United States v. Wilson, Reginald ( 2004 )


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  •                           In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-2170
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    REGINALD D. WILSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Illinois.
    No. 01-CR-30040-MJR—Michael J. Reagan, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED NOVEMBER 13, 2003—DECIDED DECEMBER 2, 2004
    ____________
    Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. This appeal represents the tail
    end of Reginald Wilson’s protracted effort to obtain a
    shorter prison sentence for his July 2001 conviction for
    possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1). Wilson pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
    agreement contemplating the possibility that, based on
    Wilson’s cooperation, the government would move for a
    reduced sentence on his behalf under either U.S.S.G.
    § 5K1.1 or Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
    Procedure. Wilson did cooperate, and indeed the govern-
    ment admitted at sentencing that it intended to file a Rule
    35(b) motion, so after waiting nearly a year for the govern-
    2                                                No. 03-2170
    ment to take action to trigger a sentence reduction, Wilson
    moved to compel the government to file a Rule 35(b) motion
    on his behalf. The district court ultimately denied Wilson’s
    motion, and he appeals. Because the government’s decision
    not to file a Rule 35(b) motion lacked a rational relationship
    to a legitimate government interest and was made in bad
    faith, we vacate the order denying Wilson’s motion and
    remand for further proceedings.
    I. BACKGROUND
    In November 2000 police arrested Wilson after discover-
    ing 25 grams of crack cocaine in his car. At the time, Wilson
    was serving a term of supervised release for a 1993 drug
    conviction. Following this November arrest, Wilson cooper-
    ated with the government in various ways. He confessed
    that he had obtained 56 grams of cocaine from a supplier,
    whom he identified to government agents. He also identified
    several individuals from whom he had purchased mari-
    juana. And from December 2000 to February 2001, Wilson
    worked as a confidential informant for the government.
    Ultimately the government charged him with possessing
    with intent to distribute in excess of five grams of crack, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1).
    Wilson and the government executed a written plea
    agreement, which provides in relevant part:
    Defendant and the Government agree that based
    upon substantial assistance rendered through the
    complete and total cooperation of Defendant, the
    Government may, in the sole discretion of the
    United States Attorney, file either a motion under
    § 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines or a motion
    under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
    Procedure advising the Court of a recommended
    reduction in sentence. The Motion, if any, will only
    be filed if the assistance rendered by the Defendant
    No. 03-2170                                                   3
    is found to be complete and thoroughly truthful,
    regardless of the outcome of any trial or hearing at
    which the Defendant may testify. The Defendant
    understands that any reduction of sentence, and
    the extent of that reduction, lies in the discretion of
    the Court.
    (emphasis in original). Wilson also agreed to waive his right
    to appeal any sentence or fine within the statutory maxi-
    mum and his right to challenge his sentence in a collateral
    attack.
    Wilson pleaded guilty pursuant to this agreement, but
    before sentencing he and his attorney discovered that
    Wilson had spent two extra years in prison for his 1993
    conviction. The presentence investigation report for Wilson’s
    current conviction revealed that the government had re-
    quested, and the district court had granted, a downward
    departure under Rule 35(b) vis-á-vis the former conviction.
    On that conviction Wilson had originally been sentenced to
    a term of 70 months’ imprisonment in July 1993. Nearly a
    year later, the government had moved to reduce his sen-
    tence to 46 months’ imprisonment—a motion the district
    court granted in November 1995. But on account of a bur-
    eaucratic bungle, the reduction was never communicated to
    the individuals who could effectuate it (presumably officials
    at the Bureau of Prisons). Thus, Wilson neither learned
    about nor received the benefit of the two-year reduction the
    district court had granted him.
