United States v. Cranley, James ( 2003 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-1908
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    JAMES CRANLEY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 02-CR-222—Lynn Adelman, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2003—DECIDED NOVEMBER 19, 2003
    ____________
    Before POSNER, MANION, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
    POSNER, Circuit Judge. James Cranley, indicted for federal
    firearms-related offenses, moved to suppress the confession
    that he had given to an agent of the federal Bureau of
    Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. The district judge granted
    the motion, and the government appeals.
    Cranley had been convicted in a Wisconsin state court
    of misdemeanor theft and had been placed on probation.
    Among the terms of his probation was a requirement that he
    report to his probation officer “as directed for scheduled or
    unscheduled meetings,” and he was also required to
    “provide true and correct information verbally and in
    writing, in response to inquiries by the [probation] agent.”
    A BATF agent traced several guns to Cranley, learned he
    2                                                 No. 03-1908
    was on probation, and asked Cranley’s probation officer to
    arrange a meeting at which the agent could question
    Cranley about the guns. She did so, explaining to Cranley
    that a BATF agent wanted to talk to him about guns. The
    meeting was held in a conference room at a local probation
    office with just Cranley, the probation officer, and the agent
    present. The room was unlocked, but to leave the probation
    office Cranley would have had to have been buzzed out by
    a guard. The meeting lasted an hour. The agent wasn’t
    satisfied with Cranley’s answers to his questions about the
    guns, and he asked the probation officer to arrange another
    meeting, in the same room, and she did so. At this meeting,
    which differed from the first only in that it lasted a half hour
    or hour longer and the probation officer was not present,
    Cranley gave a full confession, but was permitted to leave
    without being arrested. Prior to either the first or the second
    meeting (we do not know which), the probation officer had
    reminded him of his duty to answer questions truthfully. He
    was not given Miranda warnings at either meeting; nor did
    he invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege not to be com-
    pelled to incriminate himself.
    The district judge ruled that Cranley had not been in
    custody and therefore had not been entitled to the Miranda
    warnings. But the judge thought that Cranley’s Fifth
    Amendment privilege had been infringed because there was
    an implicit threat that if he refused to answer the BATF
    agent’s questions his probation would be revoked and he
    would be sent to prison.
    Cranley advances an alternative ground for upholding the
    suppression of his confession, namely that he was in cus-
    tody and therefore was entitled to the Miranda warnings. As
    a matter of logic and good sense, it would seem that a
    district court’s finding that a defendant was or was not in
    custody when he made a statement that the prosecution
    wants to use against him must stand unless the finding was
    No. 03-1908                                                    3
    clearly erroneous. United States v. Humphrey, 
    34 F.3d 551
    , 558
    (7th Cir. 1994) (concurring opinion). That is the usual scope
    of appellate review of applications of a legal standard to the
    facts, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 
    496 U.S. 384
    , 401-05
    (1990); Thomas v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 
    288 F.3d 305
    , 307-08 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Frederick, 
    182 F.3d 496
    , 499-500 (7th Cir. 1999); Anderson v. Flexel, Inc., 
    47 F.3d 243
    , 248 (7th Cir. 1995), and we cannot think of a good
    reason for an exception when the legal standard is custody.
    Whether a particular set of facts adds up to custody—that
    is, to the defendant’s reasonably believing himself unable to
    leave without the permission of the police, Stansbury v.
    California, 
    511 U.S. 318
    , 322-23 (1994) (per curiam); Berkemer
    v. McCarty, 
    468 U.S. 420
    , 442 (1984); United States v. Scheets,
    
    188 F.3d 829
    , 841 (7th Cir. 1999)— will vary unpredictably
    from case to case, so that the appellate court’s primary duty
    of prescribing uniform rules is not engaged by its having to
    rule on the existence of custody in a particular case. But we
    bow to the weight of contrary authority, e.g., United States
    v. Jackson, 
    189 F.3d 502
    , 509 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v.
