Lewis, Donna L. v. Chicago Police Dept ( 2007 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 06-2302
    DONNA L. LEWIS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CITY OF CHICAGO and TERENCE WILLIAMS,1
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 04 C 6050—Ruben Castillo, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2007—DECIDED JULY 26, 2007
    ____________
    Before KANNE, WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    KANNE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Donna Lewis is a police
    officer in the Chicago Police Department. She alleges
    sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII
    and 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against her former supervisor
    Lieutenant Terence Williams, the Department and the
    City of Chicago. The district court granted the defendants’
    1
    The City of Chicago is the real party in interest for claims
    against the Chicago Police Department and therefore we have
    adjusted the caption accordingly. See Chan v. Wodnicki, 
    123 F.3d 1005
    , 1007 (7th Cir. 1997).
    2                                               No. 06-2302
    motion for summary judgment on all claims. We affirm the
    judgment as to the Monell claim against the City but
    otherwise reverse.
    I. HISTORY
    Lewis graduated from the Chicago police academy in
    1998 and began her career in the Department as a patrol
    officer. In 2000, she was transferred to a Tactical Unit
    where she was a plain clothes officer dealing regularly
    with drug dealers and gangs. At the Tactical Unit, the
    chain of command had Lewis reporting directly to a
    sergeant who in turn was supervised by a lieutenant.
    By 2002, defendant Williams was Lewis’s supervising
    Lieutenant.
    In the late summer of 2002, the Washington, D.C. police
    department sought assistance from various police depart-
    ments, including Chicago’s, in anticipation of likely
    demonstrations during a forthcoming International
    Monetary Fund meeting. Chicago’s Chief of Patrol, James
    A. Maurer, issued a memorandum on September 11, 2002
    to various units in the Department setting forth a re-
    quest for volunteers and establishing a selection proce-
    dure.
    Pursuant to the memorandum:
    ! Participating officers would travel to Washington,
    D.C. on Friday, September 27th, work on Saturday
    and Sunday, September 28th and 29th, and return
    to Chicago on September 30th.
    ! Only Tactical, Gang or Special Operations Sections
    officers who completed riot training in September
    2002 were eligible to participate.
    ! Qualifying officers would need to be on either
    furlough or regular days off to qualify.
    No. 06-2302                                              3
    ! Officers would receive overtime pay for the time
    they spent traveling and working in Washington,
    D.C.
    The memorandum also noted that the Department
    might send “several hundred officers and supervisors” to
    the IMF rally, and “that this could serve as an excellent
    on-the-job training exercise” in light of a future demon-
    stration then scheduled for Chicago in November 2002.
    Appellant’s Appx. 885.
    Additionally, the memorandum stated that, “Because of
    hotel accommodations, a lone female officer will not be
    sent since there are two (2) persons to each room. There-
    fore, recommend a minimum of two (2) female officers.” 
    Id.
    Despite Chief Maurer’s use of the phrase “lone female
    officer” in the memorandum, the defendants claim that
    “Chief . . . Maurer intended to convey that [the Depart-
    ment] had a limited number of hotel rooms, so an odd
    number of either gender would not be chosen.” Appellees’
    Brief at 9.
    Lewis qualified for the IMF Detail and wanted to attend.
    She completed the necessary form and provided it to
    her supervisor, Sergeant Melean, in a timely fashion in
    compliance with the procedure established by Chief Mau-
    rer’s memorandum. Her name was initially placed on the
    list of IMF attendees from her unit. However, Lewis’s
    name was removed from the final list submitted from her
    unit and she would not go to Washington, D.C.
    The defendants’ explanation is that Lewis’s unit did not
    have another qualified female officer interested in going
    to Washington, D.C. Lieutenant Williams determined
    that Lewis was the “odd woman out” and therefore re-
    moved her name from the list in conformance with Chief
    Maurer’s memorandum.
    Lewis, however, believes the defendants’ explanation is
    hogwash. According to Lewis, she questioned Williams
    4                                               No. 06-2302
    about being removed from the list. Williams allegedly
    responded that he took her name off the list “because [she]
    was a female,” and that “it was going to be a working trip,
    and he thought it would be dangerous and that [she] would
    thank him for it later.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. Williams
    denies making this statement.
    Lewis argues that the issue of avoiding an odd number
    of officers for rooming purposes is a pretextual argument
    masking discrimination against her. She claims that a
    fellow qualified female officer, Officer Regan, was never
    informed about the IMF Detail. Thus, Lewis implies that
    Williams intentionally tried to prevent her from obtain-
    ing a partnering officer for the IMF Detail. Additionally,
    Lewis claims that other units in the Department contacted
    each other in an attempt to pair up single officers.
    If Chief Maurer’s intention was to avoid an odd number
    of participants of either gender on the IMF Detail for
    rooming purposes, the Department was unsuccessful in
    achieving this task. The record contains a document
    entitled “Fall 2002 IMF / World Bank Conference—
    Washington, D.C.” that lists the officers who attended the
    IMF Detail and corresponding hotel room numbers for