    The discovery, in part, prompted Assistant Federal Public
    Defender Lawrence Fleming (who did not represent Wilson
    in the 1993 case) to move for a downward departure in the
    current case. The motion requested that the court depart
    downward to 120 months from the range otherwise yielded
    by the relevant guidelines calculations (188 to 235 months)
    to account for the lost two years and because, Fleming
    argued, Wilson’s criminal history category overstated the
    4                                                No. 03-2170
    seriousness of his prior offenses. Before filing the motion,
    Fleming had tried to bring the situation to the attention of
    the prosecutor, Assistant United States Attorney James
    Porter (who also prosecuted Wilson’s 1993 case), but Fleming
    never got through to Porter, who did not return Fleming’s
    voice mails. Fleming thus went ahead and filed the motion
    and with the service copy included a transmittal letter to
    Porter “confirming” what his telephone messages had ex-
    plained: that the unexpected discovery of Wilson’s two extra
    years in prison had precipitated the unusual departure
    request. Fleming’s letter also explained that the downward
    departure motion contemplated that the government would
    still file its own motion to reward Wilson for his assistance.
    In closing, Fleming expressed his hope that Porter “and the
    powers that be” would not object to the motion, which
    Fleming thought was “the right thing to do.”
    Porter objected. He wrote Fleming a letter of his own,
    announcing that he was “simply floored” by Fleming’s at-
    tempt to secure a downward departure on Wilson’s behalf,
    a move Porter labeled “unconscionable.” And although no
    term in Wilson’s plea agreement can even arguably be read
    to prohibit Wilson from moving for a downward departure,
    Porter took the position in his letter that Wilson had
    breached the plea agreement by filing his motion. Thus,
    warned Porter, unless Wilson withdrew his motion, Porter
    would “cease any and all cooperation” with Wilson and sug-
    gest to the district court that Wilson be allowed to withdraw
    his guilty plea so that all matters against him could be
    “reset ab initio for trials or hearings.” In closing, Porter
    condemned Wilson’s motion as “overreaching by a three-
    time convicted felon” that made Porter “shudder to think”
    whether he would be doing his job if he “did any less than
    ensure that Mr. Wilson never gets to see the light of day
    again given his current situation.”
    Fleming—“shocked and disheartened” by Porter’s re-
    sponse—immediately replied with another letter (complying
    No. 03-2170                                                5
    with a demand in Porter’s letter that they communicate
    only in writing). Fleming laid out his reasons for filing the
    downward departure motion and assured Porter that he
    would approach Wilson about Porter’s demand that the
    motion be withdrawn. Fleming acknowledged that it would
    not be in Wilson’s interest to withdraw his guilty plea, and
    reiterated his desire that Porter move, as contemplated by
    the plea agreement, for a downward departure under U.S.S.G.
    § 5K1.1 or after sentencing under Rule 35(b). To that end,
    Fleming proposed the following potential “solution”: Porter
    would agree to file a § 5K1.1 motion at sentencing, and then
    Wilson could argue to the district court that the botched
    handling of the court’s order compelling his early release on
    the 1993 conviction warranted reducing his current sen-
    tence by more than the a customarily recommended by the
    government.
    In several telephone conversations, Porter and Fleming
    discussed the possibility Fleming proposed. Ultimately,
    though, Porter refused to file a § 5K1.1 motion at sentenc-
    ing. Instead, the lawyers agreed that if Wilson would with-
    draw his motion for a downward departure, he would qualify
    for a later-filed Rule 35(b) motion if he remained willing to
    cooperate at the government’s request. Then when the
    government filed a Rule 35(b) motion, Wilson could argue
    for an additional reduction premised on the two extra years
    he wrongly spent in prison. In a letter to Porter that met
    with no disagreement from the prosecutor, Fleming memo-
    rialized this arrangement, which, he explained, “of course,
    contemplates the good faith of the Government in affording
    [Wilson] the benefit of Rule 35 provided he continues to
    cooperate.” Wilson then moved to withdraw his downward
    departure motion “pursuant to negotiations with Govern-
    ment counsel.”
