Weaver, Robbin v. Hollywood Casino Aur ( 2001 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 00-2862
    Robbin Weaver,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    Hollywood Casino-Aurora, Inc.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 98 C 2947--Elaine Bucklo, Judge.
    Argued February 13, 2001--Decided June 21, 2001
    Before Manion, Kanne, and Evans, Circuit
    Judges.
    Manion, Circuit Judge. Robbin Weaver, a
    slot machine attendant, was injured on a
    riverboat casino owned by Hollywood
    Casino-Aurora Inc. ("Hollywood"). She
    sued for relief under general maritime
    jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1333, and
    the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. sec. 688, et
    seq. The district court held a bench
    trial, and awarded Weaver $20,000 under
    the Jones Act for pain and suffering, but
    found that there was no causal connection
    between the injury and some of Weaver’s
    physical complaints. The district court
    also denied maintenance and cure, as well
    as attorneys’ fees. Weaver appeals the
    causation ruling, the denial of
    maintenance and cure, and the denial of
    attorneys’ fees. Because the record is
    insufficient to determine whether
    jurisdiction existed in the district
    court over Weaver’s suit, we remand for
    further proceedings.
    I.
    On May 15, 1995, Weaver was employed as
    a slot machine attendant on the City
    Lights I, a riverboat casino owned by
    Hollywood./1 A movable chest of drawers
    containing coins and tokens, known as a
    "bank," fell on another employee. These
    banks are quite heavy, weighing between
    1,000 and 1,500 pounds, and Weaver
    injured her left wrist while helping to
    push the bank off the other employee’s
    foot. This was the second time in two
    days that a bank had fallen over, so
    Hollywood apparently knew they were
    unstable.
    Weaver filed suit in federal district
    court under general maritime jurisdiction
    and the Jones Act, seeking damages for
    injuries arising from the incident. The
    district court held a bench trial.
    Hollywood argued that the district court
    lacked jurisdiction under the Jones Act
    because a boat whose primary purpose is
    gaming is not a Jones Act vessel. In an
    effort to resolve this issue, the parties
    orally stipulated that the boat had
    navigational equipment, engines, a crew,
    and a raked bow. At the behest of
    Weaver’s counsel, Hollywood also
    stipulated that the boat "cruises on a
    navigable waterway." Moments later,
    however, in response to a question from
    the court, Hollywood’s counsel stated
    that the City Lights I can only travel
    "[t]hree hundred yards, because there is
    a dam on the one side and a bridge on the
    other side." The parties also stipulated
    that the purpose of the boat was
    gambling.
    The district court subsequently rejected
    Hollywood’s jurisdictional argument,
    concluding that a gaming ship "can be a
    Jones Act vessel," and holding that
    "[b]ecause the defendants have not come
    forward with any evidence of special
    circumstances that would defeat Ms.
    Weaver’s jurisdictional showing," Jones
    Act jurisdiction existed. Weaver, 121
    F.Supp.2d at 1170. Hollywood did not
    raise the jurisdictional issue on appeal,
    but during oral argument this court
    raised the question, and we later ordered
    supplemental briefing on whether Jones
    Act and general maritime jurisdiction
    existed in light of the parties’ factual
    stipulations before the district court.
    II.
    While Hollywood did not appeal the
    district court’s holding that it had
    jurisdiction under the Jones Act, and the
    issue of general maritime jurisdiction
    was not even discussed below, "[n]o court
    may decide a case without subject matter
    jurisdiction, and neither the parties nor
    their lawyers may stipulate to
    jurisdiction or waive arguments that the
    court lacks jurisdiction." United States
    v. Tittjung, 
    235 F.3d 330
    , 335 (7th Cir.
    2000). Indeed, "[i]t is the duty of this
    court to ’satisfy itself not only of its
    own jurisdiction, but also that of the
    lower courts in a cause under review.’"
    EEOC v. Chicago Club, 
    86 F.3d 1423
    , 1428
    (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Mitchell v.
    Maurer, 
    293 U.S. 237
    , 244 (1934)).
    Accordingly, if the parties do not do so,
    then a court must raise the
    jurisdictional question on its own, as we
    have done in this case. See Tittjung, 
    235 F.3d at 335
    ; see also Florio v. Olson,
    
    129 F.3d 678
     (1st Cir. 1997) (considering
    sua sponte the question of whether
    admiralty jurisdiction existed).
