Central States Areas v. Basic American Indus ( 2001 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 00-3920
    Central States, Southeast and Southwest
    Areas Pension Fund, et al.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    Basic American Industries, Inc., et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 96 C 4736--Blanche M. Manning, Judge.
    Argued May 8, 2001--Decided June 5, 2001
    Before Bauer, Posner, and Coffey, Circuit
    Judges.
    Posner, Circuit Judge. The Multiemployer
    Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C.
    sec.sec. 1301 et seq., requires an
    employer that withdraws from a plan which
    is not overfunded to pay a "withdrawal
    liability" calculated to avoid shifting
    the cost of that employer’s pension
    obligations to the other employers. E.g.,
    Milwaukee Brewery Workers’ Pension Plan
    v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 
    513 U.S. 414
    , 416-17 (1995); Central States,
    Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund
    v. Hunt Truck Lines, Inc., 
    204 F.3d 736
    ,
    739 (7th Cir. 2000); Central States,
    Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund
    v. Creative Development Co., 
    232 F.3d 406
    , 408-09 (5th Cir. 2000). The district
    court dismissed this suit by the Central
    States multiemployer pension plan for
    payment of withdrawal liability as barred
    by the Act’s six-year statute of
    limitations. 29 U.S.C. sec. 1451(f). A
    brief chronology will aid in focusing the
    issue.
    On June 22, 1989, a trio of affiliated
    corporations (collectively "Allied
    Grocers"), employers that were members of
    the Central States plan, declared
    bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the
    Bankruptcy Code. According to Central
    States, the declaration of bankruptcy
    entitled it, under the terms of the
    multiemployer plan, to declare that
    Allied was in default of its withdrawal
    liability obligations, though it had not
    yet actually withdrawn from the plan. The
    statute defines "default," so far as
    bears on this case, as "any . . . event
    defined in rules adopted by the plan
    which indicates a substantial likelihood
    that an employer will be unable to pay
    its withdrawal liability." 29 U.S.C. sec.
    1399(c)(5)(B). Central States’ plan makes
    an employer’s declaration of bankruptcy a
    default. And under the statute a default
    entitles a plan to "require immediate
    payment of the outstanding amount of an
    employer’s withdrawal liability." sec.
    1399(c)(5); Board of Trustees v. Kahle
    Engineering Corp., 
    43 F.3d 852
    , 854 (3d
    Cir. 1994).
    On May 18 of the following year, with
    the Allied bankruptcy still pending,
    Central States filed a proof of claim in
    the bankruptcy proceeding, claiming that
    Allied owed it a withdrawal liability
    obligation of some $752,000 and setting
    forth an installment schedule on which it
    wanted to be paid. Two weeks later, on
    June 2, Allied ceased operations, a move
    that effected, as a matter of law, its
    complete withdrawal from the plan. sec.
    1383(a)(2); Bay Area Laundry & Dry
    Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar
    Corp. of California, Inc., 
    522 U.S. 192
    ,
    196 (1997); Central States, Southeast &
    Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Sherwin-
    Williams Co., 
    71 F.3d 1338
    , 1341-42 (7th
    Cir. 1995). Two weeks after that, on June
    18, 1990, the plan sent Allied a notice,
    and demand for payment, of withdrawal
    liability in the exact amount of the
    proof of claim in the bankruptcy
    proceeding, to be paid in 14 equal
    monthly installments, the first due on
    August 1--just as requested in the proof
    of claim. The record is silent on whether
    the automatic stay was lifted to permit
    Central States to make a demand outside
    of bankruptcy; later we’ll see that it is
    uncertain whether the stay must be lifted
    to permit such a demand.
    On December 27, 1995, Central States and
    Allied settled the dispute over Allied’s
    withdrawal liability, agreeing that it
    was $526,000, which became a nonpriority
    unsecured claim in the bankruptcy. The
    record is silent on whether any part of
    the claim was ever paid or whether Allied
    emerged from its Chapter 11 bankruptcy as
    an operating company.
    Central States brought this suit on July
    31, 1996, not against Allied but against
    Basic American Industries, Inc. and other
    companies under common control with
    Allied and therefore jointly and
    severally liable for Allied’s withdrawal
    obligation. 29 U.S.C. sec. 1301(b)(1).
    Some defendants were added later by an
    amended complaint and there is an issue
    whether the original defendants were
    served with process in a timely fashion,
    but we can avoid these matters and
    confine our attention to the statute of
    limitations issue. The suit seeks the
    same amount as the proof of claim filed
    in the Allied bankruptcy proceeding and
    the demand for payment from Allied made
    by Central States in June of 1990. (There
    is no suggestion, as yet anyway, that the
    settlement with Allied capped Central
    States’ claim against the affiliates.)
