Scheck, Kenneth v. Barnhart, Jo Anne B. ( 2004 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-2107
    KENNETH SCHECK,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER
    OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 00 C 4902—Charles R. Norgle, Sr., Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED OCTOBER 21, 2003—DECIDED FEBRUARY 5, 2004
    ____________
    Before BAUER, and DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit
    Judges.
    BAUER, Circuit Judge.       Plaintiff-Appellant Kenneth
    Scheck brings this appeal to challenge an administrative
    law judge’s (ALJ) finding that he was not entitled to
    disability insurance benefits. The Appeals Council of the
    Social Security Administration denied Scheck’s appeal. Up-
    on review, we find that substantial evidence supports the
    decision of the ALJ and we therefore affirm.
    2                                               No. 03-2107
    BACKGROUND
    In December of 1983 Scheck began experiencing back
    problems. That same month, he underwent anterior cervical
    fusion surgery to correct a herniated cervical disc. More
    than four years later, Scheck visited the Mayo Clinic for
    problems with shortness of breath, rising blood pressure,
    and difficulty walking, and bending. The results from the
    tests conducted at the Mayo Clinic were within normal
    limits. In April of 1993, Scheck was again admitted to the
    hospital with severe back pain and right leg pain. MRIs and
    CT scans were performed and ultimately, Scheck underwent
    a decompressive laminectomy. Scheck’s date of last insured
    fell on December 31, 1994. There exists no other objective
    medical evidence until 1997. However, as this evidence
    deals with Scheck’s condition after his date last insured, it
    will not be reiterated here.
    Scheck filed for disability insurance benefits on November
    13, 1997. His claim was heard by ALJ Jan E. Dutton who
    found him to be capable of performing his former job as a
    distribution warehouse manager. The Social Security
    Administration’s Appeals Council denied Scheck’s appeal.
    Therefore, the ALJ’s decision was the final decision of the
    Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. Scheck
    filed suit in the district court, naming the Commissioner of
    the Social Security Administration, Jo Anne Barnhart, as
    defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The lower court disposed
    of the case by denying Scheck’s motion for summary
    judgment and granting the Commissioner’s cross-motion.
    Scheck appeals this decision.
    DISCUSSION
    Standard of Review
    “The standard of review in disability cases limits this court
    as well as the district court to determining whether the
    No. 03-2107                                                 3
    final decision of the Secretary is both supported by substan-
    tial evidence and based on the proper legal criteria.”
    Ehrhart v. Secretary of HHS, 
    969 F.2d 534
    , 538 (7th Cir.
    1992) “[T]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
    as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
    conclusive.” Butera v. Apfel, 
    173 F.3d 1049
    , 1055 (7th Cir.
    1999) (quoting Diaz v. Chater, 
    55 F.3d 300
    , 305 (7th. Cir.
    1995)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as
    a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.” Kepple v. Massanari, 
    268 F.3d 513
    , 516 (7th
    Cir. 2001) (quoting 
    Diaz, 55 F.3d at 305
    ). Substantial
    evidence may be less than the weight of the evidence,
    Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 
    383 U.S. 607
    , 620 (1966), and
    more than a scintilla, Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938). Under this standard, the ALJ’s
    decision, if supported by substantial evidence, will be
    upheld even if an alternative position is also supported by
    substantial evidence. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 
    503 U.S. 91
    ,
    113 (1992).
    Statutory Fr
    amework
    In order to determine whether an individual is entitled to
    disability insurance benefits, the ALJ must engage in a
    sequential five-step process which establishes whether or
    not the claimant is disabled. The claimant must show that:
    (1) he is not presently employed; (2) his impairment is
    severe; (3) his impairment is listed or equal to a listing in
    20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) he is not able to
    perform his past relevant work; and (5) he is unable to per-
    form any other work within the national and local economy.
    Stevenson v. Chater, 
    105 F.3d 1151
    , 1154 (7th Cir. 1997); 20
    C.F.R. § 416.920. It is undisputed that Scheck satisfies the
    first two requirements—he is not employed and his back
    impairments are severe within the meaning of the Social
    4                                                No. 03-2107
    Security Administration’s regulations. This, however, is not
    enough to show that he is disabled. He must now show that
    his impairment is equal to a listing or that he retains
    insufficient residual functioning capacity to hold a job.
    Impairment Meets or Equals a “Listing”—Step 3
    Scheck argues that the ALJ erred in not finding him dis-
    abled under section three of the five-step test. He claims
    that his back condition equals a listing entitled “other
    vertebrogenic disorders.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P,
    App. 1, Listings 1.05(c). This argument is contradicted by
    the reports of two state agency physicians. Those physicians
    filled out Disability Determination and Transmittal forms
    and stated that Scheck was not disabled through
    December 31, 1994. (R. at 90.) These forms conclusively
    establish that “consideration by a physician . . . designated
    by the Commissioner has been given to the question of
    medical equivalence at the initial and reconsideration levels
    of administrative review.” Farrell v. Sullivan, 
    878 F.2d 985
    ,
    990 (7th Cir. 1989); 61 Fed. Reg. 34466. The ALJ may
    properly rely upon the opinion of these medical experts.
    Scott v. Sullivan, 
    898 F.2d 519
    , 524 (7th Cir. 1990). So,
    substantial evidence supports a finding that Scheck did not
    meet or equal a listing. 
    Farrell, 878 F.2d at 990
    .
    ALJ’s Duty to Minimally Articulate
    Scheck next argues that the ALJ failed in her duty to
    “minimally articulate his or her justification for rejecting or
    accepting specific evidence of disability.” Steward v. Bowen,
    