    these officers. Appellant’s Appx. 873-80. According to
    this list, 245 male officers and 17 female officers attended
    the IMF Detail in Washington, D.C. Most officers shared
    a hotel room with a fellow officer of the same gender.
    However, four officers had a room to themselves. Three of
    the four were male officers: Lt. Flynn in Room 338, Officer
    Marin in Room 363, and Officer Saez in Room 446. The
    fourth officer, a female, Officer Varela is listed by herself
    in Room 426. The record is silent as to whether there
    were accommodations available for three officers in a
    single room such as a roll-away bed.
    The parties dispute whether Lewis was denied any
    benefit due to her absence from the IMF Detail. Lewis
    No. 06-2302                                              5
    argues that she lost out on approximately $1,000 in
    overtime earnings. She also believes that the IMF Detail
    was a “once in a lifetime opportunity” that would have
    been “great” on her resume. The defendants counter that
    Lewis does not point to any lost promotional opportunities.
    The defendants also note that Lewis was able to partici-
    pate in other similar details in Chicago and Lewis did not
    place these details on her resume.
    At the end of September 2002, Lewis filed a grievance
    with the union over the IMF Detail and later filed a
    complaint with the EEOC. She alleges that Williams
    retaliated against her in response to her complaints. The
    alleged retaliation included sending Lewis on dangerous
    assignments without sufficient support in violation of
    Department policy. She was also transferred from the
    Tactical Unit to a Gang Unit. The transfer, according to
    Lewis, was in retaliation as the Gang Unit provided her
    less opportunities for advancement and overtime. The
    transfers and disruptions also included new partners that
    Lewis did not know or trust leading her to believe that
    Williams was trying to place her in compromising and
    dangerous situations. Lewis also requested a transfer to
    the Special Operations Section but this request was
    denied. The Special Operations Section was not supervised
    by Williams. Lewis believes that Williams denied her
    request for a transfer in order to continue his retaliation
    against her. Lewis also claims that she made several
    complaints to various supervisors above Williams about
    his discrimination and retaliation. She argues that
    these other supervisors failed to take action and this
    is part of a pattern and practice in the Department to
    ignore discrimination claims.
    Lewis is now on permanent disability leave after a fellow
    officer hit her in the head with a sledgehammer when she
    was assisting in a forced entry during a narcotics investi-
    gation. Lewis does not provide any evidence that her
    6                                               No. 06-2302
    injury was anything other than an accident. However, she
    does point out that Williams ordered her to assist the
    narcotics team and she also complains about the City’s
    failure to provide her proper medical care.
    II. ANALYSIS
    “We review grants of summary judgment de novo.”
    Lummis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
    469 F.3d 1098
    ,
    1099-1100 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Hrobowski v. Worthington
    Steel Co., 
    358 F.3d 473
    , 475 (7th Cir. 2004); Rogers v. City
    of Chicago, 
    320 F.3d 748
    , 752 (7th Cir. 2003)). Summary
    judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers
    to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
    the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
    as to any material fact and that the moving party is
    entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
    56(c).
    A. Sex Discrimination Claims as to the IMF Detail
    Lewis’s claims against the City arise under Title VII
    and her claim against Williams is brought pursuant to
    § 1983. See Fairley v. Fermaint, 
    482 F.3d 897
    , 903-04 (7th
    Cir. 2007). However, we analyze Lewis’s Title VII and
    § 1983 sex discrimination claims arising from her inability
    to participate in the IMF Detail in the same manner.
    Burks v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp., 
    464 F.3d 744
    , 750 n.2
    (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Williams v. Seniff, 
    342 F.3d 774
    , 788
    n.13 (7th Cir. 2003)).
    It is unlawful to “discriminate against any individual
    with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or
    privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
    race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Thanongsinh
    v. Bd. of Educ., Dist. U-46, 
    462 F.3d 762
    , 772 (7th Cir.
    No. 06-2302                                                 7
    2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). A plaintiff “can
    avert summary judgment ‘either by putting in enough
    evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, of discrimina-
    tory motivation to create a triable issue or by establish-
    ing a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas
    formula.’ ” Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare and Rehab. Ctr.,
    LLC, 
    464 F.3d 659
    , 665 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Rudin v.
    Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 
    420 F.3d 712
    , 719 (7th Cir.
    2005)).
    1. Direct Method for Demonstrating Discrimination
    The terminology in this area of law can be a bit confus-
    ing as the word “direct” is used both for the “direct
    method” and “direct evidence.” See Rudin, 
    420 F.3d at
    720
    n.3. “Direct evidence,” one of the two types of proof used
    in the direct method for establishing a triable issue of
    fact, is “an admission by the decision-maker that his
    actions were based upon the prohibited animus. Needless
    to say, such admissions are rarely encountered.” Rogers,
    