    Mancillas, 
    183 F.3d 682
    , 701-02 (7th Cir. 1999); United States
    v. Salyers, 
    160 F.3d 1152
    , 1159 (7th Cir. 1998); United States
    v. Yusuff, 
    96 F.3d 982
    , 987-88 (7th Cir. 1996), and so give the
    district court’s ruling plenary review.
    With reluctance, given the coercive atmosphere and the
    pressure on Cranley to talk in order to avoid jeopardiz-
    ing his probation, we accept the district court’s finding that
    he was not in custody. We are influenced by the fact that
    Cranley’s lawyer failed to tell us (and admitted at argument
    that he did not know) the character of the building in which
    the probation office in Sturtevant, Wisconsin, is located. If
    the office shares the building with the local jail or police
    department, or even a courthouse, that is one thing, but if it
    shares it with offices unrelated to law enforcement, such as
    4                                                 No. 03-1908
    the department of motor vehicles or of natural resources,
    that is quite another, muting the impression that the
    probation service is a branch of the state correctional
    authority. In fact it appears from discreet inquiry that the
    probation office shares the building with the state’s depart-
    ments of transportation and natural resources rather than
    with law enforcers.
    Cranley would have been reluctant to break off an in-
    terview by a police officer, but that would have been true if
    the BATF agent had accosted him on the street outside. He
    could, however, have asked the agent, when the questioning
    got hot, “Am I under arrest or am I free to leave?” Had he
    done that we would know from the answer whether he was
    in custody. His failure to ask, given the location of the
    interview and the absence of the usual indications of police
    custody, precludes a finding of custody, in light of such
    cases as Minnesota v. Murphy, 
    465 U.S. 420
    , 433 (1984);
    United States v. Humphrey, 
    supra,
     
    34 F.3d at
    554: United States
    v. Hayden, 
    260 F.3d 1062
    , 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2001); United
    States v. Howard, 
    115 F.3d 1151
    , 1154-55 (4th Cir. 1997);
    United States v. Nieblas, 
    115 F.3d 703
    , 704-05 (9th Cir. 1997),
    and United States v. Ruggles, 
    70 F.3d 262
    , 264-65 (2d Cir.
    1995), all closely in point. (Only United States v. Byram, 
    145 F.3d 405
    , 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1998), tugs in the opposite
    direction.) These cases are perhaps not entirely realistic, and
    may reflect a subterranean dissatisfaction with the Miranda
    rule. But we are not disposed to buck such a long list of
    cases, especially when their fons et origens is a Supreme
    Court decision (Murphy).
    On whether Cranley’s Fifth Amendment privilege was
    violated, we have some doubt whether the question would
    even arise under a rational system of criminal-law enforce-
    ment. Our system seems to critics irrationally complex,
    No. 03-1908                                                   5
    and not tethered very closely to common sense either. It has
    been argued with some force that an innocent defendant
    would rather be tried under the European system of
    criminal justice than under the American, and a guilty
    defendant under the American system rather than the
    European. William T. Pizzi, Trials without Truth: Why Our
    System of Criminal Trials Has Become an Expensive Failure and
    What We Need to Do to Rebuild It (1999).
    Criminal defendants are free to waive constitutional
    rights, including the right not to be forced to incriminate
    themselves. They do it all the time, for example in pleading
    guilty, which in fact is the mode of conviction in the vast
    majority of criminal cases in America. At least as an original
    matter it would seem that Wisconsin courts should be
    allowed to require as a condition of probation that every
    person admitted to probation waive his Fifth Amendment
    right and answer all questions put to him by law enforce-
    ment officers concerning his criminal conduct. Cf. United
    States v. Ross, 
    9 F.3d 1182
    , 1190-91 (7th Cir. 1993), vacated on
    other grounds, 
    511 U.S. 1124
     (1994); Asherman v. Meachum,
    
    957 F.2d 978
    , 982-83 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
    Of course there are what are called “unconstitutional
    conditions.” Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 
    518 U.S. 668
    , 674-75 (1996); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
    512 U.S. 374
    ,
    385 (1994); Burgess v. Lowery, 
    201 F.3d 942
    , 946-47 (7th Cir.
