United States v. Jefferson, Correy ( 2003 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 02-3506
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    CORREY JEFFERSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 02-CR-21—Charles N. Clevert, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED APRIL 3, 2003—DECIDED JULY 2, 2003
    ____________
    Before CUDAHY, MANION and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
    CUDAHY, Circuit Judge Correy Jefferson bought two
    semi-automatic handguns, one of which he later gave to
    his brother, who is a convicted felon, allegedly for safe-
    keeping while Jefferson was out of town. For this transfer,
    Jefferson was convicted by a jury of knowingly delivering
    a firearm to a felon in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (d)
    and sentenced to 21 months in prison. He appeals, claiming
    that the jury instructions misconstrued the language of
    § 922(d), which he argues does not encompass his ac-
    tions. We affirm his conviction.
    2                                                   No. 02-3506
    I.
    In May 2001, Correy Jefferson legally purchased two
    Ruger semi-automatic handguns from Buttrum’s Sport-
    ing Goods in Glendale, Wisconsin, a Milwaukee suburb.
    One of these two guns later ended up in the possession of
    Correy’s brother Melvin, who is a convicted felon.1 Using
    the handgun’s serial number, the police traced the gun
    back to Correy Jefferson, and Correy was arrested on
    December 2, 2001. Everything we know about what hap-
    pened with the gun comes from Correy’s statement to
    the police. According to the statement, Correy and Melvin
    had gone to Buttrum’s together to buy the two guns, both
    of which were for Correy. Correy knew that his brother,
    as a felon, could not legally purchase a firearm. About
    a week after the purchase, Correy gave one of the guns
    to Melvin so that Melvin could keep it in Melvin’s safe
    while Correy was out of town for about a month. The gun
    remained with Melvin after Correy returned to Mil-
    waukee and then for the duration of another out-of-
    town trip. Correy stated that the last time he saw the
    gun was when Melvin placed it in the safe, and Correy
    admitted that he did not know the combination to Mel-
    vin’s safe. Correy was indicted on one count of delivery of
    a firearm to a felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (d).
    Title 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (d) makes it “unlawful for any per-
    son to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammuni-
    tion to any person knowing . . . that such person” is a felon.
    Before trial, the government proposed a jury instruction
    defining “dispose of”: “To dispose of an object is to trans-
    fer it to the control of another.” The government argued
    1
    As a result of his present receipt of the gun, Melvin Jefferson
    was eventually convicted of being a felon in possession of a
    firearm in violation of 
    28 U.S.C. § 922
    (a) and sentenced to 91
    months in prison.
    No. 02-3506                                                3
    that this broad definition of “dispose of” was supported
    by two dictionary sources as well as Huddleston v. United
    States, 
    415 U.S. 814
    , 821 (1974), in which the Supreme
    Court held that a pawnbroker “disposes of” a firearm
    when he allows a felon to redeem it. Jefferson vigorously
    opposed this instruction. Jefferson disputed the validity
    of the selected dictionary definitions and argued that
    such a broad definition would constructively amend the
    indictment. The district court, citing United States v.
    Monteleone, 
    77 F.3d 1086
    , 1092 (8th Cir. 1996), gave
    its own jury instruction broadly defining “dispose of”: “The
    term ‘dispose of’ as used in the indictment means to
    transfer a firearm so that the transferee acquires pos-
    session of the firearm.” A jury convicted Correy Jefferson
    on May 13, 2002, and he was sentenced to 21 months in
    prison.
    II.
    We review a district court’s decisions with respect to
    jury instructions for abuse of discretion, approving on
    appeal instructions that “fairly and accurately” summarize
    the law and have support in the record. United States v.
    Hendricks, 
    319 F.3d 993
    , 1004 (7th Cir. 2003). However, we
    determine de novo whether an instruction fairly and
    accurately summarizes the law or is legally erroneous.
    United States v. Smith, 
    308 F.3d 726
    , 740 (7th Cir. 2002);
    Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 
    199 F.3d 925
    , 934 (7th Cir. 1999).
    Jefferson presents the principal subject in dispute, the
    meaning of “dispose of,” in three ways. First, he argues that
    the jury instruction as given constituted an improper
    constructive amendment of the indictment. Second, he ar-
    gues that the government did not present sufficient evi-
    dence to support the jury’s verdict. Finally, he alleges
    that the jury instruction itself was not a proper statement
    of the law.
    4                                                   No. 02-3506
    The constructive amendment argument does not get
    Jefferson very far. “[A] constructive amendment occurs
    where proof at trial goes beyond the parameters of the
    indictment in that it establishes offenses different from
    or in addition to those charged by the grand jury. Such
    error . . . which in a jury trial can also be generated or
    exacerbated by faulty instructions, violates the Fifth
    Amendment since the Grand Jury Clause limits the avail-
    able bases for conviction to those contained in the indict-
    ment.” United States v. Pigee, 
    197 F.3d 879
    , 886 (7th Cir.
