Campbell, James v. Miller, Frank ( 2004 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-3018
    JAMES CAMPBELL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    FRANK MILLER, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 01:03-CV-0180-SEB-VSS—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED FEBRUARY 11, 2004—DECIDED JUNE 28, 2004
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit
    Judges.
    EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Police in Indianapolis
    arrested James Campbell for possessing marijuana. Be-
    cause the local jail is crowded, Indianapolis does not make
    a full custodial arrest of each person arrested for a misde-
    meanor; instead it issues a summons and citation. Before
    releasing Campbell, however, the police conducted a
    body-cavity search for drugs. Nothing was found, and no
    criminal prosecution ensued. Campbell then sued ten
    officers, the Chief of Police, and the City of Indianapolis,
    under 42 U.S.C. §1983, contending that the search violated
    the fourth amendment. He seeks not only damages but also
    2                                                No. 03-3018
    an injunction against this practice. The district court denied
    Campbell’s request for a preliminary injunction, concluding
    that he has an adequate remedy at law. He immediately
    appealed under 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1).
    Campbell supposes that money never is an adequate
    remedy for a constitutional wrong. That belief is incorrect.
    See Sampson v. Murray, 
    415 U.S. 61
    , 89-92 (1974); Second
    City Music, Inc. v. Chicago, 
    333 F.3d 846
    (7th Cir. 2003);
    Webb v. Ball State University, 
    167 F.3d 1146
    (7th Cir.
    1999). Damages are a normal, and adequate, response to an
    improper search or seizure, which as a constitutional tort
    often is analogized to (other) personal-injury litigation. See,
    e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 
    471 U.S. 261
    (1985). Erroneous
    grants of injunctive relief that hamper enforcement of the
    criminal law have the potential to cause havoc, while
    erroneous awards (or denials) of damages to a single person
    have more limited ability to injure the general public.
    Judges are fallible, so the costs of false positives always
    must be considered when choosing among remedies. When
    the costs of false negatives are low—and this is what it
    means to say that the remedy at law is adequate—there is
    correspondingly slight reason to incur the risk of premature
    or overbroad injunctive relief. Campbell’s suit is just getting
    under way, and the City has not had a full opportunity to
    explain and justify its practices. Once this litigation has run
    its course, the decision will have precedential effect even if
    the only remedy is monetary. If this court decides that the
    City’s practice is unconstitutional then it must cease
    whether or not a formal injunction issues (for the prospect
    of damages paid to thousands of suspects would bring the
    City into line). If, however, the City prevails in the end, or
    suffers only a partial defeat, then avoiding premature
    injunctive relief will prove to have been a wise exercise of
    restraint.
    What is more, it is difficult to see how a court could issue
    an injunction at Campbell’s behest. Unless the same events
    No. 03-3018                                                3
    are likely to happen again to him there is no controversy
    between him and the City about the City’s future handling
    of other arrests. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 
    423 U.S. 147
    (1975). Campbell has sought to represent all persons
    arrested for misdemeanors, but the district court has not
    certified that class and may never do so. Thus Campbell
    cannot rely on the prospect that other arrested persons may
    be subjected to body-cavity searches. Cf. Los Angeles v.
    Lyons, 
    461 U.S. 95
    (1983). He represents his own interests,
    not those of third parties. Only if he is apt to be arrested
    and searched again would prospective relief be apt, and
    nothing in this record suggests that Campbell is a repeat
    offender. He alleges, to the contrary, that he does not use
    drugs and has never been arrested before. These allegations
    mean that he is not the right party to pursue injunctive
    relief.
    AFFIRMED
    WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority
    opinion fails to address key testimony in this case—factual
    allegations which not only require this court to evaluate
    Campbell’s claim in more detail than the majority opinion
    provides, but also suggest a different result. While I regard
    the question of whether Campbell has standing for a pre-
    liminary injunction as close, I ultimately conclude that he
    has satisfied that constitutional requirement and has also
    demonstrated the inadequacy of money damages. For these
    reasons, I dissent.
