United States v. Lopez, Richardini ( 2005 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 05-2432
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    RICHARDINI LOPEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 04 CR 568—David H. Coar, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED NOVEMBER 10, 2005—DECIDED DECEMBER 6, 2005
    ____________
    Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE and SYKES,
    Circuit Judges.
    FLAUM, Chief Judge. On January 25, 2005, Richardini
    Lopez pled guilty to bank robbery and to carrying and
    brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime
    of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2113
    (a) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the govern-
    ment dropped charges of carjacking and one count of
    brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
    violence, although Lopez stipulated to having committed
    those offenses. On April 20, 2005, the district court sen-
    tenced Lopez to 168 months imprisonment for bank robbery
    and a consecutive sentence of 84 months imprisonment for
    carrying and brandishing a weapon during a bank robbery,
    2                                               No. 05-2432
    a total sentence of 21 years. Lopez now appeals that
    sentence. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
    I. Background
    On June 10, 2004, Lopez approached Victim A. He falsely
    identified himself as a police officer. When Victim A stated
    he did not believe Lopez, Lopez displayed a black .25 caliber
    Berreta that he had received from his 16-year-old nephew
    (who was also present and waiting in Lopez’s car during the
    carjacking) and stated, “Give me the keys.” Victim A began
    to yell, “carjacking, carjacking.” In response, Lopez punched
    him in the mouth and nose, resulting in Victim A falling
    backwards and injuring his head on the curb. While Victim
    A lay bleeding, Lopez grabbed his keys and took his car.
    Lopez drove to the TCF Bank. While his nephew re-
    mained by the entrance as a lookout, Lopez approached
    the tellers. He stated, “[P]ut the money in the bag. Hurry
    up, put the money in the bag. Give me all of it.” While
    making these statements, Lopez was pointing a .25 caliber
    Beretta handgun at the first teller’s chest. Lopez repeated
    this process with a second teller. The robbery netted
    approximately $5,856.48 from the bank. Later that day, the
    FBI arrested Lopez, at which time he confessed to the
    carjacking and bank robbery. He also confessed to carry-
    ing and brandishing a gun during both offenses.
    The government indicted Lopez on four separate counts.
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lopez pled guilty to Count
    Three (bank robbery) and Count Four (brandishing a
    firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence). In
    addition, Lopez stipulated to having committed Count One
    (carjacking) and Count Two (brandishing a firearm during
    and in relation to a crime of violence). This plea agreement
    allowed Lopez to avoid 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(C), which
    would have required a minimum term of 25 years for
    having committed two crimes involving the use of a firearm.
    No. 05-2432                                               3
    The plea agreement, which the defendant signed, con-
    tained a preliminary sentencing calculation. The agreed
    upon calculation contained a total offense level of 26 and a
    criminal history category of VI, yielding a sentencing range
    of 120-150 months imprisonment on Count Three. In
    addition, the plea agreement stated, “At the time of sen-
    tencing, both parties will recommend a sentence within the
    applicable advisory Guideline range as to Count Three and
    a sentence of seven years as to Count Four to be imposed
    consecutive to the sentence on Count Three.”
    The plea agreement contained language explicitly not-
    ing that the Probation Department and the Court would
    make their own guideline calculations and that “the validity
    of [the] Plea Agreement is not contingent upon the Proba-
    tion Department’s or the Court’s concurrence with the
    [calculations in the agreement].”
    The presentence report found several errors in the plea
    agreement’s guideline calculation. As a result, both the
    presentence report and the district court found the ap-
    propriate offense level to be 30, not 26. This yielded a
    sentence of 168-210 months on Count Three.
    At the April 20, 2005, sentencing hearing, the district
    court allowed each party an opportunity to object to the
    sentencing report. Neither party did. The district court
    reviewed the calculation differences between the sentencing
    report and plea agreement. Lopez told the court
    he understood the differences. Lopez and his lawyer
    both accepted the validity of the sentencing report.
    The district court accepted the presentence report and
    sentenced the defendant to the lowest sentence within the
    sentencing guidelines, 168 months for Count Three plus
    a mandatory consecutive term of 84 months for Count Four;
    this yielded a total sentence of 252 months or 21 years.
    During sentencing, the district court commented that Lopez
    did not “belong on the scrap heap” due to his cooperation,
    4                                               No. 05-2432
    the related nature of the offenses, his drug problem, and his
    supportive family, but that the nature of his crimes “just
    cr[ies] out for a severe punishment.”
    II. Discussion
    In reviewing a district court sentence, this Court must
    evaluate whether the sentence imposed by the district court
    was reasonable. United States v. Booker, 
    125 S.Ct. 738
    , 767
    (2005). “[A]ny sentence that is properly calculated under
    the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
    reasonableness.” United States v. Mykytiuk, 
    415 F.3d 606
    ,
    608 (7th Cir. 2005). Appellate courts are guided by the
    factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) when deciding whether a
    particular sentence is reasonable. 
    Id.
     (citing Booker, 125
    S.Ct. at 766).
    Provided a district court considers the factors in section
    3553(a) and calculates the guideline range accurately, it
    is unnecessary to discuss every section 3553(a) factor
    individually. See United States v. Dean, 
    414 F.3d 725
    , 729
    (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. George, 
    403 F.3d 470
    , 473 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is enough to calculate the
    range accurately and explain why (if the sentence lies
    outside it) this defendant deserves more or less.”).
    In this case, the district court imposed a sentence with-
    in the properly calculated guideline range. The sentenc-
    ing guideline range in the presentence report was cor-
    rect, and the sentencing guideline calculation in the plea
    agreement was incorrect.
    Although Lopez argues that his sentence fails to account
    for the lower sentence originally calculated in the plea
    agreement, the agreement’s guideline calculation was
    always preliminary. The plea agreement specifically stated
    that it would be unaffected by “corrections [to the guideline
    calculation], and the defendant shall not have a right to
    No. 05-2432                                                 5
    withdraw his plea on the basis of such corrections.” A
    correction to a preliminary guideline calculation is not a
    valid factor for consideration under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).
    The district court adequately discussed the factors
    included in section 3553(a). The district court discussed the
    nature of the offense, the characteristics of the defendant,
    the need to impose a sentence that recognizes
    the seriousness of the offense, and the need for the defen-
    dant to receive drug treatment. The district court also
    discussed the range of sentences available. While this
    discussion did not specifically reference every factor
    named in section 3553(a), such a checklist is unnecessary.
    Dean, 414 F.3dat 729.
    Lopez argues that his sentence is excessive because a
    sentence within the guideline range found in the original
    plea agreement would have been sufficient to achieve the
    goals of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2). It is not relevant to this
    Court’s review whether the sentence found in the plea
    agreement calculation would also have been reasonable.
    The role of this Court is not to choose between possible
    sentences, but rather to review the reasonableness of the
    sentence imposed by the district court. The sentence
    imposed in this case was within the advisory range of the
    sentencing guidelines, based upon the factors in section
    3553(a), and reflects significant consideration of the com-
    peting goals of sentencing. After a thorough discussion of
    the sentencing factors, the district court found that the
    guidelines captured the appropriate penalty in this case. By
    sentencing Lopez to the lowest sentence within the guide-
    line range, the district court properly balanced its desire to
    avoid unreasonably prolonged incarceration, while recogniz-
    ing the seriousness of the offenses committed. The sentence
    imposed by the district court was reasonable.
    6                                           No. 05-2432
    III. Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the sentence
    of the district court.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—12-6-05
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-2432

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 12/6/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015