St. John's United v. City of Chicago ( 2007 )


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  •                          In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 05-4418
    ST. JOHN’S UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST,
    HELEN RUNGE, and SHIRLEY STEELE,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    THE CITY OF CHICAGO, the FEDERAL
    AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, and MARION C.
    BLAKELY, Administrator of the
    Federal Aviation Administration,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________
    Nos. 05-4450 & 05-4451
    VILLAGE OF BENSENVILLE, VILLAGE OF
    ELK GROVE, ROXANNE MITCHELL, REST
    HAVEN CEMETERY ASSOCIATION,
    ROBERT PLACEK, and LEROY H. HEINRICH,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    THE CITY OF CHICAGO, the FEDERAL
    AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, and
    MARION C. BLAKELY, Administrator of
    the Federal Aviation Administration,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    2                              Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    ____________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 03 C 3726—David H. Coar, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED JANUARY 10, 2006; JUNE 7, 2006—
    DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2007
    ____________
    Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
    WOOD, Circuit Judge. Mention Chicago to almost any
    person who has been on an airplane, and that person will
    immediately think of Chicago’s O’Hare International
    Airport. It is one of the busiest airports in the world: in
    2005, more than 76.5 million passengers passed through
    its facilities, along with 1.7 million tons of freight. See
    http://www.flychicago.com/events/KidsPage2006/OHareH
    istory.shtm (last visited August 27, 2007). It is also of
    central importance to the economy of Chicago and North-
    ern Illinois, generating approximately 514,000 jobs for
    the region and nearly $37 billion a year in economic
    development. Id. Responding to growth in demand for
    O’Hare’s services, the Illinois General Assembly passed
    the O’Hare Modernization Act (OMA), 620 ILCS 65/5, in
    2003, in order to improve and expand the airport. This
    case deals with certain land acquisitions contemplated
    by that legislation.
    We consolidated these appeals for decision because each
    raises challenges to the same district court order in
    lawsuits filed by objectors to the modernization project. In
    that order, the court denied a motion for leave to file a
    second amended complaint (for all but one count) and
    refused to enjoin the City of Chicago’s plan to acquire
    each plaintiff ’s property in order to build additional
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                                 3
    runways at O’Hare. In appeal number 05-4418, the St.
    John’s United Church of Christ and two of its parishioners
    (collectively, St. John’s) challenge the district court’s
    denial of their motions for leave to file a second amended
    complaint and for a preliminary injunction. St. John’s
    claims that the City’s attempt to condemn a cemetery
    located on church property violates the First Amendment’s
    Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
    Equal Protection Clause, and the Religious Land Use and
    Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000cc et seq. We consider only the claims St. John’s
    has asserted against the City; its claims against the
    Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) were resolved in
    the FAA’s favor by the court of appeals for the District of
    Columbia Circuit in Village of Bensenville v. FAA, 
    457 F.3d 52
     (D.C. Cir. 2006).1
    1
    The main issue before the D.C. Circuit concerned whether the
    FAA had violated the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act
    (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., by approving the City’s plan
    and determining that the plan was eligible for federal funding.
    As an “agency . . . of the United States,” § 2000bb-2(1), the FAA,
    unlike the City, falls within the scope of RFRA and thus must
    meet the requirements of strict scrutiny when its actions
    substantially burden exercise of someone’s religion. The D.C.
    Circuit considered whether any potential burden on the exer-
    cise of religion in this case could be fairly attributable to the
    FAA by virtue of its having approved the City’s plan. Because
    “[t]he expansion plan for the airport, which is owned by the City,
    was prepared and will be implemented by the City, which is
    prepared to proceed without federal funds if necessary,” the court
    found that it was the City, not the FAA, that was responsible for
    any potential burden on religion that resulted from the plan.
    Bensenville, 457 F.3d at 57. It thus rejected the RFRA claims
    against the FAA without reaching the question whether the FAA
    had shown a compelling governmental interest supporting its
    decision.
    4                         Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    In appeal number 05-4450, the Villages of Bensenville
    and Elk Grove (Municipal Plaintiffs) contend that the
    district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdic-
    tion to review their claims against the FAA. Lastly, in
    appeal number 05-4451, we consider the challenge of the
    Rest Haven Cemetery Association and two members of its
    board of directors (collectively, Rest Haven) to the district
    court’s dismissal of the first amended complaint. Rest
    Haven was not named in the proposed second amended
    complaint because the City no longer plans to acquire its
    cemetery. The district court concluded, for that reason,
    that its claim was moot; Rest Haven disagrees with that
    assessment. In Rest Haven’s appeal, we also consider
    the same question raised by the Municipal Plaintiffs,
    namely, whether the district court had jurisdiction to
    consider Rest Haven’s claims against the FAA. We con-
    clude that the district court navigated its way through
    these complex issues successfully, and we thus affirm its
    judgment in all respects.
    I
    In the summer of 2001, the U.S. Senate Commerce,
    Energy, and Transportation Committee held hearings in
    Chicago to discuss the ways in which delays at O’Hare
    contribute to excessive aviation delays throughout the
    United States. During the course of these hearings, the
    Committee strongly hinted that if the City of Chicago and
    the State of Illinois did not reach a decision on airport
    expansion before September 1, 2001, Congress would
    likely intervene.
    On June 29, 2001, the City announced its plan to
    increase O’Hare’s capacity; this plan later developed into
    the O’Hare Modernization Program (OMP). The OMP
    proposed to correct some of the inefficiencies created by
    the airfield’s outdated configuration of seven intersecting
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                           5
    runways (which include a “runway triangle” created by the
    three original intersecting runways that lie north of the
    present terminals) by creating six parallel and two
    crosswind runways. The proposed design resembles the
    more effective runway architecture that has been employed
    at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and
    the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. In contrast
    to the current layout of intersecting runways, in which
    the ability to use one runway is limited by whether an
    aircraft is using any of the others, the proposed configura-
    tion would permit a constant stream of take-offs and
    landings on each parallel runway, regardless of the
    activity that may simultaneously be occurring on ad-
    jacent runways.
    On December 5, 2001, the Mayor of Chicago and the
    Governor of Illinois announced that they had reached an
    agreement on the central components of the proposed
    OMP. Shortly thereafter, the FAA submitted its Notice
    of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact State-
    ment (EIS), which is a “detailed analysis . . . conducted to
    determine if, or the extent to which, a particular agency
    action will impact the environment.” Heartwood, Inc. v.
    United States Forest Serv., 
    230 F.3d 947
    , 949 (7th Cir.
    2000). All federal agencies are required to prepare an
    EIS for any “major Federal actions significantly affect-
    ing the quality of the human environment.” See the
    National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (2)(C).
    In June of 2002, the City announced its plan to acquire
    433 acres of land located in the Villages of Elk Grove and
    Bensenville, two municipalities adjacent to O’Hare, in
    anticipation of the airport’s expansion. A wide variety of
    properties were scheduled for condemnation, including
    a number of homes and businesses, a police and fire
    station, an elementary school, several parklands, and the
    two cemeteries at issue here—St. Johannes and Rest
    6                          Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    Haven, owned by the St. John’s United Church of Christ
    and the Rest Haven Cemetery Association, respectively.
    The Municipal Plaintiffs responded by filing suit in state
    court seeking both a declaration that any effort to acquire
    the desired property without first obtaining a “certificate
    of approval” from the Illinois Department of Transporta-
    tion was beyond the City’s authority under the Illinois
    Aeronautics Act, see 620 ILCS 5/47, and a preliminary
    injunction preventing the City from proceeding with its
    land acquisition plan. On July 9, 2002, the Circuit Court
    of DuPage County granted the municipalities’ requested
    relief; the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed its decision.
    See Philip v. Daley, 
    790 N.E.2d 961
     (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
    Faced with this setback, the City turned to Springfield
    and the Illinois General Assembly for help. It was success-
    ful in persuading the legislature to enact the OMA in May
    of 2003. See 620 ILCS 65/5. The Act’s statement of find-
    ings and purposes notes the importance of O’Hare to
    both the state and national air transportation system and
    affirms the necessity of acquiring adjacent properties
    as part of the modernization program. See OMA § 5(a)(1),
    (2), (5). In addition, the Act proclaims that “[i]t is the
    intent of the General Assembly that all agencies of this
    State and its subdivisions shall facilitate the efficient
    and expeditious completion of the O’Hare Moderniza-
    tion Program to the extent not specifically prohibited by
    law, and that legal impediments to the completion of the
    project be eliminated.” OMA § 5(b).
    The Act specifically addresses the issue of acquisition of
    property in several places. It does so generally in section
    15, which grants to the City “[i]n addition to any other
    powers the City may have, and notwithstanding any other
    law to the contrary,” the power to
    acquire by gift, grant, lease, purchase, condemna-
    tion . . . or otherwise any right, title, or interest in any
    private property, property held in the name of or
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                           7
    belonging to any public body or unit of government, or
    any property devoted to a public use, or any other
    rights or easements, including any property, rights, or
    easements owned by the State, units of local govern-
    ment, or school districts, including forest preserve
    districts, for purposes related to the O’Hare Modern-
    ization Program.
    OMA § 15. Lest there be any doubt on the particular topic
    of cemeteries, the Act continues: “The powers given to the
    City under this Section include the power to acquire, by
    condemnation or otherwise, any property used for ceme-
    tery purposes within or outside of the City, and to require
    that the cemetery be removed to a different location.” See
    also id. § 92 (amending the Illinois Municipal Code, 65
    ILCS 5/11-51-1, to make it clear that the City of Chicago
    need not obtain the consent of a cemetery’s owner in order
    to exercise its powers under § 15 of the OMA, even though
    such consent is normally required).
    The OMA amends many statutes—indeed, as counsel for
    the City argued, it seems to have amended every statute
    that someone thought might stand in the way of the OMP.
    Thus, for example, it amends the Downstate Forest
    Preserve District Act, 70 ILCS 805/5e, OMA § 93; the Vital
    Records Act, 410 ILCS 535/21, OMA § 93.5; the Illinois
    Aeronautics Act, 620 ILCS 5/38.01, OMA § 94; and the
    Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-103, OMA § 95.
    Among these many modifications is the one that is central
    to this litigation: the addition of a new section 30 to the
    Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA), 775
    ILCS 35/1 et seq. OMA § 96. The IRFRA provides generally
    that the “[g]overnment may not substantially burden a
    person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results
    from a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates
    that application of the burden to the person (i) is in
    furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (ii)
    is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
    governmental interest.” 775 ILCS 35/15. That broad
    8                         Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    language was qualified by the new section 30, which
    states: “Nothing in this Act [i.e. IRFRA] limits the author-
    ity of the City of Chicago to exercise its powers under
    the [OMA] for the purpose of relocation of cemeteries or
    the graves located therein.” 775 ILCS 35/30.