    4                                                    No. 03-3018
    I. Additional Background1
    1
    Because the district court made limited findings of fact, my
    summary is taken from testimony presented in the preliminary
    injunction hearing and the parties’ briefs. While the factual al-
    legations discussed in the body of my dissent are those that are
    most germane to this case’s analysis, I offer this brief summary to
    put Campbell’s encounter with the police in context:
    Campbell, employed as the School Transportation and Security
    Supervisor for Perry Township, testified that on June 14, 2002 at
    about 8 p.m., he parked his car and began walking towards the
    house of his friend, Kimo Parham, an insurance product analyst.
    According to defendant Officer Frank Miller, it was still light
    outside. Officer Miller recounted that he saw Campbell walking
    towards Parham’s home and told Campbell to stop. Unsure of the
    officer’s motives, Campbell stated that he continued to walk
    towards Parham’s residence, hoping to get close enough so that,
    in Campbell’s words, “somebody inside would hear what was going
    on and come outside to observe what was going on.” Officer Miller
    testified that he then drew his weapon, told Campbell to drop to
    the ground, and then handcuffed him. Parham, who testified that
    he was expecting Campbell, stated that he saw Campbell being
    handcuffed, asked what was happening, and heard Officer Miller
    comment that Campbell fit the description of a fleeing suspect.
    Campbell testified that once Officer Miller said that the suspect
    fled on foot, he asked Officer Miller whether he had seen Camp-
    bell exit his car in front of Parham’s house. Campbell and Parham
    testified that there was no mention of drugs made at that time.
    Shortly thereafter, defendants Officers Andrew Lamle and Scott
    Wolfe arrived. Officer Miller conducted a pat-down search of
    Campbell and found nothing. Officer Miller told Wolfe that
    Campbell had dropped something by a car in the driveway (al-
    though Campbell disputes that he dropped anything). Wolfe then
    picked up a plastic baggie containing marijuana from the ground.
    Defendant Officer Kevin Duley, the officer who had been pursuing
    the fleeing suspect, testified that about ten minutes after the pat-
    down, he arrived and stated that he did not want to arrest
    Campbell because he had not seen the face of the suspect who fled
    from him.
    (continued...)
    No. 03-3018                                                      5
    The majority correctly notes that Indianapolis police of-
    ficers subjected Campbell to a body cavity search; however,
    the majority does not mention that the police conducted
    their inspection of Campbell’s genitalia and anal area in
    public, namely in the backyard, allegedly visible from the
    driveway of the home of Campbell’s friend, Kimo Parham,
    and within eye-shot of Parham (who observed the search)
    and his young children. In fact, Parham testified that he
    observed the search from a window of his home and actually
    saw Campbell’s genitals exposed.
    Not only was the body cavity search done in public, but it
    was done pursuant to Indianapolis Police Department
    (“IPD”) policy.2 This policy authorizes such “thorough body
    (...continued)
    Campbell contends that Officer Miller then told Campbell that
    due to jail overcrowding, he had to strip search him at that time
    to determine if he had drugs on him. Campbell testified that while
    in Parham’s backyard and while still handcuffed, Officer Miller
    (donning latex gloves) unbuckled Campbell’s pants and pulled
    down his underpants, exposing his genitalia, had him bend over
    slightly, and examined his buttocks and anal area. Campbell also
    testified that Officer Miller felt under Campbell’s groin area.
    Officer Miller contends that he only spread Campbell’s buttocks.
    Nothing was found as a result of the search. Officer Miller
    testified he then pulled up Campbell’s pants, gave him a summons
    to appear for possession of marijuana, and released him. Campbell
    testified no charges were ever filed.
    2
    While the district court made no findings of fact as to whether
    defendants conduct public strip and body cavity searches pursuant
    to a blanket police policy, both parties point to, and the district
    court noted, the provisions of the Executive Committee of the
    Marion County Superior Court Order of April 18, 2002 and the
    IPD General Order 18.02 as authorizing such public searches.
