Black, Joseph M. v. Barnes, David A. ( 2006 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 05-1102
    JOSEPH M. BLACK, JR., Trustee,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and
    MARGARET SPELLINGS, Secretary of Education,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.
    No. NA4:00-241-C-B/S—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 19, 2005—DECIDED AUGUST 16, 2006
    ____________
    Before RIPPLE, WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    WOOD, Circuit Judge. The central issue in this case
    is whether a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of
    Education that allows the assessment of collection costs
    on defaulted student loans to be done on a formulaic basis
    was a permissible implementation of the governing
    statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1091a. The district court upheld the
    regulation, 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.410
    (b)(2), over the objection of
    a bankruptcy trustee, and accordingly allowed the claim
    for collection costs computed according to the regulation.
    The trustee appeals. We agree with the district court that
    the regulation was a permissible one, and we therefore
    affirm.
    2                                               No. 05-1102
    I
    In 1987, North Shore Savings, a private financial in-
    stitution, issued two Federal Family Education Loan
    Program (FFELP) loans, totaling $2,000 and $2,625, to
    David Barnes for truck driving school. Two years later,
    Barnes defaulted on the repayment of both loans. (At the
    time Barnes’s loans were issued, a borrower was in “de-
    fault” if the borrower failed to keep up with her monthly
    payments for 180 days; currently the time period for
    default is 270 days. See 
    20 U.S.C. § 1085
    (l)(1)). Under
    FFELP, the federal government subsidizes student loans
    issued by private financial institutions and guaranteed
    by state or private non-profit agencies and reinsures
    these loans for losses, such as those caused by a borrower’s
    default. When Barnes defaulted, North Shore Savings
    filed a claim against the original guarantor of Barnes’s
    student loans—the Great Lakes Higher Education Corpora-
    tion (Great Lakes). Great Lakes paid the claim, took an
    assignment of Barnes’s student loans, and was subse-
    quently reimbursed by the United States Department of
    Education (the Department).
    For approximately six years, Great Lakes unsuccessfully
    attempted to recover Barnes’s student loan debt. In 1995,
    reporting that it was unable to collect the loan, Great Lakes
    assigned Barnes’s student loans to the Department. The
    Department made further futile attempts at collection until
    November 15, 1999, when Barnes, along with his wife
    Nancy, filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the
    Bankruptcy Code.
    On March 8, 2000, about four months after Barnes and
    his wife filed their Chapter 13 petition, the Department
    assigned Barnes’s student loans to the Educational Credit
    Management Corporation (ECMC), a non-profit corpora-
    tion that acts as a guarantee agency and occasionally
    handles the defaulted FFELP loans of debtors who file
    No. 05-1102                                                3
    a petition for relief under Chapter 13. Shortly after this
    assignment, ECMC filed an unsecured proof of claim in
    Barnes’s bankruptcy proceeding for $9,108.01, which
    represented $7,714.88 in principal and interest on Barnes’s
    two defaulted student loans and $1,393.13 in collection
    costs. The collection costs were approximately 18.06% of
    the $7,714.88 total of the principal and interest Barnes
    owed by then. (The district court indicated that collec-
    tion costs were $1,394.08 as opposed to the $1,393.13
    ECMC set forth in its proof of claim. Although nothing
    turns on the 95 cent difference, the district court should
    make this correction after it receives our mandate.) ECMC
    arrived at this figure by using the methodology pre-
    scribed in 
    34 C.F.R. §§ 6682.410
    (b)(2) and 30.60(c), which
    allows the use of a flat “make whole” rate, in lieu of actual
    collection costs in the particular case.
    On April 17, 2000, Joseph Black, the Chapter 13 trustee,
    objected to ECMC’s proof of claim in bankruptcy court.
    Although he did not dispute ECMC’s claim for the principal
    and interest on the defaulted student loans, he argued that
    the assessment of collection costs calculated as a flat-
    rate percentage of Barnes’s loan balance, as opposed to
    the actual costs ECMC incurred while attempting to col-
    lect Barnes’s loan, was unreasonable and should not be
    allowed by the bankruptcy court. The flat rate was espe-
    cially inappropriate, Black argued, because ECMC received
    the assignment of Barnes’s loans four months after he filed
    his Chapter 13 petition and, thus it had made no pre-
    petition collection efforts. In its response to the trustee’s
    objection, ECMC defended both the accuracy of its calcula-
    tions and its right to use the method set forth in the
    Higher Education Act (HEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(b)(1) and
    its implementing regulation, 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.410
    (b)(2).
