United States v. Corral, Fernando ( 2003 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    FERNANDO CORRAL and FERNANDO LOPEZ,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ____________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
    No. 00 CR 230—Rudy Lozano, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED FEBRUARY 12, 2003—DECIDED APRIL 1, 2003
    ____________
    Before BAUER, POSNER, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
    BAUER, Circuit Judge. Defendants Fernando Corral
    and Fernando Lopez pleaded guilty to possession with
    intent to distribute a quantity of powder cocaine. The
    district court found Corral responsible for more than six,
    but less than seven, kilograms of cocaine and sentenced
    him to eighty months’ imprisonment. Lopez was sentenced
    to sixty months in prison followed by three years of su-
    pervised release. Corral appeals the district court’s sentence
    to the extent the court held him responsible for five kilo-
    grams of cocaine, which he admitted to possessing during
    negotiations with a government informant. Lopez, however,
    appeals the district court’s imposition of a sentence en-
    2                                   Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734
    hancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the United States Sen-
    tencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) for possession of a
    handgun. He also appeals the district court’s decision not
    to impose a sentence reduction under USSG § 3B1.2(b)
    because he was not a “minor participant” in the offense.
    For the reasons set forth below, we affirm as to both De-
    fendants.
    BACKGROUND
    Throughout 1999 and 2000, East Chicago, Indiana, police
    officer David Zamora worked with a task force from the
    Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) on an investiga-
    tion into drug trafficking by Corral. Officers utilized a
    confidential informant to conduct several low-quantity
    purchases of cocaine from Corral, usually in the two to
    four ounce range. As a result of these transactions, officers
    directed the source to negotiate a two-kilogram purchase
    with Corral in March 2000. During those negotiations,
    which were taped and monitored by police, Corral stated
    that he had recently purchased five kilograms of cocaine
    but returned the drugs because they were of poor quality.
    Corral added that he was expecting a replacement ship-
    ment.
    Corral arranged to make delivery of one kilogram of
    cocaine to the informant in December 2000, and police
    established surveillance of Corral on the day of delivery.
    During that surveillance, officers witnessed Lopez, whom
    Zamora recognized as a dealer from nearby Hammond,
    Indiana, meet with Corral in front of a bar in East Chicago.
    Officers then followed Lopez to an apartment at 4817
    Baring Street, while continuing separate surveillance
    of Corral.
    Some time later, Corral arrived at 4817 Baring Street,
    entered the residence, and remained inside the home for
    a short time before leaving. Zamora then directed the
    Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734                                   3
    informant to call Corral and ask if Corral had the kilogram
    of cocaine. Corral responded affirmatively, and officers
    arrested him shortly thereafter while he was driving in a
    car with his girlfriend and her young son. The kilogram of
    cocaine was seized from Corral’s girlfriend, who stated
    that Corral had handed it to her when police approached
    the car.
    After being Mirandized, Corral told officers that he had
    purchased the drugs from a person named “Jose” at the
    address on Baring Street. Corral pointed out the exact
    apartment to officers and claimed that “Jose” lived there
    with Lopez. Officers transported Corral to jail and con-
    tinued surveillance of the home. Not long after Corral’s
    arrest, two men left the apartment, and police stopped the
    men, who identified themselves as Mizell Quinones and
    Jose Herredia. Herredia told police that he lived at 4817
    Baring Street with Lopez and gave consent to search the
    apartment.
    When they arrived at the apartment, Herredia revoked
    his consent to search the home, stating that Lopez was
    the actual resident of the apartment and would be the
    one needed to give consent. The agents knocked on the
    door for five minutes but received no answer. Zamora
    then obtained a search warrant and entered the apart-
    ment. There, they discovered Lopez hiding under clothing
    in a closet.
    Police also found over five pounds of marijuana hidden
    in a bean bag chair, pieces of plastic pipe consistent with
    the type used to package the kilogram of cocaine recov-
    ered from Corral, approximately $14,000 taped to the bot-
    tom of a chair, a small quantity of cocaine hidden in the
    bathroom, and a gun hidden in the tank of the toilet. The
    entire apartment was sparsely furnished and appeared
    to police to be a drug stash house, rather than a normal
    residence.