    2000). Although Wisconsin doesn’t have to provide a pro-
    bation option to convicted criminals at all, it could not
    condition the option on the probationer’s being a white man
    or a non-Jew. But to say to a convicted criminal we will not
    let you substitute freedom for imprisonment unless you
    agree to give a full accounting of any criminal behavior in
    which you have engaged seems a reasonable condition to
    attach to probation. Granted, it would be in tension with
    language in Minnesota v. Murphy, 
    supra,
     
    465 U.S. at 435-37
    ,
    6                                                  No. 03-1908
    as interpreted in such cases as Mangarella v. State, 
    17 P.3d 989
    , 992-93 (Nev. 2001); State v. Eccles, 
    877 P.2d 799
    , 800-01
    (Ariz. 1994), and Gyles v. State, 
    901 P.2d 1143
    , 1148 (Alaska
    App. 1995). But American law doesn’t stand still. Decisions
    subsequent to Murphy, such as Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
    483 U.S. 868
    , 874-75 (1987), and United States v. Knights, 
    534 U.S. 112
    ,
    119-20 (2001), evince a greater willingness to enforce terms
    attached to conditional release, though neither involved the
    right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself.
    In Griffin, the Supreme Court permitted dilution of the
    Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause” requirement be-
    cause “a State’s operation of a probation system, like its
    operation of a school, government office or prison, or its
    supervision of a regulated industry, . . . presents ‘special
    needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify
    departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
    requirements.” 
    483 U.S. at 873-74
    . The Court added that
    probationers “do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which
    every citizen is entitled, but only. . . conditional liberty
    properly dependent on observance of special [probation]
    restrictions,’ ” 
    Id. at 874
    , quoting Morissey v. Brewer, 
    408 U.S. 471
    , 480 (1972). California has gone further: “When involun-
    tary search conditions are properly imposed, reasonable
    suspicion is no longer a prerequisite to conducting a search
    of the subject’s person or property. Such a search is reason-
    able within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long
    as it is not arbitrary, capricious or harassing. . . . [T]he
    government’s action is triggered by defendant’s own
    conduct. The existence of this triggering event—the crime
    which results in conviction or juvenile adjudication—creates
    the compelling need for government intervention and
    diminishes any reasonable expectation of privacy.” People v.
    Reyes, 
    968 P.2d 445
    , 450 (Cal. 1998). And it has long been
    understood that a fundamental and unchallenged condition
    of probation is that the probationer surrender his right to
    trial by jury should the government seek revocation, and
    No. 03-1908                                                   7
    thus imprisonment. Minnesota v. Murphy, 
    supra,
     
    465 U.S. at
    435 n. 7; United States v. Czajak, 
    909 F.2d 20
    , 23-24 (1st Cir.
    1990); Morgan v. Wainwright, 
    676 F.2d 476
    , 481 (11th Cir.
    1982); United States v. Nagelberg, 
    413 F.2d 708
    , 709-10 (2d Cir.
    1969).
    A person untutored in the baroque structure that is the
    modern U.S. system of criminal procedure might have
    supposed that when as a condition of probation Cranley
    agreed to “provide true and correct information verbally
    and in writing, in response to inquiries by the agent,” he
    surrendered his Fifth Amendment privilege and with it his
    right to Miranda warnings, since their purpose is to back up
    the privilege by making it less likely that it will be forfeited
    through ignorance. New York v. Quarles, 
    467 U.S. 649
    , 654
    (1984); United States v. Gupta, 
    183 F.3d 615
    , 617 (7th Cir.
    1999); Winsett v. Washington, 
    130 F.3d 269
    , 275 (7th Cir.
    1997); United States v. Bautista, 
    145 F.3d 1140
    , 1146 (10th Cir.
    1998); United States v. Sullivan, 
    138 F.3d 126
    , 130 (4th Cir.