    We review de novo the district court’s
    legal determination of whether subject
    matter jurisdiction exists, CCC Inform.
    Services, Inc. v. Amer. Salvage Pool
    Assoc., 
    230 F.3d 342
    , 345-46 (7th Cir.
    2000), and we review the district court’s
    factual determinations for clear error.
    See Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 
    924 F.2d 729
     (7th Cir. 1991).
    A.   Maritime Jurisdiction/2
    The Constitution extends to Article III
    courts the power to hear "all Cases of
    admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."
    U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 2. That power
    was codified at 28 U.S.C. sec. 1333(1),
    which provides for "original jurisdiction
    . . . of . . . [a]ny civil case of
    admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . .
    ."
    Historically, the only question in
    determining whether admiralty or maritime
    tort jurisdiction existed was whether the
    tort occurred on navigable waters. See
    Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
    Dredge & Dock Co., 
    513 U.S. 527
    , 531
    (1995). Over time, the test has been
    refined. Now, "a party seeking to invoke
    federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant
    to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1333(1) over a tort
    claim must satisfy conditions of location
    and of connection with maritime
    activity." Grubart, 
    513 U.S. at 534
    .
    There is thus a two-prong test for
    jurisdiction. The locality test reflects
    the traditional requirement that a tort
    occur on navigable waters. The
    requirement of a connection with maritime
    activity, also known as the nexus test,
    raises two issues. The court must first
    determine whether the incident involved
    has "a potentially disruptive effect on
    maritime commerce," and second, whether
    "’the general character’ of the ’activity
    giving rise to the incident’ shows a
    ’substantial relationship to traditional
    maritime activity.’" See Grubart, 
    513 U.S. at 534
     (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 
    497 U.S. 358
    , 364, 364 n.2, 365 (1990)). We
    begin with the location test.
    1.   Location on navigable waters.
    As the Supreme Court has explained, "[a]
    court applying the location test must
    determine whether the tort occurred on
    navigable water." See 
    id.
     The seminal
    case on navigable rivers is The Daniel
    Ball, 
    77 U.S. 557
     (1870). The Daniel Ball
    set forth the following test:
    Those rivers must be regarded as public
    navigable rivers in law which are
    navigable in fact. And they are navigable
    in fact when they are used, or are
    susceptible of being used, in their
    ordinary condition, as highways for
    commerce, over which trade and travel are
    or may be conducted in the customary
    modes of trade and travel on water. And
    they constitute navigable waters of the
    United States within the meaning of the
    acts of Congress, in contradistinction
    from the navigable waters of the States,
    when they form in their ordinary
    condition by themselves, or by uniting
    with other waters, a continued highway
    over which commerce is or may be carried
    on with other States or foreign countries
    in the customary modes in which such
    commerce is conducted by water.
    
    Id. at 563
    . See also Grubart, 
    513 U.S. at
    530 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at
    563)./3
    The suitability of a river for
    interstate commerce, i.e., navigability
    in fact, is thus crucial to general
    maritime jurisdiction. As we have noted
    previously, "[t]he logic of requiring
    commercial activity is evident. The
    purpose behind the grant of admiralty
    jurisdiction was the protection and
    promotion of the maritime shipping
    industry through the development and
    application, by neutral federal courts,
    of a uniform and specialized body of
    federal law." Chapman, 575 F.2d at 149
    (quoting Adams v. Montana Power Co., 
    528 F.2d 437
    , 439 (9th Cir. 1975)). See also
    Sisson, 
    497 U.S. at 362
    . "No purpose is
    served by application of a uniform body
    of federal law, on waters devoid of trade
    and commerce, to regulate the activities
    and resolve the disputes of pleasure
    boaters . . . . [T]he burdening of
    federal courts and the frustrating of the
    purposes of state tort law would thereby
    be served." Chapman, 575 F.2d at 149-50
    (quoting Adams, 
    528 F.2d at 440-41
    )
    (emphasis added).
    In this case, the parties stipulated
    that the Fox River (on which the
    riverboat casino was located) is
    navigable./4 Weaver claims that this is
    a factual concession that the river is
    navigable in fact. Accordingly, she urges
    this court to find that the location test
    is satisfied.
    If this stipulation were all the record
    had to offer, Weaver might be correct.