    4                                     Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734
    Corral and Lopez were charged and indicted with con-
    spiracy to possess with intent to distribute (Count 1) and
    possession with intent to distribute (Count 2) a quantity
    of powder cocaine. Both men subsequently pleaded guilty
    to the second count, a violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1),
    without a plea agreement. The district court sentenced
    Corral to eighty months’ imprisonment, finding him re-
    sponsible for more than six, but less than seven, kilograms
    of cocaine.1 The court arrived at this range by adding
    three quantities: 1) the various ounce quantities Corral
    sold to the informant; 2) the negotiated-for two kilograms;
    and 3) the additional five kilograms Corral admitted to
    receiving during negotiations with the informant. Corral
    appeals only the third quantity for which the district
    court found him responsible, arguing that his statement
    about the five kilograms amounted to mere puffing and
    that he never possessed that amount.
    The district court sentenced Lopez to sixty months’
    imprisonment, increased his sentence for possession of
    the firearm found in the bathroom pursuant to USSG
    § 2D1.1(b)(1), but refused to apply a sentence reduction
    under USSG § 3B1.2(b) for being a “minor participant.”
    Lopez bases his appeal on a claim that he did not live at
    the Baring Street apartment and was only involved in
    this transaction to serve as a one-time messenger and to
    allow Corral entry to the apartment to pick up the drugs.
    1
    The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) prepared for
    Corral’s sentencing, however, recommended that Corral be held
    responsible for no less than sixty kilograms of cocaine. The PSR
    relied upon statements by the police informant, which indicated
    that Corral had been moving as much as three to five kilograms
    per month over a long period of time. Because police were unable
    to document fully this alleged activity, the district court chose
    to depart from the PSR’s recommendation when sentencing
    Corral.
    Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734                                     5
    In support of his argument, Lopez presented testimony
    at his sentencing hearing from his former landlord and
    girlfriend, both of whom claimed Lopez lived at an address
    on 150th Street in Hammond, Indiana, in December 2000.
    The landlord, however, could not produce a receipt for
    rent received from Lopez for that month, though he had
    receipts for previous months. He also stated that Lopez’s
    girlfriend had told him that Lopez no longer lived there
    and that she had removed his personal belongings. Agent
    Zamora, Corral, and Herredia each testified that Lopez
    lived in the apartment on Baring Street. The district
    court found that Lopez either lived in the apartment or
    worked out of it for some time prior to his arrest.
    ANALYSIS
    A. Standard of Review
    Because Corral and Lopez present only factual chal-
    lenges, our review of the district court’s factual determina-
    tions at sentencing is limited to a clearly erroneous stan-
    dard. United States v. Buggs, 
    904 F.2d 1070
    , 1078 (7th
    Cir. 1990). We will not overturn those findings unless
    we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a
    mistake has been made. United States v. Bonilla-Comacho,
    
    121 F.3d 287
    , 292 (7th Cir. 1997).
    B. Corral’s Relevant Drug Quantity
    Corral’s only argument is that the district court commit-
    ted clear error when it determined that he was responsible
    for an additional five kilograms of cocaine, beyond the
    negotiated two kilograms. The court’s determination was
    based on a statement made by Corral and recorded by
    police, while Corral was negotiating a multi-kilogram
    purchase with the government’s informant. During those
    negotiations, Corral told the informant that he recently
    6                                  Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734
    returned five kilograms of cocaine because the quality
    was poor and that he was expecting a replacement ship-
    ment soon. Corral now claims that this statement was
    merely puffing to bolster his bargaining position by show-
    ing his interest in quality control.
    By arguing that his statement constituted puffing,
    however, Corral has conceded that the statement was
    made as a part of his negotiations for a multi-kilogram
    purchase of cocaine with the government informant. Ap-
    plication Note 12 to USSG § 2D1.1 allows the sentencing
    court to consider “[t]ypes and quantities of drugs not
    specified in the count of conviction” and to approximate
    those quantities, when appropriate, in order to deter-
    mine the proper offense level. USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.12
    (2002). More specifically, Application Note 12 directs the
    court to consider negotiated quantities from an uncompleted
    drug transaction, unless “the defendant establishes that
    he or she did not intend to provide, or was not reasonably
    capable of providing,” the negotiated quantity. Id.