    1998). It is such a natural condition that the district judge
    thought that Cranley must have believed that his probation
    would be revoked if he refused to answer the BATF agent’s
    questions—natural because Cranley would assume that
    failure to answer would indeed be grounds for revocation,
    though in fact it would be only if he had waived his Fifth
    Amendment right when he was admitted to probation. As
    a matter of fact, Wisconsin does require probationers to
    answer questions put to them by law enforcement authori-
    ties, but grants them immunity from use of the answers in
    evidence against them. State ex rel. Tate v. Schwarz, 
    654 N.W.2d 438
    , 443-44 (Wis. 2002); State v. Evans, 
    252 N.W.2d 664
    , 668-69 (Wis. 1977); State v. Carrizales, 
    528 N.W.2d 29
    ,
    32 (Wis. App. 1995).
    However these larger issues be resolved, we disagree with
    the district judge that Cranley talked to the agent only
    because he was afraid that if he didn’t do so his probation
    8                                                  No. 03-1908
    would be revoked. The suggestion is implausible, because
    if his probation were revoked he would face only 47 days in
    prison, while if he confessed to federal firearms violations
    he would face a much longer term. But what is more im-
    portant is that the Supreme Court held in Minnesota v.
    Murphy, 
    supra,
     a case nearly identical to this one, that fear of
    revocation is not a ground for ruling that a probationer’s
    confession deprived him of his Fifth Amendment privilege.
    It is one thing if the police tell the probationer that unless he
    talks his probation will be revoked; that places a price on his
    invoking the privilege that the Court thought excessive. 
    465 U.S. at 435
    ; United States v. Humphrey, 
    supra,
     
    34 F.3d at
    554-
    55; United States v. Frierson, 
    945 F.2d 650
    , 657-58 (3d Cir.
    1991). That did not happen here; and the Court in Murphy
    held that the lesser price that consists of a merely plausible
    fear that invoking one’s Fifth Amendment privilege will get
    one into trouble with the probation authorities is not a
    heavy enough penalty to excuse the failure to assert the
    privilege.
    The only difference between this case and Murphy is that
    here the questions that elicited the defendant’s confession
    were put by a police officer rather than, as in that case, by
    the probation officer. We cannot see what difference that
    makes, given the reasoning of Murphy, legalistic as it may
    seem. The Court thought there was no difference between
    being ordered to show up for questioning at the probation
    office and being summoned to testify before a grand jury. If
    the grand jury witness thinks his answers are going to in-
    criminate him and therefore he doesn’t want to be ques-
    tioned, he has to assert his Fifth Amendment right. He can’t
    not do so and then later seek to suppress his answers on the
    ground that he was afraid that if he “took the Fifth” it
    would get him into trouble with the prosecutor. Probably it
    would—though less trouble than if he confessed. It is the
    same here. Cranley had to show up for the interview, but he
    could decide whether it would be better for him to confess
    No. 03-1908                                                  9
    or to take the Fifth, and he did the former and will not now
    be heard to complain of the consequences. He knew what
    the interview would be about and who would be doing the
    interviewing. That gave him a better opportunity to plan an
    appropriate response than if, as the district court thought
    would have been less coercive, he had not been told and
    instead the probation officer had sprung the questions about
    guns on him when he arrived not knowing why he’d been
    summoned.
    Realistically, it is more likely that a grand jury witness
    will be aware of his right to claim the Fifth Amendment
    privilege and that he will forfeit the right if he fails to
    invoke it than that a probationer will know that he has a
    Fifth Amendment privilege, because the former is more
    likely than the latter to have consulted a lawyer in advance
    of his appearance. But that is a distinction the Supreme
    Court declined to draw in Murphy. 
    465 U.S. at 427, 431-32
    .
    It is always something of a puzzle why criminals confess.
    Probably Cranley realized that the BATF had the goods on
    him and so would nail him even if he clammed up, but that
    if he confessed he might get points for having cooperated.
    No matter. His failure to assert his Fifth Amendment priv-
    ilege forfeited it, and so the order of the district court sup-
    pressing his confession must be
    REVERSED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    _____________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—11-19-03