    But Hollywood contends that the statement
    that the Fox River was navigable was a
    reference to the river generally, not to
    the portion of the river where the tort
    occurred, and cites for support its
    statement to the district court that the
    boat was confined within a small portion
    of the river. Weaver has never questioned
    Hollywood’s testimony that the riverboat
    casino could only move "[t]hree hundred
    yards, because there is a dam on the one
    side and a bridge on the other side."
    Hollywood thus argues that the river
    cannot be navigated at the point where
    the City Lights I was located.
    Indeed, the fact that a river as a whole
    is navigable is not dispositive for
    purposes of maritime law. See, e.g.,
    Leblanc v. Cleveland, 
    198 F.3d 353
     (2d
    Cir. 1999) (dammed river not navigable
    even though it was capable of supporting
    interstate commerce downstream from the
    location at issue). See also Three Buoys
    Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts,
    
    921 F.2d 775
     (8th Cir. 1990) (finding
    non-navigable a lake with an impassable
    dam); Chapman, 
    575 F.2d 147
     (holding that
    admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to
    tort claims on waters which once
    supported commercial transportation but
    subsequently only supported recreational
    activities). The key to determining
    whether there are navigable waters is the
    river’s present navigability where the
    injury transpired.
    For example, the Second Circuit recently
    held that there was no admiralty
    jurisdiction in a case involving an acci
    dent between a kayak and a recreational
    motor boat on the Hudson River. See
    Leblanc, 
    198 F.3d 353
    . In Leblanc, the
    court held that the river was not
    navigable at the location of the accident
    because of rapids, dams, and several
    waterfalls, despite the fact that other
    portions of the river were navigable and
    the river as a whole was historically
    used for commerce. Accordingly, the
    Leblanc court determined that there was
    no admiralty jurisdiction.
    The case before us presents a similar
    factual scenario. Based on the
    stipulations in this case, it is probable
    that the waters in which the City Lights
    I made its 300-yard trips are not
    "navigable in fact." The dam and bridge
    which obstructed the City Lights I
    indicate--at this location--a river which
    cannot be used as a highway for maritime
    commerce. A dam and bridge which prevent
    a riverboat casino from traveling over
    300 yards are presumably not susceptible
    to commercial shipping, and thus fail the
    test set forth in The Daniel Ball.
    In addition, if the enclosed portion of
    the Fox River at issue here is not
    navigable upstream or downstream for
    commercial shipping, it is also
    impossible to engage in interstate travel
    from this location. This part of the
    river, located in Aurora, Illinois, is
    entirely intrastate. "Those cases in
    which circuit courts have found dammed
    waterways navigable for jurisdictional
    purposes are easily distinguished by the
    fact that the waterway in question formed
    the border between two states, thereby
    rendering it capable of supporting
    interstate commerce despite the existence
    of artificial dams blocking downstream
    flow." Leblanc, 
    198 F.3d at 359
    . Because
    the waterway in this instance is located
    entirely within the state of Illinois,
    and given the circumstances of this case,
    we conclude that this small, enclosed,
    intrastate section of river is unlikely
    to qualify as a navigable water under
    general maritime law./5
    Even so, it is theoretically possible
    that although the river is impassable for
    the City Lights I (a boat whose
    dimensions might differ significantly
    from the dimensions of other craft), this
    part of the river could still serve as a
    continuous highway for other vessels
    designed for commercial shipping. While
    the record is silent on this question,
    outside sources indicate that the Fox
    River is very likely not navigable. A
    detailed map reveals that the Fox River
    is riddled with dams, both within the
    confines of the city of Aurora and within
    a short distance upstream and downstream
    of the city./6
    Despite these apparent obstructions to
    navigation, it appears from the record
    that no consideration was given to the
    possibility that the evidence precluded
    the river from meeting the legal test for
    navigability. There was certainly no
    reference to navigability in the district
    court opinion. Although Hollywood argues
    strenuously in its supplemental brief
    that the absence of navigable waters
    precluded jurisdiction, this is the first
    time this claim has been raised./7
    Indeed, Hollywood’s counsel only noted
    that the dam and bridge were impassable
    in response to a question from the
    district court about how the City Lights
    I navigates, a question which was not
    aimed at the location test.
    In this context the parties’
    stipulations could be read to concede
    that the Fox River is navigable in fact.