    The Executive Committee of the Marion County Superior Court
    Order of April 18, 2002 states “It is therefore the Order of the
    (continued...)
    6                                                   No. 03-3018
    searches” of persons charged with nonviolent misdemeanors
    including driving without a license and driving with a
    suspended license. See sources cited supra note 2. Moreover,
    Indianapolis Police Chief Jerry Barker’s testimony indicates
    that IPD officers are provided with little guidance on and
    wide discretion to conduct “thorough body search[es]” under
    this policy. In Chief Barker’s words, application of the
    policy is dependent on “[r]easonableness and discretion of
    the officer, based on the totality of the circumstances and
    [sic] officer faces,” or, as stated in the defendants’ brief, “if
    the officer feels it is necessary.”
    2
    (...continued)
    Marion Superior Court, by and through its Executive Committee
    that
    A.   The Marion County Sheriff no longer accept
    arrestees into the Marion county Lock-up who are
    only charged with the following misdemeanor
    crimes:
    1.) Possession of Marijuana
    2.) Possession of Paraphernalia
    3.) Driving with a suspended license
    4.) Operating a vehicle; never having re-
    ceived a license
    5.) Prostitution
    6.) Patronizing a prostitute
    7.) Conversion
    ....
    C.   The Marion County Sheriff advise all Law
    Enforcement agencies within Marion County to issue
    summons in lieu of arrest for the above referenced
    crimes if charges are to be filed with the Marion
    County Prosecutors’ Office.”
    IPD General Order 18.02 provides, in pertinent part, “Any officer
    making an arrest or otherwise coming into control of a prisoner
    must make an immediate and thorough body search of the
    prisoner. . . .” (emphasis added).
    No. 03-3018                                                  7
    II. Inadequacy of Money Damages
    The existence of these factual allegations, absent from the
    majority opinion, compels a closer look at Campbell’s claims
    and, in the end, different legal conclusions than those
    drawn by the majority. Several courts have recognized that,
    at the very minimum, strip and body cavity searches “give[
    ] us the most pause,” Bell v. Wolfish, 
    441 U.S. 520
    , 558
    (1979), as the invasive searches “implicate fundamental
    Fourth Amendment rights,” Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective
    and Regulatory Services, 
    299 F.3d 395
    , 404 (5th Cir. 2002).
    As the Supreme Court noted in Illinois v. Lafayette, 
    462 U.S. 640
    , 645 (1983) in its discussion of lawful inventory
    searches incident to booking and jailing,
    Police conduct that would be impractical or un-
    reasonable—or embarrassingly intrusive—on the
    street can more readily—and privately—be per-
    formed at the station. For example, the interests
    supporting a search incident to arrest would hardly
    justify disrobing an arrestee on the street, but the
    practical necessities of routine jail administration
    may even justify taking a prisoner’s clothes before
    confining him, although that step would be rare.
    Moreover, this court has characterized strip and body cavity
    searches as “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified,
    humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repul-
    sive, signifying degradation and submission . . . .” Mary
    Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 
    723 F.2d 1263
    , 1272 (7th Cir.
    1983) (quoting Tinetti v. Wittke, 
    479 F. Supp. 486
    , 491 (E.D.
    Wis. 1979), aff’d, 
    620 F.2d 160
    (7th Cir. 1980)). Finally, this
    court has stated that “we can think of few exercises of
    authority by the state that intrude on the citizen’s privacy
    and dignity as severely as the visual anal and genital
    searches practiced here.” Mary Beth 
    G., 723 F.2d at 1272
    (finding unconstitutional searches of women briefly de-
    tained for misdemeanor offenses, including driving without
    8                                                No. 03-3018
    a driver’s license, in city lockup while awaiting bail money).
    So at the very least, Campbell’s case warrants a closer look.