    320 F.3d at
    753 (citing Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 
    256 F.3d 568
    , 576 (7th Cir. 2001); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark
    Corp., 
    219 F.3d 612
    , 616 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quota-
    tions omitted)). Evidence used in the direct method is “not
    limited to near-admissions by the employer that its
    decisions were based on a proscribed criterion . . ., but also
    includes circumstantial evidence which suggests discrimi-
    nation albeit through a longer chain of inferences.” Luks
    v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
    467 F.3d 1049
    , 1052 (7th
    Cir. 2006) (citing Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Villages
    Illinois, Inc., 
    453 F.3d 900
    , 902-03 (7th Cir. 2006);
    Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 
    464 F.3d 691
    , 695 (7th Cir.
    2006)). In the present case, Lewis provides both direct
    evidence and circumstantial evidence against the defen-
    dants sufficient to survive summary judgment under
    the direct method.
    8                                                 No. 06-2302
    Lewis provides direct evidence of alleged discrimination
    through Williams’s statement that he prevented her
    from participating on the IMF Detail because she was a
    female and that “it was going to be a working trip, and he
    thought it would be dangerous and that [she] would thank
    him for it later.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. This is sufficient
    evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
    whether the defendants discriminated against Lewis.
    The district court, however, rejected this evidence. It
    determined that “Williams’s comment must be considered
    in the context in which it was made. . . . Williams’s alleged
    statement that Lewis could not go on the IMF Detail
    because she is ‘female’ cannot be characterized as direct
    evidence of discrimination without a presumption that
    gender is completely irrelevant to the IMF Detail. [Chief
    Maurer’s memorandum] indicates that gender was rele-
    vant to the rooming arrangements.” Lewis v. City of
    Chicago Police Dep’t, 
    428 F. Supp. 2d 783
    , 792-93 (N.D. Ill.
    2006).
    The district court erred by improperly weighing the
    parties’ evidence during summary judgment. In ruling on
    a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the
    nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences
    must be drawn in the nonmovant’s favor. Anderson v.
    Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986). The district
    court should not weigh the evidence and determine the
    truth of the matter but rather determine whether there is
    a genuine issue for trial. See Albiero v. City of Kankakee,
    
