Grigsby, Melvin v. Bledsoe, B. A. , 223 F. App'x 486 ( 2007 )


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  •                        NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted February 7, 2007*
    Decided February 8, 2007
    Before
    Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge
    Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
    Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
    No. 06-3284
    MELVIN GRIGSBY,                                   Appeal from the United States
    Petitioner-Appellant,                        District Court for the Southern
    District of Illinois
    v.
    No. 03-832-GPM
    B.A. BLEDSOE,
    Respondent-Appellee.                       G. Patrick Murphy,
    Chief Judge.
    ORDER
    Melvin Grigsby petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    to compel the Bureau of Prisons to credit his federal term with the time he spent in
    state custody before his federal sentencing. The district court concluded that
    federal law prohibits giving Grigsby credit for this period and denied his petition.
    We agree and affirm the judgment.
    On March 28, 1993, state authorities in California took Grigsby into custody
    on a robbery charge. He was convicted in state court, and on August 13, 1993, he
    *
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral
    argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. Fed. R.
    App. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 06-3284                                                                     Page 2
    was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. About a month later, federal
    authorities executed a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and took custody of
    Grigsby to answer an indictment charging him with committing a federal drug
    offense prior to entering state custody. He was convicted of conspiracy to possess
    with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and on August 19, 1994, he was sentenced to
    200 months’ imprisonment to run concurrently with his undischarged California
    sentence. Grigsby was then returned to a California facility, where he remained
    until he was paroled to federal officials to complete the remainder of his federal
    sentence.
    After exhausting his administrative remedies, Grigsby filed his § 2241
    petition claiming that he should have received credit against his federal sentence
    for the period between his arrest by California authorities on March 28, 1993, and
    his sentencing in federal court on August 19, 1994. The magistrate judge assigned
    to review Grigsby’s petition recommended that the district court deny it. As to the
    period before Grigsby’s state sentencing (March 28, 1993, to August 12, 1993), the
    magistrate judge reasoned that the petition was moot because the BOP already had
    credited this time against Grigsby’s federal sentence. As to the period between
    Grigsby’s state sentencing and his federal sentencing (August 13, 1993, to August
    19, 1994), the magistrate judge reasoned that 
    18 U.S.C. § 3585
    (b), which governs
    the award of federal credit for periods of prior incarceration, prohibited crediting
    this period against Grigsby’s federal sentence because the California Department of
    Corrections already had credited the time against his state sentence. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3585
    (b). The magistrate judge further concluded that BOP Program Statement
    5880.28(2)(c), which allows credit for time spent in “nonfederal presentence
    custody” in certain instances where the federal and state sentences run
    concurrently, did not provide an alternate basis for awarding the credit Grigsby
    sought. See Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c), Sentence Computation Manual of
    1984.
    The magistrate judge notified Grigsby that he had just ten days to file any
    objections to the proposed resolution of his § 2241 petition. The notice warned that
    failure to object would result in a waiver of the right to appeal. Within ten days,
    Grigsby filed a single page entitled “Objections,” which reads in full:
    Petitioner respectfully objects to the magistrate judge, Report
    and Recommendation/Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
    Law.
    If petitioner is allowed to file additional papers will the court
    please inform petitioner of the time limit for doing so.
    No. 06-3284                                                                        Page 3
    Afterward the district court adopted in full the magistrate judge’s proposed
    resolution. Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), which provides that any
    party disagreeing with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on a
    dispositive motion must file “specific, written objections,” the district court
    concluded that it need not undertake de novo review in this case because Grigsby’s
    submission was so general. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Nonetheless, the court noted
    that it “fully agree[d]” with the magistrate judge’s “findings, analysis, and
    conclusions.” The court then dismissed Grigsby’s petition and later denied his
    motion for reconsideration.
    On appeal Grigsby presses his contention that his petition should have been
    granted to the extent that it seeks credit against his federal sentence for the period
    between his California sentencing on August 13, 1993, and his federal sentencing
    on August 19, 1994. Before reaching that argument, however, we must address the
    government’s argument that Grigsby failed to comply with Rule 72(b) and thus
    waived the right to challenge the dismissal of his § 2241 petition. A party who fails
    to abide by that rule waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.
    See United States v. Hall, 
    462 F.3d 684
    , 688 (7th Cir. 2006). The government
    argues that Grigsby’s submission fails to fulfill Rule 72(b)’s mandate that a party
    file “specific” objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
    We have interpreted “specific” as used in Rule 72(b) to require only that a
    party “specify each issue for which review is sought and not the factual or legal
    basis for the objection.” Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 
    170 F.3d 734
    , 741
    (7th Cir. 1999). The magistrate judge addressed only the facts and law relating to
    whether Grigsby was entitled to presentence credit. Since this question is the only
    question presented by Grigsby’s § 2241 petition, and given that Grigsby was
    proceeding pro se, we conclude that his timely objection was sufficient under Rule
    72(b) to preserve his challenge on appeal. See United States v. Sawaf, 
    74 F.3d 119
    ,
    122 (6th Cir. 1996) (pro se litigants’ letter stating only that “[w]e object to the report
    and recommendation” satisfied Rule 72(b) given the limited nature of the legal
    question presented), cited with approval in Johnson, 
    170 F.3d at 741
    .
    We therefore take up the merits. Our review is de novo. Glaus v. Anderson,
    
