Johana Cece v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 733 F.3d 662 ( 2013 )


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  •                                In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 11‐1989
    JOHANA CECE,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General
    of the United States,
    Respondent.
    ____________________
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals.
    No. A096 158 857
    ____________________
    ARGUED OCTOBER 5, 2011 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 6, 2012
    REARGUED EN BANC SEPTEMBER 27, 2012
    DECIDED AUGUST 9, 2013
    ____________________
    Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER, FLAUM,
    MANION, KANNE, ROVNER, WOOD, WILLIAMS, SYKES, TINDER,
    and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
    2                                                  No. 11-1989
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. United States asylum laws grant
    refuge to those who have been persecuted in foreign lands
    because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
    ticular social group, or political opinion. The complexity sur-
    faces when we try to define terms such as persecution and
    “social group”—the latter of which has perplexed this court
    and others, and is in the spotlight once again in this case.
    I.
    Johana Cece, a native of Albania, arrived in the United
    States in 2002, and sought asylum within the requisite time
    allotted. The immigration judge deemed Cece credible, and
    therefore we use her testimony and the immigration judge’s
    factual findings as a basis to set forth the facts of the case.
    Cece lived with her family in Korçë, Albania until her
    parents left the country in 2001. As a young woman living
    alone in Albania, Cece caught the attention of a well-known
    local criminal gang that was notorious for forcing women
    into prostitution rings. One of the leaders of that gang, a
    man Cece knew as “Reqi,” began following her around
    town, offering her rides, and inviting her on dates. Cece
    knew Reqi by reputation—that is, for his membership in a
    gang known for its participation in prostitution rings, mur-
    der of other gang members, and the drug trade. Cece also
    testified that the gang members appeared to enjoy complete
    immunity from the law. Cece had long seen Reqi near her
    high school, where he cruised the area looking for girls and
    offering drugs to young women. Cece had heard that one of
    these women had been kidnapped by Reqi and forced into
    prostitution. Reqi’s stalking culminated in a confrontation on
    June 4, 2001, when Reqi followed Cece into a cosmetics store,
    cornered her, and pinned her to a wall. There he confronted
    No. 11-1989                                                   3
    her and asked her why she would not go out with him. Reqi
    made it clear to Cece that he could not be stopped and that
    he would find her and do whatever he wanted to her. She
    told him to let go, but he merely tightened his grip and held
    her there. There were several people in the store, but no one
    came to her aid. Cece surmised that they too were frightened
    by Reqi. Cece’s friend convinced her to report the assault to
    the police, but the police perfunctorily dismissed her accusa-
    tion, claiming she lacked proof.
    A few days later someone threw a rock through Cece’s
    window. She stopped going out, stopped going to school,
    and made plans to leave Korçë.
    Cece moved 120 miles north to Tirana to stay with her
    sister, who lived in a university dormitory, but her safety
    there was short-lived. A year later, her sister left the country
    and, without access to the dormitory or family with whom
    to live, Cece was once again left alone to fend for herself. As
    a single woman living alone in Albania, Cece claims she re-
    mained a target no matter where she lived.
    In 2002, fearing for her safety, Cece fraudulently pro-
    cured an Italian passport and came to the United States un-
    der the Visa Waiver Program. Less than a year later, she ap-
    plied for asylum and withholding of removal, asserting that
    she feared returning to Albania because she believed that as
    a young woman living alone she would be kidnapped and
    forced to join a prostitution ring.
    At Cece’s hearing, Dr. Bernd Fischer, a Professor in Bal-
    kan History at the Indiana University–Purdue University
    Fort Wayne and an expert on Albania, testified that Cece’s
    4                                                   No. 11-1989
    experience was “unfortunately usual.” (R. 223). Dr. Fischer
    described a very serious problem of human trafficking for
    prostitution in Albania in which gangs, often with the pro-
    tection, and at times the participation of the police, kidnap
    women and spirit them out of the country either through
    Greece, Kosova, or across the Adriatic Sea to Italy. Dr. Fisch-
    er described how anomalous it is for a single woman to live
    by herself in Albania, that such a woman would be an ideal
    target for a trafficker, particularly if she had been such a tar-
    get in the past, and that the problem was pervasive through-
    out Albania and not limited to Cece’s home village of Korçë.
    Dr. Fischer testified that although gang members primarily
    target women between the ages of sixteen and twenty-six,
    many women outside of the target age range are also forced
    into prostitution. Finally, he noted that the Albanian judicial
    system does not adequately enforce laws against traffickers.
    Reports issued by the U.S. State Department in 2004 corrob-
    orated his representations of a large-scale problem with hu-
    man trafficking in Albania. (R. 573-84).
    The immigration judge granted Cece asylum in 2006,
    concluding that she belonged to the group of “young wom-
    en who are targeted for prostitution by traffickers in Alba-
    nia,” and that the Albanian government was unwilling or
    unable to protect such women. (R. 128-29). He noted in par-
    ticular that Albania stands out in Europe as a major country
    of origin of traffickers in prostitution; the government’s judi-
    cial system is not effective against the problem; Albania suf-
    fers from a major and ongoing trafficking of young women
    by gangs; and there is no prospect in the foreseeable future
    of the government being able or willing to address the prob-
    No. 11-1989                                                            5
    lem. (R. 129). The immigration judge also found Cece’s tes-
    timony credible and her fear reasonable.
    The Board of Immigration Appeals vacated the decision
    of the immigration judge, however, finding that Cece failed
    to establish past persecution and had successfully relocated
    within Albania. (R. 330-31). Specifically, the Board held that
    the immigration judge erred in determining that Cece was a
    member of a social group of young women who have been
    targeted for prostitution by traffickers, noting its precedent
    that a social group must have social visibility and share a
    narrowing characteristic other than the risk of being perse-
    cuted.
    On remand, the immigration judge expressed concern
    with the Board’s conclusion that Cece did not belong to a
    protectable social group and that she could safely relocate
    within the country. (R. 114-116, 119-120). The immigration
    judge, however, recognized that he was bound by the
    Board’s determinations and denied the application for asy-
    lum. The Board dismissed Cece’s second appeal, emphasiz-
    ing that Cece’s proposed group was defined in large part by
    the harm inflicted on its members and did not exist inde-
    pendently of the traffickers. 1 The Board also concluded that
    1The Board appropriately abandoned its criticism that Cece had failed to
    demonstrate “social visibility.” Between the time of the first and second
    Board appeals, this Court rejected a social visibility analysis and
    concluded that applicants need not show that they would be recognized
    as members of a social group to qualify for withholding. See Gatimi v.
    Holder, 
    578 F.3d 611
    , 614-15 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that homosexuals
    might well pass as heterosexual, and women who have not yet
    undergone genital mutilation look no different than other women).
    6                                                  No. 11-1989
    there was insufficient evidence in the record that internal re-
    location was not reasonable. (R. 9).
    Cece appealed to this Court and over one dissent, the
    panel denied Cece’s petition for review, agreeing with the
    Board that Cece had not named a cognizable social group
    and that the Board had sufficient evidence to conclude that
    Cece could relocate safely within Albania. We granted
    Cece’s petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the panel’s
    opinion and judgment.
    II.
    To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must show that
    she is “unable or unwilling to return” to the country of his
    nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
    persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
    bership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
    8 U.S.C. §1101
    (a)(42)(A). An applicant who successfully
    proves that she was subject to past persecution is presumed
    to have a well-founded fear of future persecution, which the
    Attorney General can rebut by demonstrating a change in
    conditions in the applicant’s home country. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1); Mustafa v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 743
    , 750-751 (7th
    Cir. 2013). The applicant must show that she fits within one
    of those categories and that there is “a nexus between her
    fear of future persecution and one of those five protected
    grounds.” Escobar v. Holder, 
    657 F.3d 537
    , 542 (7th Cir. 2011);
    Ishitiaq v. Holder, 
    578 F.3d 712
    , 715 (7th Cir. 2009).
    The primary question in this case is whether Cece has
    proffered a particular social group that is cognizable under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A). Whether a group constitutes a par-
    No. 11-1989                                                     7
    ticular social group under the Immigration and Nationality
    Act is a question of law that we review de novo, while giving
    Chevron deference to the Board’s reasonable interpretation
    set forth in precedential opinions interpreting the statute.
    Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842-43 (1984); Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at 542
    . See also, Ayala
    v. Holder, 
    640 F.3d 1095
    , 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2011) (whether a
    group constitutes a particular social group under the Immi-
    gration and Nationality Act is a question of law, which a
    court of appeals reviews de novo); Castaneda-Castillo v. Hold-
    er, 
    638 F.3d 354
    , 363 (1st Cir. 2011) (same); Crespin-Valladares
    v. Holder, 
    632 F.3d 117
    , 124 (4th Cir. 2011) (same); Gomez-
    Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 
    527 F.3d 330
    , 339 (3d
    Cir. 2008) (same); Malonga v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 546
    , 553 (8th
    Cir. 2008) (same); Castillo-Arias v. United States. Att’y Gen.,
    
    446 F.3d 1190
    , 1195 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); Cruz-Funez v.
    Gonzales, 
    406 F.3d 1187
    , 1191 (10th Cir. 2005) (same).
    Under the deference analysis set forth in Chevron, if con-
    gressional purpose is clear, we must give it effect. Chevron,
    
    467 U.S. at 842-43
    . We also give deference to precedential
    decisions of the Board. 
    Id. at 843
    ; Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at 542
    .
    Our duty at this stage is to uphold the Board's determination
    if it is supported by substantial evidence—that is, reasona-
    ble, substantial, and probative evidence on the record con-
    sidered as a whole. Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at 545
    . If Congress has
    directly spoken to the precise question at issue, then a court
    must follow that clear guidance. Chevron, 
    467 U.S. at 842-43
    .
    If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court
    must defer to authoritative agency interpretations of the law.
    
