Carver, Margaret M. v. Condie, Anthony M. ( 2003 )


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  •                           In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 00-1569
    MARGARET M. CARVER and RANDALL S. CARMEAN,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    SHERIFF OF LASALLE COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
    Defendant,
    and
    LASALLE COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
    Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 94 C 2240—Charles R. Norgle, Sr., Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2000—QUESTION CERTIFIED
    MARCH 15, 2001—DECIDED APRIL 9, 2003
    ____________
    Before FAIRCHILD, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM. Margaret Carver and Randall Carmean
    hold a federal judgment for $500,000 as the result of a
    settlement in this case, which arises under 
    42 U.S.C. §1983
    and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The settle-
    ment was reached with the Sheriff of LaSalle County, in
    2                                               No. 00-1569
    his official capacity (for Title VII covers “employers” and
    not agents). Because the Sheriff’s Office lacks funds to
    pay the judgment, plaintiffs tried to collect from LaSalle
    County, which denied any obligation.
    The district court agreed with the County’s position,
    which left plaintiffs unable to collect their judgment. We
    asked the Supreme Court of Illinois to determine who
    is responsible for paying an official-capacity judgment
    against an independently elected county officer. See Carver
    v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 
    243 F.3d 379
     (7th Cir. 2001).
    The Supreme Court of Illinois accepted the certification
    and concluded:
    under Illinois law a sheriff, in his or her official
    capacity, has the authority to settle and compro-
    mise claims brought against the sheriff’s office.
    Because the office of the sheriff is funded by the
    county, the county is therefore required to pay a
    judgment entered against a sheriff’s office in an
    official capacity. We further hold that this conclu-
    sion is not affected by whether the case was settled
    or litigated.
    Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 
    2003 Ill. LEXIS 13
    at *1-2 (S. Ct. Ill. Feb. 6, 2003) (relying on 745 ILCS 10/9-
    102 in conjunction with 55 ILCS 5/4-6003 and 5-1106).
    The Supreme Court of Illinois has our thanks for resolv-
    ing this knotty and recurring question of state law. Its
    answer implies an additional point of federal law: that a
    county in Illinois is a necessary party in any suit seek-
    ing damages from an independently elected county officer
    (sheriff, assessor, clerk of court, and so on) in an official
    capacity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, 19. Because state law
    requires the county to pay, federal law deems it an indis-
    pensable party to the litigation. Plaintiffs’ complaint
    did name LaSalle County as a defendant, but the County
    sought and obtained dismissal. Having received from the
    No. 00-1569                                              3
    court exactly what it wanted, the County cannot com-
    plain that, when the Sheriff settled the suit, it was in no
    position to object. But in the future counties must be
    named as parties and are entitled to remain in the suit, so
    that they may veto improvident settlements proposed
    (at their expense) by the independently elected officers.
    The judgment of the district court is vacated, and the
    case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
    opinion and the conclusion of the state’s highest court.
    If LaSalle County does not promptly satisfy the judg-
    ment, the district judge should facilitate collection under
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 69.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—4-9-03
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-1569

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 4/9/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015