    On May 30, 2003, shortly after the legislature enacted
    the OMA, the Municipal Plaintiffs, St. John’s, and Rest
    Haven filed suit in the United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Illinois against the City of Chi-
    cago, Mayor Richard M. Daley, the State of Illinois,
    Governor Rod Blagojevich, and both the FAA and its
    administrator alleging a number of violations of federal
    law. On June 19, 2003, Plaintiffs filed an amended com-
    plaint. Most of the counts of the amended complaint
    challenged the City’s plan to acquire land before the FAA
    issued its EIS or Record of Decision (ROD). Additionally,
    all of the Plaintiffs alleged that the City, along with the
    Mayor, violated NEPA and its implementing regula-
    tions, the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 
    16 U.S.C. § 470
    , et seq., § 4(f) of the Department of Transpor-
    tation Act, 
    49 U.S.C. § 303
    (c), as well as provisions of the
    Administrative Procedures Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    .
    In the amended complaint, St. John’s and Rest Haven
    also asserted a number of claims based on religion against
    the City. They alleged that the City, in proposing to
    condemn their cemeteries without demonstrating a
    compelling governmental interest and use of the least
    restrictive mechanism, as IRFRA ordinarily requires,
    violated their constitutional rights under the Free Exercise
    Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
    Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These plaintiffs
    charged that the City is “targeting” their religious activi-
    ties and posing a substantial burden on their ability to
    practice their religion. Plaintiffs also alleged that the
    City’s plan to condemn their cemeteries violated the
    federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                          9
    Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. Additionally, they
    asserted violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
    Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
    clause. Finally, these Plaintiffs raised similar religion-
    based claims against the State of Illinois and Governor
    Blagojevich, and against the FAA and its administrator,
    including an allegation that the FAA violated the federal
    RFRA. On March 29, 2005, the district court dismissed
    the State of Illinois and Governor Blagojevich from the
    case on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.
    As this suit was pending before the district court, the
    parties entered into a court-approved order under which
    the City agreed that it would not acquire property in
    Bensenville and Elk Grove, including the St. John’s and
    Rest Haven Cemeteries, until the FAA issued an EIS or a
    ROD. At the end of 2003, the City began to move forward
    with other components of its plan to expand O’Hare,
    seeking FAA approval for over $1.3 billion in federal funds
    for “Phase One” of the OMP. Specifically, the City re-
    quested about $300 million in airport improvement
    program discretionary funds, $63 million in entitlement
    funds, and over $1 billion in Passenger Facility Charge
    (PFC) funds. Phase One of the project was to include the
    demolition of the cemeteries, as well as other property
    in the villages. In late July of 2005, the FAA issued its
    final EIS, which compared the environmental impact of
    the City’s proposal with other alternatives and concluded
    that the City’s airport plan, with some minor revisions,
    was the preferred course. The EIS also reviewed the legal
    issues raised by St. John’s and Rest Haven, ultimately
    concluding that if the City’s plan was approved in the
    ROD, the St. Johannes Cemetery would be relocated, while
    the Rest Haven Cemetery would not.
    On September 30, 2005, the FAA issued its ROD grant-
    ing the City’s request for approval of its airport layout
    plan. The ROD considered St. John’s RFRA claims and
    10                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    concluded that although the acquisition and relocation
    of the St. Johannes cemetery was likely to burden the
    exercise of the parishioners’ religion substantially, the City
    had a compelling interest in relocating the cemetery in
    order to make O’Hare more efficient. The same day that
    the FAA issued its ROD, the Municipal Plaintiffs and
    St. John’s filed a petition for review of the EIS and ROD
    in the D.C. Circuit. Their petition alleged, among other
    things, that the FAA’s approval of the airport layout plan
    violated a number of provisions of federal law, including
    the First and Fifth Amendments and RFRA. Along
    with their petition for review, the Plaintiffs filed an
    emergency motion for a stay pending appeal and a motion
    for an administrative stay, which the D.C. Circuit granted.
    Rest Haven was not a party to this litigation.
    In light of the FAA’s approval of the airport layout plan
    and the claims pending before the D.C. Circuit, the district
    court issued an order to show cause why certain parties
    and claims should not be dismissed. Given that the Rest
    Haven Cemetery had by then been excluded from the OMP
    and that the City was not challenging this step, the
    district court suggested that Rest Haven should volun-
    tarily dismiss itself from the suit. The district court also
    ordered the Plaintiffs to show cause why Mayor Daley
    should not be dismissed from the suit, because suing him
    in his official capacity and suing the City of Chicago
    amounted to the same thing. The district court also
    questioned its jurisdiction to review claims asserted
    against the FAA involving the ROD.
    Before the district court issued its show cause order,
    however, the FAA informed the D.C. Circuit that it
    planned to award the City the $363 million in discretion-
    ary funds it had requested to begin the implementation of
    the first phase of the OMP. It made this announcement
    despite the fact that it had not yet formally rendered a
    decision granting the City’s request. The City argued
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                            11
    that in the absence of the FAA’s final order rendering a
    decision on funding, the court was without jurisdiction to
    consider Plaintiffs’ NEPA and RFRA claims. On October
    25, 2005, the D.C. Circuit denied St. John’s and the
    Municipal Plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a stay pending
    appeal, determining that they had not demonstrated
    either the irreparable injury or the likelihood of success
    on the merits required for the issuance of a stay pending
    review. At that point, the court did not address the
    jurisdictional question.
    On October 26, 2005, St. John’s and the Municipal
    Plaintiffs returned to the district court and filed a motion
    for leave to file a second amended complaint. Rest Haven
    was not listed as a party to the motion for leave to file
    the second amended complaint. The proposed second
    amended complaint included a claim that the FAA had
    violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    , et seq., when it allegedly ignored the Plaintiffs’
    requests for documents relating to O’Hare’s expansion. On
    October 31, 2005, St. John’s filed a motion for a temporary
    restraining order and a motion for a preliminary injunc-
    tion, seeking to halt all action on the City’s part while
    all these challenges were pending. The district court
    entered a temporary restraining order as it reviewed
    these motions.
    After filing these motions in district court, the Plaintiffs
    then filed a docketing statement of issues in the D.C.
    Circuit. In addition to the claims they raised against the
    FAA before the district court, Plaintiffs asked the D.C.
    Circuit to decide whether it was improper for the FAA to
    fail to rule on Chicago’s funding applications, whether the
    FAA had issued an unlawful ROD, and whether their
    First Amendment and RFRA claims were entitled to de
    novo review of disputed factual questions in an Article III
    court.
    12                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    At that juncture, the district court dismissed Rest Haven
    from the litigation. Because the City no longer planned to
    acquire the Rest Haven Cemetery, and because Rest
    Haven did not present any argument explaining why or
    how it might be affected by either the City’s or the FAA’s
    actions in their response to the order to show cause, the
    district court held that its claims were moot. The court
    also dismissed Mayor Daley from the litigation, conclud-
    ing that the Plaintiffs had not responded to the issue it
    raised in the order to show cause (whether it was redun-
    dant to sue both the City and the Mayor in his official
    capacity). The Plaintiffs do not challenge the dismissal of
    Mayor Daley from this suit on appeal.
    With respect to St. John’s religious claims against the
    City, the district court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed
    to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under
    the Free Exercise Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.
    It found that the OMA was constitutional on its face and
    that there was no indication that any of the City’s pro-
    posed actions were motivated by St. John’s religious
    affiliation. The district court also denied St. John’s motion
    for leave to file a second amended complaint with respect
    to these claims, finding them to be similarly lacking.
    Additionally, the district court dismissed all counts of the
    complaint that pertained to RLUIPA, concluding that
    the City’s plan to condemn the St. Johannes Cemetery
    was not a “land use” regulation as contemplated by that
    statute.
    The district court also dismissed the bulk of St. John’s
    and the Municipal Plaintiffs’ claims against the FAA and
    its administrator. It concluded that it lacked jurisdic-
    tion to review challenges to the FAA’s actions concerning
    the ROD because under 
    49 U.S.C. § 46110
    , those claims
    fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of ap-
    peals. Indeed, as the court recognized, the D.C. Circuit
    was already considering these claims. After dismissing
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                             13
    these claims, all that remained was St. John’s and the
    Municipal Plaintiffs’ FOIA claim, for which the district
    court granted the motion for leave to file a second amended
    complaint. Given the dismissal of virtually all of the
    Plaintiffs’ claims against the City and the FAA, the dis-
    trict court vacated the temporary restraining order and
    denied the motion for a preliminary injunction as moot.
    Plaintiffs have appealed from that decision. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (a)(1).
    II
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion
    to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
    upon which relief can be granted, accepting as true “all of
    the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
    Erickson v. Pardus, 
    127 S. Ct. 2197
    , 2200 (2007) (quoting
    Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
    127 S. Ct. 1955
    , 1965
    (2007)). We may affirm the dismissal only if the com-
    plaint fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to
    relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic, 
    127 S. Ct. at 1974
    . As we held in Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v.
    AT&T Mobility LLC, 
    2007 WL 2406859
     (7th Cir. Aug. 24,
    2007), a district court should dismiss a complaint if “the
    factual detail . . . [is] so sketchy that the complaint does
    not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the
    defendant is entitled under Rule 8.” Id. at *5. A district
    court’s decision whether to allow a party to file a second
    amended complaint, however, is reviewed for abuse of
    discretion. See Doherty v. Davy Songer, Inc., 
    195 F.3d 919
    ,
    927 (7th Cir. 1999).
    With respect to the district court’s decision that St.
    John’s motion for a preliminary injunction is moot, we
    review the court’s “findings of fact for clear error, its
    balancing of the factors for a preliminary injunction
    under the abuse of discretion standard, and its legal
    14                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    conclusions de novo.” Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue
    Univ., 
    260 F.3d 757
    , 761 (7th Cir. 2001). In assessing
    whether a preliminary injunction is warranted, we must
    consider whether the party seeking the injunction has
    demonstrated that “1) it has a reasonable likelihood of
    success on the merits; 2) no adequate remedy at law
    exists; 3) it will suffer irreparable harm if it is denied; 4)
    the irreparable harm the party will suffer without injunc-
    tive relief is greater than the harm the opposing party
    will suffer if the preliminary injunction is granted; and
    5) the preliminary injunction will not harm the public
    interest.” 
    Id.
    III
    Before turning to the merits, we must address two
    jurisdictional issues that the Municipal Plaintiffs and
    Rest Haven have raised. The first is whether the district
    court erred in dismissing with prejudice all claims brought
    by Rest Haven as moot, because the City no longer plans
    to acquire that cemetery. Second is the question whether
    the district court correctly dismissed the Municipal Plain-
    tiffs’ claims against the FAA for lack of jurisdiction based
    upon 
    49 U.S.C. § 46110
    . We review de novo the district
    court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(1), which includes a dismissal on mootness grounds.
    See, e.g., Franzoni v. Hartmarx Corp., 
    300 F.3d 767
    , 771
    (7th Cir. 2002). “When reviewing a dismissal for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction, we note that a district court
    must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations
    and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plain-
    tiff.” Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 
    182 F.3d 548
    , 554 (7th
    Cir. 1999). In considering such a motion, “[t]he district
    court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allega-
    tions of the complaint and view whatever evidence has
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                           15
    been submitted on the issue to determine whether in
    fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” 
    Id.
    A. Rest Haven
    At the beginning of the EIS process, the City submitted
    to the FAA a proposed revision to its airport layout plan
    that included the construction of a runway in an area that
    would require the relocation of existing air cargo facilities.