    1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the govern-
    ment agrees, a constructive amendment can be made
    either through the evidence or through the jury instruc-
    tions.2
    Jefferson argues that the definition of “dispose of” in the
    district court’s jury instruction was so broad that he
    was effectively convicted of aiding and abetting his
    brother’s possession in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g),
    rather than of delivering a firearm to a felon in violation
    of § 922(d), the offense for which he was indicted. Ulti-
    mately, this argument only begs the question of the proper
    interpretation of § 922(d). If the district court’s instruc-
    tion was legally correct (i.e., if § 922(d) does cover Jeffer-
    son’s actions), there is no reason to believe that Jeffer-
    son was improperly convicted of aiding and abetting his
    2
    An example of a constructive amendment case, cited by
    Jefferson but not on point, is United States v. Stirone, 
    361 U.S. 212
    , 215-16 (1960). In Stirone, the defendant was indicted for
    obstructing interstate shipments of sand, but at trial the govern-
    ment also proffered evidence that the defendant had obstructed
    steel shipments. The jury was instructed that it could convict
    based on either sand or steel. The Supreme Court held that
    the indictment had been amended by the addition of the ob-
    struction of steel language in the jury instructions and reversed
    the conviction.
    No. 02-3506                                                  5
    brother’s violation of § 922(g). In fact, the government
    expressly rejected the district court’s proposal to include
    jury instructions on aiding and abetting. Trial Tr. at 61
    (May 13, 2002). Jefferson’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence ar-
    gument similarly fails if the district court’s jury instruc-
    tion was accurate. If the jury instruction was appropri-
    ate, there was clearly sufficient evidence to support the
    jury’s verdict. Thus, we move on to the jury instruction
    itself.
    The core issue is the proper interpretation of “dispose of.”
    Jefferson’s argument here is that the temporary transfer
    of a gun for safekeeping, the extent of his admission, is
    not encompassed by the statutory language. The district
    court’s instruction was based on the instruction given
    in Monteleone, 
    77 F.3d at 1092
    . Salvatore Monteleone had
    given his gun for repair to a half-brother whom he
    knew to be a felon, in a temporary transfer, also similar
    to the one before us inasmuch as it was noncommercial.
    The district court in Monteleone provided the following
    jury instruction: “[T]he term ‘dispose of’ as used in the
    indictment means to transfer a firearm so that the trans-
    feree acquires possession of the firearm.” 
    Id.
     On review, the
    Eighth Circuit noted, while reversing the conviction on
    other grounds: “This definition of ‘dispose’ is in accord
    with the Supreme Court’s decision in Huddleston v.
    United States, 
    415 U.S. 814
     (1974). There, in considering
    the very language before us in this appeal, the Court
    determined that a disposal occurs when a person ‘comes
    into possession, control, or power of disposal of a firearm.’ ”
    Monteleone, 
    77 F.3d at 1092
     (quoting Huddleston, 
    415 U.S. at 823
    ).
    While we agree with the general approach of Mon-
    teleone, its holding is not as clearly applicable here as
    the government would have us believe. First, since the
    conviction of the defendant in Monteleone was reversed on
    other grounds, the Eighth Circuit’s treatment of the jury
    6                                                No. 02-3506
    instruction may be dictum. Second, Monteleone ‘s reliance
    on Huddleston is questionable. In Huddleston, the Su-
    preme Court considered whether a felon redeeming a
    firearm from a pawnshop was “acquiring” the firearm in
    violation of § 922(a)(6). William Huddleston had argued
    that a redemptive transaction was not a “sale” from the
    perspective of the pawnbroker, and so could not be an
    “acquisition” with respect to the person redeeming. The
    Court disagreed, holding that guns can be acquired not
    only through sales but through “other dispositions.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (a)(6). The Court, citing laws regulating the
    firearms transactions of pawnbrokers, concluded that
    pawnbrokers do “dispose” of firearms when they allow
    them to be redeemed by their patrons, even if the redemp-
    tion does not constitute a sale.
    The problem with relying on Huddleston here is that
    pawnshop redemptions are both commercial and final, two
    qualities claimed to have been absent in Jefferson’s trans-
    fer to his brother. Further, the Huddleston court relied
    on both these aspects of pawnshop redemptions in coming
    to its conclusion that “disposition” should be read some-
    what broadly. And common definitions of the word “dis-
    posal” also contain the element of finality. See Merriam-
    Webster Dictionary (1990) (disposal: “to transfer to the
    control of another; to get rid of; to deal with conclusively ”)
    (emphasis added). Further, the principle of ejusdem generis
    would suggest that § 922(d) only covers dispositions that
    are similar to sales, perhaps in their commercial and final
    qualities. Reading § 922(d) to cover noncommercial trans-
    actions may even yield a Commerce Clause challenge. But
    see United States v. Lemons, 
    302 F.3d 769
    , 772 (7th Cir.