    Id. at 844
    . Congress did not directly address what it meant
    8                                                  No. 11-1989
    by a protected “social group” in the Immigration and Na-
    tionality Act, so we look to see how the agency has inter-
    preted the statute.
    The Board took on the task of defining “social group” in
    Matter of Acosta, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 211
    , 233-34 (1985), overruled,
    in part, on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 439
    , 439 (BIA 1987) limiting it to groups whose mem-
    bership is defined by a characteristic that is either immutable
    or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that
    a person ought not be required to change. 
    Id.
     This Circuit
    has deferred to the Board’s Acosta formulation of social
    group. See Lwin v. INS, 
    144 F.3d 505
    , 512 (7th Cir. 1998).
    The immutable or fundamental characteristic might be
    membership in an extended family, sexual orientation, a
    former association with a controversial group, or member-
    ship in a group whose ideas or practices run counter to the
    cultural or social convention of the country. The latter group
    might seem plausibly alterable, but we respect an individu-
    al’s right to maintain characteristics that are “fundamental to
    their individual identities.” Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at 545
    . Cece
    could find a man to marry to protect her (and anachronisti-
    cally, the lawyer representing the government in this case
    inquired why she had not done just that (R. 172)), but this is
    the type of fundamental characteristic change that we do not
    ask of asylum applicants. See, e.g., Agbor v. Gonzales, 
    487 F.3d 499
    , 502 (7th Cir. 2007) (women who are opposed to and fear
    female genital mutilation); Sarhan v. Holder, 
    658 F.3d 649
    , 654
    (7th Cir. 2011) (women who “in accordance with social and
    religious norms in Jordan, are accused of being immoral
    criminals and, as a consequence, face the prospect of being
    No. 11-1989                                                                    9
    killed without any protection from the Jordanian govern-
    ment.”); and Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 
    297 F.3d 596
    , 603 (7th Cir.
    2002) (Christian women in Iran who do not wish to adhere
    to the Islamic female dress code). See also Al-Ghorbani v.
    Holder, 
    585 F.3d 980
    , 996 (6th Cir. 2009) (social group that
    opposes the repressive and discriminatory Yemeni cultural
    and religious customs that prohibit mixed-class marriages
    and require paternal consent for marriage); Safaie v. INS, 
    25 F.3d 636
    , 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (Iranian women who advocate
    women’s rights or who oppose Iranian customs relating to
    dress and behavior); 2 Fatin v. INS, 
    12 F.3d 1233
    , 1241 (3d Cir.
    1993) (Iranian women who refuse to conform to the govern-
    ment's gender-specific laws and social norms).
    Members of a social group need not be swimming
    against the stream of an embedded cultural norm. Some-
    times the characteristic is immutable because a shared past
    experience or status has imparted some knowledge or label-
    ing that cannot be undone. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
    Thus we have held that former truckers (or, more generally,
    those with a special skill needed by the persecutors) consti-
    tute a social group because their past actions and acquisition
    of skills are unchangeable, Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at 545-46
    ; as do
    the subordinates of the attorney general of Colombia who
    had information about insurgents plaguing that nation,
    Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 
    464 F.3d 770
    , 771-72 (7th Cir. 2006);
    former members of a violent and criminal faction in Kenya,
    Gatimi v. Holder, 
    578 F.3d 611
    , 614 (7th Cir. 2009); tattooed,
    2Both Al-Ghorbani and Safaie, 
    supra,
     have been superseded on other grounds
    by statute, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(3)(B), as recognized in Rife v. Ashcroft, 
    374 F.3d 606
    , 614-15 (8th Cir. 2004).
    10                                                 No. 11-1989
    former Salvadoran gang members who had since turned to
    God, Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 
    589 F.3d 426
    , 428-29 (7th Cir.
    2009); parents of Burmese student dissidents, Lwin, 
    144 F.3d at 512
    ; and the educated, landowning class of cattle farmers
    targeted by Columbian rebels, Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales,
    
    423 F.3d 666
    , 672 (7th Cir. 2005). See also Lukwago v. Ashcroft,
    
    329 F.3d 157
    , 178 (3d Cir. 2003) (former Ugandan child sol-
    diers who have escaped abduction, enslavement and tor-
    ture).
    In order to compare Cece’s social group with the likes of
    those above, we must first determine the contours of her so-
    cial group. Both the parties and the immigration courts were
    inconsistent, and the description of her social group varied
    from one iteration to the next. The inconsistencies, however,
    do not upset the claim. See In re Kasinga, 
    21 I. & N. Dec. 357
    ,
    (BIA 1996) (the Board, recognizing that both the Immigration
    and Naturalization Service and the applicant “advanced
    several formulations of the ‘particular social group’ at is-
    sue”). And in one form or another, both Cece and the immi-
    gration judge articulated the parameters of the relevant so-
    cial group.
    On her application for asylum, Cece explains that she is a
    “perfect target” of forced prostitution because she is a
    “young Orthodox woman living alone in Albania.” (R. 669).
    The immigration judge, in initially granting Cece asylum,
    collapsed this definition and described her social group as
    first, “a social group consisting of young women who are
    targeted for prostitution by traffickers in Albania,” (R. 128)
    and then a “social group consisting of women in danger of
    being trafficked as prostitutes.” (R. 131). Thus the immigra-
    No. 11-1989                                                            11
    tion judge omitted the important characteristic that Cece
    lived alone. 3 There is no doubt that it should have been in-
    cluded in the immigration judge’s description of social
    group, as so much of the testimony before him centered on
    Cece’s status as a woman living alone. Cece testified at
    length that women do not live alone in Albania (R. 147-148,
    167, 195, 674), that she did not know anyone who lived alone
    (R. 167, 173,195, 207); that she was afraid to live alone, (167,
    171, 197, 300, 674) and most importantly that she was target-
    ed because she was living alone. See (R. 147-148, 158, 166,
    172-73, 195, 197, 300, 304, 305). Similarly, the Albanian ex-
    pert’s testimony was focused on the risk of women who
    lived alone in Albania. (R. 229-30). Cece’s brief before this
    Court noted several times that the Board failed to consider
    this formulation of the group. Opening Brief of Appellants
    before the three-judge panel of this Court, at 20, 22, 27.
    We could surmise that the immigration judge’s descrip-
    tion of Cece’s social group as one consisting of “young
    women who are targeted for prostitution by traffickers in
    Albania,” (R. 128) or “women in danger of being trafficked
    as prostitutes,” (R. 131) was simply shorthand for describing
    women who are vulnerable to trafficking. And we know that
    women in Albania become vulnerable to targeting when, for
    example, they lack protection from husbands and family
    members. We need not do too much surmising, however,
    3Occasionally the adjudicators or parties refer to Cece as “single,” which
    appears, in this context, to be shorthand for living alone, see Opening
    Brief of Appellants before the three-judge panel of this Court, at 20, 22,
    27, 28 (contending that Cece is member of a group of “young, single,
    women in Albania.”)
    12                                                          No. 11-1989
    because the immigration judge’s order on remand—and re-
    ally the only order that matters on this appeal—specifically
    concludes that her characteristics are “namely that she is a
    young woman from a minority religion who has lived by her-
    self most of the time in Albania, and thus is vulnerable, par-
    ticularly vulnerable to traffickers for this reason.” (R. 120)
    (emphasis ours). 4
    The Board’s order rejects Cece=s social group as being not
    cognizable under the Act because it “is defined in large part
    by the harm inflicted on the group, and does not exist inde-
    pendently of the traffickers.” (R. 9). This is not a reasoned
    conclusion. As we have just described, the characteristics of
    the group consist of the immutable or fundamental traits of
    being young, female, and living alone in Albania. Even if the
    group were defined in part by the fact of persecution (and
    we do not believe it to be), that factor would not defeat
    recognition of the social group under the Act. Although it is
    true that “where a proposed group is defined only by the
    characteristic that it is persecuted, it does not qualify as a
    ‘social group,’” the Board of Immigration Appeals has never
    required complete independence of any relationship to the
    4 The immigration judge’s decision on remand is the only one which we
    review, as the former has been vacated. We refer to the earlier decision
    only to determine how Cece’s social group has been articulated through-
    out the litigation. Our review then is of the immigration judge’s second
    opinion of December 1, 2008, as supplemented by the Board’s opinion of
    March 31, 2011 dismissing her appeal. See Barma v. Holder, 
    640 F.3d 749
    ,
    751 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s decision
    but supplements that decision with its own explanation for rejecting the
    appeal, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA's reason-
    ing.”).
    No. 11-1989                                                   13
    persecutor. Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at 545
     (emphasis ours). And just
    because all members of a group suffer persecution, does not
    mean that this characteristic is the only one that links them.
    
