Dumas, Cliff v. Infinity Broadcastin ( 2005 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 04-1133
    CLIFF DUMAS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    INFINITY BROADCASTING
    CORPORATION and WUSN-FM,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 03 C 4713—James F. Holderman, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 15, 2004—DECIDED AUGUST 1, 2005
    ____________
    Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and COFFEY and KANNE,
    Circuit Judges.
    COFFEY, Circuit Judge. On July 7, 2003, Cliff Dumas, a
    country music radio personality, filed a diversity action in
    the United States District Court for the District of
    New Mexico against Infinity Broadcasting Corporation
    (“Infinity”) and its Chicago affiliate, WUSN-FM (“US-99”).
    In his complaint, Dumas alleged that he was entitled to
    monetary damages for breach of contract and promissory
    2                                                No. 04-1133
    estoppel arising out of an unfulfilled employment agree-
    ment with US-99. Shortly after the complaint was filed, the
    case was transferred on Infinity’s motion to the
    United States District Court for the Northern District of
    Illinois. Following discovery, the defendants moved for
    summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. The
    district court agreed and granted the defendants’ motion,
    finding that Dumas’ claim for breach of contract was barred
    by the Illinois statute of frauds and, as a result, his promis-
    sory estoppel claim was untenable. We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Although country music is most often thought of in terms
    of geographical locales such as Nashville, Tennessee and
    Dallas, Texas, it seems that Canadians enjoy entertainers
    such as Anne Murray, Patsy Cline and Johnny Cash just as
    much as their American counterparts. Living proof of this
    phenomenon is Cliff Dumas, a country music radio broad-
    caster with an excess of 24 years of experience, most of it in
    places such as Calgary and Toronto in Canada. Throughout
    his career, Dumas has hosted a number of successful radio
    programs, an example of which is the syndicated “Canadian
    Country Countdown,” which was broadcast throughout
    Canada. Indeed, in 1990 Dumas was honored by the
    Country Music Association and presented with the “Me-
    dium Market Broadcast Personality of the Year,” the first
    time such an award was given to a radio host outside the
    United States.
    Beginning in 2000, Dumas attempted to leverage his
    accomplishments in Canadian radio and began soliciting
    employment in the United States market. At some point,
    toward the end of April of that year, he was contacted by
    Scott Aurand (a.k.a. Justin Case), the program director of
    a country music radio station in Chicago, US-99. Aurand
    No. 04-1133                                                      3
    expressed an interest in flying Dumas and his wife to meet
    with himself and other US-99 executives regarding possible
    employment opportunities. Dumas accepted Aurand’s offer,
    and while in Chicago spoke with Aurand and the US-99’s
    general manager, Steve Ennen, concerning a possible
    opening for Dumas as host of the US-99 morning show. At
    this point it became evident that although Dumas was
    negotiating directly with Aurand, it was Ennen and others
    in management positions at the station and Infinity that
    would have the final decision-making authority as to his
    hiring. Upon his return to Canada, Dumas was informed by
    Aurand via e-mail that based on his salary and bonus
    requests, as well as job expectations, Ennen “would not
    present [the proposal] to corporate”, meaning the deal was
    effectively dead.1 With the two parties far apart from a
    1
    In an e-mail dated May 3, 2000, Aurand outlined that the offer
    that the station was willing to give Dumas was a five-year deal
    with $150,000 for the first year and a $10,000 raise the following
    four years. Also, the station was willing to guarantee bonuses
    commensurate to performance starting at $10,000 for a fifth place
    ranking in the ratings for the morning time slot and an additional
    $10,000 for each step up in the ratings, with $40,000 for a first
    place ranking. However, apparently Dumas was seeking “a salary
    of 200 thousand [sic] plus,” with “a 100 thousand [sic] signing
    bonus and 250 thousand dollar [sic] buy out [sic] plus a 100
    thousand [sic] completion of contract bonus.” Dumas also stated
    that while “[a] signing bonus would be great . . . I feel a buy out
    [sic] is an absolute must.”
    Aurand responded to Dumas’ counteroffer by stating that he
    would “take it to Steve [Ennen],” but cautioned that in his opinion
    they were “a long way away.” As noted above, Ennen refused to
    present the deal to the station’s owners at Infinity. Indeed,
    Aurand informed Dumas that Infinity “works differently” and that
    the numbers Dumas was asking for might be appropriate for “a
    (continued...)
