Doctors Hosp Hyde Pa v. LaSalle Bank Nat'l ( 2007 )


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  •                                In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 05-3502
    IN RE:
    DOCTORS HOSPITAL OF HYDE PARK, INC.,
    Debtor-Appellee.
    APPEAL OF:
    LASALLE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 04 C 4319—Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED APRIL 6, 2006—DECIDED JANUARY 12, 2007
    ____________
    Before BAUER, WOOD, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    SYKES, Circuit Judge. LaSalle Bank National Associa-
    tion (“LaSalle”) appeals a district court order affirming
    the bankruptcy court’s approval of a settlement of adver-
    sary litigation in the bankruptcy of Doctors Hospital of
    Hyde Park (“Doctors Hospital” or “the Hospital”). The
    settlement releases Dr. James Desnick (“Desnick”) from
    adversary claims the Hospital brought against him,
    provides over $6 million in cash to the Hospital’s bank-
    ruptcy estate, releases the Hospital from millions of
    dollars in claims against it, and ends a complex litigation.
    The Hospital, the bankruptcy trustee, Desnick, and the
    creditors’ committee all agreed the settlement was in the
    2                                              No. 05-3502
    best interest of the estate. LaSalle disagreed and objected.
    Following a lengthy hearing, the bankruptcy court held
    the settlement was in the best interest of the estate and
    approved it. The district court affirmed, and LaSalle has
    appealed. We affirm.
    I. Background
    Desnick was the owner and sole shareholder of Doctors
    Hospital and a number of other entities. One of his other
    companies, HPCH LLC (“HPCH”), owned the land on
    which the Hospital sat and collected monthly rent from it.
    Another of his companies, Medical Management of Amer-
    ica, Inc. (“MMA”), managed the Hospital and received fees
    for these services. Desnick treated his companies like
    personal bank accounts, sometimes withdrawing money
    for himself, other times depositing money when his com-
    panies’ coffers ran low.
    Doctors Hospital guaranteed two loans that figure
    prominently in this litigation, though it enjoyed the pro-
    ceeds of only one. In March 1997 MMA Funding (99%
    owned by Doctors Hospital) borrowed roughly $25 million
    from Daiwa Healthco (the “Daiwa loan”). Because the
    loan was, in practical effect, a loan to the Hospital, the
    Hospital secured the loan by pledging its receivables. In
    addition, Desnick personally guaranteed the loan. In
    August 1997 Nomura Asset Capital Corporation loaned
    HPCH $50 million (the “Nomura loan”). Although the
    Nomura loan went ostensibly to HPCH, it was secured by
    the Hospital’s equipment and (like the Daiwa loan) by
    the Hospital’s accounts receivable. The Hospital also
    executed a guaranty and suretyship agreement in favor
    of Nomura. The Nomura loan proceeds did not go to the
    Hospital, however. Instead, the proceeds—some $48.5
    million after administrative fees—were deposited into an
    No. 05-3502                                                     3
    account bearing the name of Desnick and his wife. Over
    time LaSalle Bank came to control the Nomura loan.1
    The Hospital filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
    in April 2000. Daiwa filed a claim against the Hospital to
    collect the outstanding portion of its loan, and Desnick
    personally paid the debt of about $9 million. The Hospital
    filed an adversary complaint against Desnick and numer-
    ous other defendants. Twelve of the other defendants
    were Desnick-controlled entities2 and four were former
    corporate officers or directors3 of the Hospital whom
    Desnick had effectively agreed to indemnify for their
    losses.4 The gist of the complaint was that Desnick and
    the other officers and directors caused the Hospital’s
    bankruptcy through mismanagement and a series of
    fraudulent transactions—to the tune of about $34 mil-
    lion—which benefitted Desnick, his other companies, and
    1
    Nomura sold the loan to Asset Securitization Corporation
    (“ASC”) in October 1997. ASC transferred the loan to a trust
    for which LaSalle is the trustee.
    2
    These included: Barry Harlem Corp.; J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye
    Services Ltd.; James H. Desnick, M.D., S.C.; James H. Desnick,
    M.D., P.A.; Desnick Descendants Irrevocable Trust; Desnick
    Family Irrevocable Trust; HP Membership, Inc.; HPCH LLC;
    HPCH Partners, L.P.; Leger Acquisition Corp.; Medical Manage-
    ment of America, Inc.; Stoney Island Ventures, Inc.