    Black replied that the regulation itself was “arbitrary,
    capricious, and manifestly contrary” to the HEA and thus
    could not be used.
    4                                                No. 05-1102
    On November 27, 2000, ECMC moved to withdraw
    reference from bankruptcy court, in accordance with 
    28 U.S.C. § 157
    (d), arguing that resolution of Barnes’s objec-
    tion to the proof of claim required consideration of federal
    statutes and regulations outside of the Bankruptcy Code.
    Although the district court initially denied ECMC’s motion,
    it later took this step, reasoning that the issues Black had
    raised “require[d] the interpretation, as opposed to mere
    application, of the non-title 11 statute.” Matter of Vicars
    Ins. Agency, Inc., 
    96 F.3d 949
    , 954 (7th Cir. 1996). Shortly
    thereafter, the Secretary of Education intervened in the
    litigation to defend the regulation. The district
    court rejected Black’s challenge and upheld the legality
    of 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.410
    (b)(2), concluding that the assessment
    of collection costs as a flat-rate percentage for borrowers in
    default was not arbitrary or manifestly contrary to the
    statute, which permits guaranty agencies to charge “reason-
    able collection costs.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(b)(1).
    II
    The Higher Education Act, 
    20 U.S.C. §§ 1071
     et seq.,
    established the federal Guaranteed Student Loan Program
    in the 1960s. Out of concern for the significant financial
    problems that defaulted student loans pose for the fisc,
    Congress enacted the Higher Education Amendments in
    1986, which include a provision allowing guarantors to
    assess collection costs against borrowers in default. Specifi-
    cally, the statute provides that “a borrower who
    has defaulted on a loan . . . shall be required to pay . . .
    reasonable collection costs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1091a(b)(1). The
    statute has nothing further to say about the meaning of
    “reasonable collection costs.” Instead, Congress left it up to
    the Secretary to interpret that term through regulations.
    See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
    
    467 U.S. 837
    , 843-44 (1984) (“If Congress has explicitly
    No. 05-1102                                                5
    left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express dele-
    gation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
    provision of the statute by regulation.”). As the Supreme
    Court recently reiterated, “[d]eference in accordance
    with Chevron . . . is warranted only ‘when it appears that
    Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
    make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
    interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
    exercise of that authority.’ United States v. Mead Corp., 
    533 U.S. 218
    , 226-27 (2001). Otherwise, the interpretation is
    ‘entitled to respect’ only to the extent it has the ‘power to
    persuade.’ Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
    323 U.S. 134
    , 140
    (1944).” Gonzales v. Oregon, 
    126 S.Ct. 904
    , 914-15 (2006).
    Courts defer to legislative regulations like these unless
    they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
    otherwise not in accordance with [the] law.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A). This is a narrow standard of review, under
    which our task is only to determine whether the agency’s
    action “was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
    and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”
    Head Start Family Educ. Program, Inc. v. Coop. Educ. Serv.
    Agency 11, 
    46 F.3d 629
    , 633 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Motor
    Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm
    Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983)). If the agency
    “articulate[s] grounds indicating a rational connection
    between the facts and the agency’s action, then our inquiry
    is at an end.” 
    Id.
    In response to this delegation of authority, the Secretary
    issued 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.410
    , which establishes the basic
    rules for the assessment of collection costs against borrow-
    ers who have defaulted on their student loans. This regula-
    tion begins by providing that a “guaranty agency shall
    charge a borrower an amount equal to reasonable costs
    incurred by the agency in collecting a loan on which the
    agency has paid a default or bankruptcy claim.” 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.410
    (b)(2). “These costs may include, but are not
    6                                                No. 05-1102
    limited to, all attorney’s fees, collection agency charges, and
    court costs.” 
    Id.