    246 F.3d 927
    , 932 (7th Cir. 2001).
    The record presents a swearing contest between Lewis
    and Williams as to Williams’s alleged statement as to why
    he excluded Lewis from the IMF Detail. The reason for
    that exclusion, whether Williams had discriminatory
    intent or because of a legitimate non-discriminatory
    reason, is a question of fact for a jury to decide at trial, not
    No. 06-2302                                               9
    for a district court to consider at summary judgment.
    Lewis is a competent witness to testify because she was
    present when Williams made the alleged statement, it is
    an admission by a party-opponent and, if true, is direct
    evidence of discriminatory intent. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2);
    see, e.g., Stinnett v. Iron Works Gym/Executive Health Spa,
    Inc., 
    301 F.3d 610
    , 613 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
    evidence relied upon in defending a motion for summary
    judgment must be competent evidence of a type other-
    wise admissible at trial).
    The defendants provide a secondary argument that
    Williams’s comments must also be ignored because he
    was not a decision maker. Although he consulted with his
    supervisor, Commander Brown, the record contains
    evidence to demonstrate that Williams was involved in the
    process of determining who would be put on the IMF
    Detail. Therefore, Williams’s comments can qualify as
    direct evidence of discrimination. See Rozskowiak v. Vill.
    of Arlington Heights, 
    415 F.3d 608
    , 612 (7th Cir. 2005)
    (explaining that a decision maker is one who is involved in
    the process of making the employment decision at issue).
    Furthermore, a plaintiff can use either direct evidence,
    circumstantial evidence or a combination of the two types
    of evidence, to meet her burden under the direct method.
    Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 
    20 F.3d 734
    , 736 (7th Cir.
    1994). “Circumstantial evidence demonstrating inten-
    tional discrimination includes: ‘(1) suspicious timing, am-
    biguous oral or written statements, or behavior toward
    or comments directed at other employees in the protected
    group; (2) evidence, whether or not rigorously statistical,
    that similarly situated employees outside the protected
    class received systematically better treatment; and
    (3) evidence that the employee was qualified for the job
    in question but was passed over in favor of a person out-
    side the protected class and the employer’s reason is a pre-
    10                                               No. 06-2302
    text for discrimination.’ ” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com,
    Inc., 
    476 F.3d 487
    , 491 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sun v. Bd.
    of Tr. of Univ. of Illinois, 
    473 F.3d 799
    , 812 (7th Cir.
    2007)). Chief Maurer’s memorandum and the ultimate
    rooming arrangements made in Washington, D.C. provide
    circumstantial evidence of discrimination that Lewis
    can also use under the direct method.
    Chief Maurer’s memorandum, when viewed in the light
    most favorable to Lewis, does not convey a gender neutral
    concern in regard to hotel arrangements as suggested by
    the defendants. The Department has the same privacy
    and efficiency concerns in its rooming arrangements
    regardless of whether there is a lone female or lone male
    officer. Despite the universal nature of privacy and
    efficiency concerns to rooming arrangements for both
    genders, the memorandum uses the phrase “lone female”
    instead of “lone female or lone male” or “lone officer.”
    Additionally, the defendants’ argument that the Depart-
    ment’s purpose was to avoid single officers in a hotel
    room does not stand up to the reality that the Department
    ultimately sent an odd number of male and female officers
    to the IMF Detail and that four lone officers, three men
    and one woman, had individual rooms to themselves.
    Lewis has provided sufficient direct and circumstantial
    evidence to satisfy the direct method of proof on this issue.
    A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
    the defendants discriminated against Lewis on the basis
    of her gender.
    2. Evidence of Materially Adverse Employment Action
    Despite the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
    on one element of Lewis’s claim, summary judgment is
    still appropriate if Lewis cannot provide evidence to sup-
    port all elements of the claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 324 (1986); see, e.g., Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of the