    Id. at 545-46
    . A social group “cannot be defined merely by the
    fact of persecution” or “solely by the shared characteristic of
    facing dangers in retaliation for actions they took against al-
    leged persecutors.” Jonaitiene v. Holder, 
    660 F.3d 267
    , 271-72
    (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis ours). That shared trait, however,
    does not disqualify an otherwise valid social group. Escobar,
    
    657 F.3d at 547
     (instructing that we cannot tease out one
    component of the group’s characteristics to defeat the defini-
    tion of social group). It certainly did not invalidate the social
    group in Agbor which consisted of “women who fear being
    circumcised should they return to their home countries,” de-
    spite the fact that the group was defined in large part by the
    persecution inflicted on the group. Agbor, 
    487 F.3d at 502
    .
    Nor did it disqualify “women in Jordan who have (alleged-
    ly) flouted repressive moral norms, and thus who face a high
    risk of honor killing.” Sarhan, 
    658 F.3d at 654, 655
    . These
    women still had the immutable characteristics of gender, na-
    tionality, and the inability to alter their past labels of non-
    conformist.
    “Women who fear female genital circumcision” sound a
    lot like “women who fear prostitution,” thus demonstrating
    that it is not fair to conclude that the group is defined by the
    harm or potential harm inflicted merely by the language
    used rather than determining what underlying characteris-
    tics account for the fear and vulnerability. The Board=s cases
    instruct that we must look to see whether the group shares
    Acommon characteristics that members of the group either
    14                                                          No. 11-1989
    cannot change, or should not be required to change, because
    such characteristics are fundamental to their individual
    identities.@ Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at
    545 (citing Gatimi, 
    578 F.3d at 614
    , In re Kasinga, 
    21 I. & N. Dec. 357
    , 365-66 (BIA 1996)). In
    this case, although it is true that these women are linked by
    the persecution they suffer—being targeted for prostitu-
    tion—they are also united by the common and immutable
    characteristic of being (1) young, (2) Albanian, (3) women,
    (4) living alone. For this reason we disagree with the Sixth
    Circuit’s conclusion in Rreshpja v. Gonzales, that the social
    group of “young (or those who appear to be young), attrac-
    tive Albanian women who are forced into prostitution” does
    not constitute a social group because it is circularly defined
    by the fact that it suffers persecution. 
    Id.
     
    420 F.3d 551
    , 555-56
    (6th Cir. 2005). 5
    Our conclusion is consistent with a parallel line of rea-
    soning found in mixed motive cases. The Board of Immigra-
    tion Appeals and this Court have long recognized that per-
    secution can exist in a mixed motive case in which the perse-
    cutor targets an individual for more than one reason and one
    of the reasons does not warrant protection under the Act.
    Under the mixed-motives doctrine, an applicant may qualify
    for asylum so long as the applicant demonstrates by either
    direct or circumstantial evidence that his persecutors were
    motivated, at least in part, by one of the enumerated
    5 The Second Circuit has also addressed a similar issue in Gjura v. Holder,
    502 Fed. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2012), but in that case the court skirted the
    issue of whether “young, unmarried Albanian women could constitute a
    social group” and found instead that the applicant, Gjura, had failed to
    establish a nexus. 
    Id.
    No. 11-1989                                                              15
    grounds. Mustafa v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 743
    , 751 (7th Cir. 2013). 6
    See also Bueso-Avila v. Holder, 
    663 F.3d 934
    , 937 (7th Cir. 2011)
    (“[A]n individual may qualify for asylum if his or her perse-
    cutors have more than one motive as long as one of the mo-
    tives is specified in the Immigration and Nationality Act.”).
    Suppose, for example, that Muslims in a particular coun-
    try are wildly disfavored and frequently persecuted by the
    government. Wealthy Muslims, however, are tolerated be-
    cause of their vast contribution to the poor country’s busi-
    ness, tax base and overall wealth. The government, on the
    other hand, routinely beats, jails and strips of rights poor
    Muslims. Although the United States does not grant asylum
    based on poverty, the fact that the persecuted group shares
    this common characteristic does not disqualify the group
    from seeking asylum based on religious persecution. We
    cannot tease out one component of a group’s characteristics
    to defeat the definition of social group. Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at 547
    .
    Both dissents submit that Cece is not in the group of
    young Albanian women living alone because her own expert
    6The REAL ID Act of 2005 now requires an applicant to show that one of
    the five protected grounds was at least one “central reason” for his per-
    secution. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(i). Cece filed her asylum claim in
    2002, thus pre-REAL ID standards and case law apply. See Dawoud v.
    Gonzales, 
    424 F.3d 608
    , 613 (7th Cir. 2005). In any event, the “central rea-
    son” for her persecution is that she was a young woman living alone,
    and as such she would qualify even under the Real ID Act as the ground
    need only be “central.” A ground may be a secondary (or tertiary, etc.)
    reason and still justify asylum provided the applicant can show that the
    protected status played more than a minor role in motivating a persecu-
    tor. Shaikh v. Holder, 
    702 F.3d 897
    , 902 (7th Cir. 2012).
    16                                                   No. 11-1989
    defined “young” as 16 to 26 or 27, and Cece is now 34. He
    testified, however, that “this is just a targeted age group.
    There are many examples of people outside of the targeted
    age group being kidnapped and trafficked.” (R. 255). In this
    case, the Petitioner is part of a group of young Albanian
    women who live alone. Neither their age, gender, nationali-
    ty, or living situation are alterable. These characteristics
    qualify Cece’s proposed group as a protectable social group
    under asylum law.
    Demonstrating that an asylum applicant belongs to a
    cognizable social group is only the first step in determining
    asylum. Recall that an applicant must show not only that she
    fits within a cognizable social group but also that there is a
    nexus between the persecution and the membership in the
    social group. Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at 542
    ; Ishitiaq, 
    578 F.3d at 715
    .
    Justice Alito, while on the Third Circuit, described the steps
    as follows:
    The alien must (1) identify a group that constitutes a
    ‘particular social group’ within the interpretation just
    discussed, (2) establish that he or she is a member of
    that group, and (3) show that he or she would be per-
    secuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution
    based on that membership.
    Fatin v. INS, 
    12 F.3d 1233
    , 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). He then went
    on to note that, “to the extent that the petitioner in this case
    suggests that she would be persecuted or has a well-founded
    fear that she would be persecuted in Iran simply because she
    is a woman, she has satisfied the first of the three elements
    that we have noted.” 
    Id.
     As we are about to see, it is the nex-
    us requirement where the rubber meets the road.
    No. 11-1989                                                17
    Those who fear that the slope leading to asylum has been
    made too slick by broad categories need not worry. The im-
    portance of the “on account of” language must not be over-
    looked. It is this requirement that should assuage Judge
    Easterbrook’s fears that “[t]his makes eligible for asylum
    everyone who faces a substantial risk of harm in his native
    land, no matter the reason.” Post at 32. Although the catego-
    ry of protected persons may be large, the number of those
    who can demonstrate the required nexus likely is not. As the
    Board explained of clan-based persecution in Somalia, “the
    fact that almost all Somalis can claim clan membership and
    that interclan conflict is prevalent should not create undue
    concern that virtually all Somalis would qualify for refugee
    status, as an applicant must establish he is being persecuted
    on account of that membership.” In re H-, 
    21 I. & N. Dec. 337
    ,
    343 (BIA 1996). The breadth of the social group says nothing
    about the requirements for asylum, just as the breadth of
    categories under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act says noth-
    ing about who is eligible to sue an employer for discrimina-
    tion. All African Americans and all women, for example, are
    members of “protected” categories under Title VII, but not
    all African Americans and women have a claim for discrimi-
    nation. In order to be entitled to asylum, Cece must be able
    to demonstrate a particular link between her mistreatment
    and her membership in the stated social group. Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at 544
    ; Bueso-Avila, 
    663 F.3d at 936
    . This requirement is
    not unique to inquiries about persecution based on “social
    group,” but rather one that is applicable to cases of claimed
    persecution based on race, religion, nationality or political
    opinion. In other words, an ethnic Rom (gypsy) who has
    been mistreated by the town mayor because of a long-
    18                                                   No. 11-1989
    standing business dispute would not be eligible for asylum
    even if the mayor has undoubtedly and unfairly mistreated
    him, and even if he belongs to an ethnic group that was fre-
    quently the target of persecution in his country. The persecu-
    tion must still be “on account of” the protected category.
    In any event, the breadth of category has never been a
    per se bar to protected status. As we noted in Iao v. Gonzales,
    The number of followers of Falun Gong in China is
    estimated to be in the tens of millions, all of them sub-
    ject to persecution … . [Because] [a]nyone, we sup-
    pose, can get hold of a book of [Falun Gong] teach-
    ings, start doing the exercises, and truthfully declare
    himself or herself a bona fide adherent to Falun Gong
    [,][t]he implications for potential Chinese immigration
    to the United States may be significant … . But Con-
    gress has not authorized the immigration services to
    [control Chinese immigration] by denying asylum
    applications in unreasoned decisions.
    Iao v. Gonzales, 
    400 F.3d 530
    , 533 (7th Cir. 2005). Many of the
    groups recognized by the Board and courts are indeed quite
    broad. These include: women in tribes that practice female
    genital mutilation; Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365,
    Agbor, 
    487 F.3d at 502
    ; persons who are opposed to involun-
    tary sterilization, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(B); Chen v. Holder,
    
