Magala, Olga v. Gonzales, Alberto R. ( 2005 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 04-2819
    OLGA MAGALA,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General
    of the United States,
    Respondent.
    ____________
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ____________
    ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2005—DECIDED DECEMBER 27, 2005
    ____________
    Before COFFEY, EASTERBROOK, and WILLIAMS, Circuit
    Judges.
    EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In July 1999 an Immigra-
    tion Judge ordered Olga Magala to be removed to her native
    Ukraine. In May 2002, while her administrative appeal was
    still pending, she married a U.S. citizen and applied for a
    visa as his relative. This was approved in December 2002.
    Her lawyer, Michael Thoren, asked the Board of Immigra-
    tion Appeals to reopen her proceedings (which it still had
    under advisement) so that she could adjust her status to
    that of lawful permanent resident. This provoked the Board
    to act. In April 2003 it dismissed (for lack of merit) the
    appeal from the July 1999 ruling, observed that it could not
    “reopen” a proceeding that was still open, and declined to
    2                                                No. 04-2819
    remand to the IJ for adjustment of status because Thoren
    had failed to provide the application for that relief required
    by 
    8 C.F.R. §1003.2
    (c)(1), (4). The Board noted, however,
    that Magala could submit the application within the time
    allowed for a (proper) motion to reopen. It wrapped up by
    giving Magala 30 days to depart voluntarily.
    Thoren had to act quickly. The clock was ticking on the
    period to submit the application for adjustment of status
    and on the period for voluntary departure. The latter
    window was the shorter one, and, unless it was extended or
    cancelled, Magala had to leave and wait abroad for the
    processing of her request for permanent residence. A person
    who is given the opportunity for voluntary departure yet
    remains in the United States loses for five years any
    opportunity to obtain discretionary relief such
    as adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. §1252b(e)(2)(A)
    (1994 ed.; repealed 1996); Alimi v. Ashcroft, 
    391 F.3d 888
    (7th Cir. 2004). The current version of this law has a 10-
    year rather than a 5-year ban, plus some other changes. See
    8 U.S.C. §1229c. We cite the older one because Magala was
    placed in removal proceedings before the 1996 legislation,
    and under its transition rules the former version of this bar
    still applies to her. 
    110 Stat. 3009
    -546, 625-27 (1996).
    With time pressing, Thoren sat on his hands. He put off
    telling Magala that her appeal had been decided. He did not
    file a prompt application for adjustment of status or ask the
    Board to extend or rescind the privilege of voluntary
    departure so that adjustment of status would remain
    available. But in June 2003 Thoren filed a motion to reopen,
    with the appropriate documentation, and the Board told
    him the next month that it was too late: because Magala
    had failed to depart during the 30 days, she had forfeited
    any opportunity to adjust her status based on her marriage.
    Thoren did not bother to tell Magala about this decision.
    No. 04-2819                                                   3
    In November 2003 Magala sought Thoren’s help in
    extending her right to engage in employment while her
    appeal was pending. Only then did she learn that the
    appeal had been resolved months earlier. Magala fired
    Thoren; her new counsel, Tzvetelina Boynovska, filed a
    disciplinary complaint against Thoren with state officials, a
    step necessary before seeking relief from the Board based
    on his lapses. See Matter of Lozada, 
    19 I&N Dec. 637
    (1988); Matter of Assaad, 
    23 I&N Dec. 553
     (2003). Thoren
    conceded to the Illinois Attorney Registration
    and Disciplinary Commission that he had botched Magala’s
    case. Boynovska then filed another motion to reopen the
    removal proceedings, contending that Magala had been
    prejudiced by Thoren’s errors. But the Board denied this
    motion, observing that the lack of a proper application had
    been curable while the voluntary-departure window re-
    mained open, and that Thoren told the ARDC that he had
    informed Magala of the Board’s April decision the following
    month.
    In this court the parties dwell on constitutional argu-
    ments, which are pointless because removal is not a
    criminal proceeding and there is no constitutional
    ineffective-assistance doctrine. See Stroe v. INS, 
    256 F.3d 498
     (7th Cir. 2001). The Constitution entitles aliens to
    due process of law, but this does not imply a right to
    good lawyering. Every litigant in every suit and every
    administrative proceeding is entitled to due process, but
    it has long been understood that lawyers’ mistakes in
    civil litigation are imputed to their clients and do not justify
    upsetting the outcome. See, e.g., National Hockey League v.
    Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 
    427 U.S. 639
     (1976); Societe
    International v. Rogers, 
    357 U.S. 197
    , 212 (1958); United
    States v. 7108 West Grand Avenue, 
    15 F.3d 632
     (7th Cir.
    1994). The civil remedy is damages for malpractice, not a
    re-run of the original litigation.
    4                                                No. 04-2819
    To say that the Constitution does not assist Magala is
    not, however, to say that she has no potential arguments.
    The Board may grant relief as a matter of sound discretion;
    agencies are not limited to the very least that the Constitu-
    tion demands. The Board has been willing to assist aliens
    whose rights have been undermined by bad lawyers,
    whether or not the Constitution requires this, and it
    considered Magala’s argument on the merits rather
    than stating that substandard legal assistance is immate-
    rial. Because the agency entertains such contentions, basic
    principles of administrative law demand that it do
    so carefully and rationally.
    The Board’s care is in doubt. It relied on Thoren’s state-
    ment that he told Magala in May 2003 about the Board’s
    decision of April 2, 2003, dismissing her initial appeal, and
    took this as conclusive proof that Magala knew of her need
    to depart before the 30 days had run. Yet in this respect
    Thoren and Magala disagreed; an agency cannot credit one
    person’s testimony over another’s on a material issue
    without a hearing to determine who is right. Worse, even by
    Thoren’s account Magala had been prejudiced. A date “in
    May 2003” likely is more than 30 days after April 2,
    2003—another part of Magala’s statement implied that the
    meeting had occurred in late May—so Magala’s time to
    depart (or obtain an extension of time to do so) had expired
    and her opportunity to obtain an adjustment of status had
    lapsed before Thoren clued her in.
    What is more, the Board did not mention an important
    difference between the old version of the voluntary-depar-
    ture bar and the current one. (It may not have recognized
    that Magala is covered by the old law.) The version applica-
    ble to Magala says that an alien who is allowed to “depart
    voluntarily at his own expense . . . who remains in the
    United States after the scheduled date of departure, other
    than because of exceptional circumstances, shall not be
    eligible for” adjustment of status during the next five years.
    No. 04-2819                                                 5
    8 U.S.C. §1252b(e)(2)(A) (1994 ed.) (emphasis added). The
    Board did not consider whether counsel’s bungling is an
    “exceptional circumstance” justifying relief from the
    presumptive bar. The pre-1996 statute defined “exceptional
    circumstances” as serious matters beyond the alien’s
    control, 8 U.S.C. §1252b(f)(2) (1994 ed.). Woeful legal
    “assistance” that undermines an alien’s rights may fit that
    definition. One court of appeals deems a lawyer’s failure to
    alert the alien to the consequences of non-departure to be so
    grave that it has asked the Board to consider establishing
    an exceptional-circumstance escape hatch to the current
    statute, even though the 1996 amendment deleted that
    language. See Zmijewska v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 99
     (2d Cir.
    2005). We express no view on whether that would be
    sensible (or even legally possible); it is enough to say that,
    under the former version of this statute, the Board had
    available the means to protect Magala from the conse-
    quences of Thoren’s blunders. But it never mentioned the
    possibility.
    Boynovska and the Board may share responsibility for
    this oversight. Lawyers all too often invoke the Constitution
    as if it were a panacea and bypass seemingly mundane
    arguments based on statutes and regulations. Mimicking
    Gresham’s Law, flabby constitutional generalities drive out
    sound legal points. Aliens who fail to present their argu-
    ments to the Board cannot make them in court either;
    exhaustion of administrative remedies is no less a norm of
    administrative law than is the obligation to render careful
    decisions. See 
    8 U.S.C. §1252
    (d)(1). Because the agency’s
    lawyer seems to be as drawn to the Constitution as
    Magala’s—counsel for the Department of Justice told us at
    oral argument that he had never considered the possibility
    that there might be an administrative-law dimension to this
    litigation—the exhaustion doctrine has not been invoked.
    The parties have not joined issue on the question whether
    an ineffective-assistance claim by itself should have alerted
    6                                               No. 04-2819
    the Board to the possibility that exceptional circumstances
    obtain.
    It seems best to remand so that the Board may decide
    whether Boynovska did enough to preserve a statutory
    contention—and, if so, to address that subject on the merits.
    See INS v. Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
     (2002). The Board also
    should consider whether this is an issue it ought to raise on
    its own so as to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudica-
    tion.
    The petition for review is granted, and the matter is
    remanded to the Board for proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—12-27-05