    Close consideration of the case at hand also compels dif-
    ferent legal conclusions. Reviewing the district court’s legal
    conclusions in its preliminary injunction ruling de novo, as
    we must, Kiel v. City of Kenosha, 
    236 F.3d 814
    , 815 (7th Cir.
    2000), this court may properly conclude Campbell lacks an
    adequate remedy at law for being subjected to a body cavity
    search in public pursuant to police policy. In Bell, the
    Supreme Court described the balancing test we are to use
    to determine whether a particular search is reasonable
    under the Fourth 
    Amendment. 441 U.S. at 559
    . That test
    weighs the magnitude of the invasion of personal privacy
    against the governmental interest in conducting the
    particular searches in 
    question. 441 U.S. at 559-60
    . More-
    over, “[o]ne of the critical, and certainly most obvious,
    elements in the Bell v. Wolfish balancing inquiry into the
    reasonableness of the strip search is ‘the place in which it
    is conducted.’ ” Logan v. Shealy, 
    660 F.2d 1007
    , 1014 (4th
    Cir. 1981) (quoting 
    Bell, 441 U.S. at 559
    ).
    This court in Mary Beth G. found that strip searches of
    women arrested for misdemeanor offenses conducted at
    the city lockup while they awaited bond were unreason-
    able under the Bell balancing test and thereby violated
    the Fourth Amendment. Mary Beth 
    G., 723 F.2d at 1273
    .
    Citing, inter alia, this court’s decision in Tinetti, the Mary
    Beth G. court found the magnitude of the state’s intrusion
    into the plaintiffs’ privacy was extremely high. 
    Id. at 1272
    (“we can think of few exercises of authority by the state that
    intrude on the citizen’s privacy and dignity as severely as
    the visual anal and genital searches practiced here” where
    detainees were made to squat and bend over to permit
    inspection of their vaginal and anal areas). The privacy con-
    cerns triggered by the particular searches under scrutiny
    were found to outweigh the City of Chicago’s proffered need
    to conduct the searches (to prevent misdemeanor offenders
    No. 03-3018                                                 9
    from bringing in weapons or contraband into the City
    lockups), as the perceived security risks of not doing the
    searches was not borne out by the evidence in the record.
    
    Id. at 1272
    -73. The searches in Mary Beth G. were con-
    ducted without even reasonable suspicion that the plaintiffs
    posed security risks to the lockup by possibly concealing
    weapons or contraband and were thereby found unconstitu-
    tional. 
    Id. at 1273.
    If the searches in Mary Beth G. were
    unreasonable when they were conducted on misdemeanor
    offenders during a brief time of detention in a City lockup
    without reasonable suspicion that they posed a security
    threat to the lockup, then it is hard to see how conducting
    a body cavity search, also during a brief period of detention,
    but in public, of a suspected misdemeanor offender, who
    incontrovertibly posed no threat to the arresting officers’
    security, could be constitutionally sound. See, e.g., Amaechi
    v. West, 
    237 F.3d 356
    , 364 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that “we
    have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of conducting a
    strip search in private” and concluding “[t]he fact that,
    absent clear justification or exigent circumstances, an
    officer is not allowed to strip an arrestee on a public street
    pursuant to a search incident to an arrest necessarily
    means that an officer cannot go even further than simply
    disrobing the arrestee by actually touching and penetrating
    the arrestee’s exposed genitalia on the public street.”);
    United States v. Ford, 
    232 F. Supp. 2d 625
    , 630 (E.D. Va.
    2002) (granting a motion to suppress, stating “[t]aking the
    Bell factors into account, the Court concludes that the police
    officer engaged in a highly invasive search by exposing the
    defendant’s buttocks on the side of a public highway in
    broad daylight, and that the search violated the defendant’s
    Fourth Amendment protection”).