    604 F.3d 324
    , 332 (7th Cir. 2010); members of the Darood clan
    and Marehan subclan in Somalia, In re H–, 21 I. & N. Dec. at
    340, 343 (1% of the population of Somalia are members of the
    Marehan subclan); homosexuals in Cuba, In re Toboso–
    Alfonso, 
    20 I. & N. Dec. 819
    , 822-23 (BIA 1990); Filipinos of
    Chinese ancestry living in the Philippines, Matter of V–T–S–,
    No. 11-1989                                                          19
    
    21 I. & N. Dec. 792
    , 798 (BIA 1997) (approximately 1.5% of
    the Philippines population has an identifiable Chinese back-
    ground); Singh v. INS, 
    94 F.3d 1353
    , 1359 (9th Cir. 1996) (re-
    jecting the notion that an applicant is ineligible for asylum
    merely because all members of a persecuted group might be
    eligible for asylum). The ethnic Tutsis of Rawanda num-
    bered close to 700,000 before the genocide of 1994, and yet a
    Tutsi singled out for murder who managed to escape to the
    United States could surely qualify for asylum in this coun-
    try. And undoubtedly any of the six million Jews ultimately
    killed in concentration camps in Nazi-controlled Europe
    could have made valid claims for asylum, if only they had
    had that opportunity. 7 Many of our asylum laws originated
    out of a need to address just such refugees from World War
    II. It would be antithetical to asylum law to deny refuge to a
    group of persecuted individuals who have valid claims
    merely because too many have valid claims. See Iao, 
    400 F.3d at 533
    ; Singh, 
    94 F.3d at 1359
    . For this reason we also reject
    the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that the group of young-
    looking, attractive Albanian women who are forced into
    prostitution is not a cognizable social group because it is too
    broad and sweeping of a classification. Rreshpja, 
    420 F.3d at 555
    .
    7Although some Jews might have had the opportunity to seek asylum in
    the United States, having escaped Germany on the M.S. St. Louis, they
    were ultimately denied entry into the United States. The ship was forced
    to return to Europe where 254 of the 937 refugees seeking asylum from
    the Nazis were eventually killed in concentration camps. S.Res. 111,
    111th Cong. (2009).
    20                                                  No. 11-1989
    The safeguard against potentially innumerable asylum
    claims is found in the stringent statutory requirements for all
    asylum seekers which require that the applicant prove (1)
    that she has suffered or has a well-founded fear of suffering
    harm that rises to the level of persecution, (2) on account of
    race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion, and (3) is unable or unwilling to
    return to her country because of the persecution or a well-
    founded fear of persecution. 
    8 U.S.C. §1101
    (a)(42)(A),
    1158(b)(1); Bejko v. Gonzales, 
    468 F.3d 482
    , 484 (7th Cir. 2006).
    Judge Easterbrook’s dissent argues that “[w]hatever risk
    Cece faces comes from criminals, not from the government.”
    Post at 29. Of course “persecution does not include the
    actions of private citizens unless the government is complicit
    in those acts or is unable or unwilling to take steps to
    prevent them.” Bitsin v. Holder, No. 12-2717, 
    2013 WL 2402855
    , *6 (7th Cir. May 31, 2013). In his initial
    determination, the immigration judge found that Albania
    was unable or unwilling to protect Cece from third party
    traffickers, (R. 129, 131). In its decision overturning the
    immigration judge, the Board said only that “there is no
    indication that the government of Albania was involved in
    the incident described by the applicant, nor that such
    government is interested in harming the applicant. (R. 330).
    The first proposition is simply wrong. Cece complained to
    the police, but they refused to take any action. More
    importantly, the standard is not just whether the
    government of Albania was involved in the incident or
    interested in harming Cece, but also whether it was unable
    or unwilling to take steps to prevent the harm. Bitsin v.
    No. 11-1989                                                  21
    Holder, 
    2013 WL 2402855
     at *6. On remand, the immigration
    judge acknowledged his obligation to follow the Board’s
    determination regarding the proposed social group, but still
    noted his finding that Cece could not depend upon the
    police to protect her from traffickers. (R. 115-116). The Board
    had nothing further to say about the matter. When the Board
    agrees with the decision of the immigration judge, adopts
    that decision and supplements that decision with its own
    reasoning, as it did here, we review the immigration judge’s
    decision as supplemented by the Board. Mustafa v. Holder,
    
    707 F.3d 743
    , 750 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Jonaitiene v. Holder,
    
    660 F.3d 267
    , 270 (7th Cir. 2011)); Barma, 
    640 F.3d at 751
    . In
    this case the Board based its denial of asylum on the fact that
    first, Cece did not belong to a cognizable social group and
    second, she would have been able to relocate safely within
    Albania. The Board therefore had no need to address the
    immigration judge’s factual finding that the police were
    unable or unwilling to prevent the harm. Judge Easterbrook
    opines that the Board must be at liberty to consider this
    subject on remand. Whether or not the Board could consider
    (or reconsider) this matter on remand, however, this court is
    certainly entitled to (and indeed obligated to) review the
    decision of the immigration judge as supplemented by the
    BIA’s reasoning. Jonaitiene, 
    660 F.3d at 270
    . We review
    agency findings of fact for “substantial evidence” and may
    reverse the Immigration Judge's determinations “only if we
    determine that the evidence compels a different result.” FH–T
    v. Holder, No. 12-2471, 
    2013 WL 3800252
    , * 3 (7th Cir. July 23,
    2013). Judge Easterbrook’s conclusion that Cece faced no
    “mistreatment at public hands” is contrary to the only
    factual finding on the matter. In any event, the entirety of the
    22                                                 No. 11-1989
    discussion is unnecessary, as the Board based its decision on
    the fact that Cece’s proposed social group was not
    cognizable under the act—a holding with which we
    disagree.
    Circling back to our level of deference, now with a clear
    understanding of the Board’s definition of social group de-
    rived from Acosta, we must uphold the Board’s determina-
    tion if it is “a reasonable construction of the statute, whether
    or not it is the only possible interpretation or even the one a
    court might think best.” Holder v. Martinez-Gutierrez, 
    132 S. Ct. 2011
    , 2017 (2012) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
    sources Def. Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 843-844, and n.
    11(1984)); INS v. Orlando Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
    , 16 (2002). The
    problem here is that the Board’s decision is inconsistent with
    its decisions in other similar cases. Cece’s social group is not
    different than many of the groups approved by the BIA. For
    example, she is not unlike the women in Kasinga, supra, 21 I.
    & N. Dec. at 365-66 who were young women in a tribe that
    practices female genital mutilation. In both cases the broad
    immutable group that triggered social group status—young
    women in particular tribes in Kasinga’s case, and young
    women in Albania, in Cece’s case—could be narrowed by
    other changeable but fundamental characteristics—living
    alone in Cece’s case, and having not yet been subjected to
    female genital mutilation in Kasinga’s case. Nor is Cece un-
    like the Jordanian women who face “honor killings” because
    of the social and religious norms in Jordan, Sarhan, 
    658 F.3d at 654
    , or Christian women in Iran who do not wish to ad-
    here to the Islamic female dress code. Yadegar-Sargis, 
    297 F.3d at 603
    .
    No. 11-1989                                                 23
    In other words the social group is defined by gender plus
    one or more narrowing characteristics. Although some
    courts have toyed with the idea that gender alone can form
    the basis of a social group, we need not decide that today.
    See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 
    611 F.3d 662
    , 667 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (“Thus, we clearly acknowledged that women in a particular
    country, regardless of ethnicity or clan membership, could
    form a particular social group”); Hassan v. Gonzales, 
    484 F.3d 513
    , 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Somali females” constitute a partic-
    ular social group); Fatin v. INS, 
    12 F.3d 1233
    , 1240 (3d Cir.
    1993) (Iranian women meet the social group definition). See
    also In re A–T–, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 296
    , 304 (“gender is an immu-
    table trait that is generally recognizable”), vacated and re-
    manded, Matter of A–T–, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 617
    , Interim Decision
    3622, 
    2008 WL 4306933
     (BIA Sep 22, 2008). Although non-
    binding, the agency’s own “Gender Guidelines,” which pro-
    vide Asylum Officers with guidance on adjudicating wom-
    en's claims of asylum, provide a helpful understanding by
    noting that gender is an immutable trait that can qualify un-
    der the rubric of “particular social group.” United States Bu-
    reau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Considerations
    for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women
    ("INS Gender Guidelines"), 26 May 1995, available at:
    http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b31e7.html [ac-
    cessed July 25, 2013]. And the Office of the United Nations
    High Commissioner for Refugees (again, not authoritative,
    but informative) has made clear that “women may constitute
    a particular social group under certain circumstances based
    on the common characteristic of sex, whether or not they as-
    sociate with one another based on that shared characteris-
    tic.” UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Member-
    24                                                  No. 11-1989
    ship of a Particular Social Group, at 4 (HCR/GIP/02/02, 7 May
    2002).
    Because Cece’s group cannot be distinguished from oth-
    ers with immutable and fundamental traits, the Board’s de-
    cision is inconsistent with its own precedent.
    When an administrative agency’s decisions are incon-
    sistent, a court cannot pick one of the inconsistent
    lines and defer to that one, unless only one is within
    the scope of the agency’s discretion to interpret the
    statutes it enforces or to make policy as Congress’s
    delegate … . Such picking and choosing would con-
    done arbitrariness and usurp the agency's responsibil-
    ities.
    Gatimi, 
    578 F.3d at 616
     (internal citations omitted). In this
    case, the Board has offered no explanation for why Cece’s
    group is not cognizable under the test the Board has adopted
    in Acosta. Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 
    464 F.3d 770
    , 772 (7th Cir.
    2006). Or, more specifically, why being a young woman liv-
    ing alone in Albania does not qualify as a social group when
    the attributes are immutable or fundamental. The issue of
    whether a particular social group is cognizable is a question
    of law on which the Board erred. Escobar, 
    657 F.3d at 542
    . See
    also, Ayala, 
    640 F.3d at 1096-97
    ; Castaneda-Castillo, 
    638 F.3d at 363
    ; Crespin-Valladares, 
    632 F.3d at 124
    ; Gomez-Zuluaga, 
    527 F.3d at 339
    ; Malonga, 
    546 F.3d at 553
    ; Castillo-Arias, 
    446 F.3d at 1195
    ; Cruz-Funez, 
    406 F.3d at 1191
    . The Board’s decision
    cannot stand and must be reconsidered on remand: Cece has
    established that she belongs to a cognizable social group.
    No. 11-1989                                                  25
    We are well aware of the limits of our review set forth in
    Gonzales v. Thomas, 
    547 U.S. 183
    , 185-86 (2006) (per curium)
    and INS v. Orlando Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
    , 16-17 (2002) (per cu-
    rium). An appellate court errs by deciding in the first in-
    stance, without giving the Board the first opportunity on
    remand, whether a proposed social group is cognizable
    within the meaning of the Act. 
    Id.
     The judge and Board had
    before them all of the facts pertaining to Cece’s proposed so-
    cial group and yet determined that her social group was not
    cognizable under the Act. This was error in light of the
    Board’s own precedent in Acosta.
    III.
    The Board also found that there was insufficient evidence
    in the record that internal relocation was not a feasible
    means of avoiding the persecution of which Cece complains.
    The Board, however, ignored the fact, emphasized through-
    out the hearing and appeals, that Cece had lived safely in
    Tirana only while living with her sister in her sister’s univer-
    sity dormitory. Once her sister left Tirana and Cece had to
    move from the dormitory, she was again at risk. (R. 168-172).
    The Albanian expert testified at length that Albania was a
    small country and that it would be difficult to hide any-
    where. (R. 231). Even in the big city of Tirana, people tended
    to live in family or clan groupings, and a young single wom-
    an living alone would stick out as an anomaly. 
    Id.
     The expert
    also surmised that Cece faced an increased risk of being tar-
    geted simply because of her previous status as a target, i.e.
    she was already known to traffickers. (R. 229, 230, 257). The
    immigration judge acknowledged the expert’s testimony on
    these facts and was troubled by the Board’s conclusion that
    26                                                         No. 11-1989
    Cece could move safely within Albania notwithstanding the
    facts that “she is a young woman from a minority religion
    who has lived by herself most of the time in Albania, and
    thus is vulnerable, particularly vulnerable to traffickers for
    those reasons.” (R. 120). The immigration judge then con-
    cluded, “I do not agree with the Board’s conclusion, but I am
    required to follow it.” 
    Id.
     The Board, in its order, had but this
    to say about her ability to relocate: “we once again find that
    there is insufficient evidence in the record that internal relo-
    cation is not reasonable.” 8 (R. 9). The Board’s decision lacked
    any discussion or analysis of the issue. Thus the only evi-
    dence-based analysis we have is that of the immigration
    judge whose conclusion is that Cece could not safely relocate
    within Tirana. Nevertheless the Board held that she could.
    The Board’s conclusion is not supported by substantial evi-
    dence. Vahora v. Holder, 
    626 F.3d 907
    , 912-913 (7th Cir. 2010)
    (“Under the substantial evidence standard, the agency’s de-
    termination will stand if it is supported by reasonable, sub-
    stantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as
    a whole.”). Indeed it is not supported by evidence of any
    kind whatsoever. The only evidence in the record is that
    Cece felt safe in Tirana only so long as she was not living
    alone—a status quo that ended as soon as her last family
    member left the country. An asylum applicant is entitled to a
    reasoned analysis of her case supported by relevant, proba-
    8 In its first order, before remand, the Board simply stated that “the
    applicant appears to have successfully relocated within Albania. There is
    insufficient evidence in the record that she has a well-founded fear of
    persecution in Tirane or in another city within Albania, outside of Korçë
    … there is no indication that Reqi (or any other trafficker) tried or was
    motivated to pursue the applicant outside of Korçë.” (R. 331).
    No. 11-1989                                               27
    tive evidence. Mustafa, 707 F.3d at 754. A failure to provide
    such a reasoned analysis requires remand. Kadia v. Holder,
    