    3
    They were: Willie T. Barrow, once a director of the Hospital;
    Richard Felbinger, former executive vice president of finance;
    Nelson Vasquez, financial officer for the Hospital from 1999 until
    it closed; and Michael Nelson, former chief financial officer of
    the Hospital.
    4
    Desnick agreed to indemnify American International Group
    Technical Services, Inc., the Hospital’s directors and officers
    insurer, for any losses it incurred under the policy covering
    those four officers. Apparently, Desnick also agreed to indemnify
    some of the officers and directors individually as well.
    4                                                 No. 05-3502
    Hospital management.5 The complaint asserted twenty-
    eight counts, including breach of fiduciary duties, conver-
    sion, violation of the Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
    Act, fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code,
    improper distributions to the shareholder, and equitable
    subordination of Desnick’s claims against the Hospital
    (Desnick claimed the Hospital owed him roughly $16
    million). The complaint also named LaSalle and sought to
    void the guaranty on the Nomura loan.
    After two years of litigation, the Hospital moved the
    bankruptcy court for approval of a settlement agreement
    that had been reached by the parties (except LaSalle).
    Under the terms of the settlement, Desnick agreed to
    pay the Hospital roughly $6.1 million and also agreed to
    forfeit any subrogation rights he had to seek recovery of
    the $9 million he personally paid to Daiwa on behalf of
    the Hospital. He also agreed to withdraw any other claims
    he filed against the Hospital. Moreover, Desnick promised
    to use his best efforts to obtain dismissal or withdrawal of
    a $13 million claim against the Hospital filed by the
    Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) for
    Medicare/Medicaid reimbursements DHHS claimed were
    improperly paid to the Hospital. If he could not secure
    dismissal of the entire DHHS claim, Desnick agreed to
    pay 15% of the claim, up to $1.5 million. Finally, Desnick
    agreed to cooperate with the Hospital in its remaining
    5
    Specifically, the complaint alleged Desnick withdrew at least
    $15 million from the Hospital and cost the Hospital millions in
    fines, settlements, and legal fees because of Medicare overpay-
    ments to the Hospital. The alleged fraudulent transactions
    included the Nomura loan (through which Desnick tied up the
    Hospital’s assets and future earnings as collateral without
    any benefit to the Hospital), an overcharge by MMA of at least
    $7 million for management fees in 1997, and overcharges for rent
    by HPCH.
    No. 05-3502                                                 5
    claims against other defendants, including LaSalle, by
    (among other things) allowing the Hospital access to his
    expert. In exchange, the Hospital agreed to release from all
    claims Desnick, his companies, and the four individuals he
    agreed to indemnify.
    LaSalle objected, and the bankruptcy court conducted a
    three-day evidentiary hearing on the Hospital’s motion.
    The Hospital, Desnick, the bankruptcy trustee, and the
    creditors’ committee all recommended that the settle-
    ment would be the best way to avoid protracted, expensive,
    complex, and uncertain litigation. The bankruptcy court
    concluded that the best-case scenario for the Hospital
    would be a $34 million victory and the worst case a
    $1.8 million victory. (LaSalle had argued that the high end
    was in excess of $80 million and the low end near
    $34 million; the bankruptcy judge thought that was
    unrealistic.) The court agreed with the Hospital and
    Desnick that the high-end $34 million victory was the
    least likely result because audited financials tended to
    support Desnick’s position regarding the date of insol-
    vency, which was critical to the bulk of the Hospital’s
    claims. Given the range of litigation possibilities, the
    bankruptcy court concluded the settlement was rea-
    sonable because it would spare scarce resources, which
    might be wasted on protracted litigation that would likely
    yield mediocre results. LaSalle appealed to the district
    court, which affirmed.
    II. Discussion
    Bankruptcy courts may approve adversary litigation
    settlements that are in the best interests of the estate. In
    re Energy Co-op., Inc., 
    886 F.2d 921
    , 927-29 (7th Cir.
    1989); In re Am. Reserve Corp., 
    841 F.2d 159
    , 161 (7th Cir.