    No. 06-2302                                               11
    City of Chicago, 
    385 F.3d 1104
    , 1111 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing
    Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 
    325 F.3d 892
    , 901 (7th
    Cir. 2003)). Lewis must also demonstrate a materially
    adverse employment action that resulted from the alleged
    discrimination. See Rhodes v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 
    359 F.3d 498
    , 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Whether the plaintiff
    proceeds by the direct or indirect method of proof, [s]he
    must show a materially adverse employment action.”)
    (citing Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 
    259 F.3d 678
    , 691
    (7th Cir. 2001)).
    “Although we define adverse employment action broadly,
    not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an
    actionable adverse action. For an employment action to be
    actionable, it must be a significant change in employment
    status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassign-
    ment with significantly different responsibility, or a
    decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Bell v.
    E.P.A., 
    232 F.3d 546
    , 555 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Burlington
    Indus. v. Ellerth, 
    524 U.S. 742
    , 761 (1998); Ribando v.
    United Airlines, Inc., 
    200 F.3d 507
    , 511 (7th Cir. 1999);
    Smart v. Ball State Univ., 
    89 F.3d 437
    , 440 (7th Cir. 1996)
    (internal quotations omitted)). We have noted that materi-
    ally adverse employment action can be categorized into
    three groups of cases involving: (1) the employee’s current
    wealth such as compensation, fringe benefits, and financial
    terms of employment including termination; (2) the em-
    ployee’s career prospects thus impacting the employee’s
    future wealth; and (3) changes to the employee’s work
    conditions including subjecting her to “humiliating,
    degrading, unsafe, unhealthy, or otherwise significant
    negative alteration in [her] work place environment.”
    Herrnreiter v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 
    315 F.3d 742
    , 744-45
    (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
    The “purpose of the adverse employment action require-
    ment is to provide a reasonable limiting principle for the
    12                                              No. 06-2302
    type of conduct actionable under the statute.” Phelan v.
    Cook County, 
    463 F.3d 773
    , 780 (7th Cir. 2006). We use
    the adverse employment action requirement in order to
    distinguish meritorious cases from “trivial personnel
    action[s]” brought by “irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder
    employee[s].” Herrnreiter, 
    315 F.3d at 745
     (citations
    omitted). We do not condone bigotry or hatred, but we are
    interpreting an employment discrimination statute, not
    canons of individual virtue. See Hunt v. City of Markham,
    Illinois, 
    219 F.3d 649
    , 653-54 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations
    omitted).
    Lewis’s proposed adverse employment actions are the
    loss of two days of overtime totaling approximately $1,000
    and the loss of the experience of training on the IMF
    Detail that she claims to be a “once in a lifetime” training
    event. The loss of the training opportunity dovetails into
    an additional argument that Lewis has also lost future
    employment opportunities because of her exclusion from
    the IMF Detail. The defendants counter that the amount
    of lost pay is trivial—only two days of overtime—and that
    Lewis had no right to the overtime. They also question the
    value of the IMF Detail training experience in Lewis’s
    career as Lewis was able to participate in other large
    detail events and did not list these other training events
    on her resume.
    Our circuit has not directly addressed the issue of
    whether a denial of overtime is an adverse employment
    action sufficient to implicate Title VII. We have held that
    a denial of a raise can be an adverse employment action
    while the denial of a “more transient” payment such as a
    bonus is not. Barricks v. Eli Lilly and Co., 
    481 F.3d 556
    ,
    559 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Farrell v. Butler Univ., 
    421 F.3d 609
    , 614 (7th Cir. 2005); Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of
    Natural Res., 
    347 F.3d 1014
    , 1030 (7th Cir. 2003); Hunt,
    