    That the search of Campbell was conducted in public
    significantly increases the severity of the governmental
    intrusion involved here. The defendants’ professed reasons
    for the policy in all likelihood cannot justify such extreme
    10                                                No. 03-3018
    incursions in a person’s privacy under the Fourth
    Amendment. That the policy confers unbridled discretion on
    the officers and does not even require reasonable suspicion
    for an officer to conduct a strip and body cavity search
    (recall, the defendants write in their brief that an officer
    can submit a citizen to such a search “if the officer feels it
    is necessary”) makes the likelihood of the IPD policy’s
    unconstitutionality only greater. The Constitution clearly
    requires at least reasonable suspicion for a law enforcement
    officer to subject a person to such a search. See Mary Beth
    
    G., 723 F.2d at 1273
    ; Swain v. Spinney, 
    117 F.3d 1
    , 7 (1st
    Cir. 1997) (citing cases holding the same in the Fifth, Sixth,
    and Eleventh Circuits). See also Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 
    950 F.2d 1437
    , 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that strip and
    body cavity searches conducted incident to arrest but
    without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amend-
    ment; also, searches conducted with reasonable suspicion
    that arrestee is carrying weapons or dangerous contraband
    is constitutional, while conducting such invasive searches
    “in order to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime”
    is not constitutional (emphasis added)). Finally, the defen-
    dants “cannot reasonably assert that [they are] harmed in
    any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from consti-
    tutional violations.” Zepeda v. INS, 
    753 F.2d 719
    , 727 (9th
    Cir. 1985).
    Moreover, “[w]hen an alleged deprivation of a consti-
    tutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further
    showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Mitchell v.
    Cuomo, 
    748 F.2d 804
    , 806 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing 11 C.
    Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
    § 2948.1 (1973)). See also 11A Wright, Miller & Kane,
    Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2948.1 (2d ed.
    1995) (same); Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm’n, 
    284 F.2d 631
    , 633 (4th Cir. 1960) (“The District Court has no dis-
    cretion to deny relief by preliminary injunction to a person
    who clearly establishes by undisputed evidence that he is
    being denied a constitutional right” (citing cases)). Cf.
    No. 03-3018                                                     11
    National People’s Action v. Village of Wilmette, 
    914 F.2d 1008
    , 1013 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Even a temporary deprivation
    of first amendment freedom of expression rights is generally
    sufficient to prove irreparable harm.”). In other words,
    Campbell can establish the irreparable harm element by
    demonstrating a violation of his constitutional rights.
    Furthermore, showing irreparable harm is “[p]robably the
    most common method of demonstrating that there is no
    adequate legal remedy.” 11A Wright, Miller & Kane,
    Federal Practice and Procedure § 2944. See also Fleet
    Wholesale Supply Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 
    846 F.2d 1095
    , 1098 (7th Cir. 1988) (“To say that the injury is irrep-
    arable means that the methods of repair (remedies at law)
    are inadequate.” (emphasis in original)).3
    Furthermore, contrary to the majority’s suggestion that
    “[i]f this court decides that the City’s practice is uncon-
    stitutional then it must cease . . . (for the prospect of
    damages paid to thousands of suspects would bring the City
    into line),” supra p. 2, courts have recognized that the
    possibility of money damages engenders only meager if
    any deterrent effect against police incursions on Fourth
    Amendment rights. See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 
    364 F.2d 3
       Other cases involving significant intrusions of privacy repre-
    senting unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment also
    suggest that there is no adequate remedy at law for Campbell.
    See, e.g., Bannister v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Leavenworth
    County, Kan., 
    829 F. Supp. 1249
    , 1252 (D. Kan. 1993) (“Because
    the injury inflicted by an unconstitutional drug test cannot be
    remedied by a damage award, the court concludes that plaintiff
    has established that she will be irreparably harmed if an injunc-
    tion does not issue.”); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local 1857 v.
    Wilson, No. Civ. S-89-1274 LKK, 
    1990 WL 208749
    at *14 (E.D.