    The suit was filed more than six years
    after the proof of claim, the complete
    withdrawal by Allied from the plan, and
    the demand for payment, although less
    than six years after the first and all
    subsequent installment payments of
    Allied’s withdrawal liability were due.
    Central States argues that the statute of
    limitations did not begin to run for the
    first of the installments until Allied
    failed to pay it on August 1, 1990, and
    for the later installments until their
    due dates passed without payment.
    Central States fastens on the Supreme
    Court’s statement in Bay Area Laundry &
    Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar
    Corp. of California, 
    Inc., supra
    , 522
    U.S. at 195, that the MPPAA’s six-year
    statute of limitations does not begin to
    run "until the employer fails to make a
    payment on the schedule set by the fund,"
    and, as a backup, on the further
    statement in that opinion that "each
    missed payment [of an MPPAA installment
    obligation] creates a separate cause of
    action with its own six-year limitations
    period." 
    Id. The first
    statement, as the
    Court’s opinion makes clear, is limited
    by its context, which did not include
    bankruptcy. The employer in Bay Area
    ceased operations and withdrew from the
    plan, whereupon the plan computed the
    employer’s withdrawal liability and
    demanded payment of it in installments on
    specified dates. The plan’s cause of
    action accrued, the Supreme Court held,
    when the employer failed to make the
    first payment on time. The plan could not
    have sued earlier because until then the
    employer had not defaulted on its
    withdrawal obligation. And since the plan
    did not invoke the default as a basis for
    accelerating the due dates of the
    subsequent installments, those
    installments were not defaulted until
    their due dates arrived and the employer
    again failed to pay. In so holding, the
    Court expressly rejected (id. at 206,
    209-10) the contrary view that we had
    expressed in Central States, Southeast &
    Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Navco, 
    3 F.3d 167
    , 171-72 (7th Cir. 1993).
    The Court did not suggest and it would
    have been contrary to the thrust of its
    opinion, which (again rejecting our
    position in Navco, 
    see 522 U.S. at 208
    -
    09) was to assimilate statute of
    limitations issues under the
    Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
    to the legal principles generally
    applicable to statutes of limitations
    issues, 
    id. at 195,
    208, 210, to suggest
    that the only way in which the payor in
    a contract can default is by failing to
    pay when payment becomes due. One way is
    by repudiating the obligation to pay;
    anticipatory repudiation is a breach of
    contract that entitles the payee to sue
    without waiting for the date when payment
    was due to come and go. E.g., Roehm v.
    Horst, 
    178 U.S. 1
    , 18-19 (1900);
    Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Century
    Indemnification Co., 
    130 F.3d 787
    , 793
    (7th Cir. 1997); Nashville Lodging Co. v.
    Resolution Trust Corp., 
    59 F.3d 236
    , 245
    (D.C. Cir. 1995); E. Allan Farnsworth,
    Contracts sec.sec. 8.20-.23 (3d ed.
    1999). There is an exception: if the
    payee has completely performed his side
    of the contract and is just awaiting
    payment, he can’t declare a breach and
    sue for immediate payment just because he
    has reason (even compelling reason) to
    doubt that the other party will pay when
    due. E.g., Roehm v. 
    Horst, supra
    , 178
    U.S. at 17-18; Restatement (Second) of
    Contracts sec. 243(3) (1981); Farnsworth,
    supra, sec. 8.20, pp. 602-03 (3d ed.
    1999). The idea behind this dubious rule
    seems to be that, having performed, the
    payee can no longer protect himself
    against nonpayment by suspending
    performance. In other words, anticipatory
    repudiation (sometimes called
    anticipatory breach) is conceived of
    primarily as a trigger of a contract
    party’s right of self-help, like the
    breach of a condition in a contract. See
    C.L. Maddox, Inc. v. Coalfield Services,
    Inc., 
    51 F.3d 76
    , 81 (7th Cir. 1995);
    First National Bank v. Continental
    Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 
    933 F.2d 466
    , 469 (7th Cir. 1991); American
    Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital
    Products Ltd., 
    780 F.2d 589
    , 599 (7th
    Cir. 1986); Farnsworth, supra, sec. 8.20,
    p. 600.
    Why the doctrine of anticipatory
    repudiation should be so limited eludes
    our understanding. Announcement by the
    other party that he has no intention of
    paying should entitle the prospective
    victim of the payor’s breach to take
    immediate steps to protect his interest,
    as by suing. Against this it has been
    argued that the doctrine of anticipatory
    repudiation "will not intercede to rescue
    the promisee from the consequences of the
    absence of an acceleration clause."
