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Palay, Simeon v. United States ( 2003 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 01-1112
    SIMEON PALAY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES     OF   AMERICA,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 99 C 8169—James B. Moran, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2002—DECIDED NOVEMBER 12, 2003
    ____________
    Before POSNER, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Simeon Palay, a federal pris-
    oner, sustained injuries when a fight broke out among
    fellow inmates belonging to rival gangs at the Metropol-
    itan Community Correctional Center in Chicago (“MCC”),
    where he was detained pending trial on criminal charges.
    Palay filed suit against the United States pursuant to
    the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
     (“FTCA”),
    asserting that MCC officials had been negligent in the
    following respects: they improperly reassigned him from
    a unit for pretrial detainees like himself to a “holdover” unit
    housing convicted prisoners and members of known rival
    gangs; they failed to provide secure housing and protect
    him from violent attack; and they failed to provide him
    2                                               No. 01-1112
    with timely and effective medical care for the injuries he
    received as a result of the gang fight. The district court
    dismissed Palay’s complaint, concluding that Palay had
    failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with re-
    spect to the medical claim, that the reassignment and
    failure-to-protect claims were barred by the discretionary
    function exception to the FTCA, 
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (a), and
    that the latter claims failed alternatively for want of a
    causal link between the asserted negligence of prison
    officials and Palay’s injuries. We affirm in part and reverse
    in part.
    I.
    The following facts are alleged in Palay’s complaint.
    Given the procedural posture of the case, we accept them
    as true. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
    416 U.S. 232
    , 236, 
    94 S. Ct. 1683
    , 1686 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v.
    Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 
    102 S. Ct. 2727
     (1982).
    Palay is a federal prisoner currently housed at the
    Federal Correctional Institution in Oxford, Wisconsin. In
    June 1998, Palay was detained at the MCC in Chicago,
    where he was awaiting trial on federal charges. On June 19,
    the second shift lieutenant and unit counselor at the
    MCC transferred Palay from the pretrial unit to Unit 21, a
    holdover unit housing individuals who had already been
    convicted (hereinafter, the “holdover unit”). The complaint
    alleges that the transfer was “improper[ ].” Complaint at
    3 ¶ 11.
    At approximately 8:00 p.m. on the evening of June 19,
    a fight broke out in the holdover unit among inmates
    affiliated with two rival gangs. In the course of that alter-
    cation, one of the gang members threw a fire extinguisher,
    which struck the bunk where Palay lay sleeping and
    No. 01-1112                                                     3
    discharged into his face.1 The discharge caused Palay
    to suffer an acute asthma attack. As he awoke choking,
    Palay sat up suddenly and struck his head on the bunk
    above him forcefully enough to blur his vision.
    Another inmate helped Palay to a correctional officer’s
    station, where an officer directed Palay to an adjacent
    room. He remained there for nearly an hour before he was
    taken to the medical unit for treatment. There, a physi-
    cian’s assistant treated him for his injuries and then
    released him to a correctional officer for return to the
    holdover unit.
    Palay was returned to the holdover unit at approxi-
    mately 10:15 p.m., just over two hours after the fight
    had broken out and he had sustained his injuries. Carbon
    dioxide fumes from the discharged fire extinguisher still
    lingered in the air, and as a result Palay suffered a sec-
    ond asthma attack upon his return to the unit.
    Early the following day, a lieutenant questioned Palay
    about the incident, and he was placed in administrative
    detention pending further investigation. He was released
    several days later after officials determined that he was
    not a gang member and had not participated in the alter-
    cation. While he was placed in administrative detention, he
    1
    The complaint alleges only that the extinguisher was dis-
    charged into Palay’s face without specifying how. Complaint
    at 4 ¶ 12. The administrative claim that Palay filed with the
    Bureau of Prisons on the government’s Standard Form 95
    indicates that the extinguisher was triggered after it was
    thrown during the fight and struck the side of Palay’s bed. App.
    28. The district court took the contents of the Form 95 into
    consideration, reasoning that the form was a public record of
    which it was entitled to take judicial notice. Palay v. United
    States, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d 855
    , 858 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2000). For present
    purposes, the parties do not dispute the facts underlying the
    discharge of the fire extinguisher.
    4                                               No. 01-1112
    received no treatment or additional medication for the
    injuries he had sustained during the fight.
    Following his release from administrative detention
    and return to the holdover unit, Palay suffered a series of
    seizures. When the first occurred on June 23 (four days
    after he was injured), Palay was seen and treated by an
    MCC physician. Palay had experienced no seizures prior
    to this occasion. The second seizure occurred two weeks
    later while he was at the offices of the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation in Chicago. He was taken to a hospital, where
    a doctor diagnosed him with “New Onset Seizure Disorder.”
    Both before and after this second seizure, Palay was re-
    fused medication by MCC medical staff. On his return to
    the MCC from the hospital, an MCC physician told Palay
    that he did not need to keep asking for medication be-
    cause he was not having seizures. The physician advised
    him that he needed to “[e]at more and drink lots of water.”
    Complaint at 6 ¶ 23. Days later, Palay suffered a third
    seizure in the middle of the night and awoke to find his
    bed soaked with urine. A correctional officer summoned
    a physician’s assistant, who did not arrive for several hours
    and who failed to assess Palay’s vital signs or provide
    any treatment.
    On July 17, five days after his third seizure, Palay
    submitted an inmate request to an MCC counselor com-
    plaining about the refusal of MCC medical staff to pro-
    vide him with medication for his condition. According to
    Palay, his complaint was ignored. The medical staff’s
    alleged indifference, Palay contends, contributed to his
    pain and suffering. Complaint at 7 ¶ 27.
    On February 4, 1999, Palay completed a Standard Form
    95 “Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death” recounting the
    gang fight, the injuries he had sustained in that alterca-
    tion, and the seizures he had suffered in the aftermath. In
    this administrative claim for relief, Palay asserted that
    No. 01-1112                                                 5
    “[d]ue to the Bureau of Prisons[’] failure to protect me
    from the violence of fighting gang members and the fail-
    ure of keeping hostile gangs sep[a]rated from each other
    I have been subjected to an injury that has caused me
    severe pain and suffering and emotional and great mental
    anguish.” App. 29. He expressed concern that the seizures
    would continue and that, upon release from prison, he
    would be unable to return to his former occupation as a
    forklift operator. App. 29-30. Palay claimed total damages
    in the amount of $500,000. App. 28, 30. He attached to
    the Form 95 a July 8, 1998 letter to the MCC from his
    attorney, Andrea Taylor, requesting copies of all records
    relating to Palay’s medical treatment and/or examina-
    tions. In that letter, Taylor noted that Palay had been
    injured as a result of a gang fight among other inmates
    shortly after his transfer into the holdover unit of the
    MCC. She pointed out that Palay had suffered three
    seizures since his injury and expressed the “hope that
    Mr. Palay has been examined for these medical problems.”
    App. 31. Palay’s Form 95 was submitted to the Bureau of
    Prisons (the “BOP” or “Bureau”).
    In a memorandum dated June 18, 1999, the Bureau’s
    regional counsel informed Palay that his claim was de-
    nied. “Investigation of your claim did not reveal that
    you suffered any personal injury as a result of the negli-
    gent acts or omissions of Bureau of Prisons employees
    acting within the scope of their employment,” he wrote.
    App. 32. The memorandum advised Palay that he was
    free to file suit in federal court if he was dissatisfied with
    the agency’s decision.
    Within six months of the Bureau’s action, Palay did
    file suit, naming the warden, associate warden, and four
    other employees of the MCC as defendants. The court
    granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He subse-
    quently complied with the district court’s order to submit
    a copy of the final disposition of his administrative claim,
    6                                                    No. 01-1112
    and he served five of the six individual defendants named
    in his complaint. The United States filed a notice certify-
    ing that the named defendants were acting within the
    scope of their employment at the time of the events under-
    lying Palay’s complaint and substituting the government
    as the defendant. R. 9. The government then moved to
    dismiss Palay’s complaint, arguing in relevant part that
    the court lacked jurisdiction over the negligent reassign-
    ment and medical care claims because Palay had not
    exhausted his administrative remedies vis-à-vis those
    claims and that the claims should therefore be dismissed
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
    The district court ultimately dismissed Palay’s claims,
    although in part for reasons other than those asserted
    by the government. See Palay v. United States, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d 855
     (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Palay I”); Palay v. United States,
    
