Ahmed, Usman v. Gonzales, Alberto ( 2005 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 05-1126
    USMAN AHMED,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ALBERTO R. GONZALES,
    Respondent.
    ____________
    Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
    No. A76-782-469
    ____________
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 8, 2005—DECIDED DECEMBER 21, 2005
    ____________
    Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK, and
    ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Usman Ahmed was born on May
    23, 1992, fourteen weeks before his due date and now,
    at age thirteen, still suffers from profound disabilities
    including severe mental impairments and cerebral palsy.
    On March 25, 1996, the Immigration and Naturalization
    Service (now the Department of Homeland Security)1
    admitted Ahmed and his father, Shakeel Ahmed, as non-
    1
    For simplicity, we will refer to both the Immigration and
    Naturalization Service and the Department of Homeland Security
    as the Department.
    2                                             No. 05-1126
    immigrant visitors to the United States to receive medical
    treatment. Both Ahmed and his father remained in the
    United States past the February 2, 2001 date authorized by
    the Department. On April 11, 2002, the Department issued
    a notice to appear charging Ahmed, but not his father, with
    removability.
    At an initial hearing the immigration judge informed
    Ahmed’s father that, in light of Ahmed’s severe disability,
    the father could appear at the subsequent hearing on his
    son’s behalf. The immigration judge set the date for the
    merits hearing for July 30, 2003. Neither Ahmed nor his
    father appeared on July 30, or at any time thereafter. At
    the July 30 merits hearing, counsel claimed that the
    Ahmeds had left the country and asked the court to termi-
    nate the proceedings in light of this fact. The immigration
    judge obliged. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed
    the decision and ordered Ahmed removed in absentia,
    holding that the “Immigration Judge was statutorily
    required to order the respondent removed in absentia.” (R.
    at 3).
    Ahmed claims that the BIA erred when it found that the
    immigration judge was required to order removal in
    absentia. According to Ahmed, the immigration judge
    had the discretion to determine whether to terminate
    proceedings or to order removal. The Department disagrees
    and asks us to uphold the order of the BIA ordering Ahmed
    removed in absentia.
    The dispute focuses on the interpretation of two relevant
    provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act that
    address the consequences of an alien’s failure to appear.
    The immigration court rules of procedure state as follows:
    § 1003.26 In absentia hearings.
    * * *
    No. 05-1126                                                  3
    (c) In any removal proceeding before an Immigra-
    tion Judge in which the alien fails to appear, the
    Immigration Judge shall order the alien removed in
    absentia if:
    (1) The Service establishes by clear, unequivo-
    cal, and convincing evidence that the alien is
    removable; and
    (2) The Service establishes by clear, unequivo-
    cal, and convincing evidence that written notice
    of the time and place of proceedings and written
    notice of the consequences of failure to appear
    were provided to the alien or the alien’s counsel
    of record.
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.26
    .
    The Immigration and Nationality Act’s discussion of
    removal proceedings states:
    (5) Consequences of failure to appear
    (A) In general
    Any alien who, after written notice required under
    paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) of this title has
    been provided to the alien or the alien’s counsel of
    record, does not attend a proceeding under this section,
    shall be ordered removed in absentia if the Service
    establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
    evidence that the written notice was so provided and
    that the alien is removable (as defined in subsection
    (e)(2) of this section). The written notice by the Attorney
    General shall be considered sufficient for purposes of
    this subparagraph if provided at the most recent
    address provided under section 1229(a)(1)(F) of this
    title.
    8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5).
    4                                                No. 05-1126
    We review the BIA’s legal interpretation of the stat-
    ute—that is whether it requires or allows the immigration
    judge to order removal—de novo, giving effect to the
    legislative intent where clear, or deferring to the Depart-
    ment’s interpretation, where intent is not clear. Knutsen v.
    Gonzales, 
    429 F.3d 733
    , 736 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Chevron
    U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842-
    43 (1984)); Perez-Rodriguez v. INS, 
    3 F.3d 1074
    , 1077 (7th
    Cir. 1993) (same). The plain language of the statute is clear:
    once an immigration judge has determined that an alien (1)
    is removable and (2) has been provided with adequate
    notice, that judge “shall” issue a removal order. 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229a(b)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. 1003.26(c). The regulation simply
    does not allow an immigration judge discretion to terminate
    removal proceedings because an alien has left the country.