    In that proposed plan, the City indicated that it wanted to
    move these facilities to the site that is currently the
    Rest Haven Cemetery. The FAA concluded in its final EIS,
    however, that it would be possible to relocate the air cargo
    facilities without disturbing Rest Haven. Ultimately, on
    September 29, 2005, the FAA issued its ROD approving
    a revised airport layout plan “that depict[ed] cargo build-
    ing repositioning, but also show[ed] that Rest Haven
    Cemetery w[ould] remain in private ownership.” The ROD
    also reaffirmed that there would be no basis for the
    mandatory reinterment of bodies at Rest Haven, and it
    assured that the cemetery would “remain available for
    future burials, and for visitation and care of the graves by
    members of the public.” This convinced the district court
    that there was no longer a live controversy among Rest
    Haven, the City, and the FAA; it therefore dismissed all
    counts brought by Rest Haven in the first amended
    complaint with prejudice.
    Like the district court, we see no reason why Rest Haven
    should not be dismissed from this litigation. Under Article
    III, § 2 of the United States Constitution, federal court
    jurisdiction is limited to “actual, ongoing controversies.”
    Honig v. Doe, 
    484 U.S. 305
    , 317 (1988). “[W]hen the issues
    presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally
    cognizable interest in the outcome,” the case is (or the
    claims are) moot and must be dismissed for lack of juris-
    diction. Powell v. McCormack, 
    395 U.S. 486
    , 496 (1969);
    16                       Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    see also Stotts v. Cmty. Unit. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
    230 F.3d 989
    , 990-91 (7th Cir. 2000). The fact that Rest Haven at
    one point was entitled to pursue this action makes no
    difference. In order to satisfy Article III’s jurisdictional
    requirements, “[t]he requisite personal interest that must
    exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing)
    must continue throughout its existence (mootness).”
    Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 
    520 U.S. 43
    , 68
    n.22 (1997) (quoting United States Parole Comm’n v.
    Geraghty, 
    445 U.S. 388
    , 397 (1980)). As of July 2005, “the
    dispute between the[se] parties no longer rages”; in fact,
    the FAA granted Rest Haven precisely the relief it
    wanted—the agency approved a layout plan that leaves
    it alone. Holstein v. City of Chicago, 
    29 F.3d 1145
    , 1147
    (7th Cir. 1994). In fact, the ROD goes one step further:
    it requires the City to provide a road to the cemetery
    to allow continued access to its grounds and to ensure
    that its daily activities are not unduly disturbed by
    the surrounding construction. Once a plaintiff ’s entire
    demand is satisfied, “there is no dispute over which to
    litigate, and a plaintiff who refuses to acknowledge this
    loses outright, under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), because he
    has no remaining stake.” Rand v. Monsanto Co., 
    926 F.2d 596
    , 598 (7th Cir. 1991); see also North Carolina v. Rice,
    
    404 U.S. 244
    , 246 (1971) (noting that a case becomes
    moot when a court’s decision can no longer affect the
    rights of litigants in the case before it and would be
    nothing but an advisory opinion on hypothetical facts).
    In response to the district court’s order to show cause
    why its claims should not be dismissed, Rest Haven
    complained that it was uncomfortable without an enforce-
    able court order providing that “Chicago will preserve
    and leave forever undisturbed the graves of the departed
    at Rest Haven,” as well as an order requiring Chicago to
    “guarantee the Rest Haven plaintiffs continued access
    to the Rest Haven Cemetery.” In its reply brief here,
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                        17
    Rest Haven concedes that the City’s representation that
    it will not acquire Rest Haven Cemetery “may moot the
    claim for injunctive relief.” See Brown v. Bartholomew
    Consol. Sch. Corp., 
    442 F.3d 588
    , 596 (7th Cir. 2006) (“In
    an action seeking only injunctive relief . . . once the
    threat of the act sought to be enjoined dissipates, the
    suit must be dismissed as moot.”). At oral argument,
    however, Rest Haven appeared to defend the necessity of
    the order it requested on the ground that, without such
    an order, the City might unilaterally terminate its agree-
    ment not to condemn Rest Haven. This fear is motivating
    some of Rest Haven’s religious adherents to bury their
    loved ones elsewhere out of fear of future disinterment.
    If the City could change its mind at any time, Rest
    Haven might have a point. But that is not the case here.
    There is no indication on this record that the City has
    the authority to modify the airport layout plan without
    FAA approval. As the City represented at oral argument,
    it took approximately four years for the FAA to ap-
    prove the plan at issue, and the City has no immediate
    intention to seek modification of the approved airport
    layout plan in favor of one that requires it to condemn
    the Rest Haven Cemetery. To the contrary, the City
    stated that it is quite eager to implement the approved
    plan. Rest Haven’s fear that the City may one day change
    its mind and seek to acquire its cemetery is rooted in
    nothing but speculation. In order to satisfy Article III’s
    justiciability requirements, “[t]he injury or threat of
    injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural
    or hypothetical.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 
    414 U.S. 488
    , 494
    (1974). If and when the day comes when the City or some
    other governmental entity wants to condemn the Rest
    Haven Cemetery, Rest Haven will have ample opportunity
    to defend itself before all appropriate tribunals.
    If what Rest Haven wants is a perpetual injunction
    against the City requiring it to leave its cemetery undis-
    18                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    turbed until the end of time, it is overreaching. The power
    of eminent domain is a fundamental power of govern-
    ment, and a court cannot restrict future governmental
    authorities from its proper use. Moreover, any injunction
    issued by a court of equity is itself subject to later modifi-
    cation. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 
    502 U.S. 367
     (1992); New York State Ass’n for Retarded
    Children Inc. v. Carey, 
    706 F.2d 956
    , 967 (2d. Cir. 1983)
    (“The power of a court of equity to modify a decree of
    injunctive relief is long-established, broad, and flexible.”).
    Courts grant injunctive relief with the understanding that
    there will be an “opportunity for modifying or vacating
    [the] injunction when its continuance is no longer war-
    ranted.” Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
    Dairies, 
    312 U.S. 287
    , 298 (1941). Neither the district
    court nor this court is empowered to enjoin the City
    from ever seeking to acquire Rest Haven’s property, no
    matter what the reason. Rest Haven also indicated at oral
    argument that it would be satisfied with a court order
    finding as a fact that there would be a substantial burden
    to its First Amendment rights in the event of a future
    taking. This will not do. In the absence of a live contro-
    versy, such an order would be no more than an advisory
    opinion, which, as we are sure Rest Haven knows, federal
    courts are without constitutional authority to issue.
    Rest Haven also argues that its claims are not moot
    because it wants a declaratory judgment establishing
    that OMA’s amendment to IRFRA violates the First
    Amendment and the RLUIPA. This, at least, looks more
    like an ongoing controversy. Because Rest Haven did not
    advance this argument either before the district court or
    in its opening brief, however, we consider it waived. See
    Nelson v. LaCrosse County Dist. Attorney, 
    301 F.3d 820
    ,
    836 (7th Cir. 2002) (arguments raised for the first time
    in the reply brief are waived). Waiver or forfeiture aside,
    the argument has no merit. Even though someone may be
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                            19
    affected by the IRFRA amendment, that “someone” is no
    longer Rest Haven, and it is well established that the “case
    or controversy” requirement applies to declaratory judg-
    ments, just as it applies to every other kind of litigation
    in federal court. See Powell, 
    395 U.S. at 518
     (“The avail-
    ability of declaratory relief depends on whether there is a
    live dispute between the parties. . . .”); see also Tobin for
    Governor v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 
    268 F.3d 517
    , 528
    (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that a claim for declaratory judg-
    ment was moot where “relief . . . would have no impact on
    the parties to th[e] suit”).
    B. Municipal Plaintiffs and Rest Haven: FAA Claims
    The district court also found that it lacked jurisdiction to
    review the Municipal Plaintiffs’ and Rest Haven’s claims
    against the FAA because these claims fell within the
    exclusive jurisdiction of the court of appeals under 
    49 U.S.C. § 46110
    . After dismissing Rest Haven from the
    litigation, the district court decided that it lacked juris-
    diction to review the claims against the FAA that related
    to the issuance of the ROD. Because Rest Haven was
    not a party to this complaint, it has no “personal stake”
    in the appeal of the district court’s denial of St. John’s
    and the Municipal Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a
    second amended complaint on this ground. See, e.g.,
    Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Bugher, 
    249 F.3d 606
    , 609 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Under Article III, only a
    plaintiff with a personal stake in a case or controversy
    has standing.”). Even if Rest Haven were a party to the
    second amended complaint and its claims were not moot,
    the district court would still lack jurisdiction to review
    either Rest Haven’s or the Municipal Plaintiffs’ claims
    against the FAA. The jurisdictional language in 
    49 U.S.C. § 46110
     could not be plainer. It says that
    a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order
    issued by . . . the Administrator of the Federal Avia-
    20                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    tion Administration with respect to aviation duties and
    powers designated to be carried out by the Admin-
    istrator . . . in whole or in part under this part [or]
    part B . . . may apply for review of the order by filing
    a petition for review in the United States Court of
    Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the
    court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in
    which the person resides or has its principal place of
    business.
    
    49 U.S.C. § 46110
    (a). “Part B” refers to the Airport Devel-
    opment and Noise provisions of the same subtitle, see 
    49 U.S.C. § 47107
    , et seq., which include the provision that
    grants the FAA the authority to review airport layout
    plans. See 
    49 U.S.C. § 47107
    (a)(16). The statute goes on to
    provide that the court of appeals has “exclusive jurisdic-
    tion to affirm, amend, modify or set aside any part of the
    order.” 
    49 U.S.C. § 46110
    (a).
    The Plaintiffs’ arguments urging that the district court
    had the authority to consider these claims are without
    merit. First, Rest Haven argues that the federal RFRA,
    which Rest Haven claims the FAA has violated, commands
    that contested issues of fact pertaining to violations of
    that statute be tried in the federal district court. In
    support of this claim, they cite § 2000bb-1(c) of the Act,
    which provides that a person alleging a violation of RFRA
    “may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a
    judicial proceeding” and that standing to assert such a
    claim is “governed by . . . article III of the Constitution.”
    Plaintiffs urge that this language means that they are
    entitled to an Article III proceeding in which to resolve
    disputed issues of fact. Even assuming that Rest Haven’s
    claims are not moot, however, the statute says nothing
    about exclusive jurisdiction of district courts to find
    facts in RFRA cases. Review of an agency action in the
    court of appeals surely qualifies as an Article III judicial
    proceeding. Nothing in RFRA purported to repeal the
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                           21
    authority of federal administrative agencies to find facts,
    subject to review by the courts of appeals; there was no
    silent elimination of the judicial review provisions of
    the Administrative Procedures Act. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    .