    Rosenfeld v. City Paper Co., 
    527 So. 2d 704
    , 706 (Ala. 1988); cf. First State
    Bank v. Jubie, 
    86 F.3d 755
    , 760 (8th Cir.
    1996). That gets it backwards.
    Acceleration clauses are inserted to fill
    a hole in the law of contracts, which has
    failed here in its traditional and
    important function of interpolating
    rights and duties that the parties can be
    expected to negotiate for, e.g., In re
    Modern Dairy of Champaign, Inc., 
    171 F.3d 1106
    , 1108 (7th Cir. 1999), and thus of
    economizing on the costs of transacting.
    Acceleration clauses are a standard
    contract provision for protecting the
    payee against the consequences of a
    breach by the other party; they would be
    unnecessary were it not for the rule
    carving out the completed-performance
    case from the operation of the doctrine
    of anticipatory repudiation. In any
    event, the exception is inapplicable here
    because the Central States plan continues
    to be obligated to pay the pensions of
    Allied’s former employees.
    Our disapproved Navco case had involved,
    in fact, both bankruptcy and repudiation;
    but these features of the case had played
    no role in our analysis (which was based
    on an interpretation of the MPPAA) and
    were neither involved nor mentioned in
    Bay Area. There is nothing in the latter
    decision to suggest that they are
    immaterial. All Bay Area holds or
    implies, at least so far as the present
    case is concerned, is that withdrawal
    from the plan is not an automatic default
    of the obligations that such withdrawal
    imposes and neither is missing one
    installment payment of withdrawal
    liability a default of the entire
    withdrawal liability. There is nothing in
    the opinion or its logic to suggest that
    the principles of anticipatory
    repudiation have no role to play under
    the MPPAA, unless those principles were
    stretched so far out of shape that, for
    example, failure to make a single
    installment payment were deemed
    repudiation per se of the entire
    obligation.
    So we proceed to the question whether
    there was in fact a repudiation here and
    if so when it occurred. Filing for
    bankruptcy, though by virtue of the
    automatic stay it prevents the payee from
    invoking the usual remedies for breach of
    contract, 11 U.S.C. sec. 362; Buckley v.
    Bass & Associates, No. 00-3054, slip op.
    at 4 (7th Cir. May 7, 2001), and enables
    the contract if still executory to be
    rescinded by the trustee in bankruptcy
    (or debtor in possession, if, as in this
    case at the relevant time, there is no
    trustee), sec. 365(a), is not
    anticipatory repudiation per se. For the
    trustee or debtor in possession can
    affirm the contract even if it contains a
    clause (a so-called "ipso facto" clause)
    that makes filing for bankruptcy a ground
    for termination. sec. 365(e)(B); Lyons
    Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Westside
    Bancorporation, Inc., 
    828 F.2d 387
    , 393
    n. 6 (7th Cir. 1987); McAndrews v. Fleet
    Bank of Massachusetts, N.A., 
    989 F.2d 13
    ,
    17 (1st Cir. 1993). Affirmance is the
    opposite of repudiation, and the
    affirmance option thus makes it
    impossible to consider the declaration of
    bankruptcy itself, whether or not there
    is an ipso facto clause, a repudiation of
    a creditor’s claim.
    If the trustee or debtor in possession
    exercises the discretion that the Code
    gives him to reject the contract, that of
    course is repudiation. See Central Trust
    Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass’n, 
    240 U.S. 581
    , 589-90 (1916). But Allied, when in
    June 1989 it declared bankruptcy, didn’t
    repudiate its withdrawal liability. It
    was still making contributions to the
    fund and there was a possibility that it
    would regain its financial footing
    (remember that it filed for
    reorganization under Chapter 11, not
    liquidation under Chapter 7). It might
    never withdraw from the fund and even if
    it did it might still be able to pay the
    withdrawal liability. Indeed, it did not
    yet have any withdrawal liability, for
    that liability attaches only when the
    employer "completely withdraws" from the
    multiemployer plan, 29 U.S.C. sec.
    1381(a), which occurs only when he either
    "(1) permanently ceases to have an
    obligation to contribute under the plan,
    or (2) permanently ceases all covered
    operations under the plan." sec. 1383(a);
    see Corbett v. MacDonald Moving Services,
    Inc., 
    124 F.3d 82
    , 84 (2d Cir. 1997);
    PBGC Opinion Letter 87-1, 
    1987 WL 68403
    (Jan. 23, 1987). Merely filing for the
    protection of the bankruptcy court is not
    a repudiation of obligations or a
    cessation of operations. More broadly,
    insolvency, with or without a declaration
    of bankruptcy, does not equal
    dissolution. An insolvent firm is not
    necessarily out of business, and the
    parties with which it has contracts
    cannot automatically assume that the firm
    will default, Farnsworth, supra, sec.