    858 F.2d 1295
    , 1299 (7th Cir. 1988) (internal citations
    removed). However, “he or she need not provide a written
    evaluation of every piece of evidence that is presented.” 
    Id. We find
    that the ALJ satisfied this duty to articulate.
    No. 03-2107                                               5
    In finding that Scheck did not meet or equal a listing, the
    ALJ stated,
    At step three of the sequential evaluation process,
    the undersigned [ALJ] must consider whether the
    Claimant’s impairments, either singly or in combina-
    tion, revealed the same or equivalent attendant medical
    findings as are recited in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of
    the Social Security Administration’s Regulations No. 3,
    otherwise known as the “listings.” In the instant case,
    the Claimant has not contended that his medically
    determinable impairments met or equaled the “list-
    ings,” and the record contains no evidence which would
    support such a finding.
    (Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at A-7.)
    Scheck claims that “[t]he ALJ’s terse statement does not
    comply with the duty to ‘minimally articulate’ a conclusion
    that the record contains ‘no evidence.’ ” (Br. of Plaintiff-
    Appellant at 23.) The argument can be disposed of by re-
    ferring to Steward v. Bowen.
    In the present case, Steward did not present any
    substantial evidence to contradict the agency’s position
    on the issue of medical equivalency. The opinions of
    Steward’s treating physicians simply did not address
    this question. Thus, the ALJ did not reject specific
    evidence supporting Steward’s position that her im-
    pairments meet or equal a listed impairment in favor of
    the contrary opinions of the Secretary’s consulting
    physicians. It was therefore unnecessary for the ALJ to
    specifically articulate his reasons for accepting the
    consulting physicians’ opinions on the question of med-
    ical equivalency.
    