    1987). The linchpin of the “best interests of the estate” test
    is a comparison of the value of the settlement with the
    6                                             No. 05-3502
    probable costs and benefits of litigating. In re Energy Co-
    
    op., 886 F.2d at 927
    . Among the factors the court considers
    are the litigation’s probability of success, complexity,
    expense, inconvenience, and delay, “including the possi-
    bility that disapproving the settlement will cause wasting
    of assets.” In re Am. 
    Reserve, 841 F.2d at 161
    . As part of
    this test, the value of the settlement must be reasonably
    equivalent to the value of the claims surrendered. This
    reasonable equivalence standard is met if the settlement
    falls within the reasonable range of possible litigation
    outcomes. In re Energy 
    Co-op., 886 F.2d at 929
    ; In re N.Y.,
    New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 
    632 F.2d 955
    , 960 (2d
    Cir. 1980); see also Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockhold-
    ers of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 
    390 U.S. 414
    ,
    424-25 (1968); Depoister v. Mary M. Holloway Found., 
    36 F.3d 582
    , 586 (7th Cir. 1994). Because litigation outcomes
    cannot be predicted with mathematical precision, only if
    a settlement falls below the low end of possible litiga-
    tion outcomes will it fail the reasonable equivalence
    standard. In re Energy 
    Co-op., 886 F.2d at 929
    .
    The bankruptcy court’s approval of the settlement is
    reviewed deferentially, for abuse of discretion. 
    Depoister, 36 F.3d at 586
    . The bankruptcy court must indepen-
    dently evaluate the settlement, not simply accept the
    recommendation of the trustee. TMT Trailer 
    Ferry, 390 U.S. at 424
    ; 
    Depoister, 36 F.3d at 586
    -87; In re Am. Re-
    
    serve, 841 F.2d at 162
    . If the decision demonstrates a
    command of the case, we will not engage in second-guess-
    ing; the bankruptcy court is in a better position “to con-
    sider the equities and reasonableness of a particular
    compromise.” In re Am. Re
    serve, 841 F.2d at 162
    . Factual
    findings are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions
    are reviewed de novo. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8013; In re
    Crosswhite, 
    148 F.3d 879
    , 881 (7th Cir. 1998).
    LaSalle complains of several errors, most having to do
    with the value of the settlement to the estate and whether
    No. 05-3502                                               7
    it falls within the reasonable range of litigation outcomes.
    First, LaSalle maintains the bankruptcy court clearly
    erred in determining the value of the settlement to the
    estate. LaSalle argues that some of the claims Desnick
    gave up are worthless and that the settlement achieves
    practically nothing for unsecured creditors. Second,
    LaSalle contends the bankruptcy court miscalculated the
    range of litigation outcomes. According to LaSalle, both the
    low and high ends of possible outcomes are much higher
    than the bankruptcy judge thought, and the settlement
    does not fall within the range of LaSalle’s higher pro-
    jected outcomes. Finally, LaSalle argues the bankruptcy
    court did not make an independent evaluation of the
    settlement, but instead rubber-stamped the misguided
    recommendations of the trustee and the creditors’ com-
    mittee.
    A. Value of the Settlement
    The bankruptcy court held that the settlement had
    significant value to the estate. The Hospital released
    Desnick, twelve Desnick-controlled entities, and four
    former officers and directors of the Hospital from all
    claims against them. In return, Desnick paid the estate
    some $6.1 million cash. In addition, Desnick agreed to
    waive his claim against the estate for the $9 million or so
    he paid on the Daiwa loan. He also agreed to use his best
    efforts to help resolve the $13 million Medicare/Medicaid
    claim favorably to the estate. The settlement also made
    Desnick’s financial expert available to the estate; he had
    detailed knowledge of the Hospital’s books dating as far
    back as 1992, which could help the estate in its claim
    against LaSalle. Finally, the settlement narrowed the
    scope of litigation and allowed the Hospital to focus its
    resources on winning the few remaining claims rather than
    battling on all fronts.
    8                                              No. 05-3502
    LaSalle takes issue with several of the bankruptcy
    court’s conclusions. First, LaSalle argues that Desnick’s
    forfeiture of his claim for the Daiwa loan is worthless.
    LaSalle insists that when Desnick paid the Daiwa loan,
    the loan was extinguished and Desnick obtained no
    subrogation rights. LaSalle cites no law to support
    this argument, and the position is not defensible. When a
    guarantor pays a debt, he is subrogated to the rights of a
    creditor against the corporation on whose behalf he paid
    the debt. Weissman v. Weener, 
    12 F.3d 84
    , 87 (7th Cir.