    8.21, p. 608 n. 16 and sec. 8.23, p. 613;
    Martin v. Maldonado, 
    572 P.2d 763
    , 770 n.
    22 (Alaska 1977); Arizona Title Ins. &
    Trust Co. v. O’Malley Lumber Co., 
    484 P.2d 639
    , 647 (Ariz. App. 1971);
    Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra,
    sec. 252 comment a, although it can of
    course be a very ominous signal,
    entitling a creditor to demand security.
    E.g., id.; Arizona Title Ins. & Trust Co.
    v. O’Malley Lumber 
    Co., supra
    , 484 P.2d
    at 647; cf. UCC 2-609.
    The plan in this case contains an ipso
    facto clause. For it permits Central
    States to treat a member’s declaration of
    bankruptcy as a default upon the
    occurrence of which "the outstanding
    amount of the withdrawal liability shall
    immediately become due and payable." The
    defendants’ argument that the clause was
    even more--was a Doomsday Bomb requiring
    Central States, whether it wanted to or
    no, to treat the declaration of
    bankruptcy as a default--is contrary to
    the plan’s terms, which are permissive
    rather than mandatory, cf. Greenhouse
    Patio Apartments v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
    
    868 F.2d 153
    , 155-56 (5th Cir. 1989), and
    is bad policy as well, for reasons stated
    in Board of Trustees v. Kahle Engineering
    
    Corp., supra
    , 43 F.3d at 859 and n. 7.
    (Briefly, declaring a default may, by
    increasing the bankrupt’s obligations,
    make it more difficult for the bankrupt
    to regain its financial footing and pay
    off the claims against it.) But even read
    permissively, the default clause in the
    Central States plan is an ipso facto
    clause; and it is highly doubtful in
    light of the cases and considerations
    marshaled above that the MPPAA authorizes
    such clauses.
    So by filing a proof of claim for the
    entire withdrawal liability that Allied
    would owe if it withdrew (remember that
    the declaration of bankruptcy was not
    itself a withdrawal), Central States was
    jumping the gun. No withdrawal liability
    had yet arisen or could be precipitated
    by the bankruptcy (because ipso facto
    clauses are unenforceable). Neither in
    June 1989 when Allied filed for
    bankruptcy, nor May 18 of the following
    year when Central States filed its proof
    of claim, had a cause of action for
    withdrawal liability arisen. The statute
    of limitations therefore did not begin to
    run on either date.
    But it did begin to run--still more than
    six years before Central States sued--no
    later than June 18, 1990, when, Allied
    having ceased operations on June 2,
    Central States served on Allied a formal
    demand for payment of the withdrawal
    liability set forth in the proof of claim
    that it had filed in the bankruptcy
    proceeding. Complete cessation of
    operations precipitates, as we have seen,
    the employer’s (and any affiliates’)
    withdrawal liability. That was the
    default, and the demand determined its
    amount (before that determination, a suit
    would have been premature). It is true
    that Central States could not insist on
    immediate payment until the employer had
    a chance to invoke its right to arbitrate
    the amount of its withdrawal liability.
    29 U.S.C. sec. 1401; Chicago Truck
    Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Union
    (Independent) Pension Fund v. Century
    Motor Freight, Inc., 
    125 F.3d 526
    , 533
    (7th Cir. 1997). Allied’s duty to pay
    Central States would have been suspended
    by virtue of this rule until December 25,
    1990, but the cause of action did not
    arise then--the right to arbitration
    presupposes that the cause of action has
    already arisen and has now to be
    adjudicated.
    As a detail, we note that although
    "demanding" payment from a debtor in
    bankruptcy other than in the bankruptcy
    proceeding itself is normally a violation
    of the automatic stay, the demand for
    payment of withdrawal liability is
    probably an exception to this principle.
    Central States, Southeast & Southwest
    Areas Pension Fund v. Slotky, 
    956 F.2d 1369
    , 1372, 1375-76 (7th Cir. 1992). As a
    further detail, we note that it is
    arguable that the statute of limitations
    actually began to run earlier than June
    18, on June 2, since Central States had
    already computed the withdrawal liability
    and sent notice of the amount, via the
    proof of claim, to Allied, substantially
    complying with the statutory requirement
    for notice of and demand for withdrawal
    liability. 29 U.S.C. sec. 1399(b)(1);
    Central States, Southeast & Southwest
    Areas Pension Fund v. Koder, 
    969 F.2d 451
    , 453 (7th Cir. 1992). But this we
    need not decide, as the decision would
    not affect the outcome of the case.