    219 F.3d at 654
    ). “The difference is that raises are a
    No. 06-2302                                                13
    normal and expected element of an employee’s salary,
    while bonuses generally are ‘sporadic, irregular, unpredict-
    able, and wholly discretionary on the part of the em-
    ployer.’ ” Fyfe v. City of Fort Wayne, 
    241 F.3d 597
    , 602 (7th
    Cir. 2001) (quoting Hunt, 
    219 F.3d at 654
    ).
    Depending on the type of work, overtime can be a
    significant and recurring part of an employee’s total
    earnings similar to a recurring raise or it could be insignif-
    icant and nonrecurring like a discretionary bonus. The
    IMF Detail in Washington, D.C. in September 2002 was
    a one time event. However, as Chief Maurer’s memoran-
    dum noted, Chicago had its own IMF meeting scheduled
    for November 2002. Additionally, large public gather-
    ings requiring significant police presence are recurring
    events in a large city like Chicago. Lewis can construct
    from the evidence an argument that by denying her the
    opportunity to participate in the IMF Detail, she lost her
    ability to move forward in the component of her career of
    being a police officer at recurring large scale public
    gatherings. In turn, she can argue that she has lost the
    potential to earn many hours of overtime, not just the
    mere two days that she lost in September 2002. Conse-
    quently, we conclude that Lewis can demonstrate a
    genuine issue of material fact as to whether she has
    experienced an adverse employment action.
    We must add two final points before we conclude our
    consideration of adverse employment actions. First, as
    Title VII prohibits discrimination as to compensation,
    terms, conditions and privileges of employment, it is the
    “material, sufficiently important alterations of the employ-
    ment relationship” that qualify as adverse employment
    action. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Illinois, 
    479 F.3d 908
    , 916-17 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). A strict
    adherence to labels leads to a meaningless cry of phrases
    such as “bonus” or “salary” without reaching the critical
    14                                             No. 06-2302
    issue of whether the alleged discrimination caused a
    material change in the employment relationship.
    Second, although the adverse employment action re-
    quirement is a limiting principle within the statute, we
    cannot allow the need for a limiting principle to inadver-
    tently create a loophole for discriminatory actions by
    employers. Adverse employment actions should not be
    defined so narrowly as to give an employer a “license to
    discriminate.” Farrell, 
    421 F.3d at 614
    . An employer’s
    “actions which deprived [the employee] of compensation
    which [s]he otherwise would have earned clearly constitute
    adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII.” Bass
    v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, Orange County, Florida, 
    256 F.3d 1095
    , 1118 (11th Cir. 2001); cf. Phelan, 
    463 F.3d at 780
     (finding an adverse employment action when the
    employer terminated the employee for four months despite
    the fact that the employer eventually reinstated the
    employee and provided full back pay). We seek to avoid
    both “trivial personnel action[s]” brought by “irritable,
    chip-on-the-shoulder employee[s],” Herrnreiter, 
    315 F.3d at 745
     (citations omitted), and unlawful discrimination by
    employers. An employer cannot discriminate against an
    employee and then hide behind the argument that the
    employee’s deprivation was not material. “ ‘[T]he ‘primary
    objective’ of Title VII ‘is not to provide redress but to
    avoid harm.’ ” Phelan, 
    463 F.3d at 780
     (quoting Faragher
    v. City of Boca Raton, 
    524 U.S. 775
    , 805-06 (1998)).
    B. Retaliation Claim
    “Title VII makes it unlawful for an ‘employer to discrimi-
    nate against any of his employees . . . because [the em-
    ployee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful
    employment practice.’ ” Brewer, 
    479 F.3d at 923
     (quoting
    42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The Supreme Court recently
    instructed in Burlington N. and Santa Fe R.R. Co. v.
    No. 06-2302                                               15
    White, that “the range of conduct prohibited under [Title
    VII’s anti-retaliation] provision is broader than Title VII’s
    [anti-]discrimination provision.” Phelan, 
    463 F.3d at
    787
    (citing 
    126 S. Ct. 2405
    , 2414 (2006)).
    “An employee can establish a prima facie case of retalia-
    tion by proceeding under either the direct or indirect
    method.” Roney v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 
    474 F.3d 455
    ,
    459 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons,
    Inc., 
    463 F.3d 731
    , 740 (7th Cir. 2006)). The defendants
    argue that Lewis has pursued only the indirect method of
    argument on appeal. However, Lewis has brought both a
    direct and an indirect method argument before the dis-
    trict court and on appeal. We conclude that Lewis suc-
    ceeds in bringing her claim under the direct method.
    “Under the direct method, [a plaintiff] must show
    ‘(1) [s]he engaged in a statutorily protected activity;
    (2) [s]he suffered an adverse action taken by the employer;
    and (3) there was a causal connection between the two.’ ”
    Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 
    457 F.3d 656
    , 663 (7th
    Cir. 2006) (quoting Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 
    406 F.3d 895
    , 903 (7th Cir. 2005)). There is no dispute that
    Lewis satisfies the first element as she made complaints
    to various supervisors, the Union and the EEOC about
    the alleged discrimination by Williams with the IMF
    Detail. See Durkin v. City of Chicago, 
    341 F.3d 606
    ,
    614 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Usually a claim for retaliation is
    preceded by an obligatory complaint about discriminatory
    conduct, so that the employer is aware of the mistreat-
    ment and the corresponding protected activity.”).
    As for the second element of suffering an adverse action
    taken by the employer, “the discriminatory acts proscribed
    by Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision are not limited to