    1993); Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi.,
    
    877 F.2d 1333
    , 1336 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Mut. Serv.
    Cas. Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth State Bank, 
    265 F.3d 601
    , 626
    (7th Cir. 2001) (“[S]ubrogation can arise simply from the
    fact of payment.”). LaSalle suggests that any subroga-
    tion claim would be subject to equitable subordination
    based on Desnick’s conduct, but it does not develop the
    argument. In any event, the point is immaterial because
    the bankruptcy court did not assume the value of the
    released claim to be worth $9 million to the estate. Rather,
    the court assumed that, if nothing else, the released
    claim saved the estate the expense of litigating to deter-
    mine whether the claim was valid. That is not error.
    LaSalle also argues Desnick’s promise to use his best
    efforts to defeat the Medicare/Medicaid claim is of no
    value. By LaSalle’s reckoning, Desnick already had a duty
    to obtain the release of the claim because of his position
    as director and sole shareholder of the Hospital. Here
    again LaSalle does not cite any legal authority for its
    position. Corporate directors do not have continuing
    fiduciary duties once they resign. See, e.g., Standage v.
    Planned Inv. Corp.,772 P.2d 1140, 1144 (Ariz. 1988)
    (noting there is no more fiduciary duty when director or
    officer resigns); Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna,
    
    625 P.2d 690
    , 695 (Utah 1981) (“When a corporate officer
    ceases to act as such, because of his resignation or re-
    No. 05-3502                                                9
    moval, the fiduciary relationship ceases.”); Renpak, Inc. v.
    Oppenheimer, 
    104 So. 2d 642
    , 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
    1958); WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 3 FLETCHER CYC. CORP.
    § 860 (2002). Desnick resigned as director of the Hospital
    in November 2000, so he had no continuing duty to right
    the ship in 2004. Moreover, Desnick agreed to pay for the
    filing of a report with DHHS regarding the Medicare/
    Medicaid claim—a report that could cost $500,000—and
    he had no duty to do so personally, even in a sole share-
    holder situation (at least not without veil piercing, which
    LaSalle has not pressed). Cf. Kelly v. Fahrney, 
    145 Ill. App. 80
    (1908) (noting in the context of a closely held corpora-
    tion that “there is no duty on the[ ] part [of shareholders]
    to use individual pecuniary means to assist the corpora-
    tion in its money difficulties or by use of such means
    shield it from financial destruction”). Finally, Desnick
    agreed to pay 15% of the claim, up to $1.5 million of his
    own money, should he not secure its release. So even
    assuming he had some sort of duty to help secure the
    release of the Medicare/Medicaid claim, Desnick sweet-
    ened the deal by offering to pay for the filing of the DHHS
    report and a portion of any remaining claims. Desnick’s
    promise was hardly illusory.
    B. Range of Litigation Outcomes
    The date the Hospital became insolvent was critical to
    determining the range of possible litigation outcomes.
    Most of the Hospital’s claims against Desnick centered
    on allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent
    transfer, and conversion. Everyone agrees there are no
    viable claims for any period during which the Hospital
    was solvent; that is because as long as a corporation is
    solvent, directors typically owe fiduciary duties only to
    shareholders. Beach v. Miller, 
    22 N.E. 464
    , 466 (Ill. 1889);
    Paul H. Schwendener, Inc. v. Jupiter Elec. Co., 
    829 N.E.2d 10
                                                 No. 05-3502
    818, 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Because Desnick was the
    sole shareholder of the Hospital, he can hardly have
    defrauded himself or breached a fiduciary duty to himself.
    See cf. In re Tufts Elecs., Inc., 
    746 F.2d 915
    , 917 (1st Cir.
    1984) (holding that corporate opportunity doctrine does not
    apply against sole shareholder who cannot defraud or
    conceal information from himself ). If the Hospital was
    insolvent, however, Desnick’s fiduciary duties extend to
    the Hospital’s creditors. Paul H. 
    Schwendener, 829 N.E.2d at 828
    . Likewise, the Hospital’s fraudulent transfer and
    conversion claims depend on insolvency. See 740 ILL.
    COMP. STAT. 160/6 (1996); Nostalgia Network, Inc. v.