    In many cases uncontested factual
    stipulations can resolve a jurisdictional
    question. Cf. Workman v. United Parcel
    Service, Inc., 
    234 F.3d 998
    , 999-1000
    (7th Cir. 2000). District courts are not
    required to second-guess the parties’
    stipulations to jurisdictional facts. For
    example, "[i]f the plaintiff in a
    diversity suit alleges, and the defendant
    admits, that the defendant is
    incorporated in Delaware, the district
    judge is not required to run to Moody’s
    to see whether it really is a Delaware
    corporation, or to insist on the
    production of a certified copy of the
    defendant’s certificate of
    incorporation." Prizevoits v. Indiana
    Bell Telephone Co., 
    76 F.3d 132
    , 134 (7th
    Cir. 1996).
    However, "[t]he rule against obtaining
    federal jurisdiction by consent . . .
    would be ineffectual if parties by
    stipulating to jurisdictional facts could
    remove them entirely from judicial
    scrutiny." 
    Id. at 135
     (citations
    omitted). "[I]f . . . facts brought out
    in pretrial discovery or at trial, fairly
    shriek that there is no federal
    jurisdiction, the district judge must
    conduct whatever supplementary factual
    proceedings are necessary to resolve the
    doubt." Kanzelberger v. Kanzelberger, 
    782 F.2d 774
    , 777 (7th Cir. 1986). Although
    the district court did not do so here,
    the appellate court, as noted, must also
    satisfy itself of federal jurisdiction
    over the case, and may order a case
    dismissed when there is no doubt that the
    district court lacked jurisdiction. See,
    e.g., 
    id.
     (citing Bialac v. Harsh Bldg.
    Co., 
    463 F.2d 1185
     (9th Cir. 1972)
    (dismissing case where factual
    stipulation supporting diversity of
    parties was clearly false)).
    In this case, the record makes it
    unlikely that jurisdiction existed, and
    the district court has made no inquiry
    into the navigability of the Fox River
    where the City Lights I was located. A
    remand is appropriate in these
    circumstances so the district court may
    determine whether subject matter
    jurisdiction exists. See Freeman v.
    Northwest Acceptance Corp., 
    754 F.2d 553
    (5th Cir. 1985) (remanding to district
    court after trial where plaintiff’s
    assertion of diverse parties was unlikely
    to be true). See also Kanzelberger, 
    782 F.2d at
    777 (citing Freeman with
    approval).
    2.   Connection with maritime activity.
    Hollywood also argues that the second
    requirement for general maritime
    jurisdiction, a "connection with maritime
    activity," was not met by the facts in
    the record. First, Hollywood argues that
    Weaver’s injury does not have the
    required potential effect on maritime
    commerce. In determining whether this
    requirement is met, a court must consider
    the incident giving rise to the claim at
    an "intermediate level of generality."
    See Grubart, 
    513 U.S. at 538
    . The court
    should not consider the particular facts
    of the case before it, but must instead
    "assess the general features of the type
    of incident involved to determine whether
    such an incident is likely to disrupt
    commercial activity." Sisson, 
    497 U.S. at 363
    .
    Weaver claims the appropriate
    description of the incident would be "an
    injury occurring during rescue efforts on
    a vessel on navigable waters." Hollywood
    counters that the better description
    would be "an injury to a slot machine
    attendant on a floating casino that
    cannot move beyond a confined area of
    water." Hollywood thus argues that the
    events giving rise to Weaver’s injury
    could not possibly affect maritime
    commerce.
    Hollywood’s description of the incident
    in this case is too narrow and specific.
    Cf. Grubart, 
    513 U.S. at 539
     (incident
    described as "damage by a vessel in
    navigable water to an underwater
    structure" sufficiently indicated
    potentially disruptive impact on maritime
    commerce); Sisson, 
    497 U.S. at 363
    (incident described as "fire on a vessel
    docked at a marina on navigable waters"
    satisfied potential disruption
    requirement). Weaver’s description more
    closely captures the general features of
    the incident, although she narrows the
    focus by including the detail that she
    was involved in "rescue efforts." A more
    appropriate description would be an
    injury on board a vessel on navigable
    waters (on the condition, of course, that
    the court finds that the waters are
    navigable).