    Surprisingly, Central States has failed
    to make the strongest argument available
    to it for the timeliness of the suit,
    which is that the fact that it demanded
    payment on the installment plan shows
    that it didn’t think Allied had
    defaulted. But the argument would not
    have succeeded even if it had been made.
    The statute required Central States to
    formulate an installment plan. sec.
    1399(b)(1); Bay Area Laundry & Dry
    Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar
    Corp. of California, Inc., 
    522 U.S. 192
    ,
    196 (1997). And the reason for the
    requirement has nothing to do with
    determining when a default has occurred.
    The reason is that Congress conceived of
    withdrawal liability as a substitute for
    the annual payments that the employer
    would have made to the multiemployer
    pension fund had he not withdrawn.
    Milwaukee Brewery Workers’ Pension Plan
    v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing 
    Co., supra
    , 513
    U.S. at 418-19; H.R. Rep. No. 96-869,
    96th Congress, 2d Sess., 1980
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918. The Supreme Court made
    clear in Bay Area that the statutory
    requirement does not prevent the fund
    from accelerating all future payments
    upon 
    default, 522 U.S. at 210
    , thus
    making all the installments due at once.
    See also Board of Trustees v. Kahle
    Engineering 
    Corp., supra
    , 43 F.3d at 857,
    861.
    So the only question is whether there
    was a default. There was. When Allied
    ceased operating, Central States knew it
    would never see any of the scheduled
    installment payments. It had an unsecured
    claim, so Allied could not make any of
    the installment payments without
    violating the absolute priority rule of
    11 U.S.C. sec. 1129(b). With fewer assets
    than claims, Allied would certainly pay
    the fund less than the full value of its
    claim. The best the fund could hope for
    was a partial settlement of the
    withdrawal liability. It should therefore
    have concluded on June 2, 1990, that
    Allied had repudiated its withdrawal
    liability. Put differently, on that day
    it became clear that Allied had disabled
    itself from paying the withdrawal
    liability. The standard rule in contract
    law is that the promisee is free to sue
    for anticipatory repudiation as soon as
    the promisor has disabled itself from
    performing its contractual obligations.
    See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of
    Contracts, supra, sec. 250(b). All that
    remained to complete the cause of action
    was to determine the amount due, which
    happened, at the very latest, on June 18,
    more than six years before the suit was
    brought.
    Central States argues finally that even
    if it could not, by reason of the statute
    of limitations, sue to recover the
    payment due on August 1, 1990, a suit or
    suits for the subsequent installments was
    not barred. But there is no relevant
    difference among the installments. All
    specified payments on dates within the
    six-year limitations period; if as we
    have just held a suit to collect the
    first installment nevertheless was barred
    by reason of acceleration, so were suits
    to collect all the subsequent ones.
    We are not such skeptics as to deny the
    possibility of commercial miracles. Even
    if it seemed certain on June 2, 1990,
    that Allied would not be able to pay the
    first installment of its withdrawal
    liability due two months later, there was
    always the chance that, say, 16 months
    later, when the last installment was due,
    Allied would have had a miraculous
    recovery and could pay at least that
    installment. For all we know, it has had
    a miraculous recovery; the record is
    silent on whether and in what condition
    Allied emerged from bankruptcy. But all
    that is irrelevant. For it is
    unquestioned that if there was a default
    on June 2 or 18, Central States was
    entitled to accelerate the due date of
    all the installments to the present; the
    fourteenth installment became due
    immediately. Anyway the doctrine of
    anticipatory repudiation does not traffic
    in the miraculous. A breach occurs when
    it is reasonably certain that the other
    party is not going to meet its
    obligations under the contract in timely
    fashion. At that point the potential
    victim is freed from its own contractual
    obligations and authorized to take all
    reasonable self-protective measures,
    including suing. It is not required to
    twiddle its thumbs for 20 years (the
    maximum installment period under the
    MPAA, 29 U.S.C. sec. 1399(c)(1)(B),
    though the period here was only 14
    months), while its prospects of
    recovering what it is owed ooze away. The
    point at which Central States knew that
    Allied was not going to meet its
    obligations (and also knew how much those
    obligations were) was reached no later
    than June 18 and required Central States
    to sue within six years of that date,
    which it failed to do.
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-3920

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/5/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

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