    Furthermore, the fact that Rest Haven’s claims against the
    FAA include allegations that the FAA violated the Consti-
    tution does not allow it to “bypass the administrative
    process” because “[t]he effect would be that important
    and difficult constitutional issues would be decided devoid
    of factual content.” Gaunce v. DeVincentis, 
    708 F.2d 1290
    ,
    1293 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that exclusive jurisdiction
    rested in the court of appeals in a case in which a pilot
    challenged an FAA order revoking her flight certificate on
    due process grounds); see also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
    Reich, 
    510 U.S. 200
    , 215-16 (1994) (indicating that
    while the “[a]djudication of the constitutionality of con-
    gressional enactments has generally been thought be-
    yond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies,” such a
    “rule is not mandatory,” particularly when a plaintiff ’s
    “statutory and constitutional claims can meaningfully be
    addressed in the Court of Appeals”) (internal citations
    omitted).
    As further support for their argument that their claims
    against the FAA should be heard by the federal district
    court, both Rest Haven and the Municipal Plaintiffs
    contend that the misconduct of various FAA administra-
    tors made it impossible to develop the type of factual
    record necessary for meaningful appellate review. The
    Plaintiffs charge that the FAA has developed a compensa-
    tion program that provides monetary rewards for FAA
    officials who make decisions that allow the construction of
    new runway projects; that former Chicago employees (who
    had worked on previous O’Hare expansion projects) are
    currently FAA officials and employees; and that these
    administrators withheld thousands of documents that
    are not a part of the appellate record. Without the ability
    to present their claims to the district court, they fear, they
    22                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    will be stuck with the outcome of these tainted proceed-
    ings. Appellate courts, however, are certainly competent
    to hear a party’s argument that there were flaws in due
    process at the agency level and remand the case to the
    agency with instructions to correct these problems.
    Additionally, any plaintiff can make an argument to the
    court of appeals that there were problems with the cre-
    ation of the record before the administrative agency and
    thus in the record on appeal. See FCC v. ITT World
    Commc’ns, Inc., 
    466 U.S. 463
    , 468-69 (1984) (“If, however,
    the Court of Appeals finds that the administrative record
    is inadequate, it may remand to the agency, see Harrison
    v. PPG Indus., Inc., 
    446 U.S. 578
    , 593-94 (1980), or in some
    circumstances refer the case to a special master, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 2347
    (b)(3).”). In fact, Plaintiffs made these
    arguments before the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
    Circuit, which rejected them. See Bensenville, 457 F.3d
    at 72-73.
    Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that the district court at least
    has jurisdiction over their NEPA claims, pursuant to 
    40 C.F.R. § 1506.1
    . That regulation provides that “[u]ntil an
    agency issues a record of decision . . . no action concern-
    ing the proposal shall be taken which would [h]ave an
    adverse environmental impact; or [l]imit the choice of
    reasonable alternatives.” According to Plaintiffs, the FAA
    has not made a substantive funding decision about the
    disposition of certain passenger facility charges (PFC) that
    amount to more than one billion dollars. This is money
    that the City needs to facilitate Phase One of the OMP.
    Without the federal money, the City cannot proceed with
    the implementation of Phase One, which includes the
    acquisition of land from the Municipal Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
    argue that the City is attempting to subvert the require-
    ments of NEPA by adhering to a policy of “destruction
    before decision,” in disregard of this court’s ruling in Old
    Town Neighborhood Ass’n v. Kauffman, 
    333 F.3d 732
     (7th
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                          23
    Cir. 2003), disapproving such a strategy. The district court
    decided that it had no jurisdiction over this claim either.
    Perhaps because events continue to unfold, the Plaintiffs’
    argument in this respect seems to have unraveled. The
    regulation to which Plaintiffs refer prohibits action in the
    absence of an agency’s issuance of a ROD. Here, though,
    the ROD and the accompanying EIS have been issued.
    More than that, in an agreed order between these parties,
    the City stipulated that it “[would] not acquire property
    in the Village of Bensenville and Elk Grove Village for the
    OMP, or acquire the Rest Haven or St. Johannes Cemeter-
    ies, unless and until the FAA has issued a Record of
    Decision following completion of an EIS for the OMP.” At
    oral argument the FAA directed the Court’s attention to
    § 12.3 of the ROD where the FAA made specific factual
    findings on the airport layout plan’s effect on natural
    resources, in compliance with 
    49 U.S.C. § 47106
    (c)(1)(B).
    Plaintiffs contend that this does not do the job, because
    while environmental findings have been made with re-
    spect to the airport layout plan, those findings did not
    focus on the specific project for which the City is seeking
    funding—the Phase One Project. Based on our reading of
    the record, however, the Phase One Project is a part of the
    airport layout plan for which the City has received FAA
    approval. Furthermore, the regulation does not prohibit
    action until the FAA has made all decisions with respect
    to funding; it says only that no action can be taken before
    the issuance of the ROD, which we now have. If these
    Plaintiffs wanted to challenge the environmental find-
    ings made by the FAA, they certainly could have included
    those claims in the petition for review of the ROD that
    they filed in the D.C. Circuit.
    This shows Plaintiffs’ NEPA challenge for what it is:
    a matter so intertwined with the ROD that it falls within
    the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of appeals. If we
    needed further reassurance on the point, we have it in
    24                       Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    the fact that Plaintiffs actually made the identical argu-
    ment about NEPA compliance in their presentation to
    the D.C. Circuit. There, they argued that the FAA violated
    NEPA by issuing a ROD that approved of the airport
    layout plan without making any formal funding decisions.
    Before the district court and on appeal here, they argue
    that the FAA is violating NEPA by allowing the City to
    proceed with the acquisition of property in these villages
    before a funding decision has been made. Even if we did
    not think that this issue was under the court of appeals’
    exclusive jurisdiction, we do not think it wise to allow
    either the Municipal Plaintiffs or Rest Haven to litigate
    the same issues, either concurrently or seriatim, in
    separate federal courts.
    IV
    We turn now to St. John’s part of this case. The first
    question is whether St. John’s is entitled, as a matter of
    state law, to the protection afforded by the Illinois Reli-
    gious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/30. If the
    OMA’s amendment of IRFRA can withstand legal chal-
    lenge, then the answer must be no; if not, then St. John’s
    may have a point. Before the district court, St. John’s
    argued that the OMA’s amendment of IRFRA violated the
    Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Free
    Exercise Clause prohibits the government from “plac[ing]
    a substantial burden on the observation of a central
    religious belief or practice” without first demonstrating
    that a “compelling governmental interest justifies the
    burden.” Hernandez v. C.I.R., 
    490 U.S. 680
    , 699 (1989). In
    Employment Division v. Smith, 
    494 U.S. 872
     (1990),
    however, the Supreme Court held that neutral laws of
    general applicability do not run afoul of the Free Exercise
    Clause, even if these laws have the incidental effect of
    burdening a religious practice. 
    Id. at 883
    ; see also Church
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                           25
    of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
    508 U.S. 520
    , 531-32 (1993). In order to determine whether a law is
    neutral, as the Court used the term in Smith, we must
    examine the object of the law. A law is not neutral if “the
    object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
    because of their religious motivation.” Lukumi, 
    508 U.S. at 533
    . The related principle of “general applicability”
    forbids the government from “impos[ing] burdens only
    on conduct motivated by religious belief ” in a “selective
    manner.” 
    Id. at 543
    ; see also 
    id. at 531
     (“Neutrality
    and general applicability are interrelated, and failure to
    satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the
    other has not been satisfied.”).
    The Illinois legislature passed IRFRA in 1998 in re-
    sponse to both Smith and the Supreme Court’s subsequent
    invalidation (as applied to the states) of the federal
    Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42
    U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 
    521 U.S. 507
     (1997) (holding that RFRA, as it applied to the
    states and their subdivisions, exceeded Congress’s reme-
    dial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment). RFRA had
    been Congress’s attempt to impose what it understood to
    be the pre-Smith “compelling interest test” to state
    measures affecting religious practices. Under RFRA, a
    governmental unit could not “substantially burden a
    person’s exercise of religion even if the burden result[ed]
    from a rule of general applicability . . . unless [the gov-
    ernment’s action was] in furtherance of a compelling
    governmental interest and [was] the least restrictive
    means of furthering that . . . interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
    1; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 
    374 U.S. 398
     (1963); Wiscon-
    sin v. Yoder, 
    406 U.S. 205
     (1972).
    Since the holding of Boerne was predicated on the scope
    of Congress’s powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth
    Amendment, the Illinois legislature reasonably con-
    26                       Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    cluded that Boerne said nothing about its own ability
    under Illinois’s Constitution to enact a measure affording
    special protection to religion. It did so in IRFRA, using
    language that mirrors that of the federal RFRA. See 775
    ILCS 35/15 (“Government may not substantially burden
    a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results
    from a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates
    that application of the burden to the person (i) is in
    furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and
    (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering that com-
    pelling governmental interest.”). The legislation was
    expressly designed to afford greater protection to religious
    activity in Illinois than Smith holds is required under the
    federal Constitution. The legislature acted again in the
    OMA, however, taking back part of what IRFRA gave:
    it put religious institutions on the same footing as all
    other property owners for purposes of the O’Hare project.
    The OMA accomplishes this goal by adding a new § 30 to
    IRFRA; the new section states that nothing in IRFRA
    “limit[s] the authority of the City of Chicago to exercise
    its powers under the [OMA] for the purpose of relocation
    of cemeteries or graves located therein.” 775 ILCS 35/30.
    As St. John’s points out, the OMA also mentions cemeter-
    ies in § 92, which amends the Illinois Municipal Code, 65
    ILCS 5/11-51-1, by allowing the City to remove cemetery
    remains for airport expansion without the assent of
    cemetery trustees or owners.
    According to St. John’s, a major tenet of its religious
    beliefs is that the remains of those buried at the St.
    Johannes Cemetery must not be disturbed until Jesus
    Christ raises these remains on the day of Resurrection. It
    asserts therefore that the City’s plan to acquire and
    condemn the cemetery is a “sacrilege to [its] religious
    faith.” We accept those representations. St. John’s contin-
    ues with a claim that the OMA impermissibly targets
    the religious cemeteries adjacent to O’Hare, stripping
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                              27
    them of the protection under IRFRA that is afforded to
    every other religious institution, including other religious
    cemeteries, in Illinois. The district court decided, however,
    that this was the wrong perspective: it saw no discrimina-
    tion or targeting of religious institutions because any
    property, religious or otherwise, within the area desig-
    nated for O’Hare expansion is subject to the extraordinary
    powers conferred in the OMA. It therefore dismissed all
    counts in the first amended complaint that asserted a free
    exercise violation and similarly denied the motion for
    leave to file a second amended complaint with respect to
    the free exercise claims, concluding that the Plaintiffs
    failed to state any free exercise claim on these facts.
    Throughout these proceedings, St. John’s has insisted
    that the relevant comparison is between the two cemeter-
    ies potentially affected by the O’Hare project and all
    other cemeteries or religious properties in the state. But
    this assumes the answer to the crucial question: what
    is the proper comparison to make?2 Lukumi requires us
    to approach that question by asking whether the object of
    the OMA was “to infringe upon or restrict practices
    because of their religious motivation.” 
    508 U.S. at 533
    . In
    looking at OMA, we must consider the act as a whole, as
    well as the part that the new § 30 of IRFRA (added by § 96
    of the OMA) plays in it.