    4                                                      No. 04-1133
    compromise on monetary and other issues2 concerning the
    employment opportunity, negotiations broke down without
    Infinity ever making an official job offer and Dumas began
    pursuing other opportunities.
    Shortly thereafter, Dumas was contacted by Citadel
    Communications Corporation, another broadcasting com-
    pany, about hosting a morning show on a station they
    owned in Albuquerque, New Mexico. An interview was ar-
    ranged and a few days later Dumas accepted the position,
    officially taking over the morning program at KRST and
    moving his family to New Mexico at the end of May 2000.
    Approximately a year and a half passed without any
    further negotiation or contact between Dumas and the man-
    agement of US-99. This changed in December of 2001,
    however, when Dumas and Aurand began communicating
    once again. Initially, the conversations between the two
    were friendly interactions about how each party was faring
    as well as about a small debt that Dumas owed Aurand
    during his Chicago visit in 2000. However, beginning in
    February of 2002, the two men once again began discussing
    the possibility of Dumas hosting a radio program at US-99.
    In a series of e-mails exchanged between Dumas and
    Aurand beginning on or about February 22, 2002, Dumas
    related his intention to leave his job at KRST (Albuquerque)
    and informed him that he had sold his house in order that
    he might be ready to move when “the right opportunity”
    presented itself. Aurand responded by telling Dumas that
    he should keep in touch.
    1
    (...continued)
    second contract if [he] were wildly successful,” but not as an initial
    offering. In other words, it seems Dumas was overshooting the
    target.
    2
    Dumas stated that he “kind of felt that” if he were to accept
    employment at US-99 he would be “jumping into a sinking ship.”
    Dumas Depo. at 56.
    No. 04-1133                                                    5
    Allegedly, over the next month-and-a-half, a number of
    phone calls ensued between the two, culminating in an
    April 8, 2002 e-mail in which Aurand asked Dumas to
    identify what salary range he would consider accepting for
    an opportunity to host the morning show at US-99,3 with
    the choices ranging from $125,000 to $250,000. Dumas re-
    plied that “something in the 175 to 225 range seems right.”
    Aurand replied with an e-mail dated April 29, 2002
    wherein he informed Dumas that “[i]t is important that we
    start talking ‘real’ opportunity . . . [t]here may be ‘real’
    opportunity [at the station for you] . . . I’m going to need
    a regular influx of tape.”4 In addition, the e-mail sets out
    numerous other talking points that need to be discussed,
    such as: (a) whether or not Dumas’ personality and radio
    demeanor would fit in at the station; (b) who would join
    him, if anyone, on the air; (c) whether Dumas intended to
    stay with the station for an extended period of time; (d)
    whether Dumas could work effectively as a leader; and (e)
    whether Dumas and US-99 could compromise on the issue
    3
    The full text of the e-mail, with the subject line “what are we
    looking at” reads:
    Cliff,
    So give me an idea of where you’re [sic] heads [sic] at.
    1. 125 to 175
    2. 175 to 225
    3. 225 to 250
    4. not going to happen.
    Justin Case
    4
    When Aurand asks Dumas for a “regular influx of tape” he is
    asking that Dumas send him tape recordings of his show at KRST
    so that Aurand and US-99 management can get a feel for his
    personality and the manner in which he conducts himself on the
    air.
    6                                                      No. 04-1133
    of salary.5 Dumas claims that, following this e-mail, he and
    Aurand had a number of subsequent telephone conver-
    sations regarding the philosophy (i.e., the age, gender and
    income bracket of the targeted audience) of the proposed
    morning show, the time frame of Dumas’ potential employ-
    ment as well as the financial terms of the potential agree-
    ment. Indeed, Dumas alleges that all the components of a
    contract were in place such as salary ($175,000 to start),
    start date (August 4, 2002) and contract length (5 years
    with an option for 5 more) and that the contract was orally
    consummated via telephone on May 20, 2002.
    On May 20, Aurand informed Dumas via e-mail that, be-
    cause the morning show at US-99 had dropped to 16th in
    the most recent ratings, the station was “moving forward
    with [their] plans to bring [him] in.” Aurand outlined a for-
    mula for the morning show and informed Dumas in plain
    terms that his goal was to move the show up in the ratings.
    With the help of the right new morning host, Aurand
    believed he would be able to move the show from where it
    presently was in the ratings to the top 8 among all radio
    formats in the Chicago market.6
    5
    As to the money issue, Aurand writes in the April 29 e-mail
    that: “I think we can compromise here. There may be a window.
    You need to be willing to prove yourself to some extent . . . and we
    need to be able to pay a little more than we are comfortable with.
