable
    absences.
    While an employer should show patience when an
    employee first falls sick, if an employer "bends
    over backwards to accommodate a disabled worker
    . . . it must not be punished for its generosity
    by being deemed to have conceded the
    reasonableness of so far-reaching an
    accommodation." Vande Zande, 
    44 F.3d at 545
    ; see
    also Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 
    120 F.3d 1222
    ,
    1225 (11th Cir. 1997) (An employer is not
    necessarily required to apply its own established
    business policy as a reasonable accommodation.);
    Myers v. Hose, 
    50 F.3d 278
    , 284 (4th Cir. 1994)
    ("A particular accommodation is not necessarily
    reasonable, and thus federally mandated, simply
    because the [employer] elects to establish it as
    a matter of policy."). As noted, Ford was more
    than generous when it granted Amadio the numerous
    and extended leaves he has received; Ford was
    under no duty to continue to do so indefinitely,
    given that Amadio showed no promise of ever
    committing himself to his work.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    Because Amadio fails to establish even the
    first element of a prima facie case under the
    ADA, we need not address the parties’ dispute
    regarding the validity of Ford’s stated reason
    for releasing Amadio. See Celotex Corp. v.
    Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323 (1986) ("[A] complete
    failure of proof concerning an essential element
    of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders
    all other facts immaterial."). For the foregoing
    reasons, the district court’s entry of summary
    judgment in favor of Ford Motor Company is
    Affirmed.
    /1 Brown’s Syndrome is an inflammation of the muscle
    tissue that controls the eye. In Amadio’s case,
    this disease led to blindness in Amadio’s left
    eye lasting from November 1994 through January
    1995.
    /2 The parties dispute the meaning of this second
    five-day quit letter. Amadio maintains that this
    second letter proves that his medical leave had
    been extended until at least March 5 and that,
    therefore, Lafayette had prematurely terminated
    Amadio because of his disability. Amadio further
    supports his argument by alleging that Lafayette
    told him to stay away from the assembly plant
    because Lafayette understood hepatitis to be
    contagious. On the other hand, Ford ascribes no
    meaning to the March 8 Letter, arguing that the
    letter was an oversight. The dispute is
    immaterial, however, because it is relevant only
    to a determination of Ford’s motive for
    terminating Amadio. We need not consider Ford’s
    motive because we find that Amadio was not a
    "qualified individual with a disability" under
    the ADA. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323 (1986) ("[A] complete failure of proof
    concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
    party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
    immaterial.").
    /3 In addition, we observe that Amadio would lose on
    his reasonable accommodation claim at a trial.
    "An employee has the initial duty to inform the
    employer of a disability before ADA liability may
    be triggered for failure to provide
    accommodations--a duty dictated by common sense
    lest a disabled employee keep his disability a
    secret and sue later for failure to accommodate."
    Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 
    75 F.3d 1130
    , 1134 (7th Cir. 1996). As determined above,
    there is no admissible evidence that Ford knew of
    Amadio’s alleged disability, or even regarded him
    as having one, at the time he was fired.
    Accordingly, Ford cannot be held liable for
    failing to accommodate Amadio.
    Amadio would also likely lose on his reasonable
    accommodation claim because he did not make his
    request for a reasonable accommodation until
    after he was terminated. As announced in Webster
    v. Methodist Occupational Health Ctrs., Inc.,
    "[a]n employee cannot refuse reasonable
    accommodations during the interactive process the
    [ADA] contemplates, and then after dismissal
    suggest something different and claim that the
    employer still has a duty to consider further
    accommodations," 
    141 F.3d 1236
    , 1238 (7th Cir.
    1998). Similarly, an employee cannot wait until
    after dismissal to inform an employer of his
    disability and request an accommodation for the
    first time, as Amadio attempted to do here.