Extra Equipamentos v. Case Corporation ( 2004 )


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  •                                In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-2863
    EXTRA EQUIPAMENTOS E EXPORTAÇÃO LTDA., et al.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    CASE CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 01 C 8591—Blanche M. Manning, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED JANUARY 9, 2004—DECIDED MARCH 15, 2004
    ____________
    Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
    POSNER, Circuit Judge. Extra, a Brazilian company, sued
    Case, a major U.S. manufacturer of farm and construc-
    tion equipment, in the federal district court in Chicago,
    charging fraud. (The co-plaintiff, Extra’s boss, can be ig-
    nored.) Jurisdiction was based on 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    (a)(2),
    because the suit was between a citizen of a state (Case) and
    citizens of a foreign country (Extra and its boss). The district
    judge dismissed the suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) on the
    2                                                 No. 03-2863
    ground that Case Brasil & Cia, Case’s wholly owned
    Brazilian subsidiary, was an indispensable party to the suit.
    Extra appeals.
    Case Brasil had hired Extra to distribute Case products
    in Brazil. In 1999, Extra sued Case Brasil in a Brazilian court,
    claiming that corrupt employees of the subsidiary had
    caused the subsidiary to overcharge Extra. Later that year,
    a “settlement agreement” was negotiated and signed in
    Illinois by representatives of Extra and Case. No official of
    Case Brasil was present or signed the agreement, although
    the Case executive who signed it purported to be acting on
    behalf of both parent and subsidiary. The agreement ended
    the Brazilian litigation and provided that Case Brasil would
    continue to use Extra as a distributor and would seek no
    more than $2 million in past-due payments that it claimed
    Extra owed it under the distributorship contract. In ex-
    change, Extra, besides dropping its suit against Case Brasil,
    promised to give Case information about the corrupt
    conduct of Case Brasil’s employees that would enable Case
    to have them removed (thus avoiding possible trouble with
    the Brazilian government) without the parent or subsidiary
    incurring liability.
    Extra filed the present suit in 2001, complaining that Case
    had defrauded Extra by inducing it to enter into the settle-
    ment agreement when Case knew that Case Brasil would
    not be bound by the agreement and would not perform its
    obligations under it. Case’s objective in committing the
    fraud, Extra charged, was to get Extra’s Brazilian suit
    against Case’s subsidiary dropped and obtain the informa-
    tion about the corruption at the subsidiary without incur-
    ring any of the costs of the agreement arising from the fact
    that the agreement required Case Brasil to continue Extra as
    a distributor and to limit its claims for past moneys due
    from Extra to $2 million. But (according to Extra) Case
    No. 03-2863                                                 3
    Brasil, claiming not to be bound by the agreement because
    it had not authorized its parent to make it—indeed, con-
    tending that it had had no wind of the negotiations or of the
    signing of the agreement—terminated Extra’s distributor-
    ship and refuses to recognize any limit on its money claims,
    though Case was happy to receive the information about the
    corrupt employees that Extra furnished it pursuant to
    Extra’s obligations under the agreement. Case had thus
    “manipulated the corporate distinction between itself and
    Case Brasil” by falsely representing that the Case official
    who signed the agreement was authorized to sign on behalf
    of Case Brasil.
    Case moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that since
    Case Brasil was a party to the settlement agreement—the
    Case executive who signed it having signed it on the subsid-
    iary’s behalf as well as the parent’s—the subsidiary was an
    indispensable party to the suit. After some discovery, the
    district judge agreed and dismissed the suit. This was a
    preliminary ruling, on jurisdiction, and not a ruling that
    Extra has no fraud case against Case. And anyway the
    essence of Extra’s case is not that Case Brasil was not bound
    by the settlement agreement, but that Case schemed to make
    sure that Extra would not benefit from the agreement.
    Case had moved in the alternative for dismissal under the
    doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that Brazil was
    a more convenient locale for the litigation of the fraud claim
    (there is no suggestion that Extra could not sue Case there).
    Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 
    454 U.S. 235
     (1981). But the
    district judge did not rule on the alternative ground.
