United States v. Bothun, Aric R. ( 2005 )


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  •                          In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 04-1388
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    ARIC R. BOTHUN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Wisconsin.
    No. 03-CR-83-C-01—Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED FEBRUARY 16, 2005—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 15, 2005
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    WOOD, Circuit Judge. Aric Bothun got more than he
    bargained for when he returned to the border checkpoint
    near El Paso, Texas, to find out why his friend, Jacob
    Johnson, had not yet passed through. When he reached the
    border, he found Johnson and then some. Law enforcement
    agents had stopped Johnson, who was driving Bothun’s
    truck and trailer, and had found 80 grams of a mix-
    ture containing methamphetamine, some marijuana, and
    $32,543 in cash. Both Johnson and Bothun were arrested.
    After a grand jury indicted Bothun, he pleaded guilty to one
    count of attempting to possess with the intent to deliver 50
    grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    .
    2                                               No. 04-1388
    In this appeal, Bothun raises two challenges to the
    way that the district court applied the U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines in determining his sentence; he also asserts that
    his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when his
    sentence was increased based on judicially found facts,
    under then-mandatory Guidelines. We find no error in the
    application of the Guidelines, but Bothun is entitled to a
    limited remand under United States v. Paladino, 
    401 F.3d 471
     (7th Cir. 2005), for a determination whether the district
    court would impose a different sentence under the now-
    advisory guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 
    125 S.Ct. 738
     (2005).
    I
    Months before Bothun’s capture at the border, the Drug
    Enforcement Administration (DEA) received information
    from an informant about Bothun’s drug activities that
    eventually led to the DEA’s search and seizure of 75.3
    grams of methamphetamine from Bothun’s mailbox at a
    Mailboxes Etc. store. After obtaining a search warrant
    covering both Bothun’s Edgerton, Wisconsin, home and two
    storage units leased to him, the DEA conducted a search
    and found a wealth of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and guns.
    At Bothun’s home the DEA agents discovered a .22 caliber
    rifle and ammunition in a child’s bedroom. The agents also
    found marijuana, pharmaceutical bottles, needles, syringes,
    mailing labels, and other drug paraphernalia in the home.
    In the attic above Bothun’s workshop, which was attached
    to his garage, the agents found two rifles and a shotgun,
    more marijuana and methylenedioxyamphetamine. In the
    Madison storage unit, the agents found a .40 caliber semi-
    automatic handgun, a digital scale, 83.8 grams of
    Oxycodone, 2.02 grams of Hyrcodone, and marijuana.
    Finally, at Bothun’s storage locker in Edgerton, the agents
    found 7,646 grams of marijuana.
    No. 04-1388                                                3
    In July 2003, following his arrest in Texas, a grand jury
    indicted Bothun in a two-count indictment charging him
    with violations of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     for conspiring to possess
    with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of metham-
    phetamine and attempting to possess with intent to distrib-
    ute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. Bothun
    pleaded guilty to Count Two in October 2003.
    In the fall of 2003, while incarcerated at the Dane County
    Jail awaiting sentencing, Bothun made several calls to his
    wife, during which he instructed her how to manufacture
    methamphetamine. Bothun indicated that he would send
    her a letter with a “recipe” describing how to cook “cake and
    stuff.” He also had his wife speak to another inmate, known
    as Country, to whom Bothun referred as his “chemist
    buddy”; Country also offered Ms. Bothun some tips on how
    to manufacture methamphetamine. Bothun told his wife to
    “hit” various Wal-Marts each day to purchase the ingredi-
    ents and slowly build up a stock of cold medicine that could
    be converted into methamphetamine.