    Thus on July 30, 2001, Wilson was sentenced pursuant to
    the original plea agreement. In keeping with the parties’
    6                                               No. 03-2170
    subsequent agreement, Wilson, as noted, had withdrawn
    his motion for a downward departure, and the government
    did not move to reduce his sentence under § 5K1.1. The
    district court sentenced Wilson to 188 months’ imprison-
    ment, the bottom of the applicable guidelines range, fol-
    lowed by four years of supervised release, and imposed a
    $2,500 fine and a $100 special assessment. Before the court
    settled on a sentence, Porter offered the following regarding
    a substantial-assistance reduction:
    In mitigation we would point out the defendant has
    been cooperating with the Government since before
    his arrest in this matter, and based upon that
    cooperation the Government has indicated in the
    plea agreement it would be intending to file at the
    appropriate time a Rule 35 motion, which we’re not
    prepared to file, obviously, today, but because of
    that, we would recommend a sentence at the low
    end of the guideline range.
    Wilson did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
    As the one-year deadline for the government to file a Rule
    35(b) motion approached, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (provid-
    ing that the district court may reduce a sentence “[u]pon
    the government’s motion made within one year of sentenc-
    ing”), a new dispute over Wilson’s sentence broke out. It
    started with a May 1, 2002, letter from Fleming to Porter,
    reminding Porter that the one-year deadline was approach-
    ing and requesting that he file a “placeholder” Rule 35(b)
    motion so that the deadline did not lapse. After seeing
    Fleming’s letter, Wilson sent a letter of his own. He ad-
    dressed his May 8 letter to various individuals, including
    Porter, whom he thought shared responsibility for the extra
    two years he had spent in prison on the 1993 conviction. In
    his letter Wilson protested that the government was “far
    from remorseful over the miscarriage of justice,” as evi-
    denced by Porter’s earlier threat to put him “in prison for
    No. 03-2170                                                  7
    life” instead of trying to remedy the situation. Wilson also
    set out his belief that those involved were not “acting in
    good faith and with clean hands” in the matter. He charac-
    terized his letter as a “NOTICE OF INTENT TO INSTI-
    TUTE LEGAL ACTION” and demanded that all of its
    recipients (save Fleming) respond within 10 days “and set
    forth any facts by which you claim that I have not been
    injured by your acts and or omissions, by virtue of which
    you are personally liable to me for damages.”
    Having received both Fleming’s and Wilson’s letters,
    Porter wrote back to Fleming and told him that “the United
    States intends to do nothing” for Wilson. Porter claimed
    that such a stance was necessary in light of the “pending
    litigation,” and because of Wilson’s failure to pay his fine or
    special assessment and the “threats” in his letter. In his
    reply to Porter, Fleming portrayed Wilson’s letter as an “ill
    advised and inappropriate” reaction to his frustration over
    having spent two extra years in prison, but also told Porter
    that no lawsuit had been filed and that Wilson’s letter could
    not be fairly construed to suggest there was any “pending
    litigation” about the untimely release. Fleming also noted
    his own belief that Wilson’s letter had been drafted by a
    jailhouse lawyer who was providing “help” to Wilson.
    Fleming invited Porter to reconsider his position on the
    Rule 35(b) motion and again urged him to file a “place-
    holder” motion that would allow the parties to negotiate
    “the extent of the sentence reduction, if any.” In return,
    Fleming would advise Wilson to “withhold any further
    action on whatever it is he may be contemplating” and also
    to pay the $100 assessment. Porter, though, was unmoved
    and wrote back to summarize his “bottom line:” “[U]nless
    and until your client changes his stance and returns to
    being a cooperating person fully in compliance with his plea
    agreement, nothing will be done. Please file whatever
    motions you deem appropriate given this. The clock is, in
    fact, running.”