    2000 WL 1889668
     (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2000) (“Palay II”). The
    court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction over the medical
    claim because Palay had not asserted such a claim in his
    Form 95, and therefore had not exhausted his administra-
    tive remedies vis à vis that claim. Palay I, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d at 859-60
    .2 By contrast, the court was satisfied that
    Palay had asserted his negligent reassignment claim in the
    2
    Although the court dismissed the medical claim without
    prejudice, Palay I, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d at 860
    , the parties agree
    that at this juncture, there is nothing Palay could do that could
    resurrect the claim. The time for filing the claim at the ad-
    ministrative level has expired, so if, as the district court deter-
    mined, Palay did not properly exhaust his administrative
    remedies with respect to this claim the first time around, the
    claim is now time-barred. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2401
    (b) (claim barred
    unless presented to federal agency within two years after it
    accrues). The dismissal of the claim is therefore final for purposes
    of appellate jurisdiction. See Larkin v. Galloway, 
    266 F.3d 718
    ,
    721 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
    535 U.S. 992
    , 
    122 S. Ct. 1551
    (2002).
    No. 01-1112                                                    7
    Form 95; the court viewed this claim as encompassed
    within the broader failure-to-protect claim that Palay had
    articulated in the form. 
    Id. at 859
    . However, for either
    of two reasons that it raised sua sponte, the court concluded
    that the allegations concerning the BOP’s reassignment
    of and failure to protect Palay failed to state a claim on
    which relief could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).3
    First, in view of the broad discretion that prison officials
    possess with respect to the housing and protection of
    prisoners, the court believed that the negligent reassign-
    ment and failure-to-protect claims were foreclosed by the
    discretionary function exception to liability under the
    FTCA. Palay I, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d at 860-62
    ; Palay II, 
    2000 WL 1889668
    , at *1-*3. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (a); United
    States v. Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. 315
    , 
    111 S. Ct. 1267
     (1991);
    Calderon v. United States, 
    123 F.3d 947
     (7th Cir. 1997).
    Second, the court thought that the claims failed for
    want of proximate cause: Palay could not show that the
    pretrial unit at the MCC was substantially less dangerous
    than the holdover unit, such that his transfer from the
    former to the latter had anything to do with his injuries;
    and, for that matter, the chain of events that caused Palay’s
    injuries was so complicated and happenstance as to have
    been unforeseeable to prison officials who made the deci-
    3
    After raising these grounds in its first opinion on the gov-
    ernment’s motion to dismiss, the district court gave Palay thirty
    days to file a memorandum explaining why his remaining claims
    should not be dismissed on these grounds. Palay I, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d at 860, 864
    . When Palay failed to meet the deadline for his
    response, the court dismissed the case. R. 26. The court subse-
    quently learned that Palay had filed a response (albeit past
    the due date) several days before the court had issued the
    dismissal order. The court treated the late response as a motion
    to reconsider, which the court then denied in a written opinion.
    Palay II, 
    2000 WL 1889668
    .
    8                                                 No. 01-1112
    sion to transfer Palay. Palay I, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d at 862-63
    ;
    Palay II, 
    2000 WL 1889668
    , at *3-*4.
    II.
    Our review of the decision to dismiss Palay’s suit is, of
    course, plenary. E.g., Johnson v. Apna Ghar, Inc., 
    330 F.3d 999
    , 1001 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rule 12(b)(1)), cert. denied, 
    2003 WL 22081403
     (U.S. Nov. 3, 2003); American United Lo-
    gistics, Inc. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 
    319 F.3d 921
    , 926 (7th
    Cir. 2003) (Rule 12(b)(6)). There are cases from this cir-
    cuit (and others) describing two of the three grounds on
    which the district court disposed of Palay’s claims—namely,
    failing to exhaust administrative remedies before filing
    suit, and challenging a decision that fails within the
    discretionary function exception to the FTCA—as jurisdic-
    tional in nature, rendering them appropriate for disposi-
    tion to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See, e.g.,
    Sullivan v. United States, 
    21 F.3d 198
    , 206 (7th Cir.
    1994) (treating exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional);
    Calderon v. United States, supra, 
    123 F.3d at 950
     (noting
    that discretionary function exception raises jurisdictional
    issues).4 More recently, however, we have questioned
    whether the exhaustion requirement and the statutory
    exceptions to the FTCA truly are jurisdictional in nature.
    See, e.g., Frey v. EPA, 
    270 F.3d 1129
    , 1135-36 (7th Cir.
    2001) (exhaustion requirement); Clark v. United States, 
    326 F.3d 911
    , 913 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (section 2680(c)’s
    exception for tax-related claims). These cases suggest that
    the statutory prerequisites to suit and exceptions to
    4
    As we noted above, the district court construed the exhaus-
    tion requirement as jurisdictional but treated the discretionary
    function exception and the question of proximate cause as mat-
    ters going to the elements of Palay’s claims.
    No. 01-1112                                                    9
    governmental liability should instead be viewed as
    aspects of the plaintiff’s statutory right to relief and, at
    the pleading stage, dealt with pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
    We need not resolve the ongoing uncertainty as to
    whether these matters should or should not be labeled
    jurisdictional. What is at stake in this appeal is Palay’s
    right to proceed beyond the pleading stage on his claims.
    The only sense in which the appropriate characterization
    of the statutory exceptions and prerequisites to suit
    would matter is if the district court, believing these mat-
    ters to be jurisdictional, had exercised its authority under
    Rule 12(b)(1) to look behind the plaintiff’s allegations
    and make factual findings for purposes of assessing its
    subject matter jurisdiction. See LaSalle Nat. Trust, N.A. v.
    ECM Motor Co., 
    76 F.3d 140
    , 144 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
    United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 
    322 F.3d 942
    ,
    963 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (dissent), petition for cert.
    filed, 
    72 U.S.L.W. 3129
     (U.S. Aug. 7, 2003) (No. 03-203).
    If the court had done so, we of course would be obliged to
    defer to its findings of fact. See 
    id.
     But the district court
    here did not do that; it confined its examination to the
    face of Palay’s complaint5 and took its allegations at face
    value, just as a court does in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6)
    motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Likewise,
    we shall accept the allegations in Palay’s complaint as
    true and grant him the benefit of every reasonable infer-
    ence that may be drawn from those allegations. Johnson,
    