     It then goes on to adopt a mathematical
    formula (the details of which are not important in this
    appeal) to determine the precise amount a guarantor may
    charge a borrower for collection costs. See 
    34 C.F.R. § 30.60
    .
    The key point for our purposes is that the Secretary allows
    guaranty agencies to charge borrowers a flat-rate percent-
    age for collection costs that takes into account the total
    costs associated with the agency’s entire defaulted student
    loan portfolio, as opposed to requiring the agency to track
    the individual charges associated with the collection of a
    particular borrower’s account. The total collection costs for
    any borrower may not exceed the amount the same bor-
    rower would be charged for the cost of collection if the loan
    were held by the Department (which, at the time of this
    litigation, was a flat rate of 25% of the outstanding princi-
    pal and interest, see 
    61 Fed. Reg. 47398
    -01 (1996)). Based
    upon ECMC’s total collection expenses for 2000 (the year in
    which ECMC filed its proof of claim in Barnes’s bankruptcy
    case), the formula yielded a flat rate of 18.06%. There is no
    dispute in this case that ECMC accurately calculated this
    rate using the formula in 
    34 C.F.R. § 30.60
    .
    Black argues that 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.410
    (b)(2) is arbitrary,
    capricious, and manifestly contrary to the HEA because
    it allows guarantors to charge borrowers collection costs
    that take into account the agency’s entire cost of collection
    for a given year, including the costs associated with those
    borrowers who cannot, or will never, repay their loans.
    Black urges that it is unfair to make borrowers who seek to
    repay their loan obligations responsible for the costs
    associated with the real deadbeats who never attempt to
    reconcile their accounts. Perhaps he is correct, as a mat-
    ter of ultimate morality, but the real world does not operate
    this way. The price of merchandise in a store reflects the
    fact that some people shoplift; the rates associated with
    credit cards reflect the fact that some cardholders never pay
    No. 05-1102                                                 7
    their bills. In these and countless other instances, the many
    who pay end up absorbing the costs for the few who do not.
    Black points to no provision in the HEA that requires
    guarantors to charge each borrower in default only the
    collection costs that the agency spent in attempting to
    collect his or her individual debt. Under Black’s view, the
    costs of those who successfully evade collection efforts
    would ultimately be borne by the taxpayers. Such an
    outcome would conflict directly with the Secretary’s inter-
    pretation of the HEA as mandating that the borrowers
    themselves, not the taxpayers, should bear the reasonable
    costs of collecting student loans in default. See 
    61 Fed. Reg. 60478
    -01 (1996). This policy strikes us as entirely consis-
    tent with the statute; thus, whether the Secretary’s state-
    ment qualifies for full Chevron deference or the more
    qualified Skidmore respect, we find it well supported.
    Although we could stop here, we note as well that testi-
    mony about the practical operation of the system from high-
    ranking Department officials also supports the Secretary.
    These individuals asserted that tracking the actual collec-
    tion costs for individual borrowers would be extremely
    costly and at times infeasible. In attempting to collect
    student loan debts, guaranty agencies like ECMC have to
    send letters, make phone calls to borrowers, and conduct
    administrative hearings; in some cases, they must track
    down borrowers whose whereabouts are unknown or pursue
    litigation. Given the sheer number of borrowers whose
    federal loans are in default, it would be difficult and
    expensive for both the guaranty agencies and the Depart-
    ment to keep track of the individual costs associated with
    each borrower’s account. There are a number of overhead
    costs that cannot readily be attributed to individual borrow-
    ers. Black minimizes these problems, arguing that it would
    not have been difficult to calculate the costs ECMC ex-
    pended in attempting to collect Barnes’s debt given that it
    was assigned Barnes’s account after he filed his Chapter 13
    8                                                No. 05-1102
    petition. This assumes, however, that ECMC’s costs are the
    only ones that are relevant, rather than the accumulated
    costs of its predecessors in interest. Moreover, this is an
    argument that a great many individual debtors could make.
    When considering the Secretary’s entire default loan
    portfolio, it seems perfectly reasonable to us that the
    Secretary would choose to adopt a regulation that calls for
    the assessment of average, as opposed to individual, costs.