    8                                               No. 03-2170
    The motion Fleming apparently deemed appropriate was
    a “Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement and Agreement
    Regarding Withdrawal of Motion for Downward Departure
    and to Compel Government to File Rule 35 Motion,” which
    he filed on June 4, 2002. In it Fleming argued that the
    government was obligated to file a Rule 35(b) motion under
    both the terms of Wilson’s plea agreement and the separate
    agreement reached when Wilson withdrew his downward
    departure motion. On July 29, 2002—the day before the
    one-year mark—the government filed a “placeholder” Rule
    35(b) motion “as an accommodation to the Court and the
    defendant.” The district court determined that under Wade
    v. United States, 
    504 U.S. 181
     (1992), Wilson was entitled
    to a hearing on his motion to compel. In Wade the Supreme
    Court held that a district court may review a prosecutor’s
    refusal to move for a substantial-assistance reduction if the
    defendant makes a “substantial threshold showing” that the
    refusal is based on an unconstitutional motive or lacks a
    rational relationship to any legitimate government objec-
    tive. Wade, 
    504 U.S. at 185-86
    . Although the court did not
    have space on its calendar to conduct a hearing on Wilson’s
    motion before the one-year deadline elapsed, the govern-
    ment’s “placeholder” motion preserved the court’s jurisdic-
    tion to reduce Wilson’s sentence if it ruled in his favor on
    the motion to compel.
    In September 2002 the district court held a hearing on
    Wilson’s motion. By then the parties (and the district court)
    had brokered a tentative agreement. Wilson would abandon
    his “threat” to file a lawsuit, and the government would
    proceed with its downward departure under Rule 35(b). The
    court would then grant the motion and both reduce Wilson’s
    sentence by a and take off an additional two years to
    compensate Wilson for his previous prison time. In short, if
    Wilson would forego filing suit, he would be guaranteed a
    prison term of 101 months, just over seven years less than
    the 188-month guideline minimum that he was currently
    No. 03-2170                                                 9
    serving. But Wilson would not agree, even after the court
    explained that he risked getting “no time off” his sentence.
    Wilson insisted that he did not “really want to discuss that,
    because I mean my understanding on that is I ain’t really
    set right as far as even dwelling on it at this time because
    I am focused more on getting my reductions in this case.”
    He emphasized that he was not interested in having the
    district court reduce his current sentence to compensate him
    for the extra time he had spent in prison on the previous
    conviction; instead, he reiterated that his only concern was
    in getting the a reduction for having provided substantial
    assistance in this case.
    Wilson’s unwillingness to accept the government’s “offer”
    prompted Fleming to request an evaluation to ensure that
    Wilson was competent. The district court agreed to
    Fleming’s request and continued the hearing on Wilson’s
    motion to compel. The resulting evaluation established that
    Wilson was indeed competent, and so in mid-December
    2002 the district court reconvened the hearing on Wilson’s
    motion to compel. This time the government moved to with-
    draw its “placeholder” Rule 35(b) motion. Porter represented
    that the government sought to withdraw the motion be-
    cause he believed that Wilson, by contemplating what
    Porter deemed to be a “frivolous and vexatious” lawsuit,
    had not rendered substantial assistance after all. To sup-
    port their respective positions, the parties stipulated to the
    admission of the attachments to Wilson’s motion to compel,
    consisting primarily of the correspondence between Porter
    and Fleming. Over Fleming’s objection, the district court
    then granted the government’s motion to withdraw its Rule
    35(b) motion, rendering Wilson’s motion to compel “ripe for
    consideration.”
    Almost four months later, on April 22, 2003, the district
    court denied Wilson’s motion. The court first considered
    whether Wilson had shown his entitlement to relief under
    10                                               No. 03-2170
    Wade because the government’s refusal to move for a down-
    ward departure was not rationally related to a legitimate
    government interest, see 
    id. at 186
    . In defense of its refusal
    to file the Rule 35(b) motion, the government had proffered
    the following three reasons: (1) by threatening the govern-
    ment with a lawsuit, Wilson created an adversarial relation-
    ship inconsistent with his obligation to provide assistance
    if asked; (2) the government has an interest in deterring
    “frivolous and vexatious lawsuits” against it; and (3) Wilson
    had breached the plea agreement by failing to pay the fine
    and special assessment.