    The next step is to determine what the
    potentiality for the disruption of
    maritime commerce is, based on the
    general features of the incident. The key
    is not whether the incident affected
    maritime commerce, but whether it could
    do so. In Sisson, for example, the
    Supreme Court thought it relevant that a
    fire on board a recreational boat at a
    marina could impact other ships engaged
    in maritime commerce, even though the
    boat involved was not engaged in
    commerce.
    Courts have used differing standards to
    determine the potential for disruption of
    maritime commerce. Compare H2O Houseboat
    Vacations, Inc. v. Hernandez, 
    103 F.3d 914
     (9th Cir. 1996) (finding no potential
    disruption of maritime commerce where
    houseboat occupants were injured by
    carbon monoxide fumes which could not
    harm other boats, and refusing to
    speculate on possible harms where to do
    so would ignore the actual incident) with
    Bay Casino LLC v. M/V Royal Empress, 
    1999 WL 33218594
     (E.D.N.Y.) (finding potential
    disruption of maritime commerce where a
    passenger was served liquor during a
    cruise and subsequently injured plaintiff
    while driving on land); Young v. Players
    Lake Charles, L.L.C., 
    47 F.Supp. 2d 832
    ,
    835 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (excessive amount of
    alcohol served to casino patron while on
    navigable waters). See also Delta Country
    Ventures, Inc. v. Magana, 
    986 F.2d 1260
    ,
    1264 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
    dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s
    level of generality, while recognizing
    that "disputes about the appropriate lev
    el of generality always carry with them a
    certain degree of arbitrariness.").
    This case does not require us to
    speculate, however. The City Lights I was
    a commercial boat engaged in the
    transport of passengers for profit (even
    if its ultimate end was gambling), and
    without doubt an injury to one of its
    crew disrupts its participation in
    maritime commerce. Cf. Great Lakes Dredge
    & Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 
    3 F.3d 225
    , 230 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’d sub nom.
    Grubart, 
    513 U.S. 527
     (1995) ("Because
    commerce on the river was actually
    disrupted for more than a month, this
    question answers itself. Yes, there was
    such a potential. In fact, it was
    realized.").
    If the district court finds on remand
    that the river is navigable, then the
    substantial relationship to traditional
    maritime activities requirement is easily
    met in this case. The Supreme Court has
    held that even noncommercial vessels when
    navigating in navigable waters have a
    substantial relationship to traditional
    maritime activities. See Foremost Ins.
    Co. v. Richardson, 
    457 U.S. 668
    (1982)./8 On this record the City
    Lights I was navigating when the incident
    occurred. The general character of the
    riverboat’s activity thus relates to
    traditional maritime activity.
    Accordingly, the nexus test would be met,
    and it only remains to determine on
    remand whether Weaver’s injury occurred
    in navigable waters.
    B.   The Jones Act
    Weaver alleged another basis of
    jurisdiction, one on which the district
    court relied, namely the Jones Act. The
    Jones Act provides jurisdiction for a
    "seaman" who suffers personal injury in
    the course of his employment. 46 U.S.C.
    sec. 688. To qualify as a seaman under
    the Jones Act, "an employee’s duties must
    ’contribut[e] to the function of the ves
    sel or to the accomplishment of its mission.’"
    McDermott Int’l Inc. v. Wilander, 
    498 U.S. 337
    , 355 (1991) (quoting Offshore
    Co. v. Robison, 
    266 F.2d 769
    , 779 (5th
    Cir. 1959)). In addition, "a seaman must
    have a connection to a vessel in
    navigation (or to an identifiable group
    of such vessels) that is substantial in
    terms of both its duration and its
    nature." Chandris v. Latsis, 
    515 U.S. 347
    , 368 (1995).
    Weaver argues that "[i]n contrast to
    general maritime law, there is no
    locality requirement for the Jones Act .
    . . ." While Weaver is correct that the
    Jones Act does not focus on the location
    of the vessel at the time of the injury,
    Jones Act jurisdiction still requires a
    relationship to navigable waters. This is
    because jurisdiction under the Jones Act
    "depends ’not on the place where the
    injury is inflicted . . . but on the
    nature of the seaman’s service, his
    status as a member of the vessel, and his
    relationship . . . to the vessel and its
    operation in navigable waters.’"