    Cal. July 9, 1990) (granting an injunction, stating “Urinalysis
    drug testing is an invasive, degrading and humiliating procedure
    and the injury inflicted by a constitutional violation of this
    character cannot be remedied by a damage award.”).
    12                                               No. 03-3018
    197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966) (granting a preliminary injunction
    to protect against police violations of plaintiffs’ Fourth
    Amendment rights when, inter alia, “the lesson of experi-
    ence is that the remote possibility of money damages serves
    no deterrent to future police invasions” (citing Mapp v.
    Ohio, 
    367 U.S. 643
    , 651-52 (1961) (where the Supreme
    Court recognized “[t]he obvious futility of relegating the
    Fourth Amendment of the protection of other remedies
    [such as criminal or civil sanctions]”)). See also Elkins v.
    United States, 
    364 U.S. 206
    , 220 (1960) (citing with ap-
    proval the California Supreme Court which held “exper-
    ience has demonstrated, however, that neither administra-
    tive, criminal nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing
    lawless searches and seizures.”). In sum, Campbell has
    sufficiently alleged an injury of a type for this court to
    properly conclude that Campbell lacks an adequate remedy
    at law.
    Moreover, the cases the majority cites to support its
    conclusion that money damages are an adequate remedy for
    an unconstitutional search are readily distinguishable from
    the case at bar. Sampson v. Murray, 
    415 U.S. 61
    (1974)
    dealt with the extent of federal courts’ power to issue
    injunctions upon claims by federal government employees
    that their civil service rights have been violated. Sampson
    involved a probationary government employee’s wrongful
    discharge which the Supreme Court construed as a “routine
    case” lacking the extraordinary circumstances which would
    warrant a finding of irreparable injury. 
    Id. at 92
    n.68. The
    plaintiff in Sampson alleged embarrassment and damage to
    her reputation when her employer discharged her in a
    manner inconsistent with administrative procedural rules.
    Not only does Campbell’s case not involve federal govern-
    ment personnel actions, but the harm the Sampson plaintiff
    complained of is hardly comparable to the harm, described
    at length by this court in Mary Beth G., that one experi-
    ences as a result of having one’s most private parts fondled
    No. 03-3018                                                13
    by a law enforcement officer. This point is at least doubly
    true for Campbell who was subjected to such an intrusive
    search in public.
    Second City Music, Inc. v. Chicago, 
    333 F.3d 846
    (7th Cir.
    2003) is also distinguishable from Campbell’s case. Second
    City involved a city ordinance which required dealers of
    used audio and video equipment to obtain licenses in order
    to sell such merchandise, a measure aimed at preventing
    the dealers from becoming “fences for 
    thieves.” 333 F.3d at 847
    . In response to the plaintiff’s request for an injunction
    preventing the city from applying the ordinance to estab-
    lished businesses, we found that requiring the plaintiff to
    apply for a license to continue to operate its business would
    incur “no detriment.” 
    Id. at 849.
    Any analogy between
    requiring a used CD shop to obtain a license and a person
    to submit to an exceedingly invasive search in public is
    strained at best. The harms involved in Second City and the
    case at bar are not comparable— neither in degree nor in
    sort.
    The same can be said for Webb v. Board of Trustees of
    Ball State University, 
    167 F.3d 1146
    (7th Cir. 1999). In that
    case, no irreparable harm warranting a preliminary
    injunction was found when plaintiffs, state university em-
    ployees, alleged university retaliation against them for
    protected speech.4 Again, a “brouhaha” within a university
    department leading to a replacement of plaintiff professor
    as department chair does not rise to the level of harm
    involved, acknowledged by the Supreme Court and several
    circuits, when police conduct a body cavity search, never
    mind when it is done in public.
    Finally, the majority cites Wilson v. Garcia, 
    471 U.S. 261
    (1985). That case dealt with how to construe actions for
    damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for statute of lim-
    4
    No First Amendment violation was found in this case.