    We have interpreted this note to mean that negotiated
    quantities of undelivered drugs can be included so long
    as there was true negotiation and not idle talk. Bonilla-
    Comacho, 
    121 F.3d at 291-92
    ; United States v. Garcia, 
    69 F.3d 810
    , 820 (7th Cir. 1995). If a defendant exhibits
    the intent and ability to provide multi-kilogram quan-
    tities of narcotics, his statements constitute true negotia-
    tion and not idle talk. Bonilla-Comacho, 
    121 F.3d at 292
    .
    In Corral’s case, nothing in his statement indicates
    that he was merely bragging to increase his bargaining
    position. See 
    id.
     (“Nothing in Bonilla’s statement indicates
    that he was bragging about something he could not ac-
    complish or that he was trying to seem like a bigger
    drug operator than he really was.”). Prior to negotiating
    a multi-kilogram purchase, the informant had purchased
    several ounces of cocaine from Corral on multiple occa-
    Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734                                      7
    sions over several months. The two had established an
    ongoing, business relationship and Corral did not point to
    evidence demonstrating that the informant would look
    elsewhere for a supply of drugs, thereby revealing a need
    to puff about his prowess as a supplier.
    Corral simply made the statement concerning five
    kilograms in the midst of negotiations for a two kilogram
    purchase, revealing both his intent and ability to obtain
    multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine. Initially, it demon-
    strated that he had obtained large quantities in the past
    and had the ability to do so in the future. In fact, his abil-
    ity to obtain a large quantity of drugs is corroborated by
    the fact that he was arrested in possession of one kilogram.
    Additionally, the government’s source informed police
    that Corral had been moving as much as three to five
    kilograms per month over a long period of time. Because
    police were not able to document fully the entirety of
    Corral’s trafficking, the district court did not sentence
    Corral based upon the quantity (no less than 60 kilograms)
    recommended in his PSR. We note, however, that the
    district court was free to consider how the informant’s
    statement further corroborated Corral’s intent and ability
    to deal in multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine.
    This Court has long relied on a defendant’s admissions
    to hold that defendant responsible for a certain quantity
    of drugs, and we see no reason why Corral’s admission
    should be treated differently. See United States v. Spiller,
    
    261 F.3d 683
    , 691 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding the defendant
    responsible for dealing 28,000 grams of crack cocaine as
    evidenced by handwritten ledgers belonging to the defen-
    dant in which he recorded drug sales); United States v.
    Joiner, 
    183 F.3d 635
    , 640-41 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
    the district court did not clearly err by relying on the
    defendants’ own statements to determine the drug quantity
    for which the defendants were responsible); United States
    8                                   Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734
    v. Jarrett, 
    133 F.3d 519
    , 530-31 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming
    the district court’s sentence that relied on undercover
    buys as well as the defendants’ own admissions in re-
    corded conversations regarding drug activities); United
    States v. Benitez, 
    92 F.3d 528
    , 538-39 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting
    the district court’s proper reliance on recorded conversa-
    tions of the defendant to determine the quantity for which
    she was responsible); United States v. Ferguson, 
    35 F.3d 327
    , 333 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no clear error where the
    district court determined the quantity for which the
    defendant was responsible based, in part, upon the defen-
    dant’s own admissions). Accordingly, we find that the
    district court did not commit clear error by holding
    Corral responsible for an additional five kilograms of co-
    caine in determining his proper offense level.
    C. Lopez’s Sentence Enhancement for Possession
    of a Firearm
    Lopez’s first argument is that the district court commit-
    ted clear error by applying a two-level increase in his
    sentence pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) because he was
    in possession of a firearm when arrested. Application
    Note 3 to § 2D1.1 provides that the enhancement “should
    be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly
    improbable that the weapon was connected with the of-
    fense.” USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.3. The government, therefore,
    must first prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
    the defendant possessed the firearm. United States v.