    We begin, as Lukumi instructs, with the text of the
    OMA. As we noted earlier, the new § 30 of IRFRA says
    simply “Nothing in this Act limits the authority of the
    City of Chicago to exercise its powers under the O’Hare
    Modernization Act for the purposes of relocation of ceme-
    2
    Our dissenting colleague answers this critical question in
    St. John’s favor. For the reasons we set forth in the discussion
    that follows, we conclude that the City has the better of the
    argument.
    28                         Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    teries or the graves located therein.” In our view, this
    language does not “refer[ ] to a religious practice without
    a secular meaning discernible from the language or con-
    text.” Lukumi, 
    508 U.S. at 533
    . Some cemeteries are
    affiliated with religious sects, others are not; even graves
    in cemeteries with a religious affiliation may be relocated
    because of natural necessity, for public health concerns,
    after a hurricane or flood, or for many other private or
    public reasons. We conclude there is nothing inherently
    religious about cemeteries or graves, and the act of
    relocating them thus does not on its face infringe upon a
    religious practice, as Lukumi uses that term. (We acknowl-
    edge the fact that the OMA addresses only cemeteries
    that are entitled to invoke the protections of IRFRA, but
    that is only because secular cemeteries presumably
    would have no extraordinary defense to the power of
    eminent domain to begin with.) We note in this connection
    that the Supreme Court held in Lukumi that the words
    “sacrifice” and “ritual” were not so closely associated
    with religious practice that a finding of facial non-neutral-
    ity was compelled. 
    Id. at 534
    . If that was the case there,
    then it is straightforward here to conclude that the OMA
    is facially neutral.
    Even if a law passes the test of facial neutrality, it
    is still necessary to ask whether it embodies a more
    subtle or masked hostility to religion. See, e.g., Gillette v.
    United States, 
    401 U.S. 437
    , 452 (1971) (indicating that the
    Free Exercise Clause “forbids subtle departures from
    neutrality”); see also Bowen v. Roy, 
    476 U.S. 693
    , 703
    (1986) (noting that the First Amendment prohibits the
    government from engaging in the “covert suppression of
    particular religious beliefs”). To answer that question, we
    must look at available evidence that sheds light on the
    law’s object, including the effect of the law as it is designed
    to operate, the “historical background of the decision under
    challenge, the specific series of events leading to the
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                          29
    enactment or official policy in question, and the [act’s]
    legislative or administrative history.” Lukumi, 
    508 U.S. at 540
    . Perhaps the most important of these sources is the
    remainder of the statute of which the new § 30 is a part.
    The OMA in its entirety is the law that the Illinois Gen-
    eral Assembly passed; by relying on it we do not run the
    risk of selective use of statements in legislative history
    that might not reflect the intent of the legislature. The
    Supreme Court took this approach when it reviewed the
    Free Exercise and Establishment Clause claims in Locke
    v. Davey, 
    540 U.S. 712
     (2004). There, although the peti-
    tioner challenged only the specific statutory provision of a
    scholarship program that prohibited recipients from
    pursuing post-secondary degrees in theology, the Court
    observed that “the entirety of the Promise Scholarship
    Program goes a long way toward including religion in
    its benefits.” 
    Id. at 724
     (emphasis added).
    Although St. John’s alleges in its complaint that the
    City targeted its religious rights when the City asked
    the Illinois General Assembly to amend IRFRA as part
    of the OMA, in reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint
    “we are not obliged to accept as true legal conclusions or
    unsupported conclusions of fact.” Hickey v. O’Bannon, 
    287 F.3d 656
    , 658 (7th Cir. 2002). There are simply no facts
    in the voluminous record on appeal that support any
    such claim of targeting religious institutions or practices.
    According to its stated purpose, the OMA was enacted, in
    part, to insure that “legal impediments to the completion
    of the [O’Hare] project be eliminated.” OMA § 5(b). As
    we noted earlier, most of the OMA’s provisions have
    absolutely nothing to do with religion, cemeteries, or
    IRFRA. See, e.g., id. § 20 (prohibiting local government
    units, other than the City of Chicago, from condemning
    property that is slated to become part of O’Hare); id. § 94
    (amending the Illinois Aeronautics Act, 620 ILCS 5/38.01,
    to exempt project applications under the provisions of the
    30                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    Airport and Airway Improvement Act submitted in con-
    nection with the OMP from the general requirements for
    such applications); id. § 95 (amending the Illinois Code of
    Civil Procedure to include a quick-take provision for
    property condemned for the OMP). In fact, the record as
    a whole strongly supports the position the City has urged
    throughout these proceedings: the OMA was designed to
    remove any and all state-law based impediments to the
    O’Hare expansion project, no matter what their source.
    St. John’s makes the obvious point that, as matters have
    developed, it is now the only cemetery in the State of
    Illinois affected by the new § 30 of IRFRA. That is true,
    but an “adverse impact will not always lead to a finding of
    impermissible targeting.” Lukumi, 
    508 U.S. at 535
    . In fact,
    if this point matters at all, it may cut in favor of the
    City. As St. John’s repeatedly mentions in its brief, no
    other religious cemetery in Illinois, including other
    cemeteries similarly affiliated with the United Church of
    Christ, is affected by the OMA. The fact that the legisla-
    tion leaves other religious cemeteries untouched (includ-
    ing those affiliated with churches or other religious
    institutions that hold similar beliefs with respect to
    burial grounds) reinforces the proposition that the legisla-
    ture had the nondiscriminatory purpose of clearing all
    land needed for O’Hare’s proposed expansion. If there
    were ten cemeteries in that area, then the new § 30 would
    apply to all ten; while there were two, it applied to both.
    We conclude that the OMA, including the portion that
    amends IRFRA, is a neutral law of general applicability.
    The Illinois legislature was entitled to restore Illinois law
    to the regime governed by Smith in order to facilitate the
    airport project.
    Although we think it unnecessary to ask whether the
    plan passes the strict scrutiny test, and whether the City
    has shown that it is the least restrictive means of fur-
    thering a compelling governmental interest, we add for
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                          31
    the sake of completeness that we agree with the FAA’s
    conclusion in the ROD that the plan passes muster. Unlike
    our dissenting colleague, we see no disputed issues of
    material fact that would require further proceedings.
    Virtually all involved parties, from the competent
    committee in Congress, to the FAA, to the State of Illinois,
    to the City of Chicago, have made a compelling case that
    the OMP addresses a serious problem with national—
    indeed international—consequences. O’Hare is a vital
    transportation link for the Midwest region, for North
    America, and for the world. It is the only airport in the
    United States that is the hub of two major airlines.
    Serving 47 scheduled passenger airlines and 23 cargo
    carriers, O’Hare provides nonstop service to 127 domestic
    and 48 international destinations. In part because
    Chicago is the largest population and economic center in
    the middle of the country, O’Hare “plays an important role
    in the National Airspace System (NAS) as a dual airline
    hub, a major mid-continent market for nearly every major
    airline, and a key international gateway.”
    O’Hare is not only one of the busiest airports in the
    world. Unfortunately, recently it has also become one of
    the most congested. Its delay record is at least twice as
    bad as that of the next two airports that suffer from
    excessive delays, Atlanta and Newark. Nearly 70,000
    airport operations at O’Hare were delayed in 2004, for a
    total of almost 4,000,000 minutes. As the OMA states,
    “The reliability and efficiency of air transportation for
    residents and businesses in Illinois and other States
    depend on efficient air traffic operations at O’Hare.” 620
    ILCS 65/5. Approximately 51% of total passengers travel-
    ing through O’Hare connect to and from other airports.
    As a major international gateway, the effects of the
    congestion at O’Hare are far-reaching. Delays at O’Hare
    spark further delays around the country and the world,
    with serious economic and logistical consequences. Ac-
    32                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    cording to the ROD, “O’Hare has consistently been the
    number one problem related to delays with the National
    Airspace System in the United States today.” Moreover,
    the problem seems unlikely to abate; the FAA believes
    that “[a]ir traffic at O’Hare is projected to increase in the
    future from some 31 million passengers and 922,787
    operations in 2002 to some 50 million passengers and
    1,194,000 operations by 2018.” Many who have tried to
    connect through O’Hare have learned the hard way that
    the airport simply lacks the capacity to accommodate
    all the demand for its services. It is for these reasons that
    the FAA concluded that the state interests at stake are
    compelling and agreed to fund one of the largest and most
    costly reconfigurations of an airport in the United States.
    The routes and networks that have developed around
    O’Hare are vast and entrenched. The FAA considered
    the option of diverting air traffic to other regional airports
    or mid-continent hubs, but it found that local, national
    and international dependence on O’Hare as a national
    connecting hub and international gateway had developed
    to the point of making those ideas effectively unworkable.
    To borrow a concept from the “essential facilities” doctrine
    in antitrust law, as a practical matter it is impossible
    reasonably to duplicate O’Hare in a way that meets the
    crushing demand for its important services. Compare MCI
    Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 
    708 F.2d 1081
    , 1132 (7th
    Cir. 1983). If the decision were ours to make (a proposition
    that we find doubtful), rather than that of the FAA or the
    competent authorities in Chicago and Illinois, we would
    find that there really is “no realistic, economically practi-
    cal alternative,” City of Malden, Missouri v. Union
    Electric Co., 
    887 F.2d 157
    , 163 n.6 (8th Cir. 1989), to the
    restructuring of O’Hare to remedy those concerns. Given
    O’Hare’s unique importance to the national transporta-
    tion infrastructure, we are persuaded that the City and
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                          33
    State have a compelling interest in fixing the problems
    from which O’Hare suffers.
    Even if the need is compelling, if IRFRA applied it would
    be necessary to decide whether the OMP is the least
    restrictive alternative. St. John’s has offered no plausible
    evidence to suggest that it is not. See Bell Atlantic, 
    127 S. Ct. at 1974
    . The City and its many partners carefully
    considered the concerns of the religious entities in an
    exhaustive review. They studied the alternatives thought-
    fully, adopted some of them, and came up with a final
    plan that represents the City’s best effort to be solicitous
    of the religious concerns involved without substantially
    undermining the goals of the overall project. See Bensen-
    ville, 457 F.3d at 72 (stating that the FAA “appears to
    have acted with great care in conducting its analyses for
    the EIS and ROD” in this case). Cf. Lyng v. Northwest
    Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 
    485 U.S. 439
    , 453-55
    (1988) (noting that where the government commissioned
    a comprehensive study of the effects its proposed road
    would have on the religious concerns at issue and had
    planned numerous ameliorative measures to mitigate the
    intrusion as much as possible, “it is difficult to see how
    the Government could have been more solicitous”). The
    City discarded its original plan to relocate air cargo
    facilities to the Rest Haven site, after the FAA concluded
    that “there is a measure of flexibility in the design and
    location of these buildings sufficient to accommodate the
    religious liberty interests without impeding the air cargo
    component” of the overall plan. Accordingly, Rest Haven
    was spared in an effort to tailor the plan in as accommo-
    dating a manner as possible.