    Stewart, 858 F.2d at 1299
    .
    The Stewart panel’s reasoning is quite applicable here.
    The ALJ did not reject any evidence. Like Stewart, there
    6                                               No. 03-2107
    was no evidence which would support the position that
    Scheck met or equaled the listing. Also similar to the facts
    of Stewart, the letter from Scheck’s treating physician,
    Dr. Heiferman, did not address the issue of medical equiv-
    alency. It was unnecessary for the ALJ to articulate her
    reasons for accepting the state agency physicians’ determi-
    nation of not disabled. 
    Id. SSR 83-20:
    Onset Date
    Scheck claims that the ALJ violated SSR 83-20 by not
    consulting a medical expert in order to determine the onset
    date of his alleged disability. He argues that medical evi-
    dence from after his date last insured can be related back
    to the relevant time period to show disability. After wading
    through the record and reviewing the relevant case law, we
    find Scheck’s arguments relating to onset date to be mis-
    placed. SSR 83-20 addresses the situation in which an
    administrative law judge makes a finding that an individ-
    ual is disabled as of an application date and the question
    arises as to whether the disability arose at an earlier time.
    See, e.g., Lichter v. Bowen, 
    814 F.2d 430
    , 434 (7th Cir.
    1987); Campbell v. Chater, 
    932 F. Supp. 1072
    , 1075 (N.D.
    Ill. 1996); SSR 83-20. The ALJ did not find that Scheck was
    disabled, and therefore, there was no need to find an onset
    date. In short, SSR 83-20 does not apply.
    Residual Functioning Capacity—Steps 4 and 5
    Having failed at step three, Scheck must show that he has
    insufficient residual functioning capacity to perform his
    past work. 
    Stevenson, 105 F.3d at 1154
    . In making such a
    determination, the ALJ must consider whether there is an
    underlying “determinable physical or mental impairment
    that could reasonably be expected to produce the symp-
    toms.” SSR 96-7p. Once this has been established, the ALJ
    No. 03-2107                                                 7
    must further evaluate the “intensity, persistence, and
    functionally limiting effects of the symptoms” in order to
    find whether those symptoms “affect the individual’s ability
    to do basic work activities.” 
    Id. As the
    ALJ noted,
    “[i]nherent in such analysis, of course, is an assessment
    of the Claimant’s credibility.” (Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant
    at A-7.) The credibility of the claimant is then considered in
    light of “the entire case record, including the objective
    medical evidence, the individual’s own statements about
    symptoms, statements and other information provided
    by treating or examining physicians or psychologists and
    other persons about the symptoms and how they affect the
    individual, and any other relevant evidence in the case rec-
    ord.” SSR 96-7p. This finding on credibility must be sup-
    ported in the ALJ’s decision to a point where a reviewing
    court can discern the weight assigned to the individual’s
    statements and reasons for that weight. 
    Id. In this
    case, the ALJ found that Scheck’s medically
    determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
    produce the type of symptoms discussed during the course
    of his testimony. Thus, she moved on and assessed the
    credibility of Scheck’s testimony by looking at the objective
    medical evidence, the claimant’s testimony, and a letter
    from Scheck’s surgeon. She first addressed the objective
    medical evidence and noted that “there is a dearth of docu-
    mentary medical evidence concerning Mr. Scheck’s symp-
    toms and treatment from June 2, 1989, his alleged onset
    date, to December 31, 1994, his date last insured, and in
    particular from June 2, 1989 to April 14, 1993, the date of
    his second surgery.” (Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at A-10.) It
    is axiomatic that the claimant bears the burden of supply-
    ing adequate records and evidence to prove their claim of
    disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(c) (“You must provide
    medical evidence showing that you have an impairment and
    how severe it is during the time you say that you were
    disabled.”); Bowen v. Yuckert, 
    482 U.S. 137
    , 146, n.5 (1987)
    8                                                 No. 03-2107
    (“It is not unreasonable to require the claimant, who is in a
    better position to provide information about his own medi-
    cal condition, to do so.”). Scheck failed to support his claim.
    While it is true that the ALJ has a duty to make a
    complete record, this requirement can reasonably require
    only so much. As this court noted in Kendrick v. Shalala,
    “[t]he difficulty is that no record is ‘complete’—one may al-
    ways obtain another medical examination, seek the views
    of one more consultant, wait six months to see whether the
    claimant’s condition changes, and so on. Taking ‘complete
    record’ literally would be a formula for paralysis.” Kendrick
    v. Shalala, 
    998 F.2d 455
    , 456 (7th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless,
    the hearing transcript indicates that the ALJ attempted to
    make as complete a record as possible. Speaking about
    Scheck’s attempts to obtain medical records from the Mayo
    Clinic, she said, “All right. I’ll give you 30 days. If there is
    nothing received within 30 days I will make a decision
    based on which I—what I have, which as I have indicated
    already is not very much supporting an impairment prior to
    the date last insured. Okay?” (R. at 46) Scheck’s attorney
    simply replied “very good.” (R. at 46) Clearly, Scheck was
    aware that the ALJ considered there to be “a dearth of
    documentary medical evidence” and cannot fault the ALJ
    for his own failure to support his claim of disability.
    The ALJ next looked to the letter from Dr. Heiferman,
    Scheck’s surgeon. The ALJ noted that the letter was dated
    January, 1999—about four years after Scheck’s date last
    insured. It was further noted that the record contained no
    office notes or medical records from April 14, 1993, when
    Dr. Heiferman performed surgery on Scheck, to December
    31, 1994, Scheck’s date of last insured. Finally, it is not
    unheard of that a personal physician “might have been
    leaning over backwards to support the application for dis-
    ability benefits.” Cummins v. Schweiker, 
    670 F.2d 81
    , 84
    (7th Cir. 1982). We find no error in the ALJ’s credibility
    determination. Powers v. Apfel, 
    207 F.3d 431
    , 435 (7th Cir.
    2000).
    No. 03-2107                                                   9
    Scheck urges that the ALJ should have given more weight
    to the 1999 letter from Dr. Heiferman. He cites to various
    Social Security rulings and regulations which stand for the
    general proposition that more weight will be given to a
    treating physician’s opinion partially because of its longitu-
    dinal view. See generally SSR 96-2p; 20 C.F.R.
    § 404.1527(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5); SSR 96-7p. The
    problem with this argument, as the ALJ noted, is that there
    is no longitudinal view from Dr. Heiferman; “Dr. Heiferman
    was unable to closely follow Mr. Scheck’s progress after the
    April 14, 1993 surgery, due to the latter’s move to Texas.”
    (Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at A-11.) It would be exceedingly
    illogical to credit a doctor’s opinion because he is more likely
    to have a detailed and longitudinal view of the claimant’s
    impairments when in fact, there is no detail or longitudinal
    view. In other words, the very reasons the Social Security
    regulations set out for giving substantial weight to a
    treating physician’s opinion are absent in this case. The
    ALJ’s assignment of little weight to Dr. Heiferman’s letter
    was proper. See 
    Powers, 207 F.3d at 435
    .
    Finally, the ALJ addressed the credibility of Scheck’s
    testimony and found it to be incredible. (Br. of Plaintiff-
    Appellant at A-12.) In doing so, she discussed much of the
    evidence that supported Scheck’s claim of disability, in-
    cluding: Scheck’s daily activities; the duration, frequency,
    and intensity of pain; precipitating and/or aggravating
    factors; dosage and effectiveness of medication; and the
    functional limitations placed on Scheck during the relevant
    time period. (Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at A-9, 10.) She also
    addressed the objective medical evidence, as discussed
    above. (Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at A-10 - A-12.)
    “The absence of an objective medical basis which supports
    the degree of severity of subjective complaints alleged is
    just one factor to be considered in evaluating the credibility
    of the testimony and complaints.” Polaski v. Heckler, 
    739 F.2d 1320
    , 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). The other factors to be
    10                                              No. 03-2107
    considered by the ALJ are: (1) the claimant’s daily activity;
    (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of pain; (3) the
    precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effective-
    ness, and side effects of medication; and (5) functional
    restrictions. 
    Id. Clearly, the
    ALJ was aware of these
    requirements and followed them in making her decision.
    The credibility determinations of an ALJ are entitled to
    special deference and we see no reason to overturn her
    findings. 
    Powers, 207 F.3d at 435
    . Such deference is
    especially proper in light of the fact that the ALJ ade-
    quately considered the Polaski v. Heckler factors.
    Based on the above analysis, we hold that the ALJ did not
    err in finding that Scheck retained the residual functioning
    capacity to perform his past work as a distribution ware-
    house manager. The ALJ considered the objective medical
    evidence and the claimant’s testimony in order to determine
    how his impairment affected his ability to do basic work
    activities. We further hold that the ALJ used the proper
    procedures in making her findings.
    Conclusion
    While the members of this court sympathize with
    Mr. Scheck due to his condition, that condition did not rise
    to the level of a disability within the context of this case.
    Therefore, we find that the ALJ’s decision was supported by
    substantial evidence. We AFFIRM.
    No. 03-2107                                        11
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—2-5-04
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-2107