    557 F.3d 464
    , 467 (7th Cir. 2009).
    We therefore grant the petition for review and remand to
    the agency for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
    ion.
    28                                                  No. 11-1989
    EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, dissenting. Cece defines, as the
    “social group” at risk of persecution, “young Albanian
    women in danger of being trafficked as prostitutes.” At ear-
    lier stages of these proceedings she made different pro-
    posals, but this is the definition in her appellate briefs. My
    colleagues hold that the Board of Immigration Appeals erred
    by not treating “young Albanian women who live alone” as
    her social group. Put to one side the fact that Cece does not
    ask us to define a social group that way. Whether the group
    is “young Albanian women in danger of being trafficked as
    prostitutes” or “young Albanian women who live alone”,
    Cece isn’t in it. Her own expert defined “young” as 16 to 26
    or 27. Cece is 34. The basis for her claim of asylum is future
    risk; she does not argue that she suffered persecution before
    leaving Albania, so the fact that she is not a member of her
    own proposed group should be dispositive. (Perhaps Cece
    looks younger than her age and would be targeted by mis-
    take, but she does not argue this.)
    Then there is the question “how much risk is too much?”
    Cece’s expert did not attempt to quantify the risk that young
    Albanian women living alone face, nor does the majority.
    That many of Western Europe’s prostitutes are Albanians
    does not tell us how many are in the sex trade involuntarily.
    The State Department tries to estimate risk. Its Human Traf-
    ficking Report 2012 finds that 84 complaints about trafficking
    were made to Albanian public agencies during 2011. Report
    at 64. Nongovernmental groups (NGOs) reported more: they
    counted 132 Albanian trafficking victims in 2011. 
    Ibid.
     The
    number of young women living alone in Albania is substan-
    tially higher. The State Department ranks nations into four
    tiers (1, 2, 2 Watch List, and 3), with Tier 1 representing the
    best performance. 
    Id. at 51
    . Albania is in Tier 2, as are Greece,
    No. 11-1989                                                   29
    Hong Kong, Japan, Switzerland, and more than 60 other na-
    tions. 
    Id. at 52
    . Fifty-one nations are in tiers 2WL or 3, below
    Albania. 
    Ibid.
     Deplorable as human trafficking is, any given
    woman’s danger in Albania may be modest.
    Whatever risk Cece faces comes from criminals, not from
    the government, yet “persecution” means mistreatment at
    public hands. See Hor v. Gonzales, 
    421 F.3d 497
     (7th Cir. 2005);
    Bitsin v. Holder, 
    719 F.3d 619
    , 628–31 (7th Cir. 2013). Crime
    may be rampant in Albania, but it is common in the United
    States too. People are forced into prostitution in Chicago.
    See, e.g., United States v. Cephus, 
    684 F.3d 703
     (7th Cir. 2012).
    Must Canada grant asylum to young women who fear pros-
    titution in the United States, or who dread the risk of vio-
    lence in or near public-housing projects? If there were reason
    to think the Albanian government in cahoots with the traf-
    fickers, Cece would have a better case; but when the record
    shows no more than ineffective law enforcement, there’s no
    basis to infer persecution. Meghani v. INS, 
    236 F.3d 843
    , 847
    (7th Cir. 2001).
    I can see why we ought not make anything turn today on
    the facts that Cece is 34 years old, that the number of traf-
    ficking victims in Albania may be under 150 annually, and
    that any risk comes from private criminals rather than public
    policy: the BIA did not do so, and the Chenery doctrine (SEC
    v. Chenery Corp., 
    318 U.S. 80
    , 87 (1943)) limits reviewing
    courts to the agency’s grounds of decision. Perhaps the
    Board will consider these issues on remand.
    When tackling this subject, the Board may wish to con-
    sider whether a government’s inability to protect people
    from criminals is a form of persecution. Equating inability to
    control crime with unwillingness to do so (a form of perse-
    30                                                   No. 11-1989
    cution because it reflects public policy disfavoring a person
    or group) first appeared in a decision of the Board in 1964.
    See Matter of Eusaph, 
    10 I&N Dec. 453
    , 454 (1964). The formu-
    la has been repeated many times, e.g., Matter of Pierre, 
    15 I&N Dec. 461
    , 462 (1975); Matter of Kasinga, 
    21 I&N Dec. 357
    ,
    365 (1996), without explaining why “unable” has the same
    effect as “unwilling”—or quantifying what “unable” means.
    The Board appears to be happy with this formula, but its
    utility is limited when we do not know how much shortfall
    in law enforcement counts as “inability” to protect citizens.
    A remand is unnecessary even on the majority’s views
    about the social-group question, however. The Board found
    that Cece could live safely in Tirana, though perhaps not in
    her parents’ city. Part III of the majority’s opinion declares
    that this decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
    As Judge Manion shows, however, the Board had, and gave,
    the best of all possible reasons: that Cece had moved to Tira-
    na and was not followed or accosted there. Indeed, Cece does not
    even contend that the person who pursued her in Korçë
    learned that she was in Tirana or attempted to locate her (or
    anyone else) outside of Korçë. Cece’s expert witness testified
    that Tirana is a collection of enclaves and that people find
    things out; this might have led the Board to conclude that
    Cece was at risk there after her sister left. But the inference is
    permissive, not compulsory. An agency is entitled to give
    more weight to what actually happened than to what could
    have happened. Cece’s untroubled time in Tirana is “sub-
    stantial evidence” for the Board’s conclusion. See INS v. Eli-
    as-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992) (if the record allows rea-
    sonable disagreement, the Board’s decision must stand).
    No. 11-1989                                                  31
    Cece’s brief in conjunction with the rehearing en banc
    makes a different argument: that it is not reasonable to re-
    quire her to relocate to Tirana, even if she would be safe. See
    