    Case denies that it committed fraud. It contends that the
    executive who signed the settlement agreement was indeed
    authorized to do so on behalf of both parent and subsidiary
    and therefore Case Brasil became bound by the settlement
    agreement, and that it has never repudiated or, for that
    4                                                 No. 03-2863
    matter, violated it, though it has terminated Extra’s distribu-
    torship (but without, Case contends, violating the agree-
    ment). Case points out that Extra has sued Case Brasil in
    Brazil for damages arising from the termination and that the
    suit is pending.
    Two steps are involved in deciding whether someone is
    indispensable to a suit, so that the suit must be dismissed if,
    as in this case, he can’t be made a party. The diversity
    jurisdiction does not extend to a suit in which there is a U.S.
    citizen on only one side of the suit and foreign parties on
    both sides, Karazanos v. Madison Two Associates, 
    147 F.3d 624
    ,
    627 (7th Cir. 1998); Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. v. Sanwa
    Business Credit Corp., 
    16 F.3d 198
    , 202 (7th Cir. 1994);
    Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc., 
    10 F.3d 425
    , 428 (7th Cir. 1993); Universal Licensing Corp. v. Paola del
    Lungo S.P.A., 
    293 F.3d 579
    , 580-81 (2d Cir. 2002), as there
    would be if Case Brasil became a defendant. And the federal
    courts’ supplemental jurisdiction cannot be used to leap this
    jurisdictional hurdle. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (b).
    The first step in determining indispensability is to decide
    whether if the person could be joined, he would have to be
    joined. One of the circumstances in which he would have to
    be joined (if he could be) would be if he “claims an interest
    relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
    the disposition of the action in [his] absence may as a
    practical matter impair or impede [his] ability to protect that
    interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i). The second step is to
    determine, if he cannot be joined, “whether in equity and
    good conscience the action should proceed among the
    parties before [the court], or should be dismissed.” Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 19(b). Rule 19(b) lists several factors as bearing on
    this determination, of which the two most important in this
    case are “to what extent a judgment rendered in the per-
    son’s absence might be prejudicial to” him and “whether the
    No. 03-2863                                                    5
    plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
    dismissed for nonjoinder.”
    Because of the looseness of the terms “equity and good
    conscience” and because their applicability is to be deter-
    mined in each case by weighing several factors with no
    weights indicated, we agree with those courts (the majority)
    that hold that appellate review of a determination of
    indispensability is limited to deciding whether the district
    judge has committed an abuse of discretion. E.g., National
    Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid of South Carolina, Inc., 
    210 F.3d 246
    , 250 n. 7 (4th Cir. 2000); Davis v. United States, 
    192 F.3d 951
    , 957 (10th Cir. 1999); Washington v. Daley, 
    173 F.3d 1158
    ,
    1165 (9th Cir. 1999); Jota v. Texaco Inc., 
    157 F.3d 153
    , 161 (2d
    Cir. 1998). The more particularistic, and the less rule-bound
    and therefore more discretionary, the required judgment
    made by the trial court, the more limited the competence of
    the appellate court. A judgment that is not governed by a
    rule cannot be determined to be correct or incorrect by
    comparing it to the language or purpose of a rule, because
    there is none; there is just a medley of imponderables. All
    the appellate court can do as a practical matter in such a
    situation is to decide whether the trial court exercised
    judgment in a reasonable manner.
    The second factor that we quoted—whether the plaintiff
    has an alternative if the suit is dismissed—supports the
    district court’s ruling. Dismissal would not be a disaster
    for Extra. It can bring its fraud claim against Case in a
    Brazilian court or, if it prefers, in a state court in Wisconsin,
    where Case is headquartered, or Illinois, where the settle-
    ment agreement was negotiated and signed. Extra is a
    Brazilian company and therefore should be especially
    comfortable litigating in Brazil’s court system, and Case is
    suable there—remember that it moved to have the case
    transferred to Brazil, and we take this to be binding consent
    6                                                 No. 03-2863
    to be sued there. Brazil seems in fact a natural venue for the
    litigation, given the pendency there of the related litigation
    between Extra and Case’s Brazilian subsidiary. We do not
    say that Brazil is in fact a more convenient forum for the
    fraud litigation; that is the issue raised by Case’s forum non
    conveniens motion, which the district judge did not address.
    Such a motion, like a motion to dismiss for failure to join an
    indispensable party, is addressed to the district judge’s
    discretion, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at 257;
    In re Ford Motor Co., 
    344 F.3d 648
    , 651 (7th Cir. 2003), and it
    is not for us to exercise that discretion in the judge’s place.