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 2/5/2004

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

Authorities (17)

Judy K. Powers v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of the ... , 207 F.3d 431 ( 2000 )

23-socsecrepser-315-unemplinsrep-cch-14204a-florence-steward-v , 858 F.2d 1295 ( 1988 )

Lorraine POLASKI, Et Al., Appellees, v. Margaret M. HECKLER,... , 739 F.2d 1320 ( 1984 )

Ron Jay LICHTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D.... , 814 F.2d 430 ( 1987 )

Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission , 86 S. Ct. 1018 ( 1966 )

Bowen v. Yuckert , 107 S. Ct. 2287 ( 1987 )

Barbara J. STEVENSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. ... , 105 F.3d 1151 ( 1997 )

Wallace E. Ehrhart v. Secretary of Health and Human Services , 969 F.2d 534 ( 1992 )

James M. FARRELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN,... , 878 F.2d 985 ( 1989 )

Gerard C. Kepple, II v. Larry G. Massanari, Acting ... , 268 F.3d 513 ( 2001 )

James KENDRICK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donna E. SHALALA, ... , 998 F.2d 455 ( 1993 )

James R. Butera v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social ... , 173 F.3d 1049 ( 1999 )

Thomas L. SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, ... , 898 F.2d 519 ( 1990 )

Julian DIAZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, ... , 55 F.3d 300 ( 1995 )

Duane E. Cummins v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of ... , 670 F.2d 81 ( 1982 )

Arkansas v. Oklahoma , 112 S. Ct. 1046 ( 1992 )

Campbell v. Chater , 932 F. Supp. 1072 ( 1996 )

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