    Thomas, 
    294 F.3d 899
    , 905-06 (7th Cir. 2002); United
    States v. Harris, 
    230 F.3d 1054
    , 1057 (7th Cir. 2000).
    “Actual possession of the firearm need not be established
    in order to trigger the enhancement. Instead, proof of
    constructive possession, that is, that the defendant had
    the power and the intention to exercise dominion or con-
    trol of the firearm, is sufficient to warrant the enhance-
    Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734                                    9
    ment.” Thomas, 
    294 F.3d at 906
     (internal citations omitted).
    Once possession is established, the burden shifts to the
    defendant to prove that it was clearly improbable that the
    firearm was possessed in connection with the offense.
    Harris, 
    230 F.3d at 1057
    .
    There is no question that Lopez did not physically pos-
    sess the gun when arrested. He was found hiding under
    clothing in a closet; the gun was in the toilet tank in the
    bathroom. The issues before us, therefore, are: 1) whether
    the government proved that Lopez constructively pos-
    sessed the gun found in the toilet tank; and 2) whether
    Lopez showed that it was clearly improbable that the
    gun was connected to the offense.
    1. Whether Lopez “possessed” the gun
    In United States v. Singleton, this Court upheld applica-
    tion of the sentence enhancement when the defendants
    were arrested in a home they had transformed into a drug
    distribution center. United States v. Singleton, 
    125 F.3d 1097
    , 1109-10 (7th Cir. 1997). Inside that home, police
    recovered a small arsenal of six weapons, ammunition, and
    drugs hidden strategically throughout. 
    Id.
     We held that,
    while no gun was found in the hands of the defendants
    when arrested, the sentence enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(1)
    still applied because they constructively possessed the
    guns. Id. We have, likewise, held that the § 2D1.1(b)(1)
    enhancement can be applied when the defendant knows
    of weapons stored in a drug stash house. United States
    v. Brack, 
    188 F.3d 748
    , 764 (7th Cir. 1999).
    Here, the district court made a factual finding that
    the Baring Street apartment was a stash house. It was
    sparsely furnished, containing almost no food, few clothes,
    and little furniture. In fact, the only furniture consisted
    of a mattress, a small television, a table (upon which po-
    lice found drug packing material consistent with that
    10                                 Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734
    in Corral’s possession), and a couple of chairs, one with
    $14,000 taped to the bottom of it. Police also found over
    five pounds of marijuana as well as a small quantity of
    cocaine and a gun hidden in the bathroom. The district
    court further found that Lopez was a trusted part of this
    drug operation. He was left in sole possession of the
    apartment in order to allow Corral entry to pick up the
    drugs. As the sole occupant of a drug stash house on the
    day he was arrested, Lopez clearly had the power and
    intention to exercise dominion and control over the entire
    apartment. The gun’s location in the bathroom does not
    diminish Lopez’s control over it.
    Lopez claims that he did not know of the gun’s presence
    and location in the apartment and also asserts that he
    could not have possessed the gun because he was only in
    the apartment for the one-time, limited purpose of letting
    Corral in to pick up the drugs. The district court, howev-
    er, reasonably chose not to accept Lopez’s testimony and
    further based application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhance-
    ment on credible evidence demonstrating that Lopez ac-
    tually lived in the apartment or worked in the residence
    on prior occasions. We too reject Lopez’s assertion that
    his presence in the apartment was a one-time deal. Accord-
    ingly, we find that Lopez constructively possessed the
    gun in question.
    2. Whether it was “clearly improbable” the gun
    was connected to the offense
    The next question is whether it was clearly improbable
    that the gun was connected to the drug offense. As we
    have stated, guns found in close proximity to drug activ-
    ity are presumptively connected to that activity. United
    States v. Adams, 
    125 F.3d 586
    , 597 (7th Cir. 1997). In fact,
    we have held that the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement can be
    applied when the connection between the gun and the
    Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734                                   11
    drugs is only temporal in nature. United States v. Grimm,
    
    170 F.3d 760
    , 768 (7th Cir. 1999). In United States v.