    Our point is only that dismissal of this suit will not force
    Extra to abandon its fraud claim; it has an alternative forum,
    indeed alternative forums, in which to litigate it.
    So this is a factor favoring indispensability. But the
    first factor bearing on the issue—whether a judgment in this
    suit would so harm Case Brasil that it would be inequitable
    to allow the suit to proceed to judgment without its being a
    party—is not as supportive of a finding of indispensability
    as the judge thought. She termed Case Brasil a “primary or
    active participant in the acts underlying the alleged fraudu-
    lent conduct” and said that its presence in the litigation
    would be “vital to this Court’s determination of whether
    Case is liable.” The alleged fraud, to repeat, was Case’s
    making Extra think that the settlement agreement gave
    Extra the right to remain a distributor of Case Brasil and
    capped its liability to Case Brasil. This allegation makes
    Case Brasil, which has been sued for terminating Extra, an
    intended beneficiary of the fraud but possibly an unwitting
    one, so it is unclear whether it would be hurt by a judgment
    against Case, as it would be if it were determined to be a
    participant in the fraud. Freeman v. Northwest Acceptance
    Corp., 
    754 F.2d 553
    , 559 (5th Cir. 1985). And while evidence
    obtained from Case Brasil might well be vital to a determi-
    nation of whether Case committed the alleged fraud—there
    No. 03-2863                                                    7
    may have been no fraud if Case Brasil is, as Case claims,
    bound by the settlement agreement—this would just make
    Case Brasil an indispensable witness, and an indispensable
    witness isn’t an indispensable party.
    The judge added that “a judgment entered by this Court
    would prejudice Case Brasil because it would impair its
    ability to defend itself in subsequent actions which Extra
    could file regarding its actions and obligations under the
    [Settlement] Agreement.” Either in the pending litigation in
    Brazil or in a new case there or in a U.S. state court, Extra
    might be able to use findings underlying a judgment in its
    favor in the suit in the Northern District of Illinois to further
    its claims against Case Brasil. Suppose Extra proves that the
    purpose of the agreement was to enable Case to obtain the
    information that it wanted about the corrupt practices of its
    subsidiary’s employees without preventing Case Brasil from
    terminating Extra, by making Extra think that by agreeing
    to turn over the information it would preserve its distribu-
    torship, when all along Case Brasil was planning to repudi-
    ate the agreement on the ground that it had never become
    a party to it. Such a finding might help Extra prove in the
    Brazilian litigation against Case Brasil that the termination
    of the distributorship agreement was a breach for which
    Case Brasil must pay damages. Or suppose that while Case
    tried in the present litigation to show that there was no
    fraud because its subsidiary performed all the subsidiary’s
    obligations under the settlement agreement, the court found
    the contrary. Such a finding too might be used against Case
    Brasil in Brazil.
    Under Illinois law, as under American law in general,
    findings made after a full and fair hearing and essential to
    the judgment entered on the basis of that hearing can be
    used to preclude relitigation of the issues resolved by the
    findings in another lawsuit between the same parties, or
    8                                                   No. 03-2863
    parties in privity with them. Herzog v. Lexington Township,
    
    657 N.E.2d 926
    , 929-30 (Ill. 1995); Brokaw v. Weaver, 
    305 F.3d 660
    , 669 (7th Cir. 2002) (Illinois law); Kalush v. Deluxe Corp.,
    
    171 F.3d 489
    , 493 (7th Cir. 1999) (ditto). Although Extra
    rather surprisingly does not contend that Case Brasil is
    merely an alter ego of Case—that is, does not try to “pierce
    the corporate veil” and thus treat the two corporations as
    one—it does contend that Case Brasil was a tool used by its
    parent to commit the fraud. It contends that the promise
    that Case Brasil would not terminate Extra or seek payment
    of more than $2 million was the bait dangled before Extra to
    persuade it both to drop its suit against Case Brasil and give
    Case the information about Case Brasil’s corrupt employees
    that Case needed to clean up its subsidiary— and the tool
    might well be thought to be in privity with the hand, as in
    other agency settings. Moy v. County of Cook, 
    640 N.E.2d 926
    ,
    928 (Ill. 1994); Horwitz, Schakner & Associates, Inc. v. Schakner,
    
    625 N.E.2d 670
    , 674 (Ill. App. 1993); Ellens v. Chicago Area
    Office Federal Credit Union, 
    576 N.E.2d 263
    , 266 (Ill. App.
