United States v. Rosas, Freddy ( 2005 )


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  •                           In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 04-2929
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    FREDDY ROSAS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 03-CR-239—Rudolph T. Randa, Chief Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED DECEMBER 15, 2004—DECIDED MARCH 24, 2005
    ____________
    Before BAUER, COFFEY, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM. Freddy Rosas was convicted of drug and
    gun crimes and sentenced as a career offender under
    U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 to a total of 262 months imprisonment,
    based in part on his prior Wisconsin conviction for fleeing
    a police officer. In this appeal Rosas argues that he is not a
    career offender because, he says, his conviction for fleeing
    a police officer is not a qualifying “crime of violence.” Like
    the district court, however, we conclude that United States
    v. Howze, 
    343 F.3d 919
    , 921 (7th Cir. 2003), compels the
    2                                                No. 04-2929
    conclusion that under the Wisconsin statute at issue,
    fleeing a police officer is categorically a crime of violence.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    I.
    Rosas pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine, 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), possessing a firearm during and in relation to
    a drug offense, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c), and possession of a fire-
    arm by a felon, 
    id.
     § 922(g)(1). Rosas had several prior
    Wisconsin convictions, including a felony conviction for a
    drug offense and another under 
    Wis. Stat. § 346.04
    (3) for
    fleeing a police officer. The probation officer recommended
    that Rosas be sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 as a career
    offender, a guideline applicable if the defendant has at least
    two prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence or
    a controlled substance offense. The probation officer
    concluded that Rosas’ flight conviction under § 346.04(3),
    which qualified as a crime of violence, along with his state
    drug conviction provided the two convictions necessary for
    sentencing him as a career offender. Rosas’ base offense
    level otherwise would have been 24, and with a three-level
    downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under
    U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and a Category VI criminal history score,
    he might have faced an imprisonment range of 77 to 96
    months. The proposed career offender guideline, however,
    increased his base offense level to 37, and with the decrease
    for acceptance of responsibility, Rosas’ total offense level
    was 34, yielding a recommended imprisonment range of 262
    to 327 months. The district court imposed concurrent
    sentences for 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1), 240 and 120 months respectively, and a 60-
    month consecutive sentence for 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) for a
    “total term of 262 months imprisonment.” Additionally, the
    court ordered Rosas to serve five years of supervised release
    and pay a 300 dollar assessment and a 2,000 dollar fine.
    No. 04-2929                                                 3
    At sentencing Rosas objected to the characterization of his
    fleeing conviction as a crime of violence. He offered three
    reasons. First, he argued that Howze, which holds in the
    context of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e) that all flights to avoid arrest
    pose a serious potential risk of physical injury and thus are
    categorically “violent felonies,” did not control because
    Howze analyzes § 924(e) and the related armed career
    criminal guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, rather than the career
    offender guideline, id. § 4B1.1. Second, Rosas argued that,
    even if applicable, Howze should be reconsidered because a
    recent addition to the Wisconsin statute creating an
    additional misdemeanor provision for flight from the police
    renders the decision overbroad. And, third, he argued that
    certain conduct prohibited by § 346.04(3) does not include
    an element of risk to qualify it as a “crime of violence.” The
    district court concluded that it was bound by Howze and
    held that Rosas’ fleeing conviction did qualify as a “crime of
    violence” because, despite the different sentencing provi-
    sions at stake, the conduct described in Howze and in Rosas’
    case is the same. Regarding Rosas’ argument about the
    amendment to § 346.04 after Howze was decided, the
    district court reasoned that the change was irrelevant since,
    as Rosas concedes, even after the amendment his conduct
    would amount to a felony, not a misdemeanor. Finally, the
    court looked to the conduct underlying Rosas’ conviction and
    concluded that, indeed, his flight from police had created a
    potential risk of physical injury. On appeal Rosas reasserts
    the three arguments he made in district court, and adds a
    fourth contesting the district court’s reliance on information
    from outside his charging instrument in concluding that the
    conduct underlying his fleeing conviction presented a
    serious potential risk of physical injury. Rosas also contends
    that his sentence runs afoul of Blakely v. Washington, 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
     (2004), and this court’s decision in United States
    v. Booker, 
    375 F.3d 508
     (7th Cir. 2004).
    4                                                No. 04-2929
    II.
    Under § 4B1.1, a defendant is a career offender if he is
    being sentenced for a crime of violence or drug trafficking
    offense committed after he turned 18 and he has at least
    two prior felony convictions for either crimes of violence or
    controlled substance offenses. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A “crime
    of violence” is a state or federal felony that is either enu-
    merated in the guideline definition, or “has as an element
    the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
    against the person of another,” or “otherwise involves
    conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
    injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Fleeing a police
    officer is not one of the felonies enumerated in the guideline
    definition, and Wisconsin’s statute does not include any
    element of force, so flight from police can be a crime of
    violence only if it fits within the “otherwise” clause of
    § 4B1.2. A district court’s decision to sentence a defendant
    as a career offender is a question of law reviewed de novo.
    United States v. Cole, 
    298 F.3d 659
    , 661 (7th Cir. 2002).
    In arguing that Howze should not control, Rosas correctly
    observes that the decision actually decided that flight under
    § 346.04(3)—the very statute at issue in this case—is a
    “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e), which the guidelines implement in § 4B1.4,
    not § 4B1.1. This distinction is significant, says Rosas,
    because Application Note 1 to § 4B1.4 states that the
    definitions of “violent felony” and “crime of violence” are
    “not identical.” True enough, but the relevant language in
    the definition of “violent felony” at issue in Howze—“or
    otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
    risk of physical injury to another”—is identical to the
    “otherwise” clause of the definition of “crime of violence”
    found in § 4B1.2. Compare 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(2)(B)(ii),
    U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, comment. (n.1), with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
    Rosas concedes this point, but simply insists, without elab-
    No. 04-2929                                                  5
    oration, that there is a material distinction between Howze
    and his case because different provisions of the guidelines
    are at stake.
    In fact there is no distinction. In Howze itself, we ex-
    plained that United States v. Shannon, 
    110 F.3d 382
     (7th
    Cir. 1997) (en banc), viewed the career offender guideline
    and the Armed Career Criminal Act as “interchangeable.”
    See Howze, 
    343 F.3d at 924
    . And at least as to the “other-
    wise” clause in both the definition of “violent felony” and
    the career offender definition of “crime of violence,” Rosas
    makes no argument as to why cases interpreting the same
    language in one provision should not apply equally to the
    other. We note that, at the time Howze was decided, the
    clause at stake in both the Armed Career Criminal Act and
    in the career offender definition (“or otherwise involves
    conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
    injury to another”) was identical to what is in use today.
    Moreover, although the precise question has not been before
    this court, the Sixth Circuit—relying on Howze—has
    concluded that flight does qualify as a “crime of violence”
    under § 4B1.2. See United States v. Martin, 
    378 F.3d 578
    ,
    582-83 (6th Cir. 2004) (characterizing § 924(e) analysis in
    Howze as “a comparable conclusion”).
    Rosas also argues that Howze’s holding should not control
    because, he contends, a recent amendment that expanded
    