    330 F.3d at 1001
     (Rule 12(b)(1)); American United Logis-
    tics, 319 F.3d at 926 (Rule 12(b)(6)).
    5
    The court did look to Palay’s Form 95 for elucidation as to
    how the fire extinguisher was discharged. See supra n.1. However,
    in resolving a motion to dismiss, the district court is entitled
    to take judicial notice of matters in the public record. Anderson
    v. Simon, 
    217 F.3d 472
    , 474-75 (7th Cir. 2000); G.E. Capital
    Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 
    128 F.3d 1074
    , 1080-81 (7th Cir.
    1997) (collecting cases).
    10                                                No. 01-1112
    A. Exhaustion
    The FTCA permits an individual to bring suit in federal
    court against the United States
    for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
    caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
    any employee of the Government while acting within
    the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
    stances where the United States, if a private person,
    would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
    law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    (b)(1). Pursuant to this provision, federal
    inmates may bring suit for injuries they sustain while
    incarcerated as a consequence of the negligence of prison
    officials. United States v. Muniz, 
    374 U.S. 150
    , 
    83 S. Ct. 1850
     (1963). However, the plaintiff may not bring such
    a suit unless he has first presented his claim to the appro-
    priate federal agency and that agency has denied the claim.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2675
    (a).
    [A] claim shall be deemed to have been presented when
    a Federal agency receives from a claimant . . . an
    executed Standard Form 95 or other written notifica-
    tion of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money
    damages in a sum certain for . . . personal injury . . .
    alleged to have occurred by reason of the incident . . . .
    
    28 C.F.R. § 14.2
    (a). A plaintiff’s failure to exhaust adminis-
    trative remedies before he brings suit mandates dismissal
    of the claim. McNeil v. United States, 
    508 U.S. 106
    , 113,
    
    113 S. Ct. 1980
    , 1984 (1993).
    Palay, of course, completed a Standard Form 95 and
    submitted it to the appropriate agency—the Bureau of
    Prisons—for review. That form described the incident giv-
    ing rise to Palay’s injuries and requested a sum certain
    for those injuries. App. 28. The Bureau, in turn, denied
    his claim in writing.
    No. 01-1112                                                      11
    The issue, however, is whether Palay “presented” his
    negligent reassignment and medical claims in the sense
    that he set forth the relevant facts in enough detail to
    alert the Bureau of Prisons to the presence of those
    claims. Palay was not obliged to plead legal theories in the
    Form 95. Murrey v. United States, 
    73 F.3d 1448
    , 1452 (7th
    Cir. 1996). But he did bear the burden of pleading the
    pertinent facts. 
    Id.
     In that respect, his Form 95 is entitled
    to a generous construction. See 
    id. at 1451-52
    . As the
    district judge observed, “[a]ll that is required is ‘sufficient
    notice to enable the agency to investigate the claim.’ ” Palay
    I, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d at 859
    , quoting Charlton v. United
    States, 
    743 F.2d 557
    , 559 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
    “[A]ny cause of action fairly implicit in the facts” that Palay
    set forth in the Form 95 will be considered a claim that
    was “presented” to the Bureau of Prisons for purposes of
    the exhaustion requirement. Murrey, 
    73 F.3d at 1452
    . Put
    another way, if the claim would have been apparent to
    a “legally sophisticated reader” of the form, then we
    will charge the agency with notice of that claim and deem
    it to have been exhausted. 
    Id. at 1453
    .
    The district court found that Palay’s negligent reas-
    signment claim had been presented to the Bureau, and we
    agree. Palay’s Form 95 expressly charged the Bureau
    with having failed to protect him from violence at the
    hands of fellow inmates (App. 29), and Palay’s claim
    that the Bureau negligently reassigned him from the
    pretrial to the holdover unit is really just a more specific
    iteration of a failure-to-protect claim.6 Moreover, Palay
    6
    The district court treated the complaint as asserting a single
    claim for the failure to protect Palay. See Palay I, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d at 859
    . However, the parties agree that Palay is actually assert-
    ing two separate claims relating to his physical safety, one for
    the MCC’s negligent reassignment of him to the holdover unit
    (continued...)
    12                                              No. 01-1112
    attached to his Form 95 the letter from his attorney, and
    in so doing made that letter a part of his Form. See Murrey,
    