    14                                                    No. 03-3018
    itation purposes. Not only did that case involve a request
    for damages only and not injunctive relief, but to the extent
    that Wilson analogizes a constitutional wrong to a personal-
    injury tort, it does so for statute of limitation purposes. The
    case in and of itself provides no comment to support the
    majority’s broader claim that damages are a normal and
    adequate response to an improper search or seizure.
    III. Standing
    In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 
    461 U.S. 95
    (1983), the
    Supreme Court set forth a two-part test that plaintiffs must
    satisfy in order to demonstrate standing for a preliminary
    injunction: a plaintiff must “allege that he would have
    another encounter with the police” and, in pertinent part,
    “that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act” in
    the manner about which the plaintiff complains. 
    Id. at 105-
    06. Campbell has satisfied the second part of that test as he
    has sufficiently alleged, and the defendants admitted,5 that
    the IPD officers subjected Campbell to a body cavity search
    in public pursuant to IPD policy.6 In other words, IPD
    General Order 18.02 and Executive Committee of the
    Marion County Superior Court Order of April 18, 2002
    together authorize such searches and the police officer
    5
    Compare Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶ 56 (“The search performed on
    Plaintiff James Campbell was performed pursuant to a practice or
    policy of the Indianapolis Police Department.”) with Defs.’ Answer
    to Am. Compl. ¶ 42 (“Defendants admit the material allegations
    in paragraph 56.”).
    6
    While this court must review the district court’s findings of fact
    for clear error, Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 
    274 F.3d 470
    , 474 (7th Cir. 2001), the district court in this case made no
    findings of fact on this issue. However, the defendants admit that
    the search at issue in this case was done pursuant to IPD policy
    or practice.
    No. 03-3018                                                 15
    defendants were within their (apparently unbridled)
    discretion, as interpreted by IPD Chief Barker, when they
    conducted the invasive search in public of Campbell’s pri-
    vate parts.
    As for the first part of the Lyons standing test, requiring
    a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction to show that he
    faces a real threat of another encounter with the police
    of the type alleged in his complaint, there are several fac-
    tual allegations present in Campbell’s case on which basis
    courts have found standing for a preliminary injunction,
    even when presented with somewhat speculative claims of
    future harm. Courts have paid judicial notice to the follow-
    ing facts, alleged in Campbell’s case, in finding a party had
    standing for a preliminary injunction: (1) the police acts to
    which the plaintiff was subjected and about which he
    complains were authorized by police policy; or (2) the police
    policy did not clearly limit the occasions in which the police
    activity could take place.
    As my research to date has not yielded a Seventh Circuit
    case directly on point, I look to outside authority. Case law
    from our sister circuits suggests that Campbell has stand-
    ing for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from
    conducting body cavity searches against him. For example,
    in Deshawn E. v. Safir, 
    156 F.3d 340
    , 345 (2d Cir. 1998), the
    Second Circuit distinguished Lyons and found standing for
    injunctive relief in large part because the challenged police
    activities were “officially endorsed policies.” It found that
    “there is a likelihood of recurring injury because the [police]
    Squad’s activities are authorized by a written memorandum
    of understanding between the Corporation Counsel and the
    Police Commissioner.” 
    Id. In other
    words, the existence of
    a written policy authorizing the complained-of police
    conduct, present in Campbell’s case, bolsters a claim of
    future harm.
    The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thomas v. County of Los
    Angeles, 
    978 F.2d 504
    (9th Cir. 1993) reached a similar
    16                                                   No. 03-3018
    conclusion. It found standing for a preliminary injunction
    when plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the challenged police
    conduct was “condoned and tacitly authorized by [sheriff]
    department policy makers.” 
    Id. at 508.
    As in Thomas,
    Campbell has alleged, and the defendants have admitted,
    that the police officers subjected Campbell to a body cavity
    search in public, consistent with IPD policy or practice.
