Prela, Gjergj v. Ashcroft, John D. ( 2005 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 03-3963
    GJERGJ PRELA, also known as GRERGI PRELA,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    JOHN D. ASHCROFT,
    Respondent.
    ____________
    Petition for Review of an Order of
    the Board of Immigration Appeals.
    No. A77-767-632
    ____________
    ARGUED NOVEMBER 4, 2004—DECIDED JANUARY 7, 2005
    ____________
    Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
    BAUER, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Grergi Prela requests
    review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his application for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and protection under the United
    Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the
    reasons stated herein, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Prela is a native and citizen of the Federal Republic of
    Yugoslavia. An ethnic Albanian from Kosovo, Prela claims
    that he suffered persecution at the hands of Serbian police
    2                                                No. 03-3963
    and was also persecuted by the Albanian population due to
    his mother’s Serbian heritage and the fact that he was seen
    at the police station several times. With regard to the Serbian
    police, he identifies three incidents which he believes con-
    stitute persecution. First, in 1989, Prela accidentally shot
    himself while cleaning a gun which he owned. At that time,
    civilians were not permitted to own firearms. He sought
    medical treatment and was later confronted by the Serbian
    police, who confiscated his passport and would not return it
    until he surrendered the illegally-possessed gun. At the
    time he surrendered the weapon, he was interrogated about
    his political opinions. Second, in 1994, police surrounded
    and searched Prela’s house for illegal weapons. They
    arrested Prela and his brother and detained them for
    twenty-four hours until their mother paid a bribe to secure
    their release. Finally, in 1995, Prela was stopped by police
    while driving a car with Swiss tags. The police interrogated
    him, asked him to show them his documents, and demanded
    bribes. They also caused an unspecified injury to Prela’s
    hands, though the injury was not serious. The police even-
    tually released him, but told him that they did not want to
    see him anymore or they would kill him.
    Prela also claims that the Albanians persecuted him, re-
    citing incidents that actually occurred in Switzerland. From
    1989 to 1999, Prela received a series of temporary work
    permits and performed construction work in Switzerland
    intermittently. While in Switzerland in 1998 and 1999, Prela
    claims that people associated with the Kosovo Liberation
    Army (“KLA”) came to his house and threatened him with
    “elimination” if he did not join the KLA.
    On March 21, 1999, Prela entered the United States as a
    non-immigrant visitor. An inspection of his documents
    revealed that he had previously entered the United States
    as a non-immigrant visitor in June 1998, but there was no
    No. 03-3963                                                 3
    record of his departure. The INS1 initiated removal proceed-
    ings on March 31, 1999. Prela conceded removability and
    applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
    under the CAT on September 30, 1999. The Immigration
    Judge (“IJ”) denied Prela’s petition on July 1, 2002, finding
    that he had failed to prove that the claimed persecution was
    directed at him individually on the basis of his political
    opinion or nationality. Prela appealed, and the BIA sum-
    marily affirmed on October 15, 2003. The BIA adopted the
    conclusions of the IJ and added that the harm experienced
    by Prela did not rise to the level of past persecution or
    torture. Prela petitions for review of the BIA’s decision.
    DISCUSSION
    Since the BIA’s order merely supplements the opinion of
    the IJ, that opinion, as supplemented, becomes the basis for
    review. Liu v. Ashcroft, 
    380 F.3d 307
    , 311 (7th Cir. 2004).
    We review the IJ’s denial of Prela’s petition under the defer-
    ential substantial evidence standard. Under this standard,
    we must affirm if the decision is “supported by reasonable,
    substantial, and probative evidence on the record consid-
    ered as a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481,
    
    112 S.Ct. 812
    , 
    117 L.Ed.2d 38
     (1992). We will reverse only
    if we determine that the evidence compels a different result.
    Brucaj v. Ashcroft, 
    381 F.3d 602
    , 606 (7th Cir. 2004).
    Asylum
    Under § 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
    (“INA”), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a), the Attorney General has
    discretion to grant asylum to any alien who qualifies as a
    1
    The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which
    is a part of the Department of Homeland Security, now performs
    the immigration enforcement function previously handled by the
    INS.
    4                                                No. 03-3963
    “refugee” as defined by 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A). To es-
    tablish that he is a refugee, Prela must prove either that he
    has been the victim of persecution in the past or that he has
    a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his
    race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion. Tolosa v. Ashcroft, 
    384 F.3d 906
    ,
    908 (7th Cir. 2004). While the INA does not define “pers-
    ecution,” we have held that the conduct at issue must rise
    above the level of mere harassment. Asani v. INS, 
    154 F.3d 719
    , 723 (7th Cir. 1998). We have also recognized that
    “unpleasant and even dangerous conditions do not necessar-
    ily rise to the level of persecution.” Mitev v. INS, 
    67 F.3d 1325
    , 1331 (7th Cir. 1995).