    73 F.3d at 1452-53
    . In recapping the circumstances
    that culminated in the attack on Palay, his counsel made
    note of the fact that Palay had been transferred to a new
    unit on June 19 and that he was injured “[s]hortly after his
    transfer.” App. 31. By noting both the transfer and its
    temporal nexus to the incident, the attorney’s letter gave
    the legally sophisticated reader of his Form 95 reason to
    discern that there was a potential connection between
    Palay’s reassignment and the harm that befell him. That
    Palay did not explicitly charge that the transfer was
    inappropriate is not dispositive; that claim was rea-
    sonably implicit in the facts that Palay had set forth in
    his papers. See Murrey, 
    73 F.3d at 1452-53
     (informed
    consent claim implicit in allegation that doctors had
    assured patient and his family that surgery was only
    available therapy and would extend his life).
    Whether Palay’s medical malpractice claim was implicit
    in the facts that Palay set forth in his Form 95 is a
    much closer question. Although Palay described the in-
    juries he sustained and the physical effects—including
    the recurrent seizures—that he suffered, he stated no
    facts suggesting that the prison medical staff had treated
    him inappropriately. Whereas, for example, Palay’s com-
    plaint notes that an MCC physician had dismissed his
    seizure disorder and that his requests for seizure med-
    ication were repeatedly denied, there is not a hint of this
    in his Form 95. On the other hand, the complaint charges
    the defendants with denying Palay timely as well as
    effective medical care, and one might find the timeliness
    6
    (...continued)
    and a second claim for the failure to protect him from inmate
    violence. See Palay Br. at 6, Government Br. at 10; see also
    Complaint at 7-8, ¶ 28(a) & (b).
    No. 01-1112                                                13
    aspect of Palay’s medical claim to be implicit in certain of
    the facts he alleged in the Form 95. For example, Palay
    noted that an hour passed after the attack before he
    was taken to the MCC medical unit for treatment; he
    also notes that at that time, his head was bleeding from
    the laceration he sustained when his head hit the bunk
    above him. App. 29. Palay also notes that his attorney’s
    letter to the MCC expressed a hope that he was receiv-
    ing adequate medical care and in addition requested
    access to his medical records. App. 31. But as the district
    court observed, although these statements might have
    signaled an intent to look into a possible medical claim,
    they did not suggest that Palay was presently asserting
    such a claim. Palay, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d at 859-60
    .
    The most that can be said, really, is that Palay’s claim put
    the Bureau on notice that he had been injured and that
    he had sought and received some medical treatment for
    his injuries. A complete investigation of Palay’s injuries
    and the treatment he had received might well have dis-
    closed the facts underlying his medical claim; and in the
    Fifth Circuit, that would be enough to put the govern-
    ment on notice of such a claim. See Frantz v. United
    States, 
    29 F.3d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1994). But we have
    expressly declined to go as far as the Fifth Circuit has
    in that regard. Murrey, 73 F.2d at 1453. Under the law
    of this circuit, because Palay did not include facts in his
    Form 95 from which a legally sophisticated reader might
    have discerned that he had received inadequate medical
    treatment, it would appear that Palay did not exhaust
    his administrative remedies with respect to his medical
    claim.
    But that does not preclude Palay from seeking relief
    for any harm he may have suffered as a result of the
    allegedly deficient medical care he received. It is a basic
    rule of tort law that the original tortfeasor is respon-
    sible not only for the injury directly resulting from the
    14                                               No. 01-1112
    tort but also for aggravation of that injury caused by
    negligence in the medical treatment occasioned by the
    injury. E.g., Selbe v. United States, 
    130 F.3d 1265
    , 1267 (7th
    Cir. 1997); Brownell v. Figel, 
    950 F.2d 1285
    , 1294 (7th Cir.
    1991); Gertz v. Campbell, 
    302 N.E.2d 40
    , 43 (Ill. 1973). So,
    in the event that Palay prevails on either of his other
    claims, he would be entitled to damages for both his
    original injuries and any aggravation of those injuries
    resulting from the manner in which the prison’s medical
    staff treated him.
    B. Discretionary Function Exception
    Although the FTCA broadly entitles individuals to sue
    for injuries they suffer at the hands of negligent federal
    officials, Congress has exempted a variety of claims
    from the coverage of the statute, including “[a]ny claim . . .
    based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
    to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
    the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Gov-
    ernment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (a). This exception operates to “prevent
    judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administra-
    tive decisions grounded in social, economic, and political
    policy through the medium of an action in tort.” United
    States v. Gaubert, 
    supra,
     