    If you can get us into scoring position . . . we can all make a little
    dough.”
    6
    In pertinent part the e-mail states: “Trend [i.e., ratings] came
    out today-down-morning show 16th 25-54. This is not acceptable.
    We are moving forward with our plans to bring you in. Here is our
    formula for the AM show. How does this strike you. We will likely
    reduce it to TWO players—CLIFF & TRISH. (no producer at
    beginning) [with the format being] 1) Warm & Friendly [sic] 2)
    Music Focused (at start) [sic] 3) Brief & Topical [sic] 4) positive
    (continued...)
    No. 04-1133                                                      7
    Despite Aurand’s enthusiasm for Dumas in late May, the
    record reflects that Dumas was having a problem obtaining
    the necessary release before negotiating with any interested
    parties from KRST.7 Indeed, on June 4, 2002, Aurand
    advised Dumas in writing that: “We can’t do anything
    without a release . . . [v]erbal does not count for our legal
    team . . . [b]est of luck securing the paper work.” Dumas
    responded by writing that he was “just waiting for the . . .
    paper work” from management and informed Aurand that
    he had advised KRST that June 21, 2002 would be his last
    day at that station. Apparently Aurand was surprised at
    this turn of events and wrote back the next day stating:
    “You are leaving—as in done? Do you have the option of
    staying? You said you were just getting a waiver to look at
    opportunities. Hope you did not burn a bridge.” Shortly
    thereafter Dumas did obtain a written release from his
    contract on June 6, 2002, which he in turn forwarded to
    Aurand, and tendered his resignation to KRST effective
    June 24, 2002. Dumas claims that shortly after receiving
    the June 4 e-mail he contacted Aurand on the telephone
    and was assured that once Infinity’s lawyers received the
    written release document Dumas’ employment would be
    assured, but admits that Aurand also told him that he
    should contact Eric Logan (Aurand’s supervisor), who had
    recently been hired as the operations manager at US-99
    and would have to “sign off” on the hiring of Dumas.
    On June 13, 2002, Dumas took Aurand’s advice and sent
    an e-mail to Logan introducing himself and stating that he
    looked “forward to talking . . . about what [he could] bring
    6
    (...continued)
    [sic] a) Love the city [sic] b) Love the listener [sic] c) Love the
    music [sic] The goal for the show is to be in the (TOP 8) 25-54 all
    formats.”
    7
    The parent company of US-99, Infinity, required a release from
    KRST before carrying on any further negotiations with Dumas.
    8                                                No. 04-1133
    to the station and the company.” In the same e-mail, Dumas
    informed Logan that he had been released from his contract
    “to pursue this opportunity,” and reminded Logan of the
    “discussions [he and Aurand] had about taking over the
    morning show in August.” The remainder of the e-mail to
    Logan contains a protracted recitation of Dumas’ qualifi-
    cations for the morning host position and closes with a
    reference to the fact that Aurand was aware of his merits as
    a performer including the tapes that he had previously
    forwarded to Aurand up to that “point in the negotiations.”
    Although Logan was in transit at the time, he set up an
    appointment to talk with Dumas in the near future. The
    two eventually did talk and Dumas recalls being reassured
    that “everything was moving forward.”
    Over the next few weeks Dumas continued to send Logan
    e-mails espousing his qualifications in an attempt to con-
    vince Logan that he was the right person for the job. For
    example, on June 28, 2002, Dumas sent Logan a follow-up
    e-mail with a list of references for him to peruse while “con-
    sidering [his] options.” Then, on July 12, 2002, Dumas’ tone
    turned a bit more anxious and he pleaded with Logan to tell
    him whether the “pending deal was going to fly,” while
    letting him know that he had waited “for close to a month
    for a decision to be made.” Nonetheless, Dumas made clear
    that he had “a couple of other opportunities in Toronto, op-
    portunities I want to take.” The situation became consider-
    ably more tempestuous on July 23, however, when Dumas
    challenged Logan to “come up with a financial arrangement
    to help me out of this mess we’ve got ourselves into,” and
    offered that his “lawyer [had] copies of everything.” At this
    point US-99 executives stopped returning Dumas’ phone
    calls and e-mails, and Dumas became aware that his
    chances of being employed with the company had been
    eclipsed.