    We are not compelled by the record to find that the
    incidents of which Prela complains are severe enough to
    constitute persecution. To reiterate, he was interrogated at
    various times by the police, detained for twenty-four hours,
    harassed for money, and beaten, causing an injury to his
    hands. Although these events may qualify as harassment or
    even intimidation, they are not so extreme that they rise to
    the level of persecution. This Court has held that similar or
    even more severe conduct is not persecution. See, e.g.,
    Dandan v. Ashcroft, 
    339 F.3d 567
    , 573-74 (7th Cir. 2003)
    (finding that detention for three days without food and
    beatings that caused facial swelling did not compel a
    finding of past persecution); Zalega v. INS, 
    916 F.2d 1257
    ,
    1260 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming finding that periodic
    searches, arrests, and detainments did not constitute past
    persecution). The evidence in this case and our precedent
    does not compel a finding that Prela was persecuted in the
    past.
    We also agree that there is substantial evidence supporting
    the IJ’s determination that Prela does not have a well-
    founded fear of future persecution. In the absence of a find-
    ing of past persecution, Prela must prove that he genuinely
    fears persecution on the basis of one of the protected
    grounds if removed to Yugoslavia, and that his fears are
    No. 03-3963                                                   5
    objectively reasonable. Liu, 
    380 F.3d at 312
    . Yugoslavia, and
    Kosovo in particular, has undergone significant change
    since 1999. The State Department Country Reports on
    Human Rights Practices in Yugoslavia for 2000 and 2001
    both describe the establishment of a new government in the
    province of Kosovo and the return of hundreds of thousands
    of ethnic Albanians to Kosovo since the end of the Milosevic
    regime. Recent opinions by this Court have also recognized
    this change in country conditions. See, e.g., Brucaj, 
    381 F.3d at 607
    . Given these changes, we do not dispute the IJ’s
    conclusion that Prela’s fear of future persecution is not
    objectively reasonable.
    Withholding of Removal
    Prela also seeks withholding of removal under § 241(b)(3)
    of the INA, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3). Under this section, he
    may not be removed to Yugoslavia if his life or freedom
    would be threatened there because of his race, religion, na-
    tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political
    opinion. 
    Id.
     The standard for withholding of removal is
    more stringent than that for granting asylum. Bevc v. INS,
    
    47 F.3d 907
    , 910 (7th Cir. 1995). To be eligible, he must
    establish a clear probability of persecution if returned to
    Yugoslavia; in other words, he must prove that it is more
    likely than not that he would be subject to persecution.
    Borca v. INS, 
    77 F.3d 210
    , 217 (7th Cir. 1996). As we have
    often held, the stricter standard logically dictates that a pe-
    titioner who fails to demonstrate eligibility for asylum
    cannot demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal.
    See, e.g., Hasanaj v. Ashcroft, 
    385 F.3d 780
    , 783 (7th Cir.
    2004).
    Torture Convention
    To qualify for protection under the CAT, Prela must prove
    that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if
    6                                                   No. 03-3963
    removed to Yugoslavia. 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c)(2). Torture is
    defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering,
    whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
    person . . . with the consent or acquiescence of a public
    official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.18
    (a)(1). It is also described as an “extreme form
    of cruel and inhuman treatment.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.18
    (a)(2). In
    determining whether it is more likely than not that a
    petitioner will be tortured, the IJ is directed by the imple-
    menting regulations to consider: (1) evidence of past torture
    inflicted upon the petitioner; (2) evidence that the petitioner
    could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he
    or she is not likely to be tortured; (3) evidence of gross,
    flagrant, or mass violations of human rights within the
    country of removal; and (4) other relevant information
    regarding conditions in the country of removal. 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c)(3).
    The evidence supports the IJ’s assessment that the harm
    Prela suffered in Yugoslavia and Switzerland does not rise
    to the level of “torture” as defined by the CAT. As detailed
    above, Prela complains that he was detained for twenty-four
    hours, harassed for bribes, interrogated, threatened, and
    sustained an unspecified injury to his hands. While cer-
    tainly unpleasant, these events do not amount to torture.
    We also find that there is substantial evidence supporting
    the IJ’s determination that the likelihood of Prela being
    tortured if removed from the United States is low. Again, as
    we noted previously, country conditions in Yugoslavia have
    changed considerably over the past five years. We are not
    compelled to find that Prela will more likely than not be
    tortured if he returns to that country.
    CONCLUSION
    The IJ’s and BIA’s decisions denying asylum, withholding
    of removal, and protection under the CAT to Prela are
    AFFIRMED and his petition for review is denied.
    No. 03-3963                                         7
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—1-7-05