    499 U.S. at 323
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1273
    , quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 
    467 U.S. 797
    ,
    814, 
    104 S. Ct. 2755
    , 2765 (1984).
    In order for the exception to apply, two requirements
    must be met. First, as its label suggests, this exception
    shields the government from suit only when the
    complained-of act is discretionary in the sense that it
    “involv[es] an element of judgment or choice.” Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. at 322
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1273
    , quoting Berkovitz v.
    United States, 
    486 U.S. 531
    , 536, 
    108 S. Ct. 1954
    , 1958
    (1988). Thus, where a “federal statute, regulation, or policy
    No. 01-1112                                               15
    prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow” and
    the employee deviates from that course, his/her acts are
    not immune from suit. Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. at 322
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1273
    , quoting Berkovitz, 
    486 U.S. at 536
    , 
    108 S. Ct. at 1958
    . Second, the exception “protects only governmental
    actions and decisions based on considerations of public
    policy.” Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. at 323
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1274
    ,
    quoting Berkovitz, 
    486 U.S. at 537
    , 
    108 S. Ct. at 1959
    . See
    also Calderon, 
    123 F.3d at 949
    ; Grammatico v. United
    States, 
    109 F.3d 1198
    , 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1997); Maas v.
    United States, 
    94 F.3d 291
    , 297 (7th Cir. 1996).
    With respect to the policy requirement, applicability of
    the exception depends not on the intent of the government
    actor “but on the nature of the actions taken and on
    whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.” Gaubert,
    
    499 U.S. at 325
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1275
    . Nor must the actor
    belong to the policymaking or planning ranks of govern-
    ment in order for the exception to apply; “[i]t is the nature
    of the conduct, rather than status of the actor, that gov-
    erns whether the discretionary function applies in a
    given case.” 
    Id. at 325
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1275
    , quoting Varig
    Airlines, 
    467 U.S. at 813
    , 
    104 S. Ct. at 2764
    ; see also
    Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. at 334
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1279
    . In short,
    “[w]hen established government policy, as expressed or
    implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows
    a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be
    presumed that the agent’s acts are grounded in policy when
    exercising that discretion.” 
    Id. at 324
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1274
    .
    The government contends that the decision to transfer
    Palay from a pretrial unit to a holdover unit housing
    convicted inmates reflects an exercise of discretion
    grounded in policy considerations. In support of that
    assertion, it points to the statute committing to the discre-
    tion of the Bureau of Prisons the safekeeping and care
    of federal inmates, 
    18 U.S.C. § 4042
    (a)(2) & (3), and to
    16                                             No. 01-1112
    our decision in Calderon invoking the discretionary func-
    tion exception based in part on that statute.
    In Calderon, we relied on section 4042 to conclude that
    the decisions of prison officials as to how to respond to
    threats against an inmate fell within the protection of the
    discretionary function exception. 
    123 F.3d at 950
    . The
    plaintiff in Calderon had been injured in an attack by
    a fellow inmate. The attack was preceded by a series of
    threats, which the plaintiff had reported to at least four
    prison officials. Nonetheless, officials had not endeavored
    to prevent the attack by disciplining the inmate who
    had threatened the plaintiff and who ultimately made
    good on the threats by assaulting him. We acknowledged
    that section 4042 on its face requires the BOP to “provide
    for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons
    charged with or convicted of offenses against the United
    States.” See 
    id. at 950
    , quoting § 4042(a)(2). However,
    “[t]he statute sets forth no particular conduct the BOP
    personnel should engage in or avoid while attempting to
    fulfill their duty to protect inmates.” Id. We thus thought
    it clear from the terms of section 4042 that the prison’s
    decision not to discipline the source of the threats
    against Calderon was a discretionary act and that the
    pertinent question was whether that decision was
    grounded in policy. Id. We rejected the plaintiff’s conten-
    tion that the day-to-day actions of correctional officers
    are not policy-based and so are outside the ambit of
    the discretionary function exception. “It is clear that
    balancing the need to provide security with the rights of
    the inmates to circulate and socialize within the prison
    involves considerations based on public policy.” Id. at 951.
    The record before the court left no doubt on that score: the
    evidence revealed that BOP personnel in evaluating
    potential safety/disciplinary measures were required to
    consider such factors as economic feasibility, staff alloca-
    tion, security concerns, and disruption of an inmate’s
    No. 01-1112                                                17
    participation in rehabilitation programs. Id.; see also
    Santana-Rosa v. United States, 
    335 F.3d 39
    , 44-45 (1st
    Cir. 2003); Alfrey v. United States, 
    276 F.3d 557
    , 564-67
    (9th Cir. 2002); Cohen v. United States, 
    151 F.3d 1338
    ,
    1342-43 (11th Cir. 1998); Dykstra v. U.S.B.O.P., 
    140 F.3d 791
    , 796 (8th Cir. 1998).
    Because prison officials also have discretion with re-
    spect to housing assignments, the government contends
    that its decision to place a prisoner in one unit as
    opposed to another falls within the discretionary func-
    tion exception just as we concluded in Calderon that the
    decision whether and how to discipline one inmate for
    threatening another does. The government notes that it
    has no obligation to segregate pretrial inmates from
    convicted inmates. The statute governing the terms of
    pretrial detention states only that an order of pretrial
    confinement shall “direct that the person be committed to
    the custody of the Attorney General for confinement in a
    corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from
    persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in
    custody pending appeal.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3142
    (i)(2) (emphasis
    added). The statute thus reflects a preference for segrega-
    tion but does not demand it where impractical. The perti-
    nent regulations employ similar language. 
    28 C.F.R. §§ 551.100
     (“Pretrial inmates will be separated, to the
    extent practicable, from convicted inmates.”), 551.104 (“To
    the extent practicable, pretrial inmates will be housed
    separately from convicted inmates.”). Thus, the BOP is left
    with discretion to assess the practicability of separating
    pretrial detainees from those who have already been
    convicted. Such assessments presumably would reflect
    the same balancing of policy-related considerations that
    led us to invoke the discretionary function exception in
    Calderon.
    The government certainly is correct that both the stat-
    ute and the implementing regulations, although reflect-
    18                                             No. 01-1112
    ing a preference for segregation, leave room for prison
    officials to decide that separating pretrial detainees from
    other inmates is not practicable. Given the burdens that
    the growth in the prison population in recent decades
    has imposed on the nation’s correctional centers, it would
    not be surprising to learn that officials at the MCC and
    other facilities like it have concluded that segregation is
    not always feasible and that pretrial detainees may be
    housed with other prisoners as the need arises. But with
    nothing more than Palay’s complaint to go on, we have
    no idea what the BOP’s or MCC’s policy in fact was, or
    whether the official(s) who moved Palay acted in accord
    with that policy. For all we know, BOP/MCC policy may
    have prohibited such transfers or confined them to circum-
    stances that were not present in Palay’s case. Indeed,
    consistent with that theory, Palay predicts that the evi-
    dence will show that he had previously been transferred
    into the holdover unit and then returned to the pretrial
    unit in short order after prison officials realized that
    placing him in the holdover unit was a mistake (Palay Br.
    at 25); his complaint also characterizes his subsequent
    return to the holdover unit as “improper[ ],” suggesting
    that it was unauthorized (Complaint at 3 ¶ 11).
    We also do not know whether the relevant actors were
    authorized to move Palay into the holdover unit. We know
    from Gaubert that the discretionary function exception
    is not limited to decisions made at the policy or planning
    level, but rather extends to decisions at the operational
    level that are in furtherance of governmental policy. 
    499 U.S. at 325
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1275
    ; see also Calderon, 
    123 F.3d at 950-51
    . However, the decision at issue still must fall
    within the actor’s realm of responsibility in order to qual-
    ify for the exception. As Justice Scalia pointed out in
    his Gaubert concurrence, the status of the actor matters
    in the sense that a decisionmaker must be charged with
    making policy-related judgments in order for his choices
    No. 01-1112                                                 19
    to qualify for the discretionary function exception. 
    499 U.S. at 335-37
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1280-81
     (concurrence); see also
    Berkowitz, 
    486 U.S. at 536
    , 
    108 S. Ct. at 1958
     (“[i]n examin-
    ing the nature of the challenged conduct, a court must
    first consider whether the action is a matter of choice for
    the acting employee”).
    Thus, for example, in Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
    