    On July 7, 2003, Dumas brought suit against US-99's
    parent corporation, Infinity, claiming that he was entitled
    No. 04-1133                                                  9
    to damages for breach of contract and promissory estoppel
    based on his dealings with US-99. Although the legal action
    was originally filed in the United States District Court for
    the District of New Mexico, the case was subsequently
    transferred for trial to the Northern District of Illinois and,
    after discovery, Infinity moved for summary judgment. The
    district court granted Infinity’s motion, finding that both of
    Dumas’ claims were controlled by Illinois law. Furthermore,
    the court found that both of Dumas’ claims failed as a
    matter of law because of his failure to produce sufficient
    documentary evidence establishing the existence of a written
    contract or agreement, as required by the Illinois statute of
    frauds, between himself and Infinity. We affirm.
    II. DISCUSSION
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
    de novo, and will view all the facts and draw all reasonable
    inferences therefrom in favor of the non-movant, Dumas.
    Hardy v. Univ. of Ill. at Chicago, 
    328 F.3d 361
    , 364 (7th Cir.
    2003); Architectural Metal Systems, Inc. v. Consolidated
    Systems, Inc., 
    58 F.3d 1227
    , 1228 (7th Cir. 1995). Summary
    judgment is proper only in cases where “there is no genuine
    issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
    56(c); Smith v. Ball State Univ., 
    295 F.3d 763
    , 767 (7th Cir.
    2002).
    On appeal Dumas does not challenge the district court’s
    finding that Illinois law controls nor does he challenge the
    court’s determination that his breach of contract claim is
    barred by the Illinois statute of frauds, which requires that
    any “promise or agreement” that cannot be performed
    within one year be documented in writing. Accordingly, the
    only issue we are presented with on appeal is whether, as
    a matter of law, Dumas has presented sufficient evidence to
    establish a viable claim for promissory estoppel and what,
    if any, application the statute of frauds has upon this claim.
    10                                                   No. 04-1133
    Dumas presents this court with what can only be classi-
    fied as a most confusing and convoluted argument. At the
    outset, Dumas admits that he has no quarrel with the
    district court’s determination that his breach of contract
    claim is barred by Illinois’ statute of frauds because any
    alleged contract between US-99 and himself could not be
    established with the paucity of written evidence (e-mails)
    presented to the district court. See 740 ILCS 80/1. Also,
    Dumas readily concedes, as he must, that “his promissory
    estoppel claim is [also] within the [scope of the] Illinois
    statute of frauds.” Appellant’s Brief at 15; see Fischer v.
    First Chicago Capital Markets, Inc., 
    195 F.3d 279
    , 284 (7th
    Cir. 1999) (“Under Illinois law, the statute of frauds is
    applicable to a promise claimed to be enforceable by virtue
    of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.”); McInerney v.
    Charter Golf, Inc., 
    176 Ill. 2d 482
    , 492, 
    223 Ill. Dec. 911
    , 916,
    
    680 N.E.2d 1347
    , 1352 (Ill. 1997).8 Nonetheless, Dumas
    claims that he can prevail, as a matter of law, on his
    promissory estoppel claim by employing documentary
    evidence, which he concedes falls short of satisfying the
    Illinois statute of frauds for contract purposes, to establish
    that Infinity made an unambiguous promise to employ him
    under a promissory estoppel theory.
    8
    It should be noted that under Illinois law a claim for equitable
    estoppel, unlike promissory estoppel, is not subject to the re-
    quirements of the statute of frauds. See Dickens v. Quincy College
    Corp., 245 Ill.App.3d 1055, 1062, 
    185 Ill. Dec. 822
    , 826, 
    615 N.E.2d 381
    , 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (citing Cohn v. Checker Motors Corp.,
    233 Ill.App.3d 839, 845-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)), accord Ozier v.
    Haines, 
    411 Ill. 160
    , 165, 
    103 N.E.2d 485
    , 488 (Ill. 1952). However,
    at no point in the proceedings either in this court or in the trial
    court did Dumas advance a claim based on equitable estoppel
    grounds. Thus, we will not consider whether the outcome of this
    case would be altered by the introduction of a claim for equitable
    estoppel.