    Lockwood, 
    315 F.3d 717
    , 719 (7th Cir. 2002) (“When a
    person transfers money or other property to another
    person without receiving anything in return, and the
    transferor is insolvent (or made insolvent by the transfer),
    the transfer is voidable . . . .”); Dannen v. Scafidi,
    
    393 N.E.2d 1246
    , 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (no liability
    for converting corporate funds if all shareholders ratify
    the act and creditors are not impaired).
    The Hospital maintains that it became insolvent in
    January 1997. Between January and August 28, 1997 (the
    date of the Nomura loan), some $23 million in transfers
    moved from the Hospital to Desnick. After August 1997, no
    more than about $10 or $11 million in transfers occurred.
    The bankruptcy court, sensibly enough, determined that
    the upper limit of possible litigation outcomes was
    about $34 million, assuming the Hospital could prove
    insolvency as early as January 1997 and would prevail on
    all of its claims.
    LaSalle contends the bankruptcy judge’s upper limit
    does not account for all of the Hospital’s claims. According
    to LaSalle, the bankruptcy court should have included a
    claim for the $48 million Nomura loan because Desnick
    had pledged the Hospital’s assets to secure it. That
    claim would have raised the upper limit of possible
    No. 05-3502                                             11
    outcomes to nearly $82 million, and LaSalle contends the
    Hospital had a viable alter ego or “LBO-like” (leveraged
    buyout) theory that would permit recovery of the amount
    of the Nomura loan. The Hospital’s lawyer disagreed. He
    testified that he entertained this theory, but ultimately
    considered it too far-fetched.
    The bankruptcy court did not clearly err by leaving
    the Nomura funds out of the calculation. The court noted
    that the adversary complaint did not actually make a
    claim against Desnick for the $48 million Nomura loan.
    The Hospital had only secured the loan; it never had a
    right to the loan proceeds, which were given to HPCH. Nor
    had the proceeds ever passed through the Hospital’s bank
    accounts. The Hospital wanted only to be off the security
    hook; it did not have a claim to recover the money from
    Desnick.
    From the estate’s perspective, trying to get the Nomura
    money from Desnick on a novel legal theory would
    have been more trouble than it was worth. To do so would
    also run the risk of undercutting its claim against
    LaSalle to void the Nomura guaranty; it would essentially
    confirm LaSalle’s claim against the estate for the Nomura
    funds. By disavowing any recovery against Desnick on the
    Nomura loan and seeking only to void the guaranty, the
    Hospital looked to knock out $48 million (or more) in
    claims. Perhaps the estate could have pressed the legal
    theories necessary to win the Nomura funds, but it
    made the strategic decision not to. The bankruptcy
    court’s exclusion of the Nomura loan amount was not
    clearly erroneous.
    The bankruptcy court determined the low end of pos-
    sible outcomes by figuring the result if Desnick’s defenses
    were established, which necessarily included an assess-
    ment of whether those defenses were any good. Desnick
    claimed the Hospital was not insolvent until September
    12                                             No. 05-3502
    1998. He also claimed to have given back to the Hospital
    some of the funds he transferred out. If his theories
    and proofs held up, Desnick maintained he could be liable
    for no more than $1.8 million. The bankruptcy court thus
    placed the low end of possible outcomes at $1.8 million.
    LaSalle maintains the district court erred in this deter-
    mination as well. At the low end, LaSalle argues, the
    Hospital could have recovered at least the $34 million
    because Desnick’s defenses are not viable. We disagree.
    The parties do not dispute that insolvency is more diffi-
    cult to prove further back in time, and the Hospital’s
    position on insolvency is further back than Desnick’s.
    LaSalle has effectively conceded that Desnick’s claims
    have some merit—it asserted in the bankruptcy court
    that the Hospital was solvent until at least August 28,
    1997 (the date of the Nomura loan). By taking that
    position LaSalle concedes some $23 million of the Hospi-
    tal’s claims against Desnick are out, leaving claims for
    only $10 to $11 million (the money transferred after the
    date of the Nomura loan). LaSalle’s argument also makes
    no allowance for Desnick’s transfers back to the Hospital.
    Moreover, the bankruptcy court concluded Desnick’s
    litigation position was not only arguably defensible, but
    supported by audited financial statements. LaSalle’s
    argument rings hollow in the face of its own concession
    on insolvency dates and its failure to account for money
    Desnick already repaid. It was not clear error to con-
    clude that the lowest possible outcome for the Hospital was
    a recovery of $1.8 million.