    The district court rejected each of these reasons and found
    them “pretextual for the real reason”—the government’s
    desire to use its control over the Rule 35(b) motion as a tool
    to secure a release from liability for the two extra years
    Wilson spent in prison on his previous conviction. As for the
    first reason, the district court explained that it could see no
    reason why the “possibility of a civil suit” would interfere
    with Wilson’s ability to render assistance; more impor-
    tantly, though, the court reminded the government of its
    stated position that Wilson had already provided substantial
    assistance. The court then posed the following question in
    dismissing the government’s second reason: “If Wilson’s
    civil lawsuit was ‘frivolous and vexatious,’ why did the
    Government use Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 as
    a civil bargaining tool in the instant case rather than
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 or Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 50 in the wrongful incarceration civil case?” And
    as for the third reason, the court pointed out that the
    government would have been unconcerned about Wilson’s
    fine and special assessment had he been willing to waive
    his civil claim against it and, regardless, Wilson was paying
    his financial obligations under the terms of the BOP
    financial responsibility program. Nonetheless, even after
    “seriously question[ing] the legitimacy” of the government’s
    stated reasons, the court concluded that Wilson had not met
    No. 03-2170                                               11
    “his heavy burden” of proving that the government’s action
    was not rationally related to a legitimate government
    interest.
    Because the court concluded that the real reason for the
    government’s refusal to move for a sentence reduction was
    unrelated to the type or quality of Wilson’s assistance, it
    also considered whether he could receive relief under an
    Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Anzalone, 
    148 F.3d 940
    (8th Cir. 1998). Anzalone holds that the government may
    not withhold a motion for a downward departure for rea-
    sons unrelated to whether the defendant provided substan-
    tial assistance. Although the district court thought Anzalone
    was well-reasoned and offered a “check and balance on
    overreaching prosecution,” the court did not think the opin-
    ion could be squared with the limits for relief set out in
    Wade. Thus, the court rejected Anzalone’s approach, under
    which Wilson would have prevailed.
    The court also rejected Wilson’s argument that the gov-
    ernment’s use of its power to trigger a reduced sentence as
    leverage to prevent him from filing a civil suit amounted to
    an unconstitutional motive. See Wade, 
    504 U.S. at 186
    . The
    court cursorily reasoned that the government’s effort to
    block Wilson’s suit was not on par with refusing to file
    based on a defendant’s race or religion, the examples cited
    in Wade. See 
    id.
    Finally, the district court found that the government had
    not promised to file a Rule 35(b) motion in exchange for
    Wilson’s withdrawal of his downward departure motion.
    Instead, the court found, the government had promised to
    “act in good faith” regarding the motion. And although the
    government’s behavior was “questionable,” the court con-
    tinued, it did not amount to “bad faith.”
    12                                               No. 03-2170
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. Rational Relationship
    On appeal, Wilson maintains that, apart from the terms
    of his plea agreement, he is entitled to relief under Wade,
    which sets forth two limitations on a prosecutor’s refusal to
    file a substantial-assistance motion. First, the prosecutor’s
    decision must have some rational relationship to a legiti-
    mate government interest. See Wade, 
    504 U.S. at 186
    ;
    Bischel v. United States, 
    32 F.3d 259
    , 263 (7th Cir. 1994);
    see also United States v. Duncan, 
    242 F.3d 940
    , 950 (10th
    Cir. 2001). Additionally, the decision may not be based on
    an unconstitutional motive, such as race or religion. Wade,
    
    504 U.S. at 185-86
    ; Bischel, 
    32 F.3d at 263
    . Although
    Wilson claims here that the government’s decision ran afoul
    of both limitations, he does not develop his assertion that
    the government harbored an unconstitutional motive, i.e.,
    impeding his right of access to the courts. See United States
    v. Holm, 
    326 F.3d 872
    , 877 (7th Cir. 2003) (even arguments
    raising constitutional claims are waived when undeveloped
    and unsupported by pertinent legal authority). We thus
    focus on Wilson’s contention that the government’s refusal
    to file a Rule 35(b) motion lacked a rational relationship to
    some legitimate government objective.