    Unfortunately, geography and the needs of the expansion
    project made it impossible similarly to accommodate
    the St. Johannes cemetery. The FAA’s review of alterna-
    tive proposals illustrates, however, that this conclusion
    was not reached lightly. The proposals attempted to
    34                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    minimize encroachment on the St. Johannes cemetery as
    much as possible by considering options that would
    have shifted, shortened, or eliminated various runways
    or other parts of the overall plan. For example, one
    alternative called for moving a key runway about 400 feet
    to the south and shortening it to avoid the St. Johannes
    cemetery. The FAA found that doing so would have moved
    the runway into protected space for a new air control
    tower that could not be moved without running afoul of
    FAA safety standards. According to the ROD, the ulti-
    mate result would have “compromis[ed] the efficiency
    and capacity of [other] runways in poor weather.” The
    ROD noted that the responses to these concerns
    “demonstrate[d] an unfamiliarity with the real-world
    situation of operating a major airport in both a safe and
    efficient manner.” Another proposal suggested simply
    shortening the runway without moving it to another
    part of the airport. The FAA found that this alternative
    would “place severe operating constraints on the airfield
    any time weather conditions presented a ceiling below
    4,500 feet and less than 7 miles of visibility” which “would
    not accommodate anticipated growth in aviation activity
    at acceptable levels of delay.”
    More creative possibilities were considered as well, such
    as simply constructing a necessary runway on the surface
    of the cemetery ground without disturbing the bodies
    underneath. Even though this would have made access to
    and future use of the cemetery impossible and may also
    have offended religious sensibilities, some thought that
    this proposal was less restrictive because the bodies would
    remain untouched. The FAA consulted the Tennessee
    Valley Authority, a federal agency with considerable
    experience in cemetery relocation (derived over many
    years of building hydro-power facilities in areas where
    cemeteries were located), about this idea. The concept
    proved to be infeasible as a matter of engineering. The
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                            35
    FAA concluded that “the depth of excavation needed for
    runway construction, along with the ancillary activities
    such as electrical cabling for airfield runway lighting and
    storm sewer pipes for airfield drainage, presented a
    substantial likelihood that the graves could be disturbed.”
    It is significant that this case involves physical intrusion
    on a religious site, not the curtailment or prohibition of
    a religious practice. The least restrictive alternative
    analysis here comes down to concrete measurements.
    The question is whether there is a way to construct
    the vitally needed new runways and supporting struc-
    tures at O’Hare—a defined physical space—in a way that
    limits or avoids entirely physical encroachment on an
    adjacent geographical area. An airport layout and runway
    configuration is an intricate web of interrelated parts
    where placements and measurements are carefully cali-
    brated to account for variables such as wake turbulence,
    weather, and visibility, as well as the size, speed, and
    schedules of departing and arriving aircraft. The entire
    project is constrained by demanding FAA standards. As
    the ROD explains, “a change in one runway often has
    consequences for other runways, nearby taxiways, and the
    overall ability to handle greater levels of traffic.” Each
    alternative proposal fell victim to that reality. The
    City has demonstrated that it has accommodated the
    religious concerns as much as is physically possible
    without compromising its compelling interests. The only
    plausible conclusion that the pleadings support is that
    the OMP represents the least restrictive alternative.
    Lastly, St. John’s argues that the district court erred
    in concluding that in order to state a free exercise claim a
    plaintiff must allege two things: (1) that the defendant’s
    actions were motivated by animus or prejudice, and
    (2) that the law at issue is not neutral or of general
    applicability. The first of these, it asserts, is precluded
    by cases such as Shrum v. City of Coweta, Okla., 449
    36                         Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-
    4451 F.3d 1132
     (10th Cir. 2006). There, the Tenth Circuit
    observed that “the Free Exercise Clause has been applied
    numerous times when government officials interfered
    with religious exercise not out of hostility or prejudice,
    but for secular reasons.” Id. at 1144.
    With respect, we think that St. John’s has misread the
    district court’s opinion. Only after the court decided that
    the OMA was a neutral law of general applicability did
    it observe that “none of the allegations in the complaint
    give[s] rise to the inference that the facially neutral
    language masks more insidious underpinnings.” This
    comment reflects the inquiry required by Lukumi. The
    district court was not suggesting that a plaintiff is re-
    quired to allege animus or prejudice in order to state a
    free exercise claim.
    In fact, a closer look at Shrum reveals that it is not
    of much help to St. John’s. In that case, the plaintiff, a
    police officer and minister, alleged that he was assigned to
    a day shift precisely because this schedule would conflict
    with his ministerial duties. Although the defendant gave
    a neutral justification for the assignment, the plaintiff ’s
    allegation was that the decision to reassign him was
    “motivated by [plaintiff]’s religious commitments.” Id.
    at 1144. A question therefore existed with respect to
    whether the decision at issue was actually neutral and of
    general applicability; the court had no need to require
    the plaintiff also to allege that the assigning officer had
    held his faith against him or had acted out of religious
    prejudice. The problem was that the assigning officer
    wanted to force the plaintiff to choose between his duties
    as a police officer and his post as a minister and “religious
    discrimination was the means to [that] entirely secular
    end . . . .” Id. Here, in contrast, St. John’s does not
    allege that the City is seeking to acquire its land because
    of its religious significance; the City needs the land in spite
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                            37
    of its current dedication to religious use. Cf. Personnel
    Adm’r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 
    442 U.S. 256
    , 279 (1979) (“ ‘Dis-
    criminatory purpose,’ however, implies more than intent
    as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It
    implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state
    legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
    action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’
    its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”) (internal
    citation omitted). There are no facts in this record that
    could support such a claim.
    V
    Moving on from its free exercise challenge to the OMA’s
    amendment of IRFRA, St. John’s argues that the OMA
    violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
    Clause when it deprived St. John’s of constitutional and
    statutory legal protections that are available to every
    other cemetery in the state. The district court dis-
    missed this aspect of the case, in both the original and
    the second amended complaint, for failure to state a
    claim upon which relief could be granted. The court’s
    error in this respect, according to St. John’s, was its fail-
    ure to review the equal protection theory using strict
    scrutiny.
    In deciding whether the OMA violates the Equal Protec-
    tion Clause, our first question is whether the act targets
    a suspect class or addresses a fundamental right. See Eby-
    Brown Co., LLC v. Wisc. Dep’t of Agric., 
    295 F.3d 749
    , 754
    (7th Cir. 2002). If it does either of these things, then the
    legislation must survive more demanding scrutiny. Nor-
    mally, this means that it must be tailored narrowly to
    facilitate a compelling state interest. See Krislov v.
    Rednour, 
    226 F.3d 851
    , 863 (7th Cir. 2000). If no funda-
    mental rights or suspect categories are at issue, “[t]he
    general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid
    38                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the
    statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”
    City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
    473 U.S. 432
    , 440 (1985).
    St. John’s first tries to repackage its free exercise
    argument in equal protection language, by claiming that
    the new § 30 unduly burdens its fundamental right freely
    to exercise its religion. We have already rejected the
    underlying point, however. “Where a plaintiff ’s First
    Amendment Free Exercise claim has failed, the Supreme
    Court has applied only rational basis scrutiny in its
    subsequent review of an equal protection fundamental
    right to religious free exercise claim based on the same
    facts.” Wirzburger v. Galvin, 
    412 F.3d 271
    , 282-83 (1st Cir.
    2005) (citing Johnson v. Robison, 
    415 U.S. 361
    , 375 n.14
    (1974)).
    St. John’s also argues that the new § 30 targets a
    suspect class, namely, the two religious cemeteries adja-
    cent to O’Hare. It has not fleshed out this argument
    particularly well. If it means to suggest that “cemeteries
    adjacent to O’Hare” constitute a constitutionally suspect
    class, we must disagree with it. A suspect class either
    “possesses an immutable characteristic determined solely
    by the accident of birth,” Frontiero v. Richardson, 
    411 U.S. 677
    , 686 (1973), or is one “saddled with such disabilities,
    or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
    treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
    powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
    from the majoritarian political process.” San Antonio
    Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
    411 U.S. 1
    , 28 (1973).
    Although religion may fit the bill, see, e.g., City of New
    Orleans v. Dukes, 
    427 U.S. 297
    , 303 (1976), strict scrutiny
    has been reserved for laws that “discriminat[e] among
    religions.” Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
    Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
    483 U.S. 327
    ,
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                            39
    339 (1987). The new § 30 neither classifies on the basis
    of religion nor discriminates among religions.
    Once again, St. John’s notes that it is the only religious
    cemetery currently affected by the OMA; other religious
    cemeteries in the state, including those affiliated with the
    United Church of Christ, are beyond the statute’s reach.
    As was the case with respect to its free exercise claim,
    St. John’s own argument proves that this statute does
    not treat St. John’s differently from other religious ceme-
    teries in the state because it is a religious cemetery.
    Rather the statute puts St. John’s in a different position
    from other religious cemeteries in the state because it is
    near O’Hare and, unlike the Rest Haven Cemetery, the
    City badly needs the land to construct additional runways.
    Geography, however, is not a suspect class for equal
    protection purposes. If St. John’s is attempting to state a
    “class of one” equal protection claim, see Village of
    Willowbrook v. Olech, 
    528 U.S. 562
    , 564 (2000), it has
    failed to do so. This court has held that “[a] class of one
    equal protection claim may be brought where (1) the
    plaintiff alleges that he has been intentionally treated
    differently from others similarly situated and (2) that
    there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment or
    the cause of the differential treatment is a ‘totally illegiti-
    mate animus’ toward the plaintiff by the defendant.”
    Lunini v. Grayeb, 
    395 F.3d 761
    , 768 (7th Cir. 2005)
    (quoting McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 
    371 F.3d 992
    , 1001
    (7th Cir. 2004)). Even if St. John’s could satisfy the first
    part of that test, it cannot survive the second part.
    The fact that this statute affects a religious group or
    institution does not necessarily mean that the statute
    classifies on the basis of religion. See, e.g., Johnson, 
    415 U.S. at
    375 n.14 (declining to categorize group of religious
    conscientious objectors as a suspect class); Locke, 
    540 U.S. at 712
     (applying rational basis review to a statute that
    prohibited state aid to any post-secondary student pursu-
    40                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    ing a degree in theology). As we observed earlier, in a case
    like this, where a facially neutral statute is challenged on
    equal protection grounds, the challenger must prove that
    the legislature “selected or reaffirmed a particular course
    of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite
    of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Feeney,
    
    442 U.S. at 279
    . Nothing supports the proposition that
    the Illinois legislature singled out St. John’s for lesser
    protection under IRFRA protection because it runs a
    religious cemetery. Anyone or anything standing in the
    way of the O’Hare project faces the prospect of the City’s
    exercise of its eminent domain power. We have no doubt
    that the legislature was unmoved by St. John’s religious
    affiliation.
    In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
    state an equal protection claim, “a plaintiff must allege
    facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality
    that applies to government classifications.” Wroblewski v.
    City of Washburn, 
    965 F.2d 452
    , 460 (7th Cir. 1992). As
    the district court observed, St. John’s does not even
    attempt to argue that the OMA’s amendment to IRFRA is
    not rationally related to some legitimate government
    purpose. Certainly, the expansion of O’Hare is a legitimate
    state purpose. As a classic “public use”—an airport to be
    operated by the City of Chicago for the benefit of local,
    national, and international transportation—it does not
    raise any of the questions that concerned the dissenting
    Justices in the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of
    New London, Conn., 
    545 U.S. 469
     (2005). Enacting a
    statute that removes legal barriers to the City’s ability to
    acquire land in connection with the expansion of the
    airport is not “wholly impossible” to relate to that legiti-
    mate interest. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City
    of Chicago, 
    342 F.3d 752
    , 766 (7th Cir. 2003).
