Anderson, Bobby J. v. Hardman, Alfred ( 2001 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 00-1171
    Bobby J. Anderson,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    Alfred Hardman, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 99 C 7282--Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.
    Submitted November 22, 2000--Decided February 23, 2001/*
    Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Ripple and Rovner,
    Circuit Judges.
    Rovner, Circuit Judge. Illinois inmate Bobby
    Anderson filed a pro se civil rights suit under
    42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, alleging that various state
    and federal correctional officers conspired to
    have him "unlawfully detained" in federal custody
    from 1986 to 1989 on the basis of a "falsified
    indictment." The district court dismissed
    Anderson’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. sec.
    1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a federal claim,
    and Anderson appeals.
    Mindful that pro se pleadings are held to less
    exacting standards than those prepared by counsel
    and are to be liberally construed, Haines v.
    Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    (1972) (per curiam);
    McCormick v. City of Chicago, 
    230 F.3d 319
    , 325
    (7th Cir. 2000), the district court extensively
    analyzed Anderson’s complaint under a variety of
    theories before concluding that it failed to
    state a federal claim. We too construe pro se
    filings liberally, Whitford v. Boglino, 
    63 F.3d 527
    , 535 n.10 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), but
    still we must be able to discern cogent arguments
    in any appellate brief, even one from a pro se
    litigant. Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of
    Appellate Procedure so requires--a brief must
    contain an argument consisting of more than a
    generalized assertion of error, with citations to
    supporting authority. Fed. R. App. P.
    28(a)(9)(A); Mathis v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
    
    133 F.3d 546
    , 548 (7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam);
    United States ex rel. Verdone v. Circuit Court,
    
    73 F.3d 669
    , 673 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
    Yet Anderson offers no articulable basis for
    disturbing the district court’s judgment.
    Instead, he simply repeats certain allegations of
    his complaint and cites one irrelevant case.
    We are cognizant of the unique challenges
    facing pro se litigants and are generally
    disposed toward providing a litigant the benefit
    of appellate review. But we must also insist on
    compliance with procedural rules such as Rule 28
    to promote our interest in the uniform
    administration of justice. McNeil v. United
    States, 
    508 U.S. 106
    , 113 (1993) ("[I]n the long
    run, experience teaches that strict adherence to
    procedural requirements specified by the
    legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded
    administration of the law." (internal quotations
    and citation omitted)); Members v. Paige, 
    140 F.3d 699
    , 702 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[R]ules apply to
    uncounseled litigants and must be enforced.").
    Rule 28 applies equally to pro se litigants, and
    when a pro se litigant fails to comply with that
    rule, we cannot fill the void by crafting
    arguments and performing the necessary legal
    research, see Pelfresne v. Village of Williams
    Bay, 
    917 F.2d 1017
    , 1023 (7th Cir. 1990). Indeed,
    we have previously warned that pro se litigants
    should expect that noncompliance with Rule 28
    will result in dismissal of the appeal.
    McCottrell v. EEOC, 
    726 F.2d 350
    , 351 (7th Cir.
    1984). Anderson points us to no error, and we see
    no obvious errors. The appeal is therefore
    DISMISSED.
    /* The appellees notified this court that they were
    not served with process in the district court and
    would not be participating in this appeal. After
    examining the appellant’s brief and the record,
    we have concluded that oral argument is
    unnecessary. Accordingly, the appeal is submitted
    on the appellant’s brief and the record. Fed. R.
    App. P. 34(a)(2).