    Wilson argues that, in light of the district court’s con-
    clusion that each of the government’s asserted reasons was
    pretextual, the refusal to file a Rule 35(b) motion on his be-
    half could not have been rationally related to a legitimate
    government end. We agree. Instead of acknowledging the
    district court’s factual findings about its motive, the gov-
    ernment simply reasserts the reasons the district court
    rejected (it does abandon reliance on Wilson’s alleged failure
    to pay his fine and special assessment). Nowhere does the
    government argue that the district court clearly erred by
    disbelieving its asserted reasons for refusing to file a Rule
    35(b) motion. See United States v. Butler, 
    272 F.3d 683
    , 686
    No. 03-2170                                                13
    (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, if we are to review anything at all, we
    would consider the reason that the district court found was
    really motivating the government’s conduct: the government
    was using its discretion over the filing of a Rule 35(b)
    motion in this case to force Wilson to abandon his effort to
    redress the extra two years he spent in prison on another
    case because of apparent negligence by government employ-
    ees. The government avoids directly defending this reason,
    and instead urges us to reject Anzalone and conclude that
    a reason wholly unrelated to the defendant’s cooperation is
    one that is rationally related to a legitimate government
    objective.
    In Anzalone the Eighth Circuit held that “the government
    cannot base its [Rule 35(b)] decision on factors other than
    the substantial assistance provided by the defendant.”
    Anzalone, 
    148 F.3d at 941
     (internal quotations omitted).
    The court reasoned that since the defendant admittedly had
    provided substantial assistance the government could not
    refuse to file a departure motion on the ground that he was
    suspected of subsequently possessing and using a controlled
    substance—a reason “unrelated to the quality of [his]
    assistance in investigating and prosecuting other offend-
    ers.” 
    Id.
     The Fourth Circuit, however, has expressly rejected
    Anzalone as inconsistent with Wade. See Butler, 
    272 F.3d at 687
    . In Butler the government refused to file a downward
    departure motion under § 5K1.1 after receiving word that
    the defendant, before sentencing, had threatened to kill one
    of his co-defendants, along with the co-defendant’s family
    and his dogs. Id. at 685. The panel in Butler rejected But-
    ler’s contention that his threats were unrelated to the “type
    or quality of assistance he rendered.” Id. at 687. But the
    court went further and concluded that “even if it were
    somehow the case that Butler’s threats were not rationally
    related to the assistance he provided, that is not the rele-
    vant inquiry under Wade.” Id. Thus, the court concluded
    that the government’s refusal to file could be defended with
    14                                                No. 03-2170
    reference to the general governmental interest in “deterring
    a defendant from threatening the life of a co-defendant.” Id.
    The other case to flatly reject Anzalone, United States v.
    Nealy, 
    232 F.3d 825
     (11th Cir. 2000), is unhelpful because
    it appears to have disregarded the Wade rational basis test
    altogether, limiting the defendant’s recourse to those
    instances when the government harbors an “unconstitu-
    tional motive” for refusing to file a substantial-assistance
    motion. 
    Id. at 831
    .
    We need not resolve the conflict between the extreme
    positions articulated in Anzalone and Butler to decide that
    the government has simply failed to convincingly articulate
    a rational reason for withholding the Rule 35(b) motion. We
    do not go so far as to endorse Anzalone and say that the
    government’s reason must always be related to the quality
    of a defendant’s assistance. Here, however, the govern-
    ment’s attempt to block Wilson from pursuing his unrelated
    (and, as far as we know, still unrealized) civil suit is so far
    afield from the purpose of § 5K1.1 and Rule 35(b) as to be
    irrational. It has nothing whatsoever to do with even
    general prosecutorial aims, which our circuit and others
    have assumed should animate a refusal to move for a
    substantial-assistance departure. See, e.g., United States v.