    those that affect the terms and conditions of one’s employ-
    ment.” Roney, 
    474 F.3d at
    461 (citing White, 
    126 S. Ct. at 2412-13
    ). But, the “challenged action must be one that a
    16                                              No. 06-2302
    reasonable employee would find to be materially adverse
    such that the employee would be dissuaded from engaging
    in the protected activity.” 
    Id.
     Lewis has provided sufficient
    evidence in the record that Williams’s alleged retaliatory
    action is such that a “reasonable employee would be
    dissuaded from engaging in the protected activity.” 
    Id.
     As
    required in reviewing a summary judgment, we must
    credit Lewis’s competent evidence that Williams singled
    her out for otherwise dangerous assignments that were
    beyond the level of treatment she was previously receiv-
    ing as an officer before she made her complaints about
    the IMF Detail. Additionally, Lewis provides evidence
    that Williams singled her out for adverse treatment about
    her job performance and refused a transfer in order to
    allow him to continue his alleged acts of retaliation.
    Finally, Lewis has provided evidence of a causal connec-
    tion. “[T]he mere fact that one event preceded another does
    nothing to prove that the first event caused the second; the
    plaintiff also must put forth other evidence that reason-
    ably suggests that her protected speech activities were
    related to her employer’s discrimination.” Burks, 
    464 F.3d at 758-59
     (internal quotations and citations omitted); see,
    e.g., Scaife v. Cook County, 
    446 F.3d 735
    , 742 (7th Cir.
    2006) (“Close temporal proximity provides evidence of
    causation and may permit a plaintiff to survive summary
    judgment provided that there is other evidence that
    supports the inference of a causal link.”) (quoting Lang v.
    Illinois Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 
    361 F.3d 416
    ,
    419 (7th Cir. 2004)). There is additional evidence in the
    record beyond suspicious timing. Most notable is the
    apparently active steps taken by Williams after Lewis
    made her discrimination claim. Williams allegedly di-
    rected Lewis to more dangerous assignments via the police
    radio after her discrimination claims. This is an alleged
    change in Williams’s actions that occurred after Lewis’s
    discrimination claims against Williams. Williams did not
    No. 06-2302                                              17
    personally direct Lewis to an assignment via the radio
    prior to the discrimination claim. This is sufficient to
    survive summary judgment on this issue.
    C. Monell Claim Against the City
    Lewis’s § 1983 claim against the City must be evaluated
    under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of the City of New
    York, and its progeny. 
    436 U.S. 658
     (1978). Misbehaving
    employees are responsible for their own conduct, “units of
    local government are responsible only for their policies
    rather than misconduct by their workers.” Fairley v.
    Fermaint, 
    482 F.3d 897
    , 904 (7th Cir. 2007); see, e.g.,
    Jenkins v. Bartlett, 
    487 F.3d 482
    , 492 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A
    municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 based on
    a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”)
    (citing Monell, 
    436 U.S. at 694
    ).
    “To establish liability, [Lewis] must produce evidence of
    ‘(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a
    constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that,
    although not authorized by written law or express munici-
    pal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to con-
    stitute a custom or usage with the final force of law; or
    (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was
    caused by a person with final policymaking authority.”
    Phelan, 463 F.3d at 789 (quoting Roach v. City of Evans-
    ville, 
    111 F.3d 544
    , 548 (7th Cir. 1997)).
    Lewis’s first argument against the City is that it had an
    express policy discriminating against women for the IMF
    Detail as set forth in Chief Maurer’s memorandum.
    However, “[o]nly those individuals with the requisite
    policymaking authority are capable of establishing ‘official
    policy’ as required by Monell.” Chortek v. City of Milwau-
    kee, 
    356 F.3d 740
    , 748-49 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Cornfield
    by Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 
    991 F.3d 1316
    ,
    18                                              No. 06-2302
    1324-25 (7th Cir. 1993)). Lewis does not provide any
    evidence to demonstrate that Chief Maurer has policy
    making authority sufficient to bind the City in this case.
    Lewis is not suing Chief Maurer for his alleged discrimina-
    tory actions in implementing the IMF Detail but instead
    seeks to hold the City liable. As she has failed to demon-
    strate that Chief Maurer can create liability for the City,
    we must reject this argument.
    We must also reject Lewis’s second argument that the
    City has a widespread practice of ignoring allegations
    of gender discrimination and unlawful retaliation. “If
    the same problem has arisen many times and the munici-
    pality has acquiesced in the outcome, it is possible (though
    not necessary) to infer that there is a policy at work.”
    Phelan, 
    463 F.3d at 789
     (quoting Calhoun v. Ramsey, 
    408 F.3d 375
    , 380 (7th Cir. 2005)). Lewis has failed to present
    evidence of a widespread practice by the City of ignoring
    gender discrimination and retaliation. Failing to meet her
    burden, the district court properly entered judgment in
    favor of the City on Lewis’s Monell claim.
    III. CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the district court as to Lewis’s Monell
    claim against the City of Chicago is AFFIRMED. The
    judgment of the district court as to Lewis’s Title VII claims
    against the City and § 1983 claim against Williams is
    REVERSED. The case is REMANDED to the district court for
    additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    No. 06-2302                                        19
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—7-26-07
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-2302