    350 U.S. 61
    , 
    76 S. Ct. 122
     (1955), the failure of Coast Guard
    maintenance personnel to ensure that a lighthouse re-
    mained illuminated, which resulted in a tug and barge
    running aground, could not be described as an exercise in
    judgment entitled to protection under the discretionary
    function exception, because such workers were not charged
    with deciding what level of maintenance inspections were
    necessary. See 
    id. at 64, 69
    , 
    76 S. Ct. at 124, 127
    ; see also
    Berkovitz, 
    486 U.S. at
    538 n.3, 
    108 S. Ct. at
    1959 n.3
    (distinguishing Indian Towing on ground that failure to
    keep lighthouse in working order “did not involve any
    permissible exercise of policy judgment); Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. at 336
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 1280
     (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing
    Indian Towing: “though there could conceivably be policy
    reasons for conducting only superficial inspections [of
    the lighthouse], the decisions had been made by mainte-
    nance personnel, and it was assuredly not their respon-
    sibility to ponder such things”).
    Here, Palay points out that several provisions in the
    Bureau’s Program Statement on the care and custody
    of pretrial detainees suggest that these individuals were
    evaluated and housed pursuant to guidelines unique to
    pretrial detainees, that pretrial detainees were to be
    housed separately from convicted inmates whenever
    feasible, that transfers of pretrial detainees from one
    housing unit to another were not to be made casually, and
    that the approval of upper-level managers may have
    been required before such a transfer occurred. See BOP
    Program Statement 7331.03 (“Pretrial Inmates”) (Nov. 22,
    20                                                    No. 01-1112
    1994) (available at  (last checked Nov. 7,
    2003).7 Thus, Palay may be able to show that the particular
    7
    See Program Statement 7331.03 §§ 2(a) (“Each pretrial inmate
    will be separated to the extent practicable from convicted inmates,
    and where it is not practicable staff will screen and assess
    each pretrial inmate permitting those who do not present a risk
    to the orderly running of the institution to have regular contact
    with convicted inmates.”); 2(e) (“The status of each pretrial inmate
    will be reviewed regularly and upon each return from court.”); 8(b)
    (Upon intake screening of a pretrial detainee, “[u]nit staff should
    document an initial impression and make a recommendation for
    housing to the unit manager. The decision of a housing assign-
    ment for a pretrial inmate is normally not designated below the
    level of a unit manager. Alternate procedures may be imple-
    mented based on institution needs, only with specific written
    guidelines approved by the Warden.”); 9(a) (“A pretrial inmate
    who presents a risk to the security and orderly running of the
    institution shall be housed where appropriate security is provided.
    Where practicable, separation from convicted inmates must
    still be maintained. At each subsequent pretrial inmate review,
    staff shall consider whether that inmate is appropriate for
    placement in less secure housing.”); 9(c) (“Prior to any housing
    change, staff shall review SENTRY information for possible
    separatees or other management concerns and shall document
    in the inmate’s file that the review was done.”); 9(d) (“Because
    pretrial inmates are to be separated to the extent practicable
    from persons who are awaiting sentence, staff should verify
    as quickly as possible the status of a pretrial inmate who is
    returning from a court appearance and who had been separated
    from convicted inmates. . . . When staff receive official notifica-
    tion that a pretrial inmate has pleaded or been found guilty,
    the inmate is no longer regarded as ‘pretrial,’ and staff shall
    place the inmate in ‘holdover’ status, pending sentencing and
    initial designation.”); 9(e) (“The Warden shall delegate responsi-
    bility for supervision of the housing area for pretrial inmates to
    a full-time manager or supervisor . . . .”); 12(a) (“Each pretrial
    inmate shall be scheduled for an initial review by the unit team
    (continued...)
    No. 01-1112                                                 21
    prison officials who transferred him into the holdover unit
    either lacked the authority to make the transfer and in
    that sense did not exercise protected discretionary judg-
    ment, or that they acted in direct contravention of BOP
    regulations in transferring Palay. Either way, their con-
    duct would not be protected by the exception.
    As for the broader alleged failure to protect Palay
    from inmate violence, we likewise cannot say that this
    failure necessarily arose from discretionary judgments
    rendered in furtherance of prison policy. Although Calderon
    makes clear that prison officials enjoy discretion in matters
    of inmate safety, we do not know at this juncture wheth-
    er the actions (or inactions) leading up to the altercation
    in which Palay was injured involved judgment. Again, the
    government presumes that the circumstances that made
    the fight (and Palay’s injury) possible were the result
    of discretionary decisions by prison officials charged with
    making such choices—for example, judgments about
    housing inmates affiliated with rival gangs in the same
    housing unit. Certainly that is possible. But one can also
    imagine that negligence having nothing whatever to
    do with discretionary judgments enabled the fight to
    break out.
    The Second Circuit’s decision in Coulthurst v. United
    States, 
    214 F.3d 106
    , 109-11 (2d Cir. 2000), illustrates
    this point. There a prisoner was injured when a cable on
    the weightlifting machine he was using in the prison
    7
    (...continued)
    within 21 calendar days of the inmates’s first arrival at the
    institution, and subsequent reviews shall be conducted at least
    every 90 days. The initial and subsequent reviews are to assess
    all factors relating to the inmate’s detention including the
    practicability of separation from convicted prisoners.”); 12(d)
    (“Inmate reviews are to be documented on the Pretrial Inmate
    Review Report.”).
    22                                              No. 01-1112
    gymnasium snapped. He filed suit contending that prison
    officials had been negligent in inspecting and maintain-
    ing the equipment. The district court dismissed the pris-
    oner’s complaint, relying on the discretionary function
    exception; but the appellate court reversed, concluding
    that the prison’s failure to properly inspect its weightlift-
    ing equipment was not necessarily covered by the excep-
    tion. The court recognized that there were potentially
    two types of negligence that had contributed to the failure
    of the equipment: negligence in the design of an inspec-
    tion program for the equipment, and negligence in the
    actual inspection of the equipment. See 
    id. at 109
    . The
    court assumed that the first type of negligence would
    be covered by the discretionary function exception, as it
    likely involved elements of judgment and choice (balanc-
    ing economic, safety, and other considerations). 
    Id.
     By
    contrast, one could readily imagine that an inspector’s
    failure to carry out the inspection program with appro-
    priate care was of a different character altogether:
    For example, the official assigned to inspect the ma-
    chine may in laziness or haste have failed to do the
    inspection he claimed (by his initials in the log) to
    have performed, the official may have been distracted
    or inattentive, and thus failed to notice the frayed
    cable; or he may have seen the frayed cable but been
    too lazy to make the repairs or deal with the paper-
    work involved in reporting the damage. Such negligent
    acts neither involve an element of judgment or choice
    within the meaning of Gaubert nor are grounded in
    considerations of governmental policy.
    