    As we have already noted, so long as the settlement falls
    within the reasonable range of litigation possibilities, it
    meets the reasonable equivalency standard. In re Energy
    
    Co-op., 886 F.2d at 929
    . Litigation outcomes are uncertain,
    not reducible to mathematical formulas. All kinds of
    variables can lead to all kinds of results. The sum certain
    of $6.1 million, plus the release of claims by Desnick
    No. 05-3502                                               13
    against the Hospital, even if small compared to the best
    possible litigation outcome, reasonably represents a
    positive outcome for the estate in light of the risks,
    specifically the possibility that the Hospital would be
    found solvent up until late August 1997. This settlement
    falls squarely within the reasonable range of litigation
    outcomes.
    As a last resort, LaSalle argues that the proponents of
    the settlement did not actually prove the range of possible
    outcomes because they did not present final insolvency
    analyses. Instead, Desnick and the Hospital presented
    only estimates and preliminary solvency evaluations.
    LaSalle argues the bankruptcy court could not have made
    an informed decision on the limits of litigation. But
    estimates are acceptable in this context; no one would
    ever settle a case if the claim and amount of recovery
    could be established with 100% certainty. By settling the
    parties have concluded that a definite amount today
    is more valuable than the risk and expense of trying the
    case in the future. Parties assess settlement offers by
    taking stock of the information they have, even if pre-
    liminary, and considering whether the possibility the
    case will improve is worth the risk of losing the settle-
    ment offer. In this case, the bankruptcy court considered
    the preliminary insolvency reports and noted that the
    audited financials lent support to Desnick’s position. That
    is enough to show the settlement was good for the
    estate—it was more than three times higher than the
    worst-case scenario for the estate, to say nothing of the
    value of the claims Desnick surrendered and the money
    saved by foregoing additional litigation.
    LaSalle’s position, if accepted, would encourage waste.
    Preliminary evidence suggested the viability of some of
    Desnick’s positions. Suppose the bankruptcy court had
    refused to approve the settlement until the parties
    brought in their final reports on insolvency. It is unrealis-
    14                                              No. 05-3502
    tic to think that positions would have changed significantly
    (Desnick’s expert was not likely to come back to court and
    say that after further research he realized the Hospital
    was insolvent in January 1997). The parties would have
    spent more time and money in litigation, and Desnick may
    have become less willing to settle for $6.1 million because
    his expert report and the audited financials supported his
    case. The Hospital would have spent more to gain less.
    And if the case should go to trial, all bets would be off; one
    side stands to lose nearly everything. The point of a
    settlement is that everyone stops gambling and walks
    away from the table with some winnings (or at least fewer
    losses). Estimates and preliminary solvency reports were
    sufficient to support the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that
    this settlement was within the reasonable range of litiga-
    tion outcomes.
    C. Value of the Settlement v. Costs and Benefits of
    Litigation
    At bottom, the best-interests-of-the-estate test is a
    comparison between the value of the settlement and the
    probable costs and benefits of litigating. In re Energy Co-
    
    op., 886 F.2d at 927
    . As we have noted, in making this
    comparison, the bankruptcy court considers the litiga-
    tion’s probability of success, complexity, expense, inconve-
    nience, and delay, including the wasting of assets that
    comes from extended litigation. In re Am. 
    Reserve, 841 F.2d at 161
    . We have already touched on most of these
    factors. We must also be satisfied that the bankruptcy
    judge independently evaluated the settlement and did not
    simply accept the recommendation of the trustee.
    
    Depoister, 36 F.3d at 587
    .
    LaSalle argues the bankruptcy court could not have
    independently concluded the settlement was in the best
    interests of the estate because the court was not given
    No. 05-3502                                                  15
    the proper information. LaSalle contends the Hospital
    improperly compared the value of the settlement to the
    value of the creditors’ claims against the estate (between
    $10 and $14 million). With improper comparative infor-
    mation, LaSalle argues, the bankruptcy court could not
    have properly exercised its discretion.
