United States v. Rock, Timothy ( 2004 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 01-4070
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    TIMOTHY ROCK,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.
    No. 01 CR 1—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED APRIL 5, 2004—DECIDED JUNE 8, 2004
    ____________
    Before BAUER, POSNER, and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit
    Judges.
    BAUER, Circuit Judge. This direct appeal arises from
    Timothy Rock’s 2001 conviction for conspiracy to possess
    with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of metham-
    phetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
    Rock raises the sole issue of whether sufficient evidence
    was presented at trial to support his conspiracy conviction.
    For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
    The relevant events occurred in December of 2000. At
    that time, Detective Carl Lamb was posing as a drug buyer
    in the area around Seymour, Indiana. Lamb had been
    purchasing small quantities of methamphetamine from two
    2                                               No. 01-4070
    men, Nicholas Beverstock and Matthew Thompson. On
    December 18, Lamb asked to purchase a larger quantity—
    one pound—of methamphetamine; Beverstock agreed to sell
    it to him for $23,000. The exchange was to take place the
    next day, but Beverstock did not have such a large quantity
    of the drug. After enlisting the help of his brother-in-law
    (Delbert Allman), Beverstock eventually found a supplier
    who could deliver the requested pound of methamphet-
    amine; an acquaintance named Timothy Rock. Allman
    contacted Rock to set up the deal.
    Over the telephone Rock inquired for whom Beverstock
    was procuring the methamphetamine; after being satisfied
    that Lamb could be trusted, Rock agreed to provide
    Beverstock with one pound of methamphetamine for sale to
    Lamb. When Rock arrived at Allman’s home, however, he
    produced only a half-pound of the drug. The second half,
    Rock said, would be delivered after he was paid in full for
    the transaction. Beverstock and Thompson took the half-
    pound of methamphetamine to their designated meeting
    spot with Lamb—the Jackson/Washington State Forest.
    Rock also drove to the State Forest with Allman to secretly
    monitor the sale, carrying with him the second half-pound
    of methamphetamine. The meeting went as planned and,
    after discussion, Lamb paid Beverstock and Thompson
    $11,500 for the half-pound of methamphetamine. Immedi-
    ately following the transaction, officers arrested Beverstock
    and Thompson. Rock and Allman fled the scene, Rock
    disposed of a cooler containing the remainder of the drugs,
    and helped Allman remove equipment used in selling
    methamphetamine from his home.
    Rock was arrested in January 2001. He was tried and
    convicted later that year. Rock now appeals, claiming there
    was insufficient evidence to convict him of the conspiracy
    charge.
    No. 01-4070                                                 3
    Discussion
    In appeals regarding sufficiency of the evidence we gen-
    erally consider whether “after viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Pearson, 
    113 F.3d 758
    , 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,
    
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979)). Because Rock did not file a
    motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 29, however, we review the jury’s find-
    ings only for plain error. United States v. Williams, 
    298 F.3d 688
    , 691-92 (7th Cir. 2002). This standard significantly
    limits our review of the case; we will only reverse if, “the
    conviction amounted to a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
    
    Id. Rock argues
    the government failed to present sufficient
    evidence to support the conspiracy charge. Under 21 U.S.C.
    § 846, a conspiracy exists where “(1) two or more people
    agreed to commit an unlawful act and (2) the defendant
    knowingly and intentionally joined in the agreement.”
    United States v. Gardner, 
    238 F.3d 878
    , 879 (7th Cir. 2001).
    This Court has held that in the case of drug conspiracies it
    is not enough for the government to demonstrate that a
    defendant is a participant in a mere buyer-seller relation-
    ship because, “such an agreement is itself the substantive
    crime.” United States v. Hach, 
    162 F.3d 937
    , 942-43 (7th
    Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Clay, 
    37 F.3d 338
    , 341
    (7th Cir. 1994)). Rather, the government must prove that
    the defendant conspired to commit some crime beyond that
    agreement to sell drugs.
    Rock and the government present two slightly different
    descriptions of the activities of December 18 and 19, 2000.
    For his part, Rock argues that he sold the methamphet-
    amine to Beverstock and Thompson, who subsequently sold
    the methamphetamine to Lamb. On the other hand, the
    4                                                     No. 01-4070
    government argues that Rock worked in concert with
    Beverstock and Thompson to sell the methamphetamine to
    Lamb. The significance of the differing descriptions is that
    in the first, Rock does not participate in a crime beyond the
    admitted sale to Beverstock and Thompson (hence, there is
    no conspiracy), whereas in the second scenario, Rock is
    conspiring with Beverstock and Thompson to sell the
    methamphetamine to a third party. Clearly these two
    differing accounts call for a sensitive factual determina-
    tion.1
    The government has no trouble backing up its theory that
    Rock was an active participant in the sale of methamphet-
    amine to Lamb. It points out that, from the outset, Rock
    was concerned with the identity of the third-party pur-
    chaser, and that he intended to be paid from the proceeds
    of the sale to the third party and not by Beverstock or
    Thompson independently. It points to the fact that Rock
    trusted Beverstock and Thompson with $11,500 worth of
    methamphetamine to show they were on the same side of
    the transaction. Additionally, Rock personally went to the
    meeting place to monitor the transaction with Lamb. These
    facts demonstrate that Rock’s involvement in the sale went
    beyond his dealings with Beverstock and Thompson; he had
    a personal investment in the sale of the methamphetamine
    1
    To carry the analysis one step further than is required by these
    facts, if we were to believe Rock’s scenario—that he was on the
    opposite side of a transaction with Beverstock and Thompson—
    we would then consider the following four factors to determine the
    presence of conspiracy: (1) the length of the affiliation between the
    buyer and seller; (2) whether there was an established method of
    payment; (3) whether transactions were standardized; and (4)
    whether there was a demonstrated level of mutual trust. United
    States v. Hach, 
    162 F.3d 937
    , 943 (7th Cir. 1998). Because we
    affirm the government’s version of the facts, we need not apply
    this test as urged by Rock.
    No. 01-4070                                                 5
    to Lamb. Case law is clear that when defendants are on the
    same side of a sale of drugs to a third party, there is
    sufficient evidence of a conspiracy. United States v. Herrera,
    
    54 F.3d 348
    , 353-54 (7th Cir. 1995).
    Because we give deference to the jury’s findings, and
    because we review now only for plain error, we have no
    trouble in holding the jury had sufficient evidence on which
    to base its verdict. Accordingly, Rock’s conviction is AF-
    FIRMED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—6-8-04