    8 C.F.R. §1208.13
    (b)(2)(ii). According to Cece, the Board
    should have deemed relocation unreasonable because she
    had no relatives in Tirana after her sister left. Yet every year
    millions of persons move to cities where they are strangers;
    they make new friends (or acquire new relatives) afterward.
    A person who left Tirana for Rome, and then left Rome for
    Chicago, is hard pressed to contend that it would not be
    “reasonable” to think that she could have lived closer to her
    relatives, even if none was in the neighborhood. (Korçë and
    Tirana are 110 miles apart.)
    Although I think the majority mistaken in its treatment of
    Cece’s specific claim, I am more concerned by its treatment
    of the Board’s doctrine. My colleagues recognize that the
    statute does not define the term “social group” and that
    Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
    
    467 U.S. 837
     (1984), therefore applies to the Board’s gap-
    filling work. See Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 
    132 S. Ct. 2011
    ,
    2017 (2012); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 
    526 U.S. 415
    , 424–26
    (1999). Yet the dispositions of this and other cases demon-
    strate that the Seventh Circuit has rejected the Board’s ap-
    proach and established its own—one under which everyone
    belongs to a “social group” and the question whether that
    membership caused the persecution drops out of considera-
    tion. (It drops out because, when the asserted criteria of per-
    secution are used to define the “social group,” the process is
    circular.)
    The Immigration and Nationality Act permits federal of-
    ficials to grant asylum to aliens who seek refuge here “be-
    32                                                  No. 11-1989
    cause of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
    on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
    particular social group, or political opinion”. 
    8 U.S.C. §1101
    (a)(42)(A). Cece does not contend that her race, nation-
    ality, or politics mattered to the traffickers (or to any Albani-
    an public official), and although she initially argued that she
    was at risk because of her religion she has abandoned that
    contention. This leaves “social group.”
    What the Seventh Circuit has done in this and other re-
    cent cases is read “because of … membership in a particular
    social group” in a way that includes everyone threatened by
    criminals, rebels, or anyone else a nation’s government does
    not control. This makes eligible for asylum everyone who
    faces a substantial risk of harm in his native land, no matter
    the reason.
    The Board of Immigration Appeals has established, in
    decisions the court concedes we must respect, several re-
    quirements of social-group status. One is that a “social
    group” entails a characteristic that is either immutable or so
    important that no one should be required to change it. See
    Matter of Acosta, 
    19 I&N Dec. 211
    , 233–34 (1985); Matter of
    Kasinga, 
    21 I&N Dec. 357
    , 365–66 (1996). Age changes; that’s
    why decisions such as Vance v. Bradley, 
    440 U.S. 93
     (1979), re-
    ject arguments that age must be treated like race or sex for
    legal purposes. Whether a person lives alone also is subject
    to change. People may marry, live with relatives, or join forc-
    es with similarly situated persons. Many single women live
    with other single women. A group such as “young Albanian
    women who live alone” therefore flunks the Board’s test on
    multiple grounds, even if we treat marital status as the sort
    of thing that no one should be required to change.
    No. 11-1989                                                  33
    Another series of cases in this circuit expands the scope
    of “social group” by a different route. It asks whether the al-
    ien used to be at risk. For example, Escobar v. Holder, 
    657 F.3d 537
     (7th Cir. 2011), holds that an alien is eligible for asylum
    as a member of a “social group” that comprises truckers who
    ever opposed a band of Colombian rebels. Events of a decade
    ago cannot be changed; the past is “immutable”; thus the
    Board’s primary defense against limitless expansion of “so-
    cial group” vanishes. Everyone who seeks asylum in the
    United States can point to some event in the past, and as the
    past can’t be changed this event becomes the basis for a
    claim based on an “immutable characteristic.” See, e.g.,
    Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 
    464 F.3d 770
     (7th Cir. 2006) (former
    employees of a public agency are a social group); Benitez
    Ramos v. Holder, 
    589 F.3d 426
     (7th Cir. 2009) (former criminal-
    gang members are a social group).
    Some people might be inclined to ask: Why not just treat
    everyone as belonging to a social group and skip to the ques-
    tion whether persecution occurred? The answer is that the
    statute makes membership in a group (or classification by
    race, religion, or politics) essential to analysis of the sup-
    posed persecution. The agency must decide whether a per-
    son has been persecuted “on account of” membership in the
    group (or because of politics, race, etc.). You can’t sensibly
    ask about cause without deciding what differentiates the
    applicant from other persons. To know whether X has been
    persecuted on account of Y, it is essential to know what Y is.
    The Board has tried to define groups by fixed attributes
    (such as “member of the Yoruba tribe” or “born in Korçë”). It
    is only after defining a group that it becomes possible to ask
    the statutory question: whether membership in that group is
    the reason for the adverse treatment.
    34                                                 No. 11-1989
    Cece is a member of one social group that the Board
    probably would acknowledge: Albanian women. But she
    does not contend that she fears persecution because of those
    characteristics. She does not say that the government of Al-
    bania persecutes Albanian women. Indeed, she does not con-
    tend that Albania discriminates in any way by national
    origin or sex. She does not maintain that police and courts
    protect male victims of crime but not female victims; instead
    she tells us that Albania’s system of law enforcement is
    weak. Failure to achieve optimal deterrence is unfortunate
    but not “persecution” by any useful understanding. That’s
    why Cece proposed a group such as “young Albanian wom-
    en in danger of being trafficked as prostitutes.” The qualifi-
    cations that distinguish this proposal from “all Albanian
    women”—age, living alone, and the criminal enterprise of
    sex traffickers—all fail the Board’s filters.
    The BIA has held that a “social group” cannot be identi-
    fied by asking who was mistreated. Matter of C– A–, 
    23 I&N Dec. 951
    , 956 (2006). For if the persecutors’ acts define social
    groups, then again §1101(a)(42)(A) effectively offers asylum
    to all mistreated persons, whether or not race, religion, poli-
    tics, or some extrinsically defined characteristics (such as
    tribal membership) account for the persecution. And again
    this court professes to accept the Board’s position—though
    with the proviso that it applies only when the persecutors’
    acts are the entire definition (opinion at 12–13, which uses
    “only” or “solely” or “merely” four times, putting three of
    the four in italics for emphasis). Thus although the Board
    concluded that “young Albanian women in danger of being
    trafficked as prostitutes” flunks, the majority rules otherwise
    because “danger of being trafficked as prostitutes” is not the
    sole component of the definition. That is not what Chevron
    No. 11-1989                                                    35
    requires. We have not applied the Board’s definition. We
    have rewritten it.
    Under this court’s approach, any person mistreated in his
    native country can specify a “social group” and then show in
    circular fashion that the mistreatment occurred because of
    membership in that ad hoc group. Anyone threatened or in-
    jured in the past has an “immutable” characteristic (the past
    can’t be changed), and the selection criteria used by the per-
    secutor (here, people who want to force others into prostitu-
    tion) become the defining characteristics of the “social
    group”. The structure of §1101(a)(42)(A) unravels.
    The majority accuses the Board of inconsistency (opinion
    at 22–25), but the BIA has been inconsistent by the court’s
    standard, not its own. For example, the “social group” in
    Kasinga, which the court calls “not unlike” Cece’s (opinion at
    22), was a tribe. The Board sees a big difference between
    tribal groups (membership is immutable and extrinsic to the
    choices made by criminals) and “young Albanian women in
    danger of being trafficked as prostitutes” (defined in part by
    changeable characteristics and in part by who criminals tar-
    get). The majority says that it does not see a difference, so
    the Board must be inconsistent. That’s a statement about ju-
    dicial rejection of the Board’s doctrine, not about how the
    Board administers its own approach.
    I grant that some of the inconsistency is real—it has been
    forced on the Board by judicial refusal to accept its approach
    to defining “social group.” Our court has discarded not only
    the immutability and don’t-use-the-wrongdoers’-perspective
    rules but also another component of the Board’s definition:
    social visibility. See, e.g., Gatimi v. Holder, 
    578 F.3d 611
    , 614–
    15 (7th Cir. 2009); majority opinion at 5 n.1. Other circuits
    36                                                  No. 11-1989
    have allowed the Board to use the “visibility” criterion but
    have revised or rejected different parts of the Board’s defini-
    tion of “social group.” See, e.g., Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 
    509 F.3d 70
     (2d Cir. 2007) (approving the “visibility” standard
    and adding that changeable attributes such as wealth do not
    identify a social group); Castillo-Arias v. Attorney General, 
    446 F.3d 1190
     (11th Cir. 2006) (denying a petition to set aside the
    decision in C– A–). The Board tries to apply circuit law—
    and, when it does so, is accused of abandoning its own defi-
    nition or applying it inconsistently.
    The majority says that it accepts the Board’s approach.
    Yet in case after case, of which today’s is just a sample, we set
    aside the Board’s decisions. I have already mentioned Esco-
    bar, Gatimi, Sepulveda, and Benitez Ramos. Here are a few
    more: Sarhan v. Holder, 
    658 F.3d 649
     (7th Cir. 2011); Torres v.
    Mukasey, 
    551 F.3d 616
     (7th Cir. 2008); Agbor v. Gonzales, 
    487 F.3d 499
     (7th Cir. 2007); Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, 
    423 F.3d 666