    Addressing whether “the same events are likely to happen
    again to [Campbell]”, supra p. 2, Campbell contends that
    these invasive public searches are done with some degree of
    frequency. Defendant Officer Miller testified that he alone
    has conducted twenty to thirty such searches. He also
    testified that he has observed other officers performing the
    invasive searches. Defendant Andrew Lamle, another
    Indianapolis police officer, testified that he too has con-
    ducted “similar searches.” While there is insufficient
    evidence in the record to determine what percentage of total
    summons arrests involved public strip and/or body cavity
    searches (nor is it clear whether the IPD even keeps such
    records),7 there is enough evidence in the record to show
    that what Campbell was subjected to was not aberrational.
    And as noted in National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights
    v. City of New York, 
    75 F. Supp. 2d 154
    , 161 (S.D.N.Y.
    1999), “[c]ourts have not been hesitant to grant standing to
    sue for injunctive relief where numerous constitutional
    violations have resulted from a policy of unconstitutional
    practices by law enforcement officers” (citing Allee v.
    Medrano, 
    416 U.S. 802
    , 815 (1974) and 
    Thomas, 978 F.2d at 508
    ).
    7
    Here, for instance, although it is undisputed that Officer Miller
    performed a public strip search of Campbell, the official case
    report narrated by Officer Miller states that Campbell was issued
    a summons for possession of marijuana but makes no mention
    whatsoever of the strip search.
    No. 03-3018                                                  17
    Lastly, the fact that the IPD policy, pursuant to which the
    police officer defendants acted when they conducted a body
    cavity search of Campbell in public, places no limit on when
    an officer may submit a summons arrestee to such searches
    supports Campbell’s standing claim. In Lyons, the Supreme
    Court took judicial notice of the limitations the Los Angeles
    police policy placed on police use of chokeholds which were
    challenged in that case. In the context of assessing whether
    Lyons would be subjected to an illegal chokehold again in
    the future, the Court stated, “police officers were instructed
    to use chokeholds only when lesser degrees of force do not
    suffice and then only ‘to gain control of a suspect who is
    violently resisting the officer or trying to escape.’ ” 
    Lyons, 461 U.S. at 110
    (quoting the record). In the Court’s judg-
    ment, the fact that there was a constraint on police use of
    the stranglehold weakened the plaintiff Lyons’s claim of
    standing. 
    Id. However, there
    is no comparable constraint on IPD of-
    ficers in the case at bar. The defendants state in their
    appellate brief that an IPD officer may conduct such an
    invasive search in public “if the officer feels it is necessary.”
    Moreover, IPD Chief Barker testified that the application of
    the search policy is dependent on “[r]easonableness and
    discretion of the officer, based on the totality of the circum-
    stances” an officer faces. However, Fourth Amendment
    jurisprudence discussed above indicates that the search
    challenged here is in all likelihood never reasonable, given
    the severity of the intrusion and the fact that it is con-
    ducted in public. So allowing an officer to conduct such a
    search whenever he “feels it is necessary” in his discretion
    functionally places no limit on the application of the policy.
    The defendants’ citation to United States v. Robinson, 
    414 U.S. 218
    (1973) on the issue of officer discretion does not
    undermine Campbell’s claim, because as we stated in Mary
    Beth G., “[t]he Court [in Robinson] did not suggest that a
    person validly arrested may be subject to any search the
    arresting officer feels is 
    necessary.” 723 F.2d at 1269
    18                                             No. 03-3018
    (emphasis in original). Such broad discretion conferred
    upon IPD officers, combined with the fact that the body
    cavity search is consistent with IPD policy, only increase
    the likelihood that Campbell will be subjected to the public
    body cavity search again in the future.
    Further, the list of misdemeanors for which a person may
    be subjected to a body cavity search in public, see sources
    cited supra note 2, not only underscores the policy’s unrea-
    sonableness, but also multiplies the likelihood that Camp-
    bell will be subjected to such a search in the future.
    I respectfully dissent.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—6-28-04
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-3018

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/28/2004

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

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