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                          41
    VI
    Last, St. John’s invokes the Religious Land Use and
    Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000cc, et seq. Congress enacted RLUIPA after the
    Supreme Court invalidated the federal RFRA, 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000bb, et seq., as it applied to the states and their
    subdivisions in City of Boerne, 
    521 U.S. 507
    . “Less sweep-
    ing” than RFRA, RLUIPA is limited to cases involving
    land use regulations or the religious exercise rights of
    institutionalized persons. It applies when a substantial
    burden to religious exercise is “imposed in a program or
    activity that receives Federal financial assistance,” affects
    interstate commerce, or, in a case involving a land use
    regulation, is imposed pursuant to a procedure that
    permits the government to make “individualized assess-
    ments of the proposed uses for the property involved.” 42
    U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(b)(1)-(2), 2000cc(a)(2)(A)-(C).
    The question before us is whether the “land use” part of
    RLUIPA applies here. That part of the statute prohibits
    any government from implementing a “land use regula-
    tion” that “imposes a substantial burden on the religious
    exercise of a person,” as well as on religious assemblies
    and other religious institutions, unless the government
    can show that the “imposition of the burden on that
    person, assembly, or institution is in furtherance of a
    compelling governmental interest [ ] and is the least
    restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmen-
    tal interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). We must decide
    whether the City’s plan to condemn the St. Johannes
    Cemetery is a “land use regulation” within the meaning
    of RLUIPA. We agree with the district court’s conclusion
    that it is not.
    Initially, we note that we are proceeding on the assump-
    tion that RLUIPA as a whole does constitutionally apply
    to the states. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
    544 U.S. 709
     (2005),
    42                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    the Supreme Court held that § 3 of RLUIPA, which deals
    with the religious exercise rights of institutionalized
    persons, is constitutional as applied to the states. The
    Court specifically declined to express any view on the
    validity of § 2 of the statute, which deals with land use
    regulations. 
    544 U.S. at
    715 n.3. Neither party has raised
    any challenges to the constitutionality of § 2; because we
    conclude that the statute does not apply here, we save
    for another day the question whether this part of the
    statute may be applied to the states.
    The term “land use regulation” is defined by RLUIPA
    as follows:
    [A] zoning or landmarking law, or the application of
    such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or
    development of land (including a structure affixed to
    land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold,
    easement, servitude, or other property interest in the
    regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such
    an interest.
    42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). St. John’s (as well as the Munici-
    pal Plaintiffs and Rest Haven, for that matter) have not
    objected, however, to any plan on the City’s part to zone
    their property in an unfavorable way or to impose restric-
    tions on it under a landmarking law. St. John’s claims
    instead that the OMA is a “zoning-type law” because it
    changes the permitted use of its land from a religious
    cemetery to land designated as “airport property.” But this
    is a misleadingly incomplete description of the City’s
    intentions under the statute. The fact that the OMA
    refers to the land it seeks to acquire from everyone living
    within the footprint of the O’Hare expansion project as
    “airport property” does not morph the OMA into a zoning
    ordinance. The City is not attempting to dictate to these
    plaintiffs what they are permitted to do with the plot of
    land that is currently the St. Johannes Cemetery; rather,
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                                43
    the City seeks to exercise its takings power to assume
    full ownership of the land, after paying St. John’s just
    compensation. As Illinois courts have long recognized, the
    “police power [zoning] and eminent domain are distinct
    powers of government.” Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. Chi. &
    Alton R.R. Co., 
    108 N.E. 312
    , 314 (Ill. 1915) (“Whatever
    restraints the Legislature imposes upon the use
    and enjoyment of property with the reason and principle
    of this duty the owner must submit to. It is a regulation,
    and not a taking; an exercise of police power, and not of
    eminent domain.”). Because zoning and eminent domain
    are “two distinct concepts” that involve land “in very
    different ways,” we reject the argument that the City’s
    plan to condemn the St. Johannes Cemetery under the
    OMA is an act of zoning. Faith Temple Church v. Town of
    Brighton, 
    405 F. Supp. 2d 250
    , 254 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).3
    3
    Some argue that the two concepts are not so distinct, and that
    the problem with zoning is that it forces property owners to limit
    the uses to which they put their property. In that sense, the
    argument goes, zoning regulations are in fact partial takings of
    private property. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private
    Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 100-03 (1985).
    Professor Epstein argues that what government should do in
    lieu of zoning is use its power of eminent domain, assuming of
    course that there is a valid public purpose and the government
    is willing to pay. He recognizes that the law has not adopted his
    theory, however, noting that “the dominant line of opinion—one
    that can be traced to Justice Holmes in [Pennsylvania Coal Co.
    v. Mahon, 
    260 U.S. 393
     (1922)]—is that regulation, far from
    being a subclass of takings, is outside the scope of the eminent
    domain clause unless it is taken ‘too far.’ ” Id. at 102.
    St. John’s argument runs in the other direction; it claims that
    the exercise of eminent domain in this case has essentially zoned
    away its entire property. But the City has paid just compensa-
    tion for what it has taken in this case, which is exactly what
    (continued...)
    44                          Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    St. John’s relies on a district court case from the South-
    ern District of Indiana for the sweeping proposition that
    “[w]hen an ordinance constitutes an attempt by the
    government to regulate the use of a piece of property, it is
    an act of zoning.” Sagamore Park v. City of Indianapolis,
    
    885 F. Supp. 1146
    , 1150 (S.D. Ind. 1994). That decision,
    however, is inapposite. It addressed the question whether
    a moratorium imposed by the Board of Zoning Appeals
    amounted to an act of zoning; it had nothing to do with the
    question whether an exercise of the sovereign power of
    eminent domain should also be regarded as “zoning.”
    In addition to arguing that the OMA is a zoning law, the
    Plaintiffs contend that eminent domain itself is a “land
    use” regulation under RLUIPA. Their best authority for
    this point is a footnote in a district court case from the
    Central District of California, Cottonwood Christian Center
    v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 
    218 F. Supp. 2d 1203
    (C.D. Cal. 2002). Briefly, in that case, the plaintiff, Cotton-
    wood Christian Center, wanted to build a church on an 18-
    acre parcel of land that it owned. The City of Cypress
    planned to use that land for commercial retail space and
    initiated eminent domain proceedings. The plaintiff
    brought an action for a preliminary injunction after the
    City denied it the necessary land use permit it needed to
    begin constructing its place of worship. The district court
    found that the City’s refusal to grant Cottonwood’s ap-
    plication for a conditional use permit was a land use
    regulation subject to RLUIPA. In a footnote, the court
    commented that “[e]ven if [it] were only considering the
    condemnation proceedings, they would fall under
    3
    (...continued)
    distinguishes it from a zoning regulation that has gone “too far.”
    It would strain the statutory definition beyond repair to equate
    a buy-out with a “limitation” or “restriction” on land use.
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                              45
    RLUIPA’s land use regulation.” Cottonwood, 
    218 F. Supp. 2d at
    1222 n.9.
    We are not persuaded by the district court’s brief dicta
    in Cottonwood that eminent domain is always and inevita-
    bly a land use regulation under RLUIPA. Given the
    importance of eminent domain as a governmental power
    affecting land use, we think that if Congress had wanted
    to include eminent domain within RLUIPA, it would
    have said something. Indeed, before federal law (even
    under the Spending Clause) starts interfering with the
    fundamental state power of eminent domain, it is likely
    that we would need a clear statement from Congress. See,
    e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 65
    (1989) (“[I]f Congress intends to alter the usual constitu-
    tional balance between the States and the Federal Gov-
    ernment, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably
    clear in the language of the statute.”) (internal quotation
    omitted). Congress did not mention eminent domain in
    so many words in RLUIPA’s definition of a land use
    regulation, which is enough for us to consider it excluded.
    See Lamie v. United States Tr., 
    540 U.S. 526
    , 534 (2004)
    (“It is well established that where the statute’s language
    is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it
    according to its terms.”). The handful of federal and state
    cases that have addressed this question have reached the
    same conclusion that we have. See, e.g., Faith Temple
    Church, 
    405 F. Supp. 2d at 255
     (“By its terms . . . RLUIPA
    does not apply to eminent domain proceedings.”); City and
    County of Honolulu v. Sherman, 
    129 P.3d 542
    , 547 (Haw.
    2006) (“RLUIPA is not available as a defense to condemna-
    tion . . . .”); see also Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 
    289 F.3d 417
    , 434 (6th Cir. 2002) (although not specifically
    addressing the question whether condemnation is a land
    use regulation under RLUIPA, indicating that the City’s
    property interest in the land at issue gave it the right to
    develop the land as it desired and thus the City’s decision
    46                        Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    to develop the roadway was not based on any zoning or
    landmarking law). Because this case does not involve a
    “land use regulation,” there is no need for us to address
    RLUIPA’s other element—whether the City’s proposed
    actions will substantially burden Plaintiffs’ religious
    exercise.
    With RLUIPA inapplicable, we have exhausted the
    possible reasons why the St. Johannes Cemetery might
    be exempt from the City’s general eminent domain power.
    Over the years, Illinois has condemned cemeteries, both
    religious and otherwise, for a variety of public uses, such
    as highways. See, e.g., Illinois State Toll Highway Comm’n
    v. Eden Cemetery Ass’n, 
    158 N.E.2d 766
     (Ill. 1956) (oft-
    cited case about the appropriate uses of the state’s eminent
    domain power involving condemnation of a religious
    cemetery); Dep’t of Transp. v. Bouy, 
    386 N.E.2d 1163
     (Ill.
    App. Ct. 1979) (resolving methods government was re-
    quired to use to determine the market value and appropri-
    ate compensation for the partial taking of a cemetery
    to provide land for a highway). We recognize that relocat-
    ing St. Johannes will be a sensitive and labor intensive
    task. The City has established a detailed protocol, which
    includes identifying the next of kin for each person buried
    at the cemetery and hiring professional archaeologists
    and a licensed funeral director to carry out archaeological
    work and disinterments for each person buried there. At
    oral argument, the City assured us that it will comply with
    these procedures. We take the City at its word and trust
    that this process will be carried out with dignity and
    respect for both living and dead. Of course, the plaintiffs
    remain free to challenge any deviation from the City’s
    proposed methods of relocation before an appropriate
    tribunal should some controversy arise in the future.
    Given our conclusion that none of St. John’s religious
    claims against the City survives, the district court was
    correct to deny its motion for a preliminary injunction.
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                           47
    VII
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
    court.
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
    in part. I join my colleagues in affirming the judgment of
    the district court with respect to the claims by Rest Haven
    and the municipal defendants. However, I believe that
    the amendments to the Illinois Religious Freedom Resto-
    ration Act (“Illinois RFRA”) made in the O’Hare Modern-
    ization Act (“OMA”), Ill. Pub. Act No. 093-0450, violate
    the Free Exercise Clause, and, for that reason, must be
    subject to strict scrutiny. I further believe that there
    remain factual questions regarding whether the City of
    Chicago (“City”) has shown that the proposed moderniza-
    tion and expansion plan of O’Hare Airport is narrowly
    tailored to meet the compelling interest the City claims.