    1991).
    That, however, is so under Illinois’s law of collateral
    estoppel, and we are given no indication of what Brazil’s
    law on the matter is; it may be quite different. See Antonio
    Gidi, “Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law
    Countries,” 
    51 Am. J. Comp. L. 311
    , 384-86 and n. 233 (2003).
    Nor whether, though under federal law Illinois’s law of
    collateral estoppel would determine the preclusive effect of
    a federal judgment rendered in a diversity case governed by
    Illinois substantive law, see Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed
    Martin Corp., 
    531 U.S. 497
    , 508-09 (2001); Matosantos Com-
    mercial Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 
    245 F.3d 1203
    , 1207-
    08 (10th Cir. 2001); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 
    631 N.W.2d 113
    , 120-21 (Minn. App. 2001); In re Armstrong, 
    294 B.R. 344
    , 357-58 (10th Cir. BAP 2003), Brazil has a similar
    rule. If it does not, or if, as Professor Gidi suggests, Brazil
    No. 03-2863                                                   9
    does not have a doctrine of collateral estoppel, Case Brasil
    may have little to fear from the outcome of the present
    litigation.
    There is another point that the district judge did not
    address, and that is the significance of the fact that Case
    Brasil is a wholly owned subsidiary of Case. Even so,
    because Extra does not argue that Case Brasil is an alter ego
    of Case, it will be treated by the law for most purposes as an
    independent entity. But it doesn’t follow that its relation to
    Case is irrelevant to determining indispensability. If Case
    and Case Brasil were separately owned, Case Brasil could
    not rely on Case to protect its interests fully in the Northern
    District litigation if Case Brasil were not (as it cannot be) a
    party. But given the complete identity of interests by virtue
    of Case’s being the sole owner of Case Brasil, we find it hard
    to see how Case Brasil can be harmed by not being made a
    party to the suit in Chicago. Suppose that a judgment
    against Case in the Northern District would be given
    preclusive effect, or at least (as may be likelier, Rudolf B.
    Schlesinger et al., Comparative Law 481-84 (6th ed. 1998))
    considerable weight, in the Brazilian litigation and result in
    a cost to Case Brasil of $10 million. Since Case owns all of
    Case Brasil, the judgment would cost Case the same
    amount, so it would have the identical incentive to defend
    Case Brasil’s interests in Chicago as Case Brasil would have
    if it could be joined as a party. North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon
    Inc., 
    152 F.3d 642
    , 648 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Cambridge Biotech
    Corp., 
    186 F.3d 1356
    , 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Dainippon Screen
    Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. CFMT, Inc., 
    142 F.3d 1266
    , 1272 (Fed. Cir.
    1998); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 
    877 F.2d 132
    ,
    135 (1st Cir. 1989); but see Freeman v. Northwest Acceptance
    Corp., supra, 
    754 F.2d at 555, 559
    . Indeed, we have great
    difficulty seeing how a 100 percent subsidiary could ever be
    an indispensable party; the cases that we have cited, while
    refusing to treat 100 percent ownership as an absolute bar
    10                                               No. 03-2863
    to a finding of indispensability, do not indicate any factors
    that would justify finding a 100 percent subsidiary to be
    indispensable. But maybe there is a wrinkle in the corporate
    structure of Case and Case Brasil that is eluding us which
    would require a different conclusion.
    The weight a Brazilian court would give a U.S. judgment
    in Extra’s favor and the significance of Case’s sole own-
    ership of Case Brasil are conspicuous loose ends in the
    district judge’s analysis of indispensability. We repeat that
    her ruling is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. But
    before the issue of abuse is even reached, the appellate court
    must be satisfied that the judge has exercised her discretion
    responsibly by considering all the salient factors that would
    enter into a responsible exercise. That was not done here
    and the judgment must therefore be vacated and the case
    remanded for further consideration of the issue, consistent
    with the guidance provided by this opinion.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    No. 03-2863                                            11
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    _____________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—3-15-04