United States v. Anderson, Gerald E. ( 2008 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 06-2205
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    GERALD E. ANDERSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 04 CR 789—Ruben Castillo, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 13, 2007—DECIDED FEBRUARY 28, 2008
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY and SYKES,
    Circuit Judges.
    CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. Gerald Anderson and John
    Meisch have been friends since 1967. Anderson was a
    successful real estate developer who owned a lot of
    valuable property around Aurora, Illinois. John Meisch
    was an Alderman for the City of Aurora and served as its
    Mayor Pro Tem. In December 2004, Anderson and Meisch
    were indicted on charges of bribery and wire and honest
    services fraud. The two men had been caught offering
    a $10,000 bribe to the Aurora Director of Public Works
    2                                               No. 06-2205
    in order to smooth the way for Anderson’s latest develop-
    ment project. Meisch pleaded guilty and testified against
    Anderson at trial. Anderson was ultimately convicted
    on two counts. He now appeals, arguing mainly that his
    six-year sentence should be reduced. Many of his argu-
    ments are without merit but he does have one sub-
    stantial challenge to his sentence. He argues that the
    district judge improperly calculated his sentencing
    range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines by overesti-
    mating the net benefit he received from his wrongdo-
    ing. We agree that the district court improperly calculated
    the Guidelines range but we find that the error was harm-
    less. We AFFIRM.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Gerald Anderson owned a number of real estate proper-
    ties around Aurora, including parcels now known as
    Grand Pointe Homes and Misty Creek. In late 1997,
    Anderson was introduced to Jeff Pelock, who was inter-
    ested in developing homes on Anderson’s land. The two
    men became partners in a venture called Aurora LLC.
    Anderson put nearly $6,000,000 of property into Aurora
    LLC, including Grand Pointe Homes and Misty Creek. In
    return, he received preferred payments for the value of
    his property as well as 30% of the profits of the business.
    The two men immediately began developing Misty Creek.
    In Aurora, developers typically begin by providing the
    City’s staff engineers with a copy of their preliminary plan.
    The staff engineers review the plan and pass their recom-
    mendation on to the Aurora City Council. If the prelimi-
    nary plan is approved by the City Council, the developer
    can submit a final plan to the City for approval. In order to
    No. 06-2205                                                 3
    be approved, a plan must comply with numerous City
    ordinances and regulations, so developing a plan often
    involves ongoing negotiations with City officials from
    various departments.
    While Misty Creek was well underway by early 2000,
    Anderson and Meisch’s second project, Grand Pointe
    Homes, was still in the initial planning stages. Rick Zirk, an
    employee of Aurora LLC, presented the plan for Grand
    Pointe Homes to the City’s staff engineers but the plan was
    rejected. Zirk believed that he had gotten an undeservedly
    hostile reception from the engineers and so went directly
    to the City Council’s Planning and Development Commit-
    tee. But, on May 31, 2000, the Committee also rejected the
    plan. The Committee objected, among other things, to the
    planned density of the project. Anderson decided to take “a
    more proactive role” with the City. The first thing he did
    was call his old friend, John Meisch, who was then the
    Chairman of the Planning and Development Committee.
    Pelock and Anderson met with Meisch in early 2001 to
    complain about the reception their plan had received.
    Anderson asked Meisch to support his development plans
    for Misty Creek and Grand Pointe Homes and to garner
    support from other aldermen. On January 30, 2001, Meisch
    made a motion before the City Council to have the City
    annex a portion of Anderson’s development (he also voted
    in favor of the motion). Anderson and Meisch met again in
    early 2001 to discuss the plan. In September 2001, Ander-
    son had a third meeting with Meisch. During this meeting,
    Anderson asked Meisch to set up a meeting with the
    Oswego Park District regarding a bike trail that ran
    through Grand Point Homes. The Park District was going
    to take over the trail once the property was developed and
    it had concerns about its design and location. At the end of
    4                                              No. 06-2205
    the meeting, Anderson handed Meisch an envelope
    containing $2500 in cash.
    Meisch later met with city officials and officials of the
    Oswego Park District. Meisch was able to resolve the issues
    with the Park District and Anderson was able to move
    forward with his project. On September 10, 2002, Meisch,
    acting as Mayor Pro Tem, signed a resolution approving a
    plan for Grand Pointe Homes. On February 27, 2003,
    Meisch supported before the Planning and Development
    Committee the resolution approving the final plan for
    Grand Pointe Homes. The plan passed even though the
    density of the project was greater than it had originally
    been. In March 2003, Anderson gave Meisch an envelope
    containing another $2500 in cash.