     (7th Cir. 2005); Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 
    297 F.3d 596
    (7th Cir. 2002). The meaning of a legal standard lies in its
    application to concrete facts. That the BIA and this court
    regularly reach different decisions on identical facts shows
    that they are applying different legal standards.
    This is a particularly poor case for our court to nix the
    Board’s approach, because at least two other circuits have
    held that the agency properly denied asylum claims identi-
    cal to Cece’s. The majority concedes (opinion at 14) that its
    decision conflicts with Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 
    420 F.3d 551
    , 555–
    56 (6th Cir. 2005). It also conflicts with Gjura v. Holder, 502
    Fed. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit’s initial
    opinion, 
    695 F.3d 223
    , held that the Board acted within its
    discretion in concluding that “young, unmarried Albanian
    No. 11-1989                                                  37
    women” is not a social group. The court then issued a re-
    placement opinion denying the petition on the ground that
    sex traffickers are private actors whose criminal conduct
    does not demonstrate persecution by public officials. Cece
    would have lost in the Second Circuit for either of these rea-
    sons. As far as I can see this circuit stands alone in disman-
    tling the BIA’s approach so thoroughly that the agency must
    recognize social groups such as “young Albanian women in
    danger of being trafficked as prostitutes” or “young Albani-
    an women who live alone” and treat members of that group
    as victims of persecution.
    The majority expresses sympathy for Cece and other ap-
    plicants for asylum. Yet the choice whether to be strict or le-
    nient belongs to the agency, not to the court. See, e.g., INS v.
    Phinpathya, 
    464 U.S. 183
     (1984); INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 
    450 U.S. 139
     (1981). The Board has chosen to make “social group” do
    real work. This court effectively reads it out of the statute
    and directs the agency to ask only whether an alien faces a
    significant risk for any reason. This intrudes on the sort of
    choice Congress has committed to the Executive Branch. The
    Attorney General could direct the Board to ditch Acosta and
    C– A–, but as long as the political branches of government
    stand by them, Chevron requires the judiciary to implement
    their choices.
    One final observation. Cece entered the United States by
    fraud, pretending to be from a nation whose citizens do not
    need visas to visit. See Bayo v. Napolitano, 
    593 F.3d 495
     (7th
    Cir. 2010) (en banc). She started that journey from Rome and
    has never contended that she feared sex trafficking in Italy.
    Her fraud thus is not mitigated by a need to escape from
    danger. The Board has concluded that entering the United
    38                                                  No. 11-1989
    States by fraud, when danger is not imminent, is a strongly
    adverse factor in the discretionary decision whether to grant
    asylum. See Alsagladi v. Gonzales, 
    450 F.3d 700
     (7th Cir. 2006);
    Matter of Pula, 
    19 I&N Dec. 467
     (1987). Although the court
    decides today that Cece is eligible for asylum, it does not hold
    that she is entitled to it; that question, at least, remains open
    to decision on remand.
    No. 11-1989                                                  39
    MANION, Circuit Judge, with whom EASTERBROOK, Chief
    Judge, joins, dissenting.
    I.
    After illegally entering the United States using a false
    Italian passport, Johana Cece sought asylum. To be eligible for
    asylum, applicants must show that they are “unable or
    unwilling to return” to the country of their nationality
    “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
    on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
    particular social group, or political opinion.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A).
    In seeking asylum, Cece claimed she both had suffered past
    persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution.
    The Board, however, concluded that Cece had not established
    past persecution, R. 330, and Cece does not challenge that
    determination on appeal. The Board also concluded that Cece
    was not entitled to asylum on the basis of a well-founded fear
    of future persecution because Cece had not “established that
    she fears persecution based upon one of the protected grounds
    under the Act.” R. 330. The Board further found that “there is
    [in]sufficient evidence in the record … that internal relocation
    is not reasonable.” R. 331.
    The en banc court holds that “Cece has established that she
    belongs to a cognizable social group,” Opinion at 24, namely
    “young Albanian women who live alone.” Opinion at 16. And
    that the immigration judge and Board erred in determining
    “that her social group was not cognizable under the Act.”
    Opinion at 25. The en banc court further holds that the Board’s
    conclusion that Cece could safely relocate in Albania was not
    40                                                 No. 11-1989
    supported by substantial evidence, and grants the petition for
    review and remands to the agency for further proceedings.
    Opinion at 26–27.
    In holding that “Cece has established that she belongs to a
    cognizable social group,” Opinion at 24, the en banc court
    discusses at length the complexity of defining a “social group.”
    See Opinion at 6–25. As discussed below, I have several
    concerns with the court’s analysis. However, even if the en banc
    court is correct that “young Albanian women who live alone,”
    is a “social group” within the meaning of the INA, her petition
    for review should nonetheless be denied because substantial
    evidence supports the Board’s finding that Cece did not
    present sufficient evidence that internal relocation is not
    reasonable. That finding alone dooms Cece’s asylum petition
    and accordingly we should deny Cece’s petition for review.
    I DISSENT.
    II.
    A. Social Group
    As the en banc court explains, “Congress did not directly
    address what it meant to be a protected ‘social group’ in the
    Immigration and Nationality Act, so we look to see how the
    agency has interpreted the statue.” Opinion at 7–8. The court
    then notes that the Board defined “social group” in Matter of
    Acosta, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 211
    , 233-34 (1985), to be limited “to
    groups whose membership is defined by a characteristic that
    is either immutable or is so fundamental to individual identity
    or conscience that a person ought not be required to change.”
    Opinion at 8. We have deferred to that definition. Opinion at
    8 (citing Lwin v. INS, 
    144 F.3d 505
    , 512 (7th Cir. 1998)).
    No. 11-1989                                                          41
    My first concern with the en banc court’s holding is that the
    court’s formulation of Cece’s social group as “young Albanian
    women who live alone” does not satisfy the Board’s definition
    of “immutable” or “fundamental” characteristics. There is
    nothing immutable about “living alone.” Nor is “living alone,”
    unlike an individual’s choice to be single1 or married, “so
    fundamental to individual identity or conscience that a person
    ought not be required to change.” And there are many varia-
    tions in location and type of dwelling where a woman can
    choose to live alone.
    I also have concerns with the en banc court defining a social
    group with the subjective adjective of “young.” A shared
    characteristic of a “social group,” “must provide a clear
    demarcation, ‘permit[ting] an accurate separation of members’
    from non-members,’ … Consequently, loose descriptive
    phrases that are open-ended and that invite subjective interpre-
    tation are not sufficiently particular to describe a protected
    social group.” Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 
    675 F.3d 9
    , 15 (1st Cir.
    2012) (quoting Ahmed v. Holder, 
    611 F.3d 90
    , 94 (1st Cir. 2010).
    The use of “young,” or for that matter, “middle-aged,” or
    “old,” to define a characteristic of a social group is simply too
    amorphous; there is no clear demarcation of who fits within
    this social group. See Larios v. Holder, 
    608 F.3d 105
    , 109 (1st Cir.
    2010) (“There are, for example, questions about who may be
    considered ‘young,’ … [this is an] ambiguous group character-
    istic[], largely subjective, that fail to establish a sufficient level
    1
    The en banc court rejected the formulation of young single Albania
    women in favor of “young Albania women living alone.” Opinion at 11 n.3.
    42                                                   No. 11-1989
    of particularity.” (quoting Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 
    602 F.3d 21
    ,
    27 (1st Cir. 2010))). In fact, this case aptly illustrates the
    problem with such a subjective term. Cece’s own expert
    defined the targeted group as “young women” between the
    “ages of about 16, 17 up until probably about 26 or so but
    many minor females get caught up in this as well, children.”
    R. 473. At the time of the hearing, Cece was just two months
    shy of 27. R. 501. And so the agency’s attorney asked the expert
    whether traffickers would be interested in Cece if she were 27
    at the time she returned to Albania. R. 501. The expert re-
    sponded that “it’s certainly possible.” R. 502. But “a social
    group does not exist as such merely because words are
    sufficiently malleable to allow a litigant to sketch its margins.”
    Ahmed, 
    611 F.3d at 94
    . Now Cece is 34. R. 105. Can “16, 17 - up
    until probably about 26,” stretch further to 34? Is 34 young? It
    depends on whom you ask. And that is the problem with using
    such subjective characteristics to define a “social group.”
    Further, we should leave to the Board in the first instance
    to determine whether “living alone” and “young” should
    qualify as characteristics of a social group. As the en banc court
    recognizes, “[a]n appellate court errs by deciding in the first
    instance, without giving the Board the first opportunity on
    remand, whether a proposed social group is cognizable within
    the meaning of the Act.” Opinion at 25. The court, however,
    reasons that the immigration judge and Board erred because
    they “had before them all of the facts pertaining to Cece’s
    proposed social group and yet determined that her social
    group was not cognizable under the Act.” Opinion at 25.
    While the immigration judge and Board may have had all
    the facts pertaining to Cece’s proposed social group before it,
    No. 11-1989                                                     43
    they did not view Cece’s proposed social group as “young
    Albania woman living alone.” Rather, they viewed the social