    No. 04-1133                                                    11
    The Illinois Supreme Court has delineated a four-part
    test to determine whether a claim premised on promissory
    estoppel grounds may succeed, which requires a plaintiff to
    prove that “(1) defendants made an unambiguous promise
    to plaintiff, (2) plaintiff relied on such promise, (3) plaintiff’s
    reliance was expected and foreseeable by defendants, and
    (4) plaintiff relied on the promise to its detriment.” Quake
    Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 
    141 Ill. 2d 281
    , 309-
    10, 
    152 Ill. Dec. 308
    , 322, 
    565 N.E.2d 990
    , 1004 (Ill. 1990)
    (quoting Yardley v. Yardley, 137 Ill.App.3d 747, 754, 
    92 Ill. Dec. 142
    , 
    484 N.E.2d 873
    (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)); see Bank
    of Marion v. Robert “Chick” Fritz, Inc., 
    57 Ill. 2d 120
    , 124,
    
    311 N.E.2d 138
    , 140 (Ill. 1974). As we have noted in the
    past, however, “[p]romissory estoppel is not a doctrine
    designed to give a party . . . a second bite at the apple in the
    event that it fails to prove a breach of contract.” See All-
    Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 
    174 F.3d 862
    , 869-70
    (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Walker v. KFC Corp., 
    728 F.2d 1215
    , 1220 (9th Cir. 1984)). Under Illinois law, a claim for
    promissory estoppel will only succeed where all the other
    elements of a contract exist, but consideration is lacking.
    See Bank of 
    Marion, 57 Ill. 2d at 124
    . In such an instance
    “[a]lthough there may be absent a bargained-for consider-
    ation, a person who makes a promise may nonetheless be
    bound by its terms.” Id.; see Prentice v. UDC Advisory
    Services, Inc., 271 Ill.App.3d 505, 512, 
    207 Ill. Dec. 690
    , 695,
    
    648 N.E.2d 146
    , 151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); People v. Raymond,
    202 Ill.App.3d 704, 708, 
    147 Ill. Dec. 878
    , 881, 
    560 N.E.2d 26
    , 29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Moore v. Illinois Bell Telephone
    Co., 155 Ill.App.3d 781, 785-86, 
    108 Ill. Dec. 358
    , 360, 
    508 N.E.2d 519
    , 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). This is consistent with
    the history of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that it is
    a common law equitable device wherein a contract may be
    implied where none is found to exist, i.e., for lack of consid-
    eration. See Dickens, 245 Ill.App.3d at 1062. Thus, the
    doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable only under
    certain narrow circumstances to serve “as substitute for
    12                                               No. 04-1133
    consideration or an exception to its ordinary requirement.”
    Bank of 
    Marion, 57 Ill. 2d at 124
    . It necessarily follows that
    where there is “no issue of consideration, there is no gap in
    the remedial system for promissory estoppel to fill.” All-
    Tech Telecom, 
    Inc., 174 F.3d at 869
    ; see also Destron, Inc. v.
    Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 
    59 B.R. 240
    , 245 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (“Promissory estoppel does
    not establish a contract, but is merely a substitute for
    consideration.”).
    Also, the Illinois statue of frauds—which Dumas agrees
    is applicable—precludes the enforcement of any promise to
    employ that cannot be performed within one calender year
    “unless the promise or agreement upon which such action
    shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof,
    shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged
    therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully
    authorized.” 740 ILCS 80/1. The statute of frauds’ writing
    requirement “is not [intended] to enable parties ‘to repudi-
    ate contracts that have in fact been made; it is only to pre-
    vent the fraudulent enforcement of asserted contracts that
    were not made.’ ” Rose v. Mavrakis, 343 Ill.App.3d 1086,
    1097, 
    278 Ill. Dec. 751
    , 760, 
    799 N.E.2d 469
    , 478 (Ill. App.
    Ct. 2003) (quoting Haas v. Cravatta, 71 Ill.App.3d 325, 328-
    29, 
    27 Ill. Dec. 414
    , 
    389 N.E.2d 226
    (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)).
    Thus, in order to succeed on his claim of promissory
    estoppel, Dumas must—as a threshold matter—present to
    the court written evidence of an “unambiguous promise”
    which, but for the existence of bargained-for consideration,
    would constitute an enforceable contractual agreement
    under Illinois law—something which he has failed to accom-
    plish.
    In the ordinary course of litigation of this nature it is
    commonplace for the plaintiff, after having been unsuccess-
    ful in producing written documentation of an alleged oral
    contract as required by the statute of frauds, to seek to
    recover under the alternate theory of promissory estoppel.