    Grimm, we held that it was not clearly improbable to
    conclude that a connection existed between a gun found
    in the defendant’s trunk when he was arrested and a
    drug shipment made with the same car six weeks prior
    to the arrest. 
    Id.
    In the case at bar, far more than temporal proximity
    connects Lopez to the gun found in the bathroom. The
    apartment was clearly a stash house being used for illicit
    drug activity. Whether Lopez resided in the apartment
    or worked there on prior occasions, as the district court
    found, or whether he was in the apartment for the first
    time, as he claims, does not affect the connection be-
    tween the drug activity and the gun. There is no other
    explanation for the presence of the gun in that apart-
    ment than to utilize it in connection with the drug activ-
    ity taking place inside. Lopez points to nothing that
    would contradict this strong presumption, and therefore,
    we find that the district court properly applied the
    § 2D1.1(b)(1) sentence enhancement. Finally, Lopez’s
    request that the case be remanded for a determination
    of his eligibility under USSG § 5C1.2 is denied because
    we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Lopez pos-
    sessed a firearm in connection with the offense.
    D. Lopez’s Role in the Offense
    Lopez’s second argument is that the district court clearly
    erred by failing to apply a two-level reduction in his sen-
    tence because he was a “minor participant” in the offense.
    According to USSG § 3B1.2(b), the defendant’s offense
    level may be decreased by two levels if the sentencing
    court finds him to have been a minor participant in the
    offense. USSG § 3B1.2(b) (2002). We have held that a
    minor participant is one who is substantially less culpable
    12                                 Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734
    than the average participant. United States v. Jones, 
    55 F.3d 289
    , 293 (7th Cir. 1995). In making this determination,
    however, we examine “whether the defendant was a minor
    participant in the crime for which he was convicted, not
    whether he was a minor participant in some broader
    conspiracy that may have surrounded it.” United States
    v. Brown, 
    136 F.3d 1176
    , 1185-86 (7th Cir. 1998). The
    burden lies upon the defendant to establish that he was
    substantially less culpable, though we will apply this
    sentence reduction infrequently. 
    Id. at 1185, 1186
    .
    Lopez argues that his role was minor because he was
    not a party to the drug transaction and served only as
    a messenger to let Corral know the drugs were ready for
    pick up and to admit Corral to the apartment for that
    purpose. The district court, however, found that Lopez
    either resided in the Baring Street apartment or worked
    out of that apartment prior to his arrest. The court also
    concluded, quite reasonably, that the apartment served
    primarily as a stash house for the parties’ drug business.
    Lopez cannot claim he was unaware of drug operations
    within the apartment.
    By virtue of agreeing to maintain the stash house
    and open it to Corral, Lopez’s argument that he was
    substantially less culpable than others must fail. First, he
    was entrusted with delivery of a large quantity (one
    kilogram) of cocaine. Second, Lopez was trusted with sole
    possession of the apartment, which contained a large
    quantity of marijuana, $14,000, a quantity of cocaine, and
    a firearm. Finally, he was aware of Corral’s purpose
    for picking up the drugs (to sell them) and Lopez made
    that possible through his own actions. See 
    id. at 1186
    (noting that one cannot be a minor participant with re-
    spect to one’s own actions).
    Lopez further argues that his minor role is supported
    by the fact that he did not stand to profit from the trans-
    Nos. 02-1493 & 02-1734                                   13
    action. We have held, however, that whether a participant
    stands to profit from the crime does not reflect upon that
    person’s role within the offense. 
    Id. at 1186
    . Lopez pleaded
    guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine
    and each of his actions was directed at possessing the
    cocaine and making distribution possible by giving Corral
    access to the apartment. For those reasons, we find that
    the district court did not clearly err by determining that
    Lopez was not substantially less culpable than others
    and in denying him a sentence reduction under § 3B1.2(b).
    The decision of the district court as to both Corral and
    Lopez is AFFIRMED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—4-1-03