    Emerson, 
    349 F.3d 986
    , 988 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that
    defendant could not show that government’s reason for
    refusing to depart lacked a rational basis because gov-
    ernment gets to decide “whether ‘substantial assistance’ has
    been rendered” (emphasis added)); Duncan, 
    242 F.3d at 949
    (noting that government’s refusal to move for downward
    departure was rationally related to “legitimate law enforce-
    ment ends”) (emphasis added). This, coupled with the
    district court’s rejection of the government’s stated justifica-
    tions (and the government’s failure to challenge the court’s
    factual findings on appeal) convinces us that the govern-
    ment’s refusal to file a Rule 35(b) motion was not rationally
    related to a legitimate government interest. See United
    No. 03-2170                                                 15
    States v. Hawkins, 
    274 F.3d 420
    , 433-34 (6th Cir. 2001)
    (noting that government’s refusal to file § 5K1.1 motion was
    not rationally related to any legitimate end when it was
    undisputed that defendant performed obligations under
    plea agreement).
    B. Bad Faith
    That leaves Wilson’s alternate contention that the gov-
    ernment acted in bad faith by refusing to file a Rule 35(b)
    motion. Although Wilson acknowledges that we do not
    generally review a prosecutor’s refusal to file a downward
    departure motion for “bad faith,” see United States v. Burrell,
    
    963 F.2d 976
    , 985 (7th Cir. 1992), he points out that here
    the district court expressly found that the government had
    promised Wilson that it would act in good faith if he
    withdrew his own motion for a downward departure. That
    motion, of course, had nothing to do with substantial as-
    sistance and, as we have said, was not forbidden by any
    term of Wilson’s plea agreement. Wilson contends that, once
    the district court rejected the government’s proffered
    reasons for refusing to move for a downward departure, the
    court erred by nonetheless concluding that the government
    had not acted in bad faith. As evidence of the government’s
    bad faith, Wilson points out that the government itself
    acknowledged that he had upheld his end of the bargain by
    providing substantial assistance. And, as the government
    demanded, he also withdrew his motion for a downward
    departure, which was premised in part on the additional
    two years he mistakenly spent in prison. Wilson contends
    that he justifiably expected that the government in turn
    would fairly, and in good faith, decide whether to file a Rule
    35(b) motion on his behalf; instead, he argues, the gov-
    ernment injected a new condition into the agreement— his
    willingness to release it from liability for the extra two
    years he spent in prison—and then asserted pretextual
    16                                                No. 03-2170
    reasons for its refusal to reward his substantial assistance
    by filing an otherwise routine Rule 35(b) motion.
    Although in the context of contract disputes we review
    deferentially a district court’s finding of good faith, see
    Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 
    260 F.3d 789
    , 797 (7th Cir. 2001), we agree with Wilson that the
    underlying facts found by the district court in this case lead
    inescapably to the conclusion that the government acted in
    bad faith. After rejecting each of the government’s stated
    reasons for refusing to file, the district court noted that “the
    propriety of the [government’s] decision not to file for
    downward departure is questionable.” Without explaining
    further, the court then concluded that it “cannot say that
    the Government’s actions amount to bad faith.”
    Yet, as Wilson points out, the court’s factual findings
    compel the opposite conclusion for several reasons. First, by
    conditioning its willingness to file a Rule 35(b) motion on
    Wilson’s assent to forego suit, the government unilaterally
    inserted a new, unbargained-for term into the agreement
    obligating Wilson to withdraw his downward departure
    motion. At that point Wilson had fully performed his obli-
    gations by providing substantial assistance and withdraw-
    ing his motion for a downward departure. It was thus
    unfair for Porter to then announce that the government
    would ignore its reciprocal obligation to perform unless
    Wilson jumped over new hurdles that were not part of the
    bargain. See Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp.,
    
    987 F.2d 429
    , 433 (7th Cir. 1993) (introducing new demands
    late in negotiating process may constitute bad faith).