    Wis. Stat. § 346.04
     to allow charging flight from the police
    either as a misdemeanor or felony renders Howze overbroad
    and undermines the decision. The statute now includes a
    new subsection (2t) that reads: “No operator, after having
    received a visible or audible signal to stop his or her vehicle
    from a traffic officer or marked police vehicle, shall know-
    ingly resist the traffic officer by failing to stop his or her
    vehicle as promptly as safety reasonably permits.” 
    Wis. Stat. § 346.04
    (2t). Rosas takes the position that the Wisconsin
    legislature, by creating a misdemeanor provision, has rec-
    ognized that “all flights do not create felonious risk-creating
    6                                                No. 04-2929
    conduct.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. The short answer is that a
    misdemeanor cannot be a crime of violence and that Howze
    analyzes § 346.04(3), not § 346.04(2t). In any event, the new
    section does not appear to alter the approach to conduct
    previously proscribed by § 346.04(3), but rather criminalizes
    a new class of conduct. Compare 
    Wis. Stat. § 346.04
    (3), with
    
    id.
     § 346.04(2t). Moreover, Rosas’ argument regarding the
    implications of misdemeanor flight is purely hypothetical, as
    Rosas concedes that his conduct would still be charged and
    resolved as a felony even after the amendment to § 346.04.
    As applied to Rosas and § 346.04(3), Howze is not under-
    mined at all.
    Because Howze compels the conclusion that a violation of
    § 346.04(3) is categorically a crime of violence, Rosas’ next
    two arguments have no relevance. Rosas insists that his
    particular violation of § 346.04(3), as charged in the
    Information, did not pose a potential risk of physical injury
    to another. Under a categorical approach, though, there is
    no need to evaluate the language of the charging instru-
    ment: Howze rejected the argument that there is a way to
    violate § 346.04(3) that does not involve the creation of risk
    and concluded, as a per se rule with respect to that provi-
    sion, “all flights involve that risk-creating conduct.” Howze,
    
    343 F.3d at 922
    . For the same reason it does not matter
    that the district court appears to have erroneously evalu-
    ated Rosas’ flight conviction by looking to the underlying
    conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 
    298 F.3d 659
    , 662
    (7th Cir. 2002) (confining a district court’s evaluation to
    charging documents, except in certain circumstances).
    That leaves only Rosas’ argument under Blakely and
    Booker. While Rosas acknowledges that prior convictions
    used to enhance sentences need not be proven to a jury be-
    yond a reasonable doubt, see Almendarez-Torres v. United
    States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 244 (1998); Pittman v. United States,
    
    388 F.3d 1104
    , 1109 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that
    Almendarez-Torres survives Blakely), he contends that it is
    No. 04-2929                                                 7
    the nature, not the mere existence, of a previous conviction
    that requires a jury determination. This argument is
    misguided because whether a previous offense constitutes
    crime of violence for purposes of sentencing enhancement is
    a question of law, see United States v. Bryant, 
    310 F.3d 550
    ,
    552 (7th Cir. 2002), whereas Blakely implicates only
    questions of fact, Blakely, 124 S. Ct at 2536; see also United
    States v. Trala, 
    386 F.3d 536
    , 547 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004)
    (holding that whether an offense is a “crime of violence or
    a controlled substance offense” is a legal determination that
    does not raise an issue of fact under Blakely or Apprendi v.
    New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000)); United States v. Moorer,
    
    383 F.3d 164
    , 169 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that status as
    a career offender is purely a legal question and does not
    implicate Blakely).
    AFFIRMED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—3-24-05