United States v. Noble, John ( 2004 )


Menu:
  •                           In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-2088
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    JOHN H. NOBLE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Wisconsin.
    No. 99 CR 6—Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED MARCH 31, 2004—DECIDED MAY 4, 2004
    ____________
    Before BAUER, POSNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    BAUER, Circuit Judge. This is the third appeal deal-
    ing with John Noble’s sentence. In the first, we vacated
    his 30-year sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to
    distribute based on the principles of Apprendi v. New
    Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000); see also United States v. Noble,
    
    246 F.3d 946
     (7th Cir. 2001) (Noble I). On remand, the
    district court reduced his sentence on that count but
    increased the sentence of another, and ordered them to run
    consecutively, which again left Noble with the same 30-year
    sentence. On his second appeal, Noble argued that the
    imposition of consecutive sentences was an Apprendi
    2                                               No. 03-2088
    violation and that there was no reliable evidence supporting
    the district court’s decision to attribute an additional 65
    ounces of cocaine to Noble’s relevant conduct calculation.
    We held that there was no Apprendi violation, but that the
    evidence supporting the amount of the cocaine was not
    reliable. See United States v. Noble, 
    299 F.3d 907
     (7th Cir.
    2002) (Noble II). At the second re-sentencing, the district
    court allowed the government to re-call witness Steven Jobe
    to testify—in a second attempt to support the inclusion of
    the 65 ounces of cocaine in Noble’s relevant conduct calcula-
    tion. Still unable to support the 65 additional ounces of
    cocaine (equal to 351 kilograms), the government used
    Jobe’s testimony to support a new, lower estimate of 300
    kilograms (the Jobe Quantity), which was added to Noble’s
    relevant conduct calculation. The district court then re-
    sentenced Noble to 315 months (26.25 years) in prison.
    Noble now appeals this sentence.
    DISCUSSION
    Noble argues that the district court improperly allowed
    the government to introduce new evidence at the second re-
    sentencing hearing because that constituted a second
    opportunity to carry its burden of proof. We agree with
    Noble.
    The district court’s decision to allow the government to
    present new evidence at the remanded sentencing hearing
    presents a question of law, which we generally review de
    novo. United States v. Sumner, 
    325 F.3d 884
    , 888 (7th Cir.
    2003). When a defendant such as Noble is sentenced on the
    basis of uncharged drug-related misconduct, the burden is
    on the government to prove the amount of drugs involved in
    that conduct. E.g., United States v. Acosta, 
    85 F.3d 275
    , 279
    (7th Cir. 1996). If the government failed to meet its burden,
    the government is not permitted on remand to try again
    and submit new evidence in a belated effort to carry its
    No. 03-2088                                                  3
    burden. See United States v. Wyss, 
    147 F.3d 631
    , 633 (7th
    Cir. 1998) (“[t]he government [i]s entitled to only one
    opportunity to present evidence on the issue”); United
    States v. Wilson, 
    131 F.3d 1250
    , 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1997).
    In this case, it was the government’s burden to present
    sufficiently reliable evidence to support the Jobe Quantity.
    The government knew what it was required to introduce to
    meet its burden, and we found that the government failed
    to do so. See Noble II, 
    299 F.3d at 910-11
    . Nonetheless,
    following the second remand, the district court allowed the
    government a second opportunity to meet the burden that
    it failed to carry at the original sentencing hearing. This the
    law does not allow.
    We remand for the district court to impose a sentence
    that is not based on the additional testimony taken after
    Noble II and not based on the evidence we concluded was
    unreliable.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—5-4-04