    See 
    McInerney, 176 Ill. 2d at 492
    . In such a case, since the
    No. 04-1133                                                    13
    statute of frauds applies with equal force under either a
    breach of contract or promissory estoppel theory under
    Illinois law, it is unnecessary for the courts to undertake a
    separate promissory estoppel analysis, for the statute of
    frauds per se cannot be satisfied. See 
    Fischer, 195 F.3d at 283-84
    . The only substantive difference between that
    scenario and the situation before us, is Dumas’ additional
    claim that, although the documents he submitted to the
    district court (admittedly) failed to satisfy the elements of
    an enforceable contract, they might conceivably constitute
    an unambiguous promise to employ. We agree with the
    reasoning employed by the district court and are of the
    opinion that it is unnecessary for a court, once satisfied that
    the statute of frauds could not be satisfied concerning a
    breach of contract claim, to undertake a separate analysis
    of whether or not an “unambiguous promise” exists for
    promissory estoppel purposes, for the outcome would be the
    same in either instance.
    The district court properly determined, and Dumas
    agrees, that the documentary evidence he presented in the
    form of e-mails falls short of establishing the essential ele-
    ments of a contract, e.g., offer, acceptance and a meeting of
    the minds. Thus, the Illinois statute of frauds’ requirement
    that documentary evidence of a “promise or agreement” be
    produced could not be satisfied. See 740 ILCS 80/1. The ab-
    sence of the essential elements of a contract also effectively
    foreclosed any legitimate promissory estoppel argument
    that he may have had, for as we have explained, Illinois law
    requires that, but for consideration, all other elements of a
    contractual agreement exist in conjunction with such a
    claim. See Bank of 
    Marion, 57 Ill. 2d at 124
    ; Prentice, 271
    Ill.App.3d at 512; Raymond, 202 Ill.App.3d at 708; Moore,
    155 Ill.App.3d at 785-86.9 In addition, by failing to establish
    9
    Also, it should be noted that although a lack of consideration is
    the only reason that courts generally will award damages on the
    (continued...)
    14                                                    No. 04-1133
    a valid agreement or promise sufficient to satisfy the
    statute of frauds while proceeding under a breach of con-
    tract theory, he likewise, on the record before us, has been
    unsuccessful in establishing a promise—much less an
    “unambiguous” promise—under the doctrine of promissory
    estoppel. See Moore, 155 Ill.App.3d at 785-86. It is only logi-
    cal to conclude that, where a plaintiff is unable to establish
    a written “promise or agreement” sufficient to satisfy the
    statute of frauds under the traditional requirements of
    contract law, he will also per se be unable to demonstrate
    the existence of an “unambiguous promise” for promissory
    estoppel purposes, for the promissory estoppel standard is
    more rigorous. Quake Constr., 
    Inc., 141 Ill. 2d at 309-10
    ; see
    9
    (...continued)
    basis of promissory estoppel, Dumas has not alleged that con-
    sideration was lacking. Under Illinois law, “[c]onsideration con-
    sists of some detriment to the offeror, some benefit to the offeree,
    or some bargained-for exchange between them.” Doyle v. Holy
    Cross Hosp., 
    186 Ill. 2d 104
    , 112, 
    237 Ill. Dec. 100
    , 105, 
    708 N.E.2d 1140
    , 1145 (Ill. 1999) (citing Lipkin v. Koren, 
    392 Ill. 400
    , 406, 
    64 N.E.2d 890
    (Ill. 1946)). And, “[a]ny act or promise which is of
    benefit to one party or disadvantage to the other is a sufficient
    consideration to support a contract.” 
    Id. (quoting Steinberg
    v.
    Chicago Medical School, 
    69 Ill. 2d 320
    , 330, 
    13 Ill. Dec. 699
    , 
    371 N.E.2d 634
    (Ill. 1977)). Indeed, the contract that Dumas alleged
    did encompass a “bargained-for” exchange in that Dumas claimed
    that he would be paid certain amounts of money ($175,000 to
    start) for hosting the morning show at US-99 over a five-year
    period, with the mutual option to continue his employment for
    another five years. See supra p. 6. The fact that consideration
    likely existed effectively extinguished any promissory estoppel
    claim that Dumas may have had. See Bank of 
    Marion, 57 Ill. 2d at 124
    ; All-Tech Telecom, 
    Inc., 174 F.3d at 869
    ; Destron, 
    Inc., 59 B.R. at 245
    . As this court has noted, to allow the doctrine of promissory
    estoppel to be invoked where consideration exists, “becomes a
    gratuitous duplication or, worse, circumvention of carefully
    designed rules of contract law.” All-Tech Telecom, 
    Inc., 174 F.3d at 869
    .