    Black may have a better method in mind for calculating
    collection costs, but we are not at liberty to “substitute
    [Black’s or even our] own construction of a statutory
    provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
    administrator of an agency.” Chevron, 
    467 U.S. at 844
    .
    Similarly, at oral argument Black contended that it would
    be unreasonable for ECMC to collect an 18.06% fee for
    collection costs in Barnes’s case, again pointing out that it
    did not take over Barnes’s loans until after he filed for
    bankruptcy. As we have already remarked, however,
    Barnes’s loans had been in default for almost a decade prior
    to the time he filed his Chapter 13 petition. Barnes should
    not be absolved from paying the years of collection costs
    associated with his account merely because the Department
    transferred his debt to the ECMC after he finally decided to
    repay his debts through the bankruptcy process. It is
    reasonable for the Secretary to assign the right to recover
    collection costs to one entity, rather than trying to distrib-
    ute it up the chain, and the last holder of the debt is a
    rational one to choose. Compare Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 
    431 U.S. 720
     (1977) (barring indirect purchaser lawsuits in
    antitrust actions).
    In the alternative, Black argues that, at the very least,
    guaranty agencies should be required to consider separately
    the average costs associated with the accounts of the subset
    of loans in bankruptcy proceedings. He takes issue with the
    fact that in calculating its collection costs, ECMC considers
    only the costs associated with defaulted student loans that
    No. 05-1102                                                  9
    are not in bankruptcy proceedings. According to Black, the
    Federal Claims Collection Standards (FCCS) regulation, 
    4 C.F.R. § 102.13
    (d)(1999) (which was in effect at the time
    Barnes filed his Chapter 13 petition, but has since been
    abrogated), provided that in assessing charges to cover the
    administrative costs incurred as a result of a delinquent
    federal debt, the costs “should be based upon actual costs
    incurred or upon cost analyses establishing an average of
    actual additional costs incurred by the agency in processing
    and handling claims against other debtors in similar stages
    of delinquency.” Black takes the position that a Chapter 13
    proceeding is a separate “stage of delinquency” and on that
    premise argues that this regulation required ECMC to
    calculate separately the average costs associated with those
    loans in Chapter 13 proceedings.
    Even if this regulation were still in effect, we would defer
    to the Secretary’s conclusion that bankruptcy is not a
    separate stage of delinquency for purposes of this regula-
    tion. In arguing to the contrary, Barnes seems to be confus-
    ing the terms “delinquent” and “default.” A loan that is 15
    days late would be delinquent, but would be in a different
    stage of delinquency than a loan that had not been paid in
    270 days (the time period after which a loan is considered
    to be in default). We see nothing in this regulation that
    imposes an obligation on a guaranty agency to calculate
    separately the collection costs associated with loans in
    bankruptcy. We also note that the evidence in the record
    confirms that the collection costs ECMC incurred pursuing
    delinquent loans in bankruptcy proceedings were actually
    higher than the costs associated with those loans not in
    bankruptcy, because of the legal fees associated with
    bankruptcy proceedings. It is therefore not clear to us why
    Black wants guaranty agencies like ECMC to calculate
    collection costs in a manner that will likely result in higher
    collection charges being assessed to borrowers who have
    filed for bankruptcy.
    10                                              No. 05-1102
    Black’s next point is that ECMC failed to establish a loan
    rehabilitation program for Barnes as required under 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.405
    , the regulation that implements the HEA’s
    default reduction program, see 
    20 U.S.C. § 1078-6
    . Pursu-
    ant to this regulation, a guaranty agency must have in
    place a loan rehabilitation program for all borrowers in
    default through which the loan may be purchased by an
    eligible lender and removed from default status. See 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.405
    (a)(1). A loan in default is considered to
    be “rehabilitated” only after the borrower has voluntarily
    submitted 12 consecutive monthly payments to the guar-
    anty agency and the loan has been sold to the eligible
    lender. See 
    id.
     § 682.405(a)(2). After the loan has been
    rehabilitated, the borrower regains all FFELP benefits. See
    id. § 682.405(a)(3). Black contends that Barnes’s loans
    qualified for rehabilitation because he submitted 12
    consecutive payments to the bankruptcy trustee as specified
    in his confirmed Chapter 13 plan (to which ECMC did not
    file an objection). But ECMC never attempted to sell
    Barnes’s loans to an eligible lender. If ECMC had done
    so, Black argues, the collection costs that would have been
    assessed, if any, would have been limited to those costs
    ECMC actually incurred in rehabilitating these loans over
    the 12-month period, as opposed to the 18.06% flat rate.