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 7/26/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

Authorities (50)

debra-jenkins-mother-special-administrator-and-personal-representative-of , 487 F.3d 482 ( 2007 )

Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Department , 428 F. Supp. 2d 783 ( 2006 )

James Hunt v. City of Markham, Illinois , 219 F.3d 649 ( 2000 )

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. , 98 S. Ct. 2018 ( 1978 )

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White , 126 S. Ct. 2405 ( 2006 )

Cory D. Chan, Cross-Appellee v. Edward S. Wodnicki, ... , 123 F.3d 1005 ( 1997 )

Vivian J. Smart v. Ball State University , 89 F.3d 437 ( 1996 )

Gul Roney v. Illinois Department of Transportation , 474 F.3d 455 ( 2007 )

William Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation , 219 F.3d 612 ( 2000 )

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth , 118 S. Ct. 2257 ( 1998 )

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of ... , 106 S. Ct. 2548 ( 1986 )

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 106 S. Ct. 2505 ( 1986 )

William R. Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Company and ... , 358 F.3d 473 ( 2004 )

Pamela J. Burks v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation, ... , 464 F.3d 744 ( 2006 )

Kerry Stinnett v. Iron Works Gym/executive Health Spa, ... , 301 F.3d 610 ( 2002 )

Samuel Scaife v. Cook County, Michael F. Sheahan, Randy ... , 446 F.3d 735 ( 2006 )

Lena C. Barricks v. Eli Lilly and Company , 481 F.3d 556 ( 2007 )

Roger Fairley and Richard Gackowski v. Evan Fermaint, ... , 482 F.3d 897 ( 2007 )

Shirley Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 256 F.3d 568 ( 2001 )

ernest-f-albiero-v-city-of-kankakee-donald-e-green-individually-and , 246 F.3d 927 ( 2001 )

View All Authorities »