    Ahmed does not argue that the government failed to
    provide adequate notice, nor does he deny removability.
    He argues instead that the immigration judge had the
    authority to terminate the removal proceedings because
    he left the country. On this point he is mistaken. Immigra-
    tion rules give enforcement officials, not immigration judges
    or the BIA the discretion to terminate removal proceedings.
    See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1239.2
    ; 
    8 C.F.R. § 239.2
    . As the BIA has
    noted in its own opinions, once enforcement officials of the
    Department opt to initiate proceedings, the immigration
    judge must issue an order of removal if the applicant is
    removable and has received adequate notice. See In re
    Singh, 21 I & N Dec. 427, 435 (BIA 1996) (“As long as the
    Service chooses to prosecute the applicant’s proceedings to
    a conclusion, the Immigration Judges and this Board must
    order the applicant excluded and deported if the evidence
    supports such a finding.”); In re Yazdoni, 17 I & N Dec. 626,
    630 (BIA 1981) (“so long as the enforcement officials of the
    Service choose to initiate proceedings against an alien and
    to prosecute those proceedings to a conclusion, the immigra-
    tion judge and the Board must order deportation if the
    No. 05-1126                                                    5
    evidence supports a finding of deportability on the ground
    charged.”)
    The “in general’ language which prefaces the statute does
    not imply, as Ahmed argues, that the statute allows for
    some unspecified and unknowable exceptions to the manda-
    tory language of a statute. The words “in general” as a
    preface to a statutory section indicate to the reader that the
    text following will present a generalized overview of a
    statutory section, to be followed later by more specifics. We
    cannot accept Ahmed’s argument that the words “in gen-
    eral” somehow erased or mitigated the clear demand of the
    words “shall be ordered removed in absentia.” See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229a(b)(5)(A).
    Finally, Ahmed tries to skirt the mandates of the stat-
    ute by claiming that the regulations for in absentia hear-
    ings do not apply at all because the immigration judge
    waived Ahmed’s appearance. This argument paints only
    half of the picture. The immigration judge waived Ahmed’s
    appearance only on the condition that Ahmed’s father
    appear in his stead—a condition he repeated three times:
    Judge to Mr. Helt: This is notice to the respon-
    dent, I’ll waive the child’s appearance at the next
    hearing and [sic] provided that Mr. Shakeel
    Ahmed appears in respondent’s stead since Mr.
    Ahmed would have to be responsible for any posi-
    tion taken on behalf of this child who is underage
    anyway. I would require him to be present, but
    not his son. All right.
    Judge to Mr. Ahmed: So this is notice to Mr.
    Ahmed that your next hearing is on October 18th2
    at 1 o’clock, you have [sic] appear for hearing
    on that date. If you don’t, you could be ordered
    2
    The hearing date was later changed to July 30, 2003 (R. at 75),
    (R. at 81).
    6                                                No. 05-1126
    removed from the United States in your absence
    and be denied enumerated reliefs.
    (R. at 72) (emphasis supplied). At an interim proceeding the
    judge again reiterated;
    The next hearing is on July 30th, 2003 at 1
    o’clock and the respondent has to be at the hearing
    on that date. If he is not, then he could be ordered
    removed from the United States in his absence and
    be denied enumerated relief . . . What I would
    suggest, given what I observed at the last hearing
    was a severe disability, is that the parent testify in
    [sic] the respondent’s behalf.
    (R. at 82).
    Ahmed concedes as much: “It is true that the Petitioner’s
    father or mother should have appeared on behalf of their
    son, however, they did not.” (Ahmed’s brief at 11). Unfortu-
    nately for Ahmed, this concession both begins and ends the
    story. By failing to appear, Ahmed triggered the Depart-
    ment regulations on in absentia hearings. Because Ahmed
    was removable, had sufficient notice, and failed to appear,
    the regulations required the immigration judge to enter an
    order of removal. Under these circumstances an immigra-
    tion judge has no authority to offer relief even for a compel-
    ling case like the one Ahmed presents. We have, therefore,
    no choice but to uphold the decision of the BIA determining
    that the immigration judge erred by terminating the
    proceedings in lieu of issuing a removal order. The decision
    of the BIA is AFFIRMED.
    No. 05-1126                                          7
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—12-21-05