    After Meisch left office, he had a final meeting with
    Anderson. They discussed a new project at Eola Road,
    which Anderson owned with another partner, Don
    Hamman (Aurora LLC was not involved). Anderson hoped
    that Meisch would assist him as he had in the past. Meisch
    advised Anderson that he would need to win the approval
    of Bob Rieser, Aurora’s Director of Public Works. Anderson
    gave Meisch an envelope containing $1000 in cash.
    In late 2003, Anderson approached Ken Schroth, a civil
    engineer for the City of Aurora, to discuss whether Eola
    Road could be developed without an onsite pond to collect
    storm water runoff. Anderson believed that an offsite pond
    was sufficient to comply with Aurora’s storm water
    ordinance but Schroth determined that the offsite pond
    could not hold all of Eola Road’s storm water. Schroth
    told Anderson that he would need to set aside 15% of
    the property for an onsite pond. Anderson met with
    Schroth again several weeks later, and Schroth again
    insisted that Anderson needed a set-aside.
    No. 06-2205                                                 5
    Rieser was also aware of the set-aside problem. In
    January 2004, just before Rieser was expected at a meeting
    of staff engineers regarding the Eola Road project, Meisch
    appeared in his office and closed the door. Meisch told
    Rieser, “Gerry Anderson has been very good to me in the
    past, and . . . he can be very good to you [if you help him
    with Eola Road].” Meisch said that “there is $10,000 cash
    that no one would know about” if he supported the project.
    After Meisch left, Rieser called the Federal Bureau of
    Investigations, which advised Rieser to play ball with
    Meisch. At the meeting of staff engineers, Rieser was asked
    about the sufficiency of the offsite water storage at Eola
    Road and responded that it was “do-able.”
    On February 9, 2004, Rieser spoke with Anderson on the
    phone and asked if he was still “okay” with the $10,000.
    Anderson assured Rieser that he was. He also told Rieser
    that he would keep everything confidential. Anderson,
    Meisch and Rieser arranged a meeting on February 17,
    2004. Anderson informed Rieser that he would seek
    approval for the project only after he had bought out the
    other owners and wanted to make sure that Rieser
    would work with his timetable. He also directed Rieser to
    talk only with Meisch so as to not raise suspicions.
    The FBI arrested Anderson on September 22, 2004. He
    waived his Miranda rights and made a number of admis-
    sions regarding the bribe offered to Rieser and the pay-
    ments made to Meisch for Grand Point Homes and
    earlier projects. On December 14, 2004, Anderson and
    Meisch were charged with three counts of wire and honest
    services fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C §§ 1343, 1346 (Counts
    I, II, and III) and one count of bribery pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 666
     (Count IV). Meisch pleaded guilty and Anderson
    proceeded to trial. On September 30, 2005, a jury convicted
    Anderson of Counts III and IV and acquitted him on
    6                                              No. 06-2205
    Counts I and II. On April 20, 2006, the District Court
    sentenced Anderson to seventy-two months in prison, a
    $100,000 fine and two years of supervised release. This
    appeal followed.
    II. ANDERSON’S CONVICTION
    Anderson raises only one challenge to his conviction.
    This is not surprising for the evidence presented against
    him at trial was overwhelming; it included extensive
    testimony from Meisch and the damaging admissions
    Anderson made shortly after his arrest. He does make
    an argument, however, that his conviction should be
    overturned because the jury rendered inconsistent ver-
    dicts when it acquitted him on Counts I and II but con-
    victed him on Count III. At issue are the three counts
    of wire and honest services fraud. Counts I and II were
    based on unrecorded telephone calls between Meisch and
    Anderson; the jury knew about the existence of the calls
    because they appeared in telephone records but never
    actually heard the conversations or learned of their con-
    tents. The jury was apparently asked to infer from suspi-
    cious timing alone that the calls were related to the scheme
    to bribe Rieser. Count III was based on a recorded telephone
    conversation in which Anderson and Rieser clearly dis-
    cussed the bribe. This call was played aloud for the jury in
    open court. Shortly before returning its verdict, the jury
    sent a note to the judge regarding Counts I and II, asking
    whether it could infer that those calls were made “in
    furtherance of” the scheme simply from their existence.