    No. 04-1133                                                         15
    also Phillips v. Britton, 162 Ill.App.3d 774, 785-86, 
    114 Ill. Dec. 537
    , 545, 
    516 N.E.2d 692
    , 700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
    (holding that “[t]he promise which the Phillipses contend to
    have made in this case, however, is the same as the agree-
    ment underlying their claim for breach of contract, and the
    evidence adduced by them with respect to each is
    identical . . . [and] just as we believe that the trial court
    could have found that the terms of the agreement were not
    clear, definite and unequivocal, we therefore likewise
    believe that it could have determined that the promise was
    not unambiguous”). Thus, we are of the opinion that the
    district court properly granted Infinity’s motion for “sum-
    mary judgment on Dumas’s promissory estoppel claim
    because [such a] claim is not available to avoid the statute
    of frauds.” Dumas v. Infinity Broadcasting, Corp., No. 03-C-
    4713, 
    2003 WL 23509644
    , at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2003).10
    10
    Dumas argued in the district court that Aurand’s April 8, 2002
    e-mail outlining potential salaries and his response that “some-
    thing in the 175 to 225 range seems right” constituted an offer (or
    promise in terms of his promissory estoppel claim) to pay Dumas
    a salary no lower than $175,000. See supra p. 5; see also
    Appellant’s Brief at 20 (“In view of Infinity’s offer in 2000 to start
    Dumas at $150,000 and increase his salary over five years . . . a
    jury could find that [Aurand] was assuring Dumas that he would
    be offered a position starting at, at least, $175,000 . . . [and] recov-
    ery can be had based on promissory estoppel ‘when the promise is
    unambiguous on the downside but not on the upside.’ ”) (citing
    Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 
    788 F.2d 456
    , 462 (7th Cir. 1986)).
    Contrary to Dumas’ arguments that these e-mails constitute a
    “promise or agreement” to employ, we agree with Judge
    Holderman’s finding that “[n]either of these writings establish that
    a salary was ever actually agreed upon . . . [and] [t]hus, these
    writings cannot establish to a reasonable certainty the salary of
    the alleged contract.” Dumas, 
    2003 WL 23509644
    , at *7.
    Likewise, Dumas claims that an e-mail he received on May 20,
    2002 from Aurand evinces a promise to employ on Infinity’s part.
    See supra p. 6. However, in that e-mail Aurand simply outlines
    (continued...)
    16                                                   No. 04-1133
    Dumas disagrees with this conclusion and argues instead
    that “sufficient documentary evidence [of a promise to
    employ was] submitted to the district court . . . to satisfy
    the statute of frauds for purposes of [his] promissory
    estoppel claim,” Appellant’s Brief at 21, even though that
    promise was “not definite enough to support a breach of
    contract claim.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2. As support for
    his argument he cites to two of this court’s opinions in
    Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 
    788 F.2d 456
    (7th Cir. 1986) and
    Architectural Metal Systems, Inc. v. Consolidated Systems,
    Inc., 
    58 F.3d 1227
    (7th Cir. 1995). However, these cases are
    distinguishable. In Architectural Metal Systems, Inc., the
    court was not dealing with the Illinois statute of frauds, but
    rather was dealing with UCC § 2-201. See Architectural
    Metal Systems, 
    Inc., 58 F.3d at 1230-31
    . In addition, we
    concluded that a written promise, in the form of a price
    quotation, existed in that case. See 
    id. Thus, the
    statute of
    frauds was not implicated and did not preclude or otherwise
    impinge on the plaintiff’s claim of promissory estoppel. 
    Id. at 1231.
    Likewise, in Goldstick this court declined to decide
    the question of whether the statute of frauds was applicable
    to the plaintiff-appellant’s promissory estoppel claim due to
    uncertainty in Illinois law at that time as to whether the
    10
    (...continued)
    what the program would likely consist of if Dumas were to become
    an employee. We agree with the district court that this e-mail
    does not “state with a reasonable certainty” the elements of either
    a promise or a valid, legally enforceable contract. See Dumas,
    
    2003 WL 23509644
    , at *7.
    The fact is that none of the documents Dumas presented the
    court with, either on their own or taken collectively, constitute
    either a legally binding contract or a “promise or agreement” to
    employ Dumas. See JamSports & Entertainment, LLC v.
    Paradama Productions, Inc., 
    336 F. Supp. 2d 824
    , 849-50 (N.D. Ill.
    2004). Thus, just as Dumas’ breach of contract claim failed, so too
    must his promissory estoppel claim, for it is barred by application
    of the Illinois statute of frauds.
