Novy, Patricia v. Astrue, Michael J. ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 06-3897
    PATRICIA NOVY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 05 C 2090—Martin C. Ashman, Magistrate Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED JULY 11, 2007—DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2007
    ____________
    Before POSNER, COFFEY, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    POSNER, Circuit Judge. Patricia Novy, age 35, applied
    unsuccessfully for social security disability benefits. The
    principal issue and the only one we need discuss involves
    her claim of being mentally retarded. Her main evidence
    of retardation is her low IQ—69—though there is also
    evidence from psychologists and other medical profession-
    als that, as one would expect, she has poor memory,
    confused thinking, and, as her brief puts it, “marginal
    ability to navigate social encounters and activities of
    daily living.”
    2                                                No. 06-3897
    The applicable regulation defines mental retardation as
    “significantly subaverage general intellectual function-
    ing with deficits in adaptive functioning initially mani-
    fested during the developmental period; i.e., the evidence
    demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before
    age 22.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. I, § 12.05. The
    requirement of early onset and the reference to the claim-
    ant’s “developmental period” seem intended to limit
    coverage to an innate condition, Brown v. Secretary of Health
    & Human Services, 
    948 F.2d 268
    , 271 (6th Cir. 1991), rather
    than a condition resulting from a disease or accident in
    adulthood. This condition was forcefully questioned in
    Tennessee Protection & Advocacy, Inc. v. Wells, 
    371 F.3d 342
    ,
    346-50 (6th Cir. 2004), but is in any event satisfied in this
    case.
    If in addition to being retarded within the meaning of
    the regulation the claimant has an IQ below 60, she is
    deemed disabled, without more. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
    App. I, § 12.05(B). But if her IQ is at least 60, she must, in
    order to establish disability without reference to her age,
    education, or work experience, demonstrate “a physical
    or other mental impairment imposing an additional and
    significant work-related limitation of function.” Id.,
    § 12.05(C); see Mendez v. Barnhart, 
    439 F.3d 360
    , 361 (7th
    Cir. 2006); Hinkle v. Apfel, 
    132 F.3d 1349
    , 1351-52 (10th Cir.
    1997); Selders v. Sullivan, 
    914 F.2d 614
    , 619 (5th Cir. 1990)
    (per curiam). In other words, and critical to Novy’s case,
    a low IQ, but not an IQ below 60, is insufficient, even
    with the presence of some impairment, to establish dis-
    ability per se on grounds of mental retardation. The reason
    is that a person with an IQ in the 60s (or even lower) may
    still be able to hold a full-time job, Mendez v. Barnhart,
    
    supra,
     
    439 F.3d at 361
    ; see Chunn v. Barnhart, 
    397 F.3d 667
    ,
    No. 06-3897                                                 3
    669 (8th Cir. 2005); Banks v. Massanari, 
    258 F.3d 820
    , 821-22
    (8th Cir. 2001); Foster v. Halter, 
    279 F.3d 348
    , 355 (6th Cir.
    2001). Their employment opportunities are of course
    limited. See, e.g., Paul Wehman, John Bricout & John
    Kregel, “Supported Employment in 2000: Changing the
    Locus of Control from Agency to Consumer,” in Mental
    Retardation in the 21st Century 115 (Michael L. Wehmeyer &
    James R. Patton eds. 2000); William E. Kiernan, “Where
    We Are Now: Perspectives on Employment of Persons
    with Mental Retardation,” in id. at 151. But the social
    security disability program is not an unemployment-
    benefits law.
    The key term in the introductory paragraph of section
    12.05 of the regulation, so far as bears on this case, is
    “deficits in adaptive functioning.” The term denotes
    inability to cope with the challenges of ordinary everyday
    life. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
    Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Text Revision (DSM-
    IV-TR) 42 (4th ed. 2000). If you cannot cope with those
    challenges, you are not going to be able to hold down a
    full-time job. In the case of Novy, however, the administra-
    tive law judge was on firm ground in finding that she
    can cope. She lives on her own, taking care of three chil-
    dren (possibly four—she definitely has four but the record
    is unclear whether more than three of them are living
    with her) without help, feeding herself and them, taking
    care of them sufficiently well that they have not been
    adjudged neglected and removed from her custody by
    the child-welfare authorities, paying her bills, avoiding
    eviction. Her intellectual limitations pose serious chal-
    lenges to her ability to raise a family on her own. But
    she has overcome those challenges well enough that she
    should be able to hold down a full-time job—or so at least
    4                                            No. 06-3897
    the administrative law judge was entitled to conclude
    without courting reversal.
    AFFIRMED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    _____________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—8-14-07