    In February 2004, the district court sentenced Bothun
    to 235 months’ imprisonment based on its finding that
    Bothun was responsible for possessing with intent to
    distribute at least 3,000 but not more than 10,000 kilo-
    grams of marijuana equivalent. (The Drug Equivalency
    Tables that follow U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 translate most common
    drugs into an equivalent amount of marijuana, to facilitate
    comparisons. Under the table, one gram of methamphet-
    amine equals two kilograms of marijuana; one gram of what
    is called methamphetamine (actual)— meaning the weight
    of the pure substance in a mixture—equals 20 kilograms of
    marijuana.) The court increased his sentence by two levels
    under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) because it found that he
    possessed a gun in connection with a drug offense. The
    court found that the government had met its burden of
    showing that the guns found at Bothun’s home and storage
    locker were used in connection with his drug distribution.
    4                                                No. 04-1388
    Bothun objected to the application of the gun enhancement
    on the ground that the government had not shown that he
    actually possessed the weapons or that he was present in
    the home or storage facilities when the guns were there, but
    the court was not persuaded. The court also determined
    that Bothun should not receive a reduction for acceptance
    of responsibility because of his efforts (along with those of
    Country) to have his wife continue to manufacture metham-
    phetamine while he was incarcerated.
    II
    A
    Bothun’s first argument on appeal is that the district
    court erred in enhancing his sentence by two levels for
    possession of a weapon in connection with a drug crime,
    because (he asserts) the evidence did not permit a finding
    that he had direct or constructive possession of the weapons
    found in his home. The government never offered physical
    proof that he had touched any of the guns, nor did it
    introduce testimonial evidence from its informants that he
    had used the weapons. Finally, according to Bothun, the
    government failed to prove that he exercised the type of
    control over the weapons that would be necessary for a
    finding of constructive possession. Post-Booker we continue
    to review the court’s application of the Sentencing Guide-
    lines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United
    States v. Turner, 
    400 F.3d 491
    , 500 (7th Cir. 2005); see also
    United States v. Garcia, 
    413 F.3d 201
    , 221-24 (2d Cir. 2005)
    (explaining why and how the clear error standard of review
    for factual findings applies even though the ultimate issue
    is reasonableness).
    The application note to § 2D1.1(b)(1) instructs a court
    to apply this provision “if the weapon was present, unless
    it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with
    the offense.” § 2D1.1, cmt. n.3. This determination requires
    No. 04-1388                                                 5
    that the government first prove by a preponderance of the
    evidence that the defendant possessed the gun. United
    States v. Corral, 
    324 F.3d 866
    , 872 (7th Cir. 2003). If the
    government is able to do so, the burden shifts to the
    defendant to show that it was “clearly improbable” that the
    weapon was connected to the offense. 
    Id.
     “Actual possession
    of the firearm need not be established in order to trigger the
    enhancement. Instead, proof of constructive possession, that
    is, that the defendant had the power and the intention to
    exercise dominion or control of the firearm, is sufficient to
    warrant the enhancement.” 
    Id.
     (quoting United States v.
    Thomas, 
    294 F.3d 899
    , 906 (7th Cir. 2002)).
    The government met its initial burden. We described
    earlier the many firearms that the agents found when they
    searched Bothun’s home and storage units. Those weapons
    were found close by drugs and drug paraphernalia. As we
    have explained before, “guns found in close proximity to
    drug activity are presumptively connected to that activity.”
    Corral, 
    324 F.3d at 873
    . Bothun did not introduce evidence
    compelling the district court to find that it was clearly
    improbable that the weapons were used in connection with
    the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Brack, 
    188 F.3d 748
    ,
    764 (7th Cir. 1999). We thus find no clear error in the
    court’s decision to apply the firearm enhancement described
    in § 2D1.1(b)(1).
    B
    Bothun also challenges his sentence because the court did
    not give him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility
    under § 3E1.1. He claims that the court had a rigid “policy
    not to give acceptance when a defendant commits a new
    offense during the case.” As a result of the purported policy,
    he accuses the court of refusing to engage in the “context-
    specific” inquiry required for determining whether a
    defendant should receive an acceptance of responsibility
    6                                                No. 04-1388
    reduction under United States v. Frykholm, 
    267 F.3d 604
    ,
    611 (7th Cir. 2001). We review the court’s decision to deny
    a reduction in a defendant’s sentence for acceptance of
    responsibility for clear error. United States v. Hicks, 
    368 F.3d 801
    , 808 (7th Cir. 2004).
