United States v. Garcia-Vasquez, Migu ( 2004 )


Menu:
  •                           In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-4275
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    MIGUEL A. GARCIA-VASQUEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 03-CR-100—William C. Griesbach, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED JULY 7, 2004—DECIDED AUGUST 12, 2004
    ____________
    Before CUDAHY, COFFEY, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Mexican citizen Miguel Garcia-
    Vasquez pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United
    States after having been deported, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    , and was
    sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment. The district court
    added two criminal history points because it found that
    Garcia-Vasquez committed the offense while under a “criminal
    justice sentence”—specifically an unexecuted 1998 California
    warrant for a probation violation. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d).
    Garcia-Vasquez challenges the addition of the two criminal
    history points, arguing that California authorities were
    unreasonably dilatory in executing the warrant. We affirm.
    2                                                No. 03-4275
    Garcia-Vasquez was convicted by a California court of
    attempted robbery in 1997, and sentenced to one year in pris-
    on followed by two years of probation. Throughout these
    California proceedings, Garcia-Vasquez used the name
    “Michael Garcia,” and also a false birth date. Immediately
    after Garcia-Vasquez was released from prison in June 1998,
    immigration authorities deported him to Mexico. When
    Garcia-Vasquez did not report to his probation officer in
    July, the state court revoked his probation and issued a
    bench warrant for his arrest.
    Garcia-Vasquez soon returned to the United States, and
    in May 2000 was arrested in Wisconsin following a domestic
    abuse incident in which he was charged with resisting law
    enforcement officers. He told Wisconsin officials that his
    name was “Miguel Garcia,” and gave them a different date
    of birth than he had given the authorities in California;
    throughout the Wisconsin proceedings he continued to use
    this name. Garcia-Vasquez was eventually convicted and
    sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. While he was
    serving that sentence, immigration authorities discovered
    in May 2003 that Garcia-Vasquez was the same person who
    had been deported in 1998, and they charged him with
    illegally reentering the country.
    The sentencing guidelines provide that a defendant’s
    criminal history score is to be increased by two points if he
    “committed the instant offense while under any criminal
    justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised re-
    lease, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.” U.S.S.G.
    § 4A1.1(d). The district court added two points to Garcia-
    Vasquez’s criminal history score because of the outstanding
    warrant for his California probation violation. The district
    court therefore calculated Garcia-Vasquez’s criminal history
    category as IV, yielding a sentencing range of 57 to 71
    months. If the two criminal history points had not been
    imposed, Garcia-Vasquez’s criminal history category would
    be III, and his sentencing range would be 46 to 57 months.
    No. 03-4275                                                      3
    Garcia-Vasquez argues that the district court should not
    have imposed the additional two criminal history points
    because, he says, California authorities have shown no
    interest in executing the warrant and their delay should
    invalidate the warrant for purposes of § 4A1.1(d). Garcia-
    Vasquez relies on our decision in United States v. Lee, 
    941 F.2d 571
    , 572-73 (7th Cir. 1991), in which we held that the
    two-point increase under § 4A1.1(d) did not apply to a de-
    fendant who had been subject to an unreasonably long
    delay in Missouri’s execution of an arrest warrant for a
    probation violation. Id.
    But Lee is inapplicable here for two reasons.1 First, Lee
    interpreted Missouri law, id., and Garcia-Vasquez has not
    cited, nor have we located, any rule in California that offi-
    cials must execute warrants for probation violations within
    a reasonable time. Second—and most importantly—Garcia-
    Vasquez unquestionably reentered the country before his
    probation term expired, thereby rendering irrelevant any
    question about the effect of the California court’s revocation
    of his probation. Garcia-Vasquez was certainly in the
    United States when he was arrested in Wisconsin in May
    2000, one month before his two-year California probation was
    to have expired. Because his probation had yet to expire in
    May 2000, Garcia-Vasquez remained under a criminal jus-
    tice sentence at the time he committed his illegal reentry.
    See United States v. Lopez-Flores, 
    275 F.3d 661
    , 663 (7th
    Cir. 2001) (illegal reentry is an ongoing offense that is first
    1
    The sentencing guidelines were amended four months after Lee
    was decided, U.S.S.G., App. C, amend. 381 (effective Nov. 1, 1991)
    (adding U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(m) and amending § 4A1.1, comment.
    (n.4)), and the First Circuit has suggested that the amendment
    invalidated Lee. See United States v. Camilo, 
    71 F.3d 984
    , 987 (1st
    Cir. 1995). But we need not reach the question of Lee’s continuing
    validity because Garcia-Vasquez has not demonstrated that his
    case is analogous.
    4                                                No. 03-4275
    committed at the time the defendant enters the country, not
    at the time that immigration authorities discover his
    presence).
    Lastly, we add that Garcia-Vasquez can hardly criticize
    California for not executing the warrant expeditiously. The
    reason federal authorities discovered Garcia-Vasquez’s il-
    legal status in May 2003 instead of May 2000 was because
    he had concealed his identity by repeatedly using false
    names and birth dates. Garcia-Vasquez was in custody in
    Wisconsin under the name “Miguel Garcia” and with a dif-
    ferent date of birth than he had used in California. Even when
    his true identity was discovered in May 2003, California
    still knew Garcia-Vasquez as “Michael Garcia,” and it learned
    that he was the same person placed on probation in 1998
    only when the probation officer who drafted the presentence
    report in this case contacted California authorities. Garcia-
    Vasquez could have informed California in May 2000 of his
    incarceration in Wisconsin and requested sentencing for his
    probation violation, see 
    Cal. Penal Code § 1203
    .2a; People v.
    Broughton, 
    133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161
    , 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003),
    but instead he tried to hide his identity. He cannot now
    claim that he should benefit from his attempted ruse.
    The district court properly imposed the two criminal his-
    tory points under § 4A1.1(d). Garcia-Vasquez’s sentence is
    AFFIRMED.
    No. 03-4275                                          5
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—8-12-04