    group as “young women who are targeted for prostitution by
    traffickers in Albania,” or “women in danger of being traf-
    ficked as prostitutes.” Opinion at 10 (citing R. 128, 131).
    Accordingly, the immigration judge and Board never consid-
    ered the propriety of the social group defined by this court, i.e.,
    “young Albania women living alone.” More specifically, the
    immigration judge and Board never considered whether
    “young” and “living alone,” could be characteristics of a social
    group. And since we lack the authority to decide in the first
    instance whether these characteristics may form a social group,
    remand is the appropriate course of action. See Gonzales v.
    Thomas, 
    547 U.S. 183
    , 186 (2006) (per curiam); INS v. Orlando
    Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
    , 16-17 (2002) (per curiam).
    There is one further complication. While Cece’s application
    for asylum and her expert witness’s testimony focused on the
    risk to young woman, human trafficking in Albania is not so
    limited. Virtually everyone in Albania is a potential target for
    human trafficking, as explained by the U.S. Embassy’s June
    2012 Trafficking in Persons Report:
    Albania is primarily a source country for
    men, women, and children subjected to sex
    trafficking and forced labor, including the
    forced begging of children. Albanian women
    and children continue to be subjected to sex
    trafficking within the country. Albanian
    victims are subjected to conditions of forced
    labor and sex trafficking in Greece, Italy,
    44                                                        No. 11-1989
    Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, and throughout
    Western Europe. Authorities reported find-
    ing trafficking victims from Greece and
    Ukraine in Albania during the year. Children
    were exploited for commercial sex, forced
    begging, and forced criminality, such as
    burglary and drug distribution; girls were
    also subjected to prostitution or forced labor
    after arranged marriage. There is evidence
    that Albanian men are subjected to forced
    labor in agriculture in Greece and other
    neighboring countries. Re-trafficking of
    Albanian victims continued to be a problem.2
    Thus, girls, boys, women, and men living in Albania are
    subjected to human trafficking. And others are targeted, as
    Cece’s expert testified, “because of the fact that the trafficker
    has something against their particular family.” R. 256. But the
    “‘generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse
    populations, of the sort which abounds in numerous countries
    and inflicts misery upon millions of innocent people daily
    around the world, generally is not sufficient to permit the
    Attorney General to grant asylum.’” Konan v. Attorney Gen. of
    U.S., 
    432 F.3d 497
    , 506 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Singh v. INS, 
    134 F.3d 963
    , 967 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 
    348 F.3d 611
    , 619 (7th Cir. 2003). Can individuals subjected to such
    “generalized lawlessness” nonetheless seek asylum by carving
    2
    http://tirana.usembassy.gov/press-releases2/2012-press-releases/
    2012-trafficking-in-person-report--albania-june-20-2012/2012-trafficking-
    in-person-report-albania-june-20-2012.html (last visited May 8, 2013).
    No. 11-1989                                                   45
    out the immutable or fundamental characteristics that make
    them the target for that violence? In other words, could
    virtually every Albania obtain “social group” status by
    identifying the characteristics that make them a target for
    human trafficking, when as Cece’s own expert testified,
    “[m]ost of the time, however, [human trafficking] has simply
    to do with economics.” R. 256. What about: “Young strong
    men,” targeted for human trafficking for forced labor; “handi-
    capped boys,” targeted for human trafficking for forced
    begging; “strong boys,” targeted for human trafficking for
    burglary; “pretty girls,” targeted for sexual exploitation; and
    “young woman living alone,” targeted for prostitution?
    When the scourge of human trafficking targets such a broad
    segment of the population, if not the entirety of the population,
    it may well seem that what the victims have in common is not
    an immutable or fundamental trait, but the unfortunate
    circumstance of being targeted for any offensive purpose. That
    may explain why the Board concluded that this was not a
    “social group” within the meaning of the INA: because it is
    “defined in large part by the harm inflicted on the group, and
    does not exist independently of the traffickers.” R. 9.
    Accord Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 
    420 F.3d 551
    , 555-56 (6th Cir 2005);
    see also Escobar v. Holder, 
    657 F.3d 537
    , 545 (7th Cir. 2011)
    (holding that a social group “cannot be defined solely by the
    fact that its members suffer persecution from the government
    or from a group that the government cannot or will not
    control”). But rather than rejecting Cece’s proposed social
    group because it is defined in large part by the harm inflicted
    on the group, as the Board did, the better approach might be to
    46                                                  No. 11-1989
    instead recognize that the problem is one of generalized
    lawlessness.
    However, in the final analysis, we need not reach these
    difficult questions because, as discussed below, even if Cece
    identified a social group within the meaning of the INA, and
    presented a case of persecution—as opposed to generalized
    lawlessness—Cece still cannot prevail on her request for
    asylum because the Board found that “there is [in]sufficient
    evidence in the record … that internal relocation is not reason-
    able.” R. 331.
    B. Internal Relocation
    Because Cece’s application for asylum is based on a well-
    founded fear of future persecution, in addition to proving that
    she is unable or unwilling to return to Albania because of her
    membership in a particular social group, she also bears the
    added burden of proving she cannot reasonably relocate to
    another part of her home country to avoid persecution.
    Oryakhil v. Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 993
    , 998 (7th Cir. 2008). “The
    immigration regulations contemplate two separate inquiries to
    determine whether an applicant could reasonably relocate
    within his home country: (1) whether safe relocation is possi-
    ble, and if so, (2) whether it would be reasonable to expect the
    applicant to safely relocate.” 
    Id.
    In this case, the Board found that Cece failed to meet her
    burden to show that internal relocation was not reasonable.
    The en banc court holds that the Board’s conclusion is not
    supported by substantial evidence because its decision lacked
    any discussion or analysis of the issue, but merely stated “we
    once again find that there is insufficient evidence in the record
    No. 11-1989                                                    47
    that internal relocation is not reasonable.” Opinion at 26. But
    in the Board’s first order before remand, it had already
    explained its reasoning. There was no need for the Board to
    restate the same analysis in the second appeal.
    Turning then to the analysis of the issue of internal reloca-
    tion contained in the Board’s first order. The Board explained
    that, after [Cece] moved to Tirane, she felt safe and
    protected and there is no indication that she had any
    further problems. See Tr. at 59-60. There is no indica-
    tion that anyone was looking for the applicant in
    Tirane, nor pursuing her there. See Tr. at 35 (indicat-
    ing that nothing happened to the applicant in
    Tirane). Thus, the applicant appears to have success-
    fully relocated within Albania. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(3)(1). There is insufficient indication in
    the record that she has a well-founded fear of
    persecution in Tirane or in another city within
    Albania, outside of Korce. The applicant testified
    that, “if [Reqi] wanted to come after me, he’d find
    me anywhere.” See Tr. at 34. However, there is no
    indication that Reqi (or any other trafficker) tried or
    was motivated to pursue the applicant outside of
    Korce. Thus, we find that the applicant failed to
    meet her burden of proof in this case.
    R. 330-331.
    The Board then concluded: “In sum, we can not find that
    there is sufficient evidence in the record … that internal
    relocation is not reasonable.” R. 331.
    48                                                  No. 11-1989
    The Board’s conclusion that Cece failed to show that safe
    relocation was not reasonable was supported by substantial
    evidence. Following her encounter with Reqi, Cece successfully
    relocated to Tirane and while there obtained a job teaching
    English. It is true that Cece was not living alone in Tirane—she
    was living in a dormitory room she shared with three other
    single women. But Cece was not homebound. She had to go to
    and from work, and about her daily affairs. Not once during
    the year Cece lived in Tirane was she approached by Reqi or
    anyone else. While Cece claimed Reqi could find her anywhere,
    the Board could reasonably conclude, as it did, that because no
    one had approached Cece in Tirane, neither Reqi nor any other
    trafficker was motivated to pursue Cece outside of Korce. And
    given Cece’s testimony that she had no problems in Tirane, the
    Board could reasonably conclude that “[t]here is insufficient
    indication in the record that she has a well-founded fear of
    persecution in Tirane or in another city within Albania, outside
    of Korce.” True, if she were living alone in Tirane she would fit
    one (of the many) profiles of those targeted by criminals. But
    when the profile of those targeted by criminals is so broad, as
    it is here, something more is necessary—some evidence that
    the individual has a well-founded fear that she will be targeted.
    In her case, Cece offered no evidence that she would actually
    be targeted in Korce and thus that she had a well-founded fear
    of persecution there. Without such evidence, the Board could
    reasonably conclude that Cece did not meet her burden of
    showing that internal relocation was not reasonable. Accord-
    ingly, the Board did not err in denying Cece’s application for
    asylum and the petition for review should be denied.
    I DISSENT.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1989

Citation Numbers: 733 F.3d 662, 2013 WL 4083282, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16533

Judges: Easterbrook, Posner, Flaum, Manion, Kanne, Rovner, Wood, Williams, Sykes, Tinder, Hamilton

Filed Date: 8/9/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

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