    There is no basis in the record to support LaSalle’s
    argument. The bankruptcy court’s opinion discusses at
    length the possible outcomes of the litigation between the
    Hospital and Desnick without reference to the validity or
    value of the creditors’ claims against the estate. The
    bankruptcy court specifically disclaimed any considera-
    tion of the creditors’ claims: “[T]he court need not deter-
    mine whether . . . claims [filed by creditors against the
    Hospital] are valid or not. It must determine the reason-
    able range of likely outcomes of the litigation against these
    settling parties . . . .” (emphasis added).
    LaSalle also notes that only about $1.7 million of the
    settlement will be available to pay unsecured creditors
    and argues that such a paltry sum can hardly be in the
    best interests of the estate when the Hospital stood to
    recover over $80 million. We have already rejected
    LaSalle’s contention that the Hospital could have recov-
    ered over $80 million; the bankruptcy court reasonably
    concluded that even $34 million was a stretch. The prelim-
    inary solvency reports and audited financials tended to
    support Desnick’s position. Given the expense and uncer-
    tainty of litigation and the possibility of a poor outcome,
    this settlement is hardly bad for the unsecured creditors.
    There is now $1.7 million more for them to recover, and
    the estate still had live claims to press against other
    defendants.6
    6
    The Hospital still had separate claims against LaSalle,
    Stephen Weinstein (President of the Hospital from 1993 through
    (continued...)
    16                                                No. 05-3502
    LaSalle cites In re Remsen Partners, Ltd., 
    294 B.R. 557
    (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002), to support its argument about
    the effect of the settlement on unsecured creditors. But
    Remsen does not stand for the proposition that courts
    should reject out of hand settlements that leave little
    for unsecured creditors. 
    Id. at 566-67
    (“This does not
    mean that a settlement must be denied if it would not
    result in a recovery by general unsecured creditors.”). The
    Remsen opinion merely noted that little or no benefit for
    unsecured creditors will cause a court to look more care-
    fully at the trustee’s recommendation. 
    Id. at 567.
    In
    Remsen, the trustee had not alerted creditors that they
    would receive no benefit from the proposed settlement. The
    bankruptcy court concluded that the trustee’s failure to
    provide this information gave rise to an inference that
    more creditors would have objected had they been in-
    formed. 
    Id. The same
    inference does not arise here. The
    creditors’ committee, whose views count but are not
    controlling, see In re Am. 
    Reserve, 841 F.2d at 161
    -62,
    was satisfied with this settlement even knowing only
    $1.7 million would be available to unsecured creditors.
    LaSalle also attacks the settlement for releasing the
    sixteen other defendants (besides Desnick) when none of
    them paid a penny. Of the sixteen other defendants,
    however, twelve were Desnick-controlled entities and
    the other four were former directors or officers of the
    Hospital whom Desnick had agreed to indemnify for their
    losses. Not surprisingly, release of these sixteen other
    defendants was one of Desnick’s terms for settling. The
    claims against the four officers and directors of the
    Hospital were identical to the claims against Desnick. If
    the estate won on its claims against Desnick and the
    6
    (...continued)
    part of 1998), and Robert Krasnow (a former hospital employee
    with managerial responsibilities) for fraudulent transfers, and
    a claim against Weinstein for breach of fiduciary duties.
    No. 05-3502                                              17
    officers, it would recover only once, likewise if it won
    against either Desnick or the officers. Desnick could
    hardly be expected to settle the claims against himself
    and remain on the hook for the same claims against the
    others.
    Moreover, like the claims against Desnick, the claims
    against the officers and directors depended on proof of
    insolvency, and the bankruptcy court’s evaluation of the
    apparent strength of Desnick’s defenses applies equally
    to the four officers and directors. There was no significant
    additional recovery to be had against the sixteen addi-
    tional defendants released, and if it had not released
    them, the Hospital could not have settled with Desnick.
    Finally, LaSalle contends the bankruptcy court relied too
    heavily on the trustee’s recommendation and that of the
    creditors’ committee. That is simply not true. The bank-
    ruptcy court’s decision reflects a command of the facts
    and the law and an independent and informed decision
    about the value of the claims surrendered and the likeli-
    hood of success in litigation. Although the judge com-
    mented on the recommendations of the trustee and the
    creditors’ committee, there is nothing in the record to
    support LaSalle’s assertion that the court simply “rubber-
    stamped” those recommendations. The bankruptcy court’s
    approval of the settlement was not an abuse of discretion.
    AFFIRMED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—1-12-07