    Chandris, 
    515 U.S. at 359-60
     (quoting
    Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 
    328 U.S. 1
    ,
    4 (1946)) (emphasis added). Thus, a ship
    with no connection to navigable waters is
    not a source of Jones Act jurisdiction.
    See also Johnson, 742 F.2d at 1063.
    The Third Circuit’s recent decision in
    Reeves v. Mobil Dredging & Pumping Co.,
    Inc., 
    26 F.3d 1247
     (3rd Cir. 1994),
    confirms this conclusion. As the Reeves
    court explained, "[a]lthough the
    requirement is not expressly stated in
    the [Jones Act], the Supreme Court has
    long required that the injury occur
    through the employee’s relationship to a
    vessel on a navigable body of water." See
    
    id.
     at 1253 (citing Swanson, 
    328 U.S. at 6
    ) (emphasis in original). Accordingly,
    the Reeves court concluded that the Jones
    Act did not provide jurisdiction over a
    claim arising on a vessel in a man-made,
    landlocked lake located entirely within
    the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
    If the water at issue in this case is
    similarly locked between a bridge and a
    dam (or is impassable to commercial
    shipping because of adjacent dams both
    upstream and downstream), as in Reeves
    the Jones Act would not provide
    jurisdiction. But as noted above, the
    record sheds insufficient light on this
    question. Therefore, the district court
    must determine on remand whether Weaver
    was employed on a boat with the requisite
    relationship to navigable waters for
    purposes of the Jones Act.
    Hollywood also contests the district
    court’s holding that the City Lights I is
    a "vessel" for Jones Act purposes. As
    noted by the Fifth Circuit, the term
    "vessel" has not been precisely defined
    in this context. See Gremillion v. Gulf
    Coast Catering Co., 
    904 F.2d 290
    , 293
    (5th Cir. 1995) ("[I]t has been suggested
    that ’three men in a tub would also fit
    within our definition, and one could
    probably make a convincing case for Jonah
    inside the whale.’") (quoting Burks v.
    American River Transp. Co., 
    679 F.2d 69
    ,
    75 (5th Cir. 1982)). If the casino were
    indefinitely moored (as the record
    suggests it is now), its status as a
    vessel in navigation would be doubtful.
    See Pavone v. Miss. Riverboat Amusement
    Corp., 
    52 F.3d 560
    , 570 (5th Cir. 1995).
    There is some difference of opinion,
    however, on when floating casinos which
    travel on a river are Jones Act vessels.
    Compare Davis v. Players Lake Charles
    Riverboat, Inc., 
    74 F.Supp.2d 675
    (W.D.La. 1999) (finding a riverboat
    casino was not a vessel because any
    navigation was incidental to the boat’s
    primary purpose of gambling) with Wiora
    v. Harrah’s Illinois Corp., 
    68 F.Supp.2d 988
     (N.D.Ill. 1999) (Williams, J.)
    (finding a riverboat casino was a vessel
    where it traveled on navigable waters).
    If the riverboat casino were a
    traditional craft navigating in navigable
    waters, it would presumably be a vessel
    and the Jones Act would apply. See
    Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 293. But
    Hollywood claims that the City Lights I,
    in its role as a riverboat casino, is an
    unconventional craft. In order to
    determine vessel status for an
    unconventional craft, "it is necessary to
    focus upon the ’purpose for which the
    craft is constructed and business in
    which it is engaged.’" See id. (quoting
    Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor
    Servs., Inc., 
    575 F.2d 1140
    , 1142 (5th
    Cir. 1978)). According to the parties’
    stipulation the purpose of the City
    Lights I was gambling. Citing Davis,
    Hollywood argues that the casino
    therefore cannot be a Jones Act vessel,
    even if it makes short trips over
    navigable water.
    Weaver does not agree that the City
    Lights I is an unconventional craft.
    Weaver also contends that the Davis case
    is bad law, and that Supreme Court
    precedent requires us to consider the
    activity of the City Lights I not as
    gambling, but as navigation.