    Id.
    As in Coulthurst, it is easy to imagine a scenario in
    which MCC officials behaved in a negligent fashion, but
    without making the types of discretionary judgments that
    the statutory exception was intended to exempt from
    No. 01-1112                                               23
    liability. Perhaps the corrections officer monitoring the
    holdover unit at the time that the gang altercation broke
    out was simply asleep, for example. Or perhaps he left
    the unit unattended in order to enjoy a cigarette or a
    snack. That type of carelessness would not be covered by
    the discretionary function exception, as it involves no
    element of choice or judgment grounded in public policy
    considerations. Coulthurst, 
    214 F.3d at 109-10
    ; Santana-
    Rosa, 
    supra,
     
    335 F.3d at 45
     (discussing United States v.
    Muniz, 
    supra,
     
    374 U.S. at 152
    , 
    83 S. Ct. at 1852
    ); see also
    Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. at
    325 n.7, 
    111 S. Ct. at
    1275 n.7. Again,
    being at the pleading stage of the case, there is much we
    do not know about the circumstances that led to Palay’s
    injury. But we cannot say that no set of facts consistent
    with Palay’s complaint would entitle him to relief, and we
    must be able to say that before dismissing Palay’s claims.
    See generally, e.g., Case v. Milewski, 
    327 F.3d 564
    , 567 (7th
    Cir. 2003), citing Hishon v. King & Spauling, 
    467 U.S. 69
    ,
    73, 
    104 S. Ct. 2229
    , 2232 (1984).
    Unstated but implicit in Calderon is the assumption that
    prison officials in that case had taken note of the threats
    against the plaintiff in that case and weighed the rele-
    vant considerations in deciding how best to act (or not)
    in response to those threats. There is no hint, for ex-
    ample, that prison officials simply ignored the reported
    threats or forgot about them. Here, we lack a developed
    record that would permit us to decide as a matter of law
    whether the actions that allegedly resulted in Palay’s
    injuries reflected the exercise of discretionary policy
    judgments. We have only Palay’s complaint before us, and
    we can sustain the dismissal of that complaint only if
    under no set of facts consistent with that complaint could
    he circumvent the discretionary function exemption.
    Conley v. Gibson, 
    355 U.S. 41
    , 45-46, 
    78 S. Ct. 99
    , 102
    (1957). Because it is possible to imagine facts showing that
    Palay’s injuries were not the result of permissible discre-
    24                                              No. 01-1112
    tionary judgments, he is entitled to proceed on his com-
    plaint. It remains for his claims to be fleshed out with
    evidence before the court can say whether the discre-
    tionary function exception applies.
    C. Proximate Cause
    Under Illinois law, proximate cause consists of two
    elements: cause in fact and legal cause. Evans v. Shannon,
    
    776 N.E.2d 1184
    , 1190 (Ill. 2002). Cause in fact exists
    when the defendant’s conduct “is a material element and
    a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” 
    Id.,
    quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 
    720 N.E.2d 1068
    , 1072 (Ill. 1999). The defendant’s conduct
    meets this criterion “if, absent that conduct, the injury
    would not have occurred.” 
    Id.,
     quoting First Springfield.
    “Legal cause,” by contrast, is essentially a question of
    foreseeability. The relevant question here is whether the
    injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see
    as a likely result of his or her conduct.
    