    408 F.3d 382
    , 386 (7th Cir. 2005). Grigsby acknowledges § 3585(b), which prohibits
    the BOP from giving credit for prior custody that already has “been credited against
    another sentence.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3585
    (b). Grigsby further admits that California
    authorities already credited the disputed time period against his state sentence.
    But relying on Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c) and our decision in Kayfez v.
    Gaselle, 
    993 F.2d 1288
     (7th Cir. 1993), Grigsby insists that the same period should
    be credited against his federal sentence because that sentence was ordered to run
    concurrently with his California sentence. Grigsby is mistaken.
    No. 06-3284                                                                     Page 4
    Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c) provides that if a prisoner’s federal and
    state sentences are concurrent, and the federal sentence is to run longer than the
    state sentence (not counting any credits), “[p]rior custody credits shall be given for
    any time spent in non-federal presentence custody that begins on or after the date
    of the federal offense up to the date that the fist sentence begins to run, federal or
    non-federal.” Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c). The BOP refers to these credits as
    “Willis time credits.” See Willis v. United States, 
    438 F.2d 923
     (5th Cir. 1971).
    We recognized in Kayfez v. Gaselle, 
    993 F.2d 1288
     (7th Cir. 1993), that by
    sanctioning Willis time credits the BOP often permits what amounts to a form of
    “double counting,” despite the language in § 3585(b). See Kayfez, 
    993 F.2d at 1290
    .
    In Kayfez, the BOP had refused to credit against the petitioner’s federal sentence
    the time he spent in state custody before receiving his first sentence (federal in that
    case) because that time already had been credited to his concurrent state sentence.
    
    Id. at 1289
    . The BOP insisted that, because his state sentence was longer than his
    federal sentence, the period he sought credit for did not qualify as “Willis time.” 
    Id. at 1290
    . We concluded, however, that because the petitioner had been in
    presentence custody for 416 days, and his state sentence was longer than his federal
    sentence by only 358 days, he needed a 58-day credit to his federal sentence in order
    to receive the full benefit of the 416-day credit he technically had received. 
    Id.
    But Grigsby’s reliance on that line of reasoning is misplaced: the time for
    which he seeks credit is not “Willis time” because it was not time spent in non-
    federal presentence custody. See Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c). (The BOP
    already credited that period—March 28, 1993 to August 12, 1993—to his sentence.)
    The disputed period—August 13, 1993 to August 19, 1994—all arose after Grigsby’s
    state sentencing, and since he obtained credit for this period from the state, he is
    not entitled to the same benefit from the BOP merely because his subsequent
    federal sentence was ordered to run concurrently. See Rios v. Wiley, 
    201 F.3d 257
    ,
    273 n.13 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that reasoning in “Willis/Kayfez line of cases”
    does not extend to permit federal credit for time served after concurrent state
    sentence was imposed). By its plain language, § 3585(b) prohibits such a credit.
    See 18 U.S.C § 3585(b); United States v. Ross, 
    219 F.3d 592
    , 594 (7th Cir. 2000)
    (“[Section] 3585(b) forbids the BOP from giving credit for presentence custody when
    that credit has been applied against another sentence.”).
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Grigsby’s petition for a writ of
    habeas corpus.