    We conclude based on the stipulations
    regarding the boat’s engines, crew, and
    other traditional vessel characteristics
    that the City Lights I is or at least was
    a traditional vessel. Cf. Gremillion, 904
    F.2d at 293 (listing some attributes of
    traditional vessels). Hollywood
    nevertheless contends that the casino is
    an unconventional craft because it only
    navigates the Fox River to comply with
    the then-Illinois statutory requirement
    that gambling boats do so./9 The
    problem for Hollywood is that this very
    circumstance defeats their argument, even
    if the City Lights I were an
    unconventional craft. Navigation is so
    intertwined with gambling in this
    particular case that it is impossible to
    extricate the one from the other. Under
    the then-existing law the casino was
    required to navigate the river whenever
    it hosted gambling activities. In other
    words, a primary purpose of the riverboat
    was navigation--although it was also a
    means to an end, navigation was hardly
    incidental to the activities of the City
    Lights I. Accordingly, jurisdiction would
    exist if the district court determines on
    remand that the boat at the time of the
    injury had the requisite connection with
    navigable waters.
    III.
    The stipulations before the district
    court raise serious questions whether the
    district court possessed subject matter
    jurisdiction over Weaver’s claims, under
    both federal maritime law and the Jones
    Act. Because the record is not
    sufficiently developed for us to
    determine whether jurisdiction exists,
    this case is REMANDED for proceedings in
    accord with this opinion.
    FOOTNOTES
    /1 In light of our jurisdictional holding, we pres-
    ent only a brief overview of the background
    events leading to Weaver’s suit, which for the
    most part are not relevant to our decision below.
    For a more in-depth discussion of the events
    giving rise to this case, see Weaver v. Hollywood
    Casino Aurora, Inc., 
    121 F.Supp.2d 1169
     (N.D.
    Ill. 2000).
    /2 The terms "admiralty" and "maritime" are used
    interchangeably for purposes of this opinion as
    the precedents discussed below use both terms. As
    noted by a leading treatise, "[i]nsofar as the
    reference is to substantive law, the terms
    ’admiralty’ and ’maritime law’ are virtually
    synonymous in this country today, though the
    first derives from the connection of our modern
    law with the system administered in a single
    English court, while the second makes a wider and
    more descriptive reference." Grant Gilmore and
    Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty sec.
    1-1 (2d ed., 1975).
    /3 The definition of "navigable waters" in one
    context does not necessarily apply in other
    contexts. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
    444 U.S. 164
    , 171-72 (1979). The definition of navi-
    gable waters for Commerce Clause purposes gener-
    ally extends beyond the definition in the context
    of maritime law. See Chapman v. United States,
    
    575 F.2d 147
    , 149-50 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
    cert. denied, 
    439 U.S. 893
     (1978).
    /4 The Fox River discussed herein should not be
    confused with Wisconsin’s Fox River, the naviga-
    bility of which is analyzed at length in The
    Montello, 
    87 U.S. 430
     (1874).
    /5 It may seem strange for a boat with crew, en-
    gines, etc., to be placed in such a location. At
    the time of Weaver’s injury, Illinois required
    gambling facilities to travel on water. The
    statute was subsequently amended to eliminate the
    requirement. See 230 ILCS 10/11(1).
    /6 In fact, a regional website devoted to paddle-
    boating offers detailed instructions and Census
    Bureau coordinates so that recreational parties
    may portage around Aurora’s several dams. See
    http://www.chicagopaddling.org.
    /7 Before the district court, Hollywood’s counsel
    stated that the question of whether the floating
    casino was engaged in a traditional maritime
    activity was the only issue raised ("I’m not
    contesting that she was working aboard the ves-
    sel, that the vessel was in navigation, all the
    other factors that would be considered."). R.43
    at 66.
    /8 Hollywood also argues that there is no substan-
    tial relationship to traditional maritime activi-
    ties because the riverboat casino is not a "ves-
    sel" under maritime law. However, for these
    purposes "a craft is a ’vessel’ if its purpose is
    to some reasonable degree ’the transportation of
    passengers, cargo, or equipment from place to
    place across navigable waters.’" Great Lakes
    Dredge & Dock Co., 
    3 F.3d at 229
     (quoting Johnson
    v. John F. Beasley Constr. Co., 
    742 F.2d 1054
    ,
    1063 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
    469 U.S. 1211
    (1985)). Assuming the navigable waters require-
    ment is met, the riverboat in this case is
    clearly a vessel for purposes of general maritime
    jurisdiction.
    /9 The fact that the casino "navigates" the Fox
    River is of course not relevant to a determina-
    tion whether the river is legally a "navigable
    water." A craft could navigate a swimming pool
    without the pool qualifying as navigable in the
    sense required for jurisdiction.