    There are a number of flaws in Black’s argument. First,
    as the Secretary points out, in order to take advantage of
    the rehabilitation process, the borrower must request
    rehabilitation from the guaranty agency. See 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.405
    (b)(1). The district court found that Barnes never
    made such a request, and we have no reason to find clear
    error in that finding of fact. Given that Barnes’s student
    loans had been in default since 1989, the district court
    also found that his rehabilitation opportunities expired long
    before the loan was assigned to ECMC.
    It is not clear whether a borrower in default can rehabili-
    tate her loans through a Chapter 13 proceeding. On the one
    No. 05-1102                                                 11
    hand, during oral argument ECMC was reluctant to take
    the position that a defaulted loan could never be rehabili-
    tated in a Chapter 13 proceeding; on the other hand, it
    argued that such an action would be an “unusual scenario”
    because some features of Chapter 13 are not entirely
    consistent with HEA’s rehabilitation provisions and imple-
    menting regulations. For example, a loan is rehabilitated
    only upon its sale to an eligible lender. Given that the
    applicable regulations require a lender to suspend collection
    efforts outside a bankruptcy proceeding and submit a proof
    of claim for payment in the bankruptcy court, see 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.402
    (f)(2)(i); (f)(4), a guaranty agency could sell a loan
    owed by a defaulter in a Chapter 13 proceeding only under
    the supervision of the bankruptcy court, at least until the
    proceeding has been completed. More importantly, even if
    Barnes’s student loans could have been rehabilitated
    through the Chapter 13 proceeding, Black is incorrect in his
    assumption that the collection costs assessed to Barnes
    would only have been ECMC’s proportionate share of the
    monthly payments under the plan actually necessary to
    rehabilitate the loan. Nothing in the HEA prohibits a
    guaranty agency from assessing collection costs as a flat-
    rate percentage upon rehabilitation. To the contrary, the
    statute explicitly provides that “[a] guaranty agency may
    charge the borrower and retain collection costs in an
    amount not to exceed 18.5 percent of the outstanding
    principal and interest at the time of sale of a loan rehabili-
    tated.” 
    20 U.S.C. § 1078-6
    (a)(1)(C). Thus, even if Barnes’s
    loans could have been rehabilitated through his Chapter 13
    proceeding, the 18.06% that ECMC charged Barnes for
    collection costs falls within the bounds of what is allowed
    under the HEA’s loan rehabilitation provisions.
    Finally, at oral argument, Black accused ECMC of fail-
    ing to comply with 
    34 C.F.R. § 682.410
    (b)(5)(ii), which
    details a guaranty agency’s administrative obligations
    under the HEA. That regulation requires a guaranty agency
    12                                               No. 05-1102
    to take a number of steps “before it reports [a borrower’s]
    default to a credit bureau or assesses collection costs
    against a borrower.” These steps include written notice to
    the borrower about the proposed actions, 
    id.
    § 682.410(b)(5)(ii)(A), “[a]n opportunity to inspect and copy
    agency records pertaining to the loan obligation,” id.
    § 682.410(b)(5)(ii)(B), “[a]n opportunity for an administra-
    tive review of the legal enforceability or past-due status of
    the loan obligation,” id. § 682.410(b)(5)(ii)(C), and “[a]n
    opportunity to enter into a repayment agreement on terms
    satisfactory to the agency,” id. § 682.410(b)(5)(ii)(D). Black
    wants to argue that there is no evidence that ECMC (or any
    of its predecessors) met any of these requirements. He
    neither raised this issue before the district court, however,
    nor did he develop it in his initial brief on appeal, and so it
    is waived. See, e.g., Hart v. Transit Mgmt. of Racine, Inc.,
    
    426 F.3d 863
    , 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“Arguments
    that first appear in a reply brief are deemed waived.”).
    Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
    No. 05-1102                                         13
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—8-16-06