JCW Investments Inc v. Novelty Incorporated ( 2007 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 05-2498
    JCW INVESTMENTS, INC., D/B/A TEKKY TOYS,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    NOVELTY, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 02 C 4950—Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
    ____________
    SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 7, 2007—DECIDED NOVEMBER 28, 2007
    ____________
    Before MANION, WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
    WOOD, Circuit Judge. Tekky Toys won a jury verdict
    for $575,099.82 on its claim that Novelty, Inc., infringed
    Tekky’s copyright and trademark on “Pull My Finger
    Fred,” a farting plush doll; this court affirmed that judg-
    ment. See JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 
    482 F.3d 910
    ,
    921 (7th Cir. 2007). Thirty days after we entered judg-
    ment in Tekky’s favor, it filed a petition for attorneys’
    fees, expenses, and costs in the district court. What is
    presently before us is the petition Tekky filed in this court
    for an award of appellate attorneys’ fees, expenses, and
    costs in the amount of $78,037.76.
    2                                             No. 05-2498
    Both the Copyright Act, 
    17 U.S.C. § 505
    , and the
    Lanham Act, 
    15 U.S.C. § 1117
    (a), permit an award of full
    costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing
    party, including fees and costs incurred on appeal. See
    Assessment Technologies of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata Inc.,
    
    361 F.3d 434
    , 436 (7th Cir. 2004) (Copyright Act);
    Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 
    874 F.2d 431
    , 438 (7th Cir. 1989) (Lanham Act). Despite
    this general rule, Novelty argues that Tekky is not en-
    titled to an award of appellate fees and costs for three
    reasons. First, it points out that the petition “does not
    appear to be timely.” JCW filed its petition for fees
    and costs 30 days after final judgment in this case was
    entered. The request for costs is indeed untimely, as
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(d)(1) requires
    that the bill of costs be filed within 14 days of entry of
    judgment. We therefore deny Tekky’s petition for costs
    in the amount of $132.76.
    This leaves the question (presumably of much greater
    interest to the parties) of whether the request for $77,905
    in attorneys’ fees is also untimely. Novelty argues that
    because Tekky submitted a “combined motion” for fees
    and costs, Rule 39(d)(1)’s 14-day deadline should apply
    to the motion in its entirety. But Novelty cites no author-
    ity to support that position, and we have been unable to
    find any. Likewise unsupported is Novelty’s contention
    that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), which pro-
    vides the vehicle and deadline (also 14 days) for motions
    for attorneys’ fees in the district court, should apply by
    analogy to such motions in the appellate courts. Neither
    Rule 39 nor Rule 54 speaks directly to the situation be-
    fore us, and neither the Copyright Act nor the Lanham
    Act provides any statutory deadline for such motions.
    In the absence of a statutory or rule-based deadline, we
    think that a general rule of diligence should govern. Here,
    then, we must decide whether Tekky was diligent in
    No. 05-2498                                              3
    preparing and submitting its request for attorneys’ fees
    to us. We conclude that it was.
    Novelty’s next argument is that an award of fees is
    unwarranted because its appeal was not frivolous. But a
    finding of frivolity or bad faith is not required under the
    Copyright Act, which permits an award of attorneys’
    fees and costs in the court’s discretion. 
    17 U.S.C. § 505
    .
    That discretion is guided by many factors, including
    “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness
    (both in the factual and in the legal components of the
    case) and the need in particular circumstances to ad-
    vance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”
    Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 
    510 U.S. 517
    , 534 n.19 (1994)
    (internal quotation omitted). We have said that the two
    most important considerations are “the strength of the
    prevailing party’s case and the amount of damages or
    other relief the party obtained.” Assessment Technologies,
    
    361 F.3d at 436
    ; see also Gonzales v. Transfer Technolo-
    gies, Inc., 
    301 F.3d 608
    , 610 (7th Cir. 2002). The
    amount of damages Tekky has recovered in this litiga-
    tion is not small: the jury awarded a total of $291,000 on
    Tekky’s various claims, and the district court awarded
    $575,099.82 in attorneys’ fees, which covered most of the
    expense of the district court litigation. When “a plaintiff
    wins a suit and is entitled by statute to a reasonable
    attorneys’ fee, the entitlement extends to the fee he
    reasonably incurs in defending the award of that fee.
    Otherwise the fee will undercompensate.” Gorenstein
    Enters., 
    874 F.2d at 438
     (internal citation omitted). The
    strength of Tekky’s case against Novelty weighs heavily
    in favor of awarding fees, as the copyright infringement
    in this case was flagrant, see JCW Invs., 
    482 F.3d at 916-17
    , and the trademark infringement was willful, see
    BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., Inc., 
    41 F.3d 1081
    ,
    1099 (7th Cir. 1994) (interpreting Lanham Act’s allow-
    ance of fees in “exceptional” cases to encompass those
    4                                              No. 05-2498
    in which the act of infringement was “malicious, fraudu-
    lent, deliberate or willful”). Accordingly, we are persuaded
    that Tekky is entitled to an award of the fees that it
    reasonably incurred in defending against Novelty’s appeal.
    This brings us to the third and final question: whether
    the amount Tekky seeks is reasonable. Novelty pre-
    dictably asserts that it is not, but it does not explain
    whether it objects to the hourly rate, the number of
    hours expended on particular tasks, or both. Having
    reviewed the records ourselves, we conclude that one
    category of the requested fees is indeed excessive, and so
    we will reduce it even without an explicit request from
    Novelty to do so. Specifically, lead counsel claims that
    it took him 33.25 hours to prepare this petition, at a rate
    of $450 per hour, for a total of $14,962.50. The petition,
    however, consisted only of a six-page argument, a three-
    page affidavit, and several computer-generated billing
    records. Because an experienced litigator should not
    have required more than half that amount of time to
    prepare such a document, we reduce the fee award of
    $77,905 by $7,481.25.
    To summarize, Tekky’s petition for costs is DENIED, and
    Novelty is ORDERED to pay Tekky a total of $70,423.75
    in attorneys’ fees.
    It is so ordered.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—11-28-07