    The application note to § 3E1.1 explains that a guilty plea
    is usually evidence that the defendant has accepted respon-
    sibility. See § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3. The district court may
    nevertheless consider a defendant’s continued criminal
    activity in the course of deciding whether he should receive
    a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, although such
    activity does not automatically preclude the reduction. See
    United States v. McDonald, 
    22 F.3d 139
    , 141 (7th Cir.
    1994). As we explained in McDonald:
    Although a guilty plea before trial is significant evi-
    dence of acceptance of responsibility, it may be out-
    weighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsis-
    tent with such acceptance. . . . A district court may
    conclude that continued criminal activity, such as use
    of a controlled substance, is not consistent with accep-
    tance of responsibility.
    
    Id. at 144
     (internal citation omitted).
    In Bothun’s case, the court found that “Mr. Bothun had
    an opportunity to show that he accepted responsibility when
    he was arrested and jailed, and instead of demonstrating
    that he understood the seriousness of his conduct at that
    time and the criminal nature of his conduct, he engaged in
    continuing criminal conduct about which there’s no dis-
    pute.” Bothun challenged that decision because it was made
    at the time of sentencing rather than at the time of the
    plea, but the court explained:
    I’m not making a definitive ruling, but it has been my
    practice to consider what a defendant did when he
    was arrested and when he pleaded. And when that
    No. 04-1388                                                7
    defendant in this case, or in other cases, where he
    continues to engage in criminal activity, I do not give
    acceptance of responsibility.
    It is somewhat troublesome that the judge said that she had
    a “practice” of not giving defendants a reduction when they
    continue to engage in criminal activity, because the Guide-
    lines do not authorize the court to adopt a per se rule
    denying a reduction when a defendant engages in further
    criminal activity after his plea. Nevertheless, in this case
    the judge’s comments taken as a whole reassure us that she
    properly weighed all the circumstances before rejecting the
    adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. In particular,
    her comments immediately prior to this statement indicate
    that she made a context-specific inquiry into Bothun’s
    actions. We conclude, therefore, that the court did not apply
    the Guidelines incorrectly in this instance and that it did
    not commit clear error in refusing to award Bothun a
    reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
    III
    The court imposed a sentence of 235 months’ imprison-
    ment based on its finding that Bothun possessed with
    intent to distribute the equivalent of 3,000 kilograms of
    marijuana, but not more than 10,000 kilograms. This drug
    quantity dictated an offense level of 34. After the court
    imposed the two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1),
    bringing his offense level up to 36, and it determined that
    his Criminal History Category was III, it arrived at a
    Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months. Within that range,
    the court decided that “[a] sentence at the bottom of the
    range will be sufficient to reflect the seriousness of [his]
    conduct and protect the community.” Imposing the sen-
    tence, the judge commented, “I’m not particularly happy
    about the length of the sentence that I have to give you, but
    just for your and [your attorney’s] thinking, I believe that
    8                                               No. 04-1388
    it is my job to apply the guidelines the way they are set up
    to work and not to try to arrive at a lower sentence by just
    ignoring the guidelines and the various factors that do
    contribute to a long sentence.”
    Although we have found no error in the court’s application
    of the Guidelines, the fact that it did so under the impres-
    sion that the Guidelines were mandatory and the lack of
    any indication that the court would have imposed the same
    sentence under any circumstances put this case in the
    familiar category of those that require a limited remand
    under the terms of Paladino, 
    401 F.3d at 483-84
    . In all
    other respects, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
    court, but while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal, we
    order a LIMITED REMAND to the district court so that it can
    advise us whether it is inclined to resentence now that it is
    clear that the Guidelines are advisory.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—9-15-05