    Id.,
     quoting First Springfield. Whether or not the defen-
    dant’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s in-
    jury ordinarily is a question for the finder of fact to de-
    cide; only rarely are the facts so clear that the court can
    resolve the issue as a matter of law. See Shick v. Ill. Dep’t
    of Human Servs., 
    307 F.3d 605
    , 615 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
    First Springfield, 
    720 N.E.2d at 1071
    ; Felty v. New Berlin
    Transit, Inc., 
    374 N.E.2d 203
    , 205 (Ill. 1978).
    Focusing first on Palay’s transfer into the holdover
    unit, the district court questioned whether there was a
    causal link between that transfer and Palay’s injury. The
    court found no reason to suppose that the gang alterca-
    tion in which Palay was injured would not have broken
    out in the pretrial unit or that the pretrial unit was sub-
    stantially less dangerous than the holdover unit. This
    No. 01-1112                                               25
    suggested to the court that Palay’s transfer from one
    unit to the other was not a cause in fact of his injuries.
    Palay II, 
    2000 WL 1889668
    , at *4.
    But granting Palay the inferences to which he is en-
    titled at the pleading stage, we think it was improper to
    dismiss the negligent transfer claim on this basis. We
    do not know, in fact, whether an inmate at the MCC
    would have been as susceptible to injury as a result of
    inmate violence in the pretrial unit as he would have
    been in the holdover unit. Palay represents that the
    evidence would show that the pretrial unit at the MCC
    has individual cells, which have an isolating effect,
    while inmates in the holdover unit are housed in dormi-
    tory fashion, which logically would make the possibility
    of altercations greater. Palay Br. at 42. Moreover, as
    Palay suggests, the two populations may indeed behave
    differently: inmates who have not yet been convicted
    may strive harder to be on their best behavior. 
    Id. at 43
    .
    So it is possible to imagine a set of facts which might lead
    a finder of fact to conclude that Palay’s transfer was a
    material and substantial factor in the injuries that Palay
    received as a result of the gang fight.
    Certainly there were independent acts by third parties
    following the transfer—including in particular the gang
    members engaging in the altercation and throwing the
    fire extinguisher—that were necessary links in the chain
    of causation culminating in Palay’s injuries. But in Illi-
    nois the rule is that such intervening causes do not re-
    lieve a defendant of liability for its own negligence if
    the intervening cause itself was foreseeable. See Felty, 
    374 N.E.2d at 205
    , quoting Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 
    356 N.E.2d 93
    , 100 (Ill. 1976); Neering v. Ill. Central R.R. Co.,
    
    50 N.E.2d 497
    , 504 (Ill. 1943); see also First Springfield
    Bank & Trust, 
    720 N.E.2d at 1072
    . We need not be con-
    vinced that the gang fight was foreseeable in order to let
    Palay proceed on his claims. For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6),
    26                                               No. 01-1112
    we need only be able to envision a set of facts in which
    such an incident would have been foreseeable to prison
    officials, and that we can do. E.g., Case, 
    327 F.3d at 567
    .
    The district court thought that Palay’s injuries were
    unforeseeable in another respect. Recall that the fighting
    gang members did not strike Palay directly. Instead, one
    of them threw a fire extinguisher, the extinguisher
    struck Palay’s bed and discharged into his face, and the
    discharge caused Palay to awake in a start, sit up sud-
    denly, and strike his head on the bunk above him. In
    the district court’s view, the peculiar path to Palay’s injury
    was not reasonably foreseeable, so that even if the MCC
    caused Palay’s injury in fact by transferring him into the
    holdover unit or by otherwise failing to protect him from
    violence, the MCC’s alleged negligence was not the legal
    cause of his injuries. Palay I, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d at 863
    ; Palay
    II, 
    2000 WL 1889668
    , at *4.
    But under Illinois law, so long as the defendant could
    have foreseen that his negligence would result in some
    type of injury, the precise nature or method of injury
    need not have been foreseeable. Enis v. Ba-Call Bldg.
    Corp., 
    639 F.2d 359
    , 362 (7th Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois
    law); Neering, 50 N.E.2d at 503; Colonial Inn Motor Lodge,
    Inc. v. Gay, 
    680 N.E.2d 407
    , 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). So
    all we need ask at this stage of the litigation is whether
    it is conceivable that Palay could establish that it was
    foreseeable to the BOP that, as a result of transferring him
    into the holdover unit or more generally by failing to
    prevent an outbreak of violence, he would suffer an in-
    jury. The answer to that question is plainly yes.
    Whatever obstacles Palay may encounter in attempting
    to establish that MCC’s allegedly negligent acts or omis-
    sions proximately caused his injuries, we cannot deter-
    mine from the face of his complaint that under no set of
    facts could he surmount them. He is entitled to proceed
    No. 01-1112                                             27
    with discovery and marshal evidence in support of his
    claims.
    III.
    The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED IN PART and
    REVERSED IN PART. For the reasons we have discussed,
    we conclude that the district court properly dismissed
    Palay’s claim for inadequate medical care. The court erred,
    however, in dismissing his negligent-reassignment and
    failure-to-protect claims. We thank Palay’s appointed
    attorneys for their service on his behalf.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—11-12-03
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-1112

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 11/12/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

Authorities (37)

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Sarah E. Frey, Kevin Enright, and Protect Our Woods, Inc. v.... , 270 F.3d 1129 ( 2001 )

Felty v. New Berlin Transit, Inc. , 71 Ill. 2d 126 ( 1978 )

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman , 188 Ill. 2d 252 ( 1999 )

United States v. Muniz , 83 S. Ct. 1850 ( 1963 )

Berkovitz v. United States , 108 S. Ct. 1954 ( 1988 )

Davis v. Marathon Oil Co. , 64 Ill. 2d 380 ( 1976 )

Robert Johnson v. Apna Ghar, Inc. , 330 F.3d 999 ( 2003 )

Derek Case v. Michael Milewski, Michael Hoyle, and John ... , 327 F.3d 564 ( 2003 )

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Scheuer v. Rhodes , 94 S. Ct. 1683 ( 1974 )

United States v. Gaubert , 111 S. Ct. 1267 ( 1991 )

United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense , 104 S. Ct. 2755 ( 1984 )

Dorrell R. Coulthurst v. United States , 214 F.3d 106 ( 2000 )

Faustino Calderon v. United States , 123 F.3d 947 ( 1997 )

Santana-Rosa v. United States , 335 F.3d 39 ( 2003 )

Sharocco Clark v. United States , 326 F.3d 911 ( 2003 )

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