    Moreover, the government overreached by requiring
    Wilson to withdraw his motion for a downward departure
    in the first place. Nothing in the plea agreement prohibited
    him from filing such a motion, yet the government refused
    to move under Rule 35(b) unless he withdrew it, and in
    exchange promised Wilson only that it would “act in good
    No. 03-2170                                                 17
    faith”—something it was already obligated to do by the
    general duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every
    agreement. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205; cf.
    Contempo Design Inc. v. Chicago and N.E. Ill. Dist. Council
    of Carpenters, 
    226 F.3d 535
    , 550 (7th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
    (promise to perform pre-existing duty does not supply
    consideration). And since the government conceded in the
    district court that it was satisfied with the assistance
    Wilson had provided, it cannot now claim that it was
    honestly dissatisfied with his performance. See United
    States v. Khan, 
    920 F.2d 1100
    , 1105 (2d Cir. 1990) (relying
    on Restatement (Second) of Contracts for proposition that
    government may characterize defendant’s performance as
    inadequate “only if it is honestly dissatisfied”). Finally, the
    district court’s finding that the government advanced
    pretextual reasons for its refusal to move for a downward
    departure evidences bad faith on the government’s part. See
    Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 
    358 F.3d 528
    , 551 (8th Cir.
    2004) (upholding district court’s finding of bad faith when
    defendant offered pretextual reason to cover up real reason
    for refusing to carry out plan for radioactive waste disposal
    site); see also United States v. Knights, 
    968 F.2d 1483
    , 1487-
    88 (2d Cir. 1992) (vacating and remanding district court’s
    finding that prosecutor acted in good faith when none of
    government’s reasons for refusing to move for downward
    departure suggested that defendant had not fulfilled his
    obligations).
    We are unpersuaded by the government’s general con-
    tention that it acted “with abundant good-faith.” To support
    its position, the government points out that it offered to
    move under Rule 35(b) to reduce Wilson’s sentence by a
    and to recommend that the district court take two addi-
    tional years off the sentence (which the district court assured
    Wilson that it would do) if Wilson would only forego any
    claim arising from the two extra years he spent in prison.
    The government contends that its offer was so good that
    18                                               No. 03-2170
    Wilson’s own attorney questioned his competence when he
    rejected it. Thus, the argument goes, the government must
    have been acting in good faith. But its position makes no
    sense: that Wilson acted irrationally by refusing the “solu-
    tion” has little or no bearing on whether the government
    acted in good faith by conditioning its willingness to file on
    Wilson’s forbearance from suit in the first place. No amount
    of window dressing can hide the fact that Porter told Wilson
    in no uncertain terms that the government would not even
    consider carrying out its part of the bargain unless Wilson
    accepted the government’s new one-sided demand. In sum,
    the district court concluded that the parties had an inde-
    pendent agreement that the government would act in “good
    faith” regarding Wilson’s Rule 35(b) motion, and by subse-
    quently conditioning its willingness to file on a reason
    unrelated to Wilson’s admittedly satisfactory assistance, the
    government instead acted in bad faith.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The district court rejected each of the government’s
    explanations for refusing to file a Rule 35(b) motion on
    Wilson’s behalf. It then concluded nonetheless that the
    refusal was rationally related to a legitimate government
    interest and made in good faith. Given the district court’s
    factual findings, and the sequence of events precipitating
    the government’s ultimate withdrawal of its “placeholder”
    motion, the government neither furthered a legitimate gov-
    ernment objective nor acted in good faith when it refused to
    file a Rule 35(b) motion in exchange for the substantial
    assistance it concedes that Wilson provided. We thus VACATE
    the district court’s order allowing the government to
    withdraw its Rule 35(b) motion, REVERSE its order denying
    Wilson’s motion to compel, and REMAND for further proceed-
    ings.
    Pursuant to Circuit Rule 36, this case shall be reassigned
    to a new district court judge.
    No. 03-2170                                         19
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—12-2-04