United States v. Shannon, Ralph ( 2008 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 07-2794
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    RALPH SHANNON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Wisconsin.
    No. 06 CR 179—Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED JANUARY 11, 2008—DECIDED FEBRUARY 29, 2008
    ____________
    Before BAUER, POSNER and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
    BAUER, Circuit Judge. Ralph Shannon pleaded guilty to
    one count of possession of child pornography, in violation
    of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2252
    (a)(4). The district court sentenced
    Shannon to 46 months’ imprisonment and a life term of
    supervised release. On appeal, he argues that (1) the
    federal sentencing scheme approved in United States v.
    Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 
    125 S.Ct. 738
    , 
    160 L.Ed.2d 621
     (2005)
    violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; and (2) his
    sentence was unreasonable. For the following reasons,
    we affirm.
    2                                              No. 07-2794
    In 2003, federal authorities initiated a nationwide inves-
    tigation into a company called Regpay, which owned
    and operated various members-only internet websites
    containing images of children engaged in sexually ex-
    plicit conduct with other children and adults. The investi-
    gation revealed that Shannon was one of Regpay’s paying
    customers, and that he had accessed several pornog-
    raphic websites through Regpay. On March 24, 2005,
    investigators executed a search warrant at Shannon’s
    home, seizing two desktop computers, three computer
    hard drives, computer media, child-sized sex toys, and
    a child-sized mannequin. An examination of the com-
    puters and hard drives revealed over 400 images con-
    taining child pornography.
    On April 20, 2007, Shannon pleaded guilty to one
    count of possession of child pornography, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 2252
    (a)(4). The presentencing investigation
    report (“PSR”), which the district court adopted, stated
    that based on Shannon’s criminal history category (I) and
    the offense level (twenty-three), the guidelines range
    was forty-six to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment with
    a range of two years to life of supervised release. The
    PSR recommended a sentence of 57 months’ imprison-
    ment with a life term of supervised release.
    At sentencing, Shannon addressed his objections to the
    PSR, including the recommended life term of supervised
    release. The court stated that though Shannon’s crim-
    inal history category was the lowest possible, his “interest
    in sexually explicit depictions of children demonstrates
    a substantial need to protect the public.” Taking into
    consideration Shannon’s history and characteristics, as
    well as the seriousness of the offense, the court found
    that a sentence of imprisonment on the low end of the
    No. 07-2794                                                   3
    sentencing guideline range would protect the com-
    munity and reflect the serious nature of Shannon’s actions
    “when the sentence is coupled with a life term of super-
    vised release with stringent conditions.” The court recom-
    mended that Shannon be afforded the opportunity to
    participate in sex offender treatment while incarcerated.
    The district court then sentenced Shannon to 46 months’
    imprisonment, and a life term of supervised release.
    Shannon raises two issues on appeal, the first of which
    we can dispose of in haste. Shannon argues (as far as
    we can discern) that his sentence was unconstitutional
    under the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment
    as interpreted by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    ,
    
    120 S.Ct. 2348
    , 
    147 L.Ed.2d 435
     (2000) because the post-
    Booker guidelines scheme impermissibly allows district
    court judges to find facts that affect federal sentences.
    Because Shannon failed to raise this issue before the
    trial court, it is forfeited, and our review is for plain
    error. United States v. Matthews, 
    505 F.3d 698
    , 707 (7th
    Cir. 2007). We have considered similar arguments on
    multiple occasions, and have rejected them. See United
    States v. Roti, 
    484 F.3d 934
    , 937 (7th Cir. 2007); United States
    v. Savage, 
    505 F.3d 754
    , 764 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
    Hollins, 
    498 F.3d 622
    , 633 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
    White, 
    472 F.3d 458
    , 464-65 (7th Cir. 2006). District court
    judges do not violate the Constitution when they find
    facts by a preponderance of the evidence for purposes of
    calculating a guideline range, as long as the guidelines
    remain advisory and the ultimate decision is based on
    consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Hollins, 
    498 F.3d at 633
    .
    In his other argument on appeal, Shannon also con-
    tends that the district court failed to adequately articulate
    4                                                    No. 07-2794
    the reasons for her decision to sentence Shannon to the
    guidelines recommendation of lifetime supervision. We
    review sentences for reasonableness, using an abuse of
    discretion standard. United States v. Sura, 
    511 F.3d 654
    ,
    664 (7th Cir. 2007). A sentence is reasonable if the district
    court gives meaningful consideration to the factors enu-
    merated in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a),1 including the advisory
    sentencing guidelines, and arrives at a sentence that is
    objectively reasonable in light of the statutory factors and
    the individual circumstances of the case. Gall v. United
    States, 552 U.S. ___, 
    128 S.Ct. 586
    , 596-97, 
    169 L.Ed.2d 445
     (2007); United States v. Wachowiak, 
    496 F.3d 744
    , 748
    (7th Cir. 2007). The court need not address every § 3553(a)
    factor in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating its con-
    clusions regarding each one. United States v. Brock, 
    433 F.3d 931
    , 934-36 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dean,
    
    414 F.3d 725
    , 729 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead the court may
    1
    Those factors include, in pertinent part:
    (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
    history and characteristics of the defendant;
    (2) the need for the sentence imposed—
    (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
    respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
    the offense;
    (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
    (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
    defendant; and
    (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational
    or vocational training, medical care, or other correc-
    tional treatment in the most effective manner.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).
    No. 07-2794                                                   5
    simply give an adequate statement of reasons, consistent
    with § 3553(a), for thinking the sentence it selects is ap-
    propriate. United States v. Harris, 
    490 F.3d 589
    , 597 (7th
    Cir. 2007). A sentence within a properly calculated guide-
    line range is presumed reasonable. United States v. Haskins,
    
    511 F.3d 688
    , 695 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Rita v. United States,
    ___ U.S. ___, 
    127 S.Ct. 2456
    , 
    168 L.Ed.2d 203
     (2007));
    United States v. Mykytiuk, 
    415 F.3d 606
    , 608 (7th Cir. 2005)
    (adopting a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness
    for within-guidelines sentences).
    In this case, the district court sufficiently explained
    Shannon’s sentence, including the life term of supervised
    release. The court took into consideration: (1) Shannon’s
    limited criminal history, see § 3553(a)(1); (2) the serious
    nature of the offense, see id.; (3) the fact that Shannon’s
    interest in child pornography demonstrated a “substan-
    tial need to protect the public,” see § 3553(a)(2)(C); and
    (4) Shannon’s need for sex offender treatment and super-
    vision, see § 3553(a)(2)(D). After explaining these factors,
    the court found that a sentence at the low end of the
    guidelines range for imprisonment and at the high end of
    the range for supervised release was required in this case.
    The court adequately addressed the objections raised by
    Shannon, and demonstrated nothing short of a thorough
    and thoughtful analysis of Shannon’s case. Shannon
    presents nothing to disturb the rebuttable presumption
    of reasonableness of his within-guidelines sentence.
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM Shannon’s sentence.
    USCA-02-C-0072—2-29-08