    These factual issues render dismissal inappropriate at
    this stage in the litigation. Therefore, I respectfully
    dissent.
    I
    BACKGROUND
    The majority’s thoughtful and comprehensive opinion
    sets forth the facts of this case in great detail; therefore,
    I shall provide only a brief description of the pertinent
    facts.
    48                            Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    In May 2003, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the
    OMA. The legislation amended various provisions of
    Illinois law to facilitate the planned expansion of O’Hare
    Airport. One of the legal impediments that this legisla-
    tion sought to remove was a restriction on the power of
    the City to condemn particular properties for the expan-
    sion, including two religiously-affiliated cemeteries, one
    of which, St. Johannes Cemetery (“St. Johannes”), is
    owned by St. John’s United Church of Christ (“St. John’s”).
    Among the changes aimed at facilitating the condemna-
    tion of these cemeteries was an amendment to the Illinois
    RFRA that repealed otherwise generally applicable
    statutes only with respect to the relocation of cemeteries
    in connection with the O’Hare expansion.
    St. John’s and two of its congregants1 filed this action,
    challenging both the City’s attempt to acquire the land
    on which St. Johannes is located and the amendment to
    the Illinois RFRA. St. John’s asserted that the City’s
    actions violated its rights under the Free Exercise Clause
    of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
    of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 St. John’s maintains
    that the relocation of St. Johannes would violate a major
    tenet of its religious beliefs, which requires that those
    buried in St. Johannes must remain undisturbed until
    resurrected by Jesus Christ on the Last Day. St. John’s
    further contended that, because the amendments to the
    Illinois RFRA singled out religious cemeteries near
    1
    Because the congregants assert the same claims as St. John’s,
    I shall refer, for ease of reference, to the plaintiffs collectively as
    St. John’s.
    2
    The owner of the second cemetery, Rest Haven Cemetery
    Association, originally joined St. John’s in these claims. As noted
    by the majority opinion, the City no longer seeks to acquire
    the land on which Rest Haven is located, rendering Rest
    Haven’s challenges moot.
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                           49
    O’Hare, the law was not neutral and of general applicabil-
    ity, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the
    Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the
    Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
    The district court dismissed St. John’s complaint for
    failure to state a claim. The district court concluded that
    the OMA was a neutral law of general applicability; thus,
    it was subject only to rational basis scrutiny under both
    the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
    II
    DISCUSSION
    The First Amendment ensures religious freedom by
    firmly committing the state to a position of neutrality
    in the relationship between individuals and religion. Sch.
    Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 
    374 U.S. 203
    , 226
    (1963). The Supreme Court has observed that, with respect
    to religious freedom, the principle of government neutral-
    ity, the government “protect[s] all, it prefers not, and it
    disparages none.” 
    Id. at 215
     (quoting Minor v. Bd. of Educ.
    of Cincinnati (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati, February 1870)
    (Taft, J., dissenting) (unpublished case), reproduced in The
    Bible in the Common Schools (Robert Clark & Co. ed.,
    1870)). The Free Exercise Clause advances the command
    of government neutrality by securing “religious liberty
    in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by
    civil authority” and protecting against the coercive effect
    of legislation “as it operates against him in the practice of
    his religion.” Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added);
    see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization
    of California, 
    493 U.S. 378
    , 384 (1990); Vision Church v.
    Vill. of Long Grove, 
    468 F.3d 975
    , 996 (7th Cir. 2006). At
    a minimum, the Free Exercise Clause protects against
    laws that “discriminate[ ] against some or all religious
    50                         Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    beliefs.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
    Hialeah, 
    508 U.S. 520
    , 532 (1993).
    State action that offends the Free Exercise Clause must
    satisfy strict scrutiny, i.e., be narrowly tailored to serve a
    compelling state interest. See Vision Church, 
    468 F.3d at 996
    ; Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago,
    
    342 F.3d 752
    , 763 (7th Cir. 2003). Additionally, when a
    legislative classification offends a fundamental right,
    such as the Free Exercise Clause, an equal protection
    challenge to that classification is subject to strict scrutiny.
    Vision Church, 
    468 F.3d at 1000
    . A law offends the Free
    Exercise Clause and its requirement of government
    neutrality with respect to religion in two circumstances.
    First, a law that burdens the free exercise of religion and
    that is not facially neutral and of general applicability
    will be subject to strict scrutiny. City of Hialeah, 
    508 U.S. at 531-32
    ; Vision Church, 
    468 F.3d at 996
    . Second, a
    facially-neutral law that “imposes a substantial burden
    on religion” offends the Free Exercise Clause and likewise
    is subject to strict scrutiny. Vision Church, 
    468 F.3d at 996
    . The OMA’s amendment to the Illinois RFRA violates
    the Free Exercise Clause under either of these approaches.
    A law is not neutral on its face if its object or purpose “is
    the suppression of religion or religious conduct.” City of
    Hialeah, 
    508 U.S. at 533
     (emphasis added). To determine
    whether a law is neutral and of general applicability, we
    first look to the text of the statute to determine whether
    it discriminates on its face. 
    Id.
     “A law lacks facial neutral-
    ity if it refers to a religious practice without a secular
    meaning discernable from language or context.” 
    Id.
    Applying these standards, it is clear that the OMA’s
    amendment to the Illinois RFRA is not facially neutral.
    OMA added a new section 30 to the Illinois RFRA which
    reads:
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                           51
    Nothing in this Act limits the authority of the City of
    Chicago to exercise its powers under the O’Hare
    Modernization Act for the purposes of relocation of
    cemeteries or the graves located therein.
    775 ILCS 35/30. The panel opinion determines that,
    because cemeteries and the burial, or relocation, of the
    dead are not inherently religious, the amendment to the
    Illinois RFRA is textually neutral. However, this analysis
    fails to appreciate that, when read in context, the new
    section 30 of the Illinois RFRA affects only religious
    cemeteries. The phrase “this Act” in the new section 30
    refers to the Illinois RFRA. See 
    id.
     35/1. The Illinois RFRA,
    in turn, protects against government actions that sub-
    stantially burden an individual’s free exercise of religion,
    
    id.
     35/15, which the Illinois RFRA defines as “an act or
    refusal to act that is substantially motivated by religious
    belief, 
    id.
     35/5. Thus, the only cemeteries affected by
    OMA’s amendment to the Illinois RFRA are those religious
    cemeteries that the City may seek to relocate. Moreover,
    because the Illinois RFRA’s protections apply only
    where the government action substantially burdens an
    individual’s free exercise of religion, the amendment
    affects only those religious cemeteries whose relocation
    would substantially burden an individual’s free exercise
    of religion.
    The effect of the amendment is to remove from the
    protections afforded to every other individual’s religious
    observance, those individuals whose religious practices
    would be substantially burdened by the relocation of
    cemeteries in connection with the expansion of O’Hare.
    The OMA amendment to the Illinois RFRA offends the
    Free Exercise Clause by penalizing those individuals
    whose religious observance is affected by the expansion
    project by denying them “an equal share of the rights,
    benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” Lyng
    v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 
    485 U.S. 52
                             Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    439, 449 (1988). Illinois RFRA demands that the govern-
    ment show a compelling interest and the lack of viable
    alternative before it burdens anyone’s religious beliefs.
    By the amendment, Illinois has watered down, signifi-
    cantly, the protection afforded these plaintiffs. It does
    not matter that Illinois has not chosen to single out the
    United Church of Christ (the faith with which St. John’s
    is affiliated) for unfavorable treatment across the state.
    The Free Exercise Clause protects the individual’s right
    to the free exercise of religion. See Jimmy Swaggart
    Ministries, 
    493 U.S. at 384
    ; Schempp, 
    374 U.S. at 223
    .
    Thus, the OMA’s amendment to the Illinois RFRA both
    burdens the free exercise of religion and lacks facial
    neutrality, and, therefore, strict scrutiny must be applied
    to the amendment.
    However, even if the amendment to the OMA was
    facially neutral, it would still be subject to strict scrutiny
    because it imposes a substantial burden on religion. As the
    Supreme Court said in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
    Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
    508 U.S. 520
    , 534 (1993):
    Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free
    Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause,
    extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause
    “forbids subtle departures from neutrality,” Gillette v.
    United States, 
    401 U.S. 437
    , 452 (1971) and “covert
    suppression of particular religious beliefs,” Bowen v.
    Roy, 
    supra, at 702
     (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Official
    action that targets religious conduct for distinctive
    treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance
    with the requirement of facial neutrality.
    See also Vision Church, 
    468 F.3d at 996
    . We have held that
    a burden on the free exercise of religion rises to the level
    of a constitutional injury when the law places significant
    pressure on the adherent to forego its religious precepts.
    
    Id. at 999
    . The effect of relocating St. Johannes on St.
    Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451                            53
    John’s religious observance is neither hypothetical nor
    speculative, but, rather, inescapable. The relocation of St.
    Johannes would force St. John’s to forego its religious
    precepts regarding the burial of its members. This burden
    goes further than placing pressure on St. John’s to forego
    its religious precepts. By relocating St. Johannes Ceme-
    tery, St. John’s would be “coerced by the Government’s
    action into violating [its] religious beliefs.” Lyng, 
    485 U.S. at 449
    . By forcing St. John’s to “perform acts undeniably at
    odds with fundamental tenets of [its] religious beliefs,” this
    coercion presents the precise “danger to the free exercise
    of religion that the First Amendment was designed to
    prevent.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
    406 U.S. 205
    , 218 (1972).
    Because the amendments to the Illinois RFRA offend
    the Free Exercise Clause, the law must survive strict
    scrutiny under both the First Amendment and the Equal
    Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under
    strict scrutiny review, the Government bears the burden of
    proving both that the act in question advances a compel-
    ling state interest and that the means chosen to pursue
    that interest are narrowly tailored to that end. See John-
    son v. California, 
    543 U.S. 499
    , 505 (2005); see also Entm’t
    Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 
    469 F.3d 641
    , 646 (7th Cir.
    2006); Vision Church, 
    468 F.3d at 996
    . The majority
    opinion accepts the City’s assertions that the current
    modernization plan is narrowly tailored. Perhaps the
    City is correct. However, accepting the City’s assertions
    at this stage in the litigation is inconsistent with our
    obligation when reviewing a motion to dismiss to accept
    all well pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable
    inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiffs. Patel
    v. City of Chicago, 
    383 F.3d 569
    , 572 (7th Cir. 2004). At
    this stage in the litigation, there has been none of the
    factual development necessary to determine whether the
    means chosen by the City are narrowly tailored to meet the
    compelling interest asserted here.
    54                       Nos. 05-4418, 05-4450 & 05-4451
    Therefore, I would remand the case for further proceed-
    ings to allow factual development. For these reasons,
    I respectfully dissent from the portion of the panel’s
    opinion that rejects St. John’s claim. I am pleased to join
    the opinion in all other respects.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—9-13-07