    2002) (holding that § 922(g)(1) is within congressional
    Commerce Clause authority).
    Legislative history pulls in both directions. The strongest
    evidence for the government comes from a source cited
    by the Huddleston court. According to Huddleston, the term
    No. 02-3506                                                  7
    “dispose” was first used in the National Firearms Act, Pub.
    L. No. 73-474, § 1(k), 
    48 Stat. 1236
    , 1237 (1934), which
    defined “to transfer” as “to sell, assign, pledge, lease, loan,
    give away, or otherwise dispose of.” If we derived our
    construction from the 1934 law, therefore, disposal would
    encompass a wide range of transfers, both temporary and
    permanent (e.g., sell or lease) and both commercial and
    noncommercial (e.g., sell or give away). On the other hand,
    we may also consider the more recent history of § 922(d).
    Prior to 1986, § 922 only forbade sales and other disposi-
    tions to felons by licensed gun dealers. H.R. Rep. No. 99-495
    at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1341. The
    Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, § 102(5), Pub. L. No. 99-
    308, 
    100 Stat. 449
    , 451 (1986), broadened the statutory
    coverage to “close an existing loophole whereby qualified
    purchasers have acquired firearms from licensees on
    behalf of prohibited persons.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-495 at 17,
    reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1343. The new
    § 922(d) “extend[ed] the prohibition which [applied] only to
    Federal firearms licensees to all persons who transfer a
    firearm.” Id. at 22, 1348. There are two ways to inter-
    pret this broadening of the law. The first possible interpre-
    tation is that the new language intends to forbid, for non-
    dealers, only actions that dealers usually engage in—
    commercial, permanent transfers. Or we can read the
    change to include under § 922(d) the wider range of trans-
    fers that a non-dealer might make (including gratuitous,
    temporary transfers). After all, there is no compelling
    reason to believe that, when the class of persons covered
    is broadened, the meaning of “sell or otherwise dispose
    of” should continue to reflect only the sorts of disposi-
    tions associated with the former and narrower class of
    persons covered.
    Although we must keep in mind that ambiguity in
    criminal statutes should generally be resolved in favor
    of lenity, United States v. Lange, 
    312 F.3d 263
    , 266 (7th Cir.
    8                                              No. 02-3506
    2002), this maxim must of course yield to the paramount
    consideration—to follow congressional intent. Here, our best
    evidence of congressional intent is the legislative history
    cited above, which indicates that Congress wanted to
    broaden the reach of the gun control statute to cover
    a wider range of firearms transfers. Given the potential
    breadth of the word “disposal,” as contained in the 1934
    National Firearms Act, we believe that Congress must
    have been aware that non-dealers may be equally likely
    to engage in gratuitous, temporary transfers (say, to
    family members or friends) as to engage in permanent,
    commercial transfers, and must have found both types
    of transfers potentially dangerous and undesirable. To
    exclude such gratuitous, temporary transfers from the reach
    of § 922(d) also ill-serves the purposes of the statute—
    Congress presumably did not want guns in the hands of
    felons, whether on a temporary or permanent basis,
    whether for free or for payment. If Congress really
    wanted to strengthen and broaden the reach of the fire-
    arms statute, it would not have distinguished between
    transfers made at arm’s length for consideration and
    gratuitous transfers to friends or family members. We
    are not aware of a persuasive reason to make such a
    distinction.
    The case at hand becomes even clearer when we note
    that Congress expressly had in mind, in broadening
    § 922(d), straw purchases “whereby qualified purchasers
    have acquired firearms from licensees on behalf of pro-
    hibited persons.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-495 at 17, reprinted in
    1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1343. After all, Jefferson’s own
    argument is that the jury instruction as given broadened
    his indictment “to include . . . aiding and abetting a pro-
    hibited person in the possession of a firearm” and that
    the jury convicted him based on that conduct. Jefferson
    Br. at 9-16. As the congressional history shows, such aiding
    and abetting, when it amounts to a straw purchase, falls
    No. 02-3506                                               9
    precisely within the range of activities prohibited by
    § 922(d). Given the substantial duration of Jefferson’s
    transfer to his brother and his brother’s undisputed ex-
    clusive control over the firearm, we see no problem with the
    district courts’ definition of “dispose of,” “to transfer a
    firearm so that the transferee acquires possession of the
    firearm.”
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
    court is AFFIRMED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—7-2-03