    No. 04-1133                                                17
    promise at issue could have reasonably been completed
    within one year. See 
    Goldstick, 788 F.2d at 464-66
    . There is
    no question that the statute of frauds applies to both of
    Dumas’ claims for promissory estoppel and breach of
    contract. See Bank of 
    Marion, 57 Ill. 2d at 124
    . And, as we
    have explained, it is the application of the statute of frauds
    coupled with the lack of any written promise or agreement
    that defeats his promissory estoppel claim.
    This decision is consistent with Illinois case law recogniz-
    ing that it is only proper to conclude that “if the statute of
    frauds bars enforcement of an oral contract which cannot be
    performed within one year, it also bars the courts from
    using promissory estoppel to imply the existence of a
    contract which cannot be performed within one year.”
    Dickens, 245 Ill.App.3d at 1063 (emphasis added). The fact
    that Dumas has presented a number of written documents,
    in the form of e-mails, to augment what essentially is an
    alleged oral contract, does not change the reality that those
    documents, when viewed in their entirety, do not amount to
    a written contract. At best, they represent an unenforceable
    promise or agreement (even assuming a promise or agree-
    ment existed) due to the operation of the statute of frauds
    and cannot form the basis of any claim premised on a
    theory of contract law or promissory estoppel. After all,
    there was only one “promise or agreement” at issue here for
    the purpose of establishing the existence of either a contract
    or promissory estoppel claim—the alleged promise to
    employ Dumas. This result may seem harsh, but as a
    number of Illinois courts have pointed out “the moral wrong
    of refusing to be bound by an agreement which is not in
    compliance with the statute of frauds does not warrant the
    application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel since the
    breach of a promise which is not regarded as binding under
    the law is not fraud.” See Dickens, 245 Ill.App.3d at 1062-63
    (citing Libby-Broadway Drive-In, Inc. v. McDonald’s System,
    Inc., 72 Ill.App.3d 806, 810-11, 
    28 Ill. Dec. 802
    , 805, 391
    18                                                     No. 04-1133
    N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). Thus, the district court’s
    uncontested determination that the essential elements of a
    contract did not exist foredoomed his promissory estoppel
    claim as well, and Dumas was not entitled to “a second bite
    at the apple.”11 See All-Tech Telecom, 
    Inc., 174 F.3d at 869
    -
    70.
    11
    Although the Illinois Supreme Court has not decided this pre-
    cise issue, as a federal court sitting in diversity we are charged
    with predicting how that court would decide if presented with the
    identical issue. See Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
    
    388 F.3d 1069
    , 1077 (7th Cir. 2004). We are convinced that, given
    the unanimity of the Appellate Courts of Illinois’ decisions on this
    issue and the nature of previous Illinois Supreme Court decisions
    on the subject, the supreme court would decide as we do today and
    hold that Dumas’ promissory estoppel claim is barred by the
    statute of frauds. See Bank of 
    Marion, 57 Ill. 2d at 124
    ; Quake
    Constr., 
    Inc., 141 Ill. 2d at 309-10
    ; 
    Doyle, 186 Ill. 2d at 118
    (Freeman, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
    by McMorrow, J.); see also Prentice, 271 Ill.App.3d at 512;
    Raymond, 202 Ill.App.3d at 708; Moore, 155 Ill.App.3d at 785-86.
    Indeed, a handful of Illinois Appellate Courts have gone even
    further and held that promissory estoppel “is not a proper vehicle
    for direct relief,” and is only “meant to be utilized as a defensive
    mechanism—not as a means of attack.” See DeWitt v. Fleming, No.
    05-04-0016, 
    2005 WL 846083
    , at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (quoting
    ESM Development Corp. v. Dawson, 342 Ill.App.3d 688, 695, 
    277 Ill. Dec. 30
    , 35, 
    795 N.E.2d 397
    , 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)). In DeWitt,
    the Appellate Court of Illinois reasoned that “an explicit rule of
    law that promissory estoppel exists only for defensive purposes in
    Illinois promotes the stability and integrity of Illinois jurispru-
    dence and provides attorneys practicing in Illinois, as well as their
    clients, with a clear, stable guidepost to which they may conform
    themselves.” 
    Id. However, given
    the relatively novel nature of
    these holdings and the lack of comment either by the Illinois
    Supreme Court or any other Appellate Court of Illinois outside the
    Fourth and Fifth Districts, we are reticent to speculate as to how
    the supreme court would deal with the issue. Cf. Taco Bell 
    Corp., 388 F.3d at 1077
    .
    No. 04-1133                                              19
    III. CONCLUSION
    The decision of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—8-1-05