    The jury acquitted on those counts shortly thereafter.
    Apparently, the jury was not persuaded that the calls
    actually contained conversations about the alleged scheme.
    No. 06-2205                                                      7
    This does not create an unexplained inconsistency. See
    United States v. Young, 
    316 F.3d 649
    , 662 (7th Cir. 2002).
    Even if the verdicts were inconsistent, this would not
    warrant reversal. See United States v. Powell, 
    469 U.S. 57
    , 69,
    
    106 S. Ct. 471
    , 
    83 L.Ed.2d 461
     (1984). United States v. Bevins,
    
    430 F.2d 601
     (6th Cir. 1970), on which Anderson relies,
    actually illustrates that inconsistency is not grounds for
    reversal. 
    Id. at 602-03
    . This is also the rule in this circuit. See
    United States v. Muthana, 
    60 F.3d 1217
    , 1223 (7th Cir. 1995).
    III. ANDERSON’S SENTENCE
    Anderson’s appeal focuses largely on sentencing issues.
    Specifically, he attacks various aspects of the district court’s
    calculation of his sentencing range. We begin with the
    Sentencing Guidelines. Using the 2003 version of the
    Guidelines,1 the district court started with a base offense
    level of ten. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
    § 2C1.1(a) (2003). A two-point enhancement was added
    for multiple bribes. See U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(1) (2003). A
    fourteen-point enhancement was added because the
    “benefit received” from the bribe was more than $400,000
    but less than $1,000,000. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H)
    (2003). All of this amounted to a total offense level of
    twenty-six. When the total offense level was combined
    with Anderson’s criminal history category of I, the Guide-
    1
    The district court sentenced Anderson in April 2006, four
    months before our decision in United States v. Demaree, 
    459 F.3d 791
     (7th Cir. 2006). Demaree held that district courts should apply
    the Guidelines in force at the time of sentencing, not the
    Guidelines in force at the time the crime was committed. See
    
    id. at 795
    .
    8                                                 No. 06-2205
    lines yielded a sentencing range of sixty-three to seventy-
    eight months. The district court then sentenced Anderson
    to seventy-two months in prison.
    Anderson raises three basic challenges to his sentence:
    First, he argues that the district court failed to calculate the
    proper base offense level because, according to Anderson,
    his offense conduct involved a gratuity, not a bribe.
    Second, Anderson argues that the district court over-
    estimated the “benefit received” and thus erred in its
    calculation of his total offense level. In particular, he
    complains that the court did not adequately explain the
    methodology it used to calculate the benefit figure. Finally,
    Anderson argues that his sentence is unreasonable in
    light of § 3553. We review these questions for abuse of
    discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. ___, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , ___ L.Ed.2d ___(2007).
    A. The Application of the Bribery Provisions to Ander-
    son’s Conduct
    We begin with the calculation of the base offense level.
    The district court applied the bribery provisions of § 2C1.1
    to Anderson’s conduct; Anderson believes that it should
    have applied the gratuity provisions of § 2C1.2. Con-
    victions under § 666 and § 1343 call for the application of
    either § 2C1.1 or § 2C1.2, whichever is most appropriate or
    most specifically covers the offense conduct. See United
    States v. Agostino, 
    132 F.3d 1183
    , 1195 (7th Cir. 1997);
    U.S.S.G. § 2C1.7(c)(4) (2003). The question here is
    simply whether Anderson’s conduct was “more akin” to a
    gratuity or to a bribe. See Agostino, 
    132 F.3d at 1195
    . Unlike
    a gratuity, a bribe is a payment made with “a corrupt
    purpose, such as inducing a public official to participate in
    No. 06-2205                                                  9
    a fraud or to influence his official action.” See U.S.S.G.
    § 2C1.1 cmt. background. Thus, we have distinguished
    bribes from gratuities as follows: “If the payer’s intent is to
    influence or affect future actions, then the payment is a
    bribe. If, on the other hand, the payer intends the money as
    a reward for actions the payee has already taken, or is
    already committed to take, then the payment is a gratuity.”
    Agostino, 
    132 F.3d at 1195
    . In this case, it is clear that
    Anderson was attempting to influence the future actions of
    a public official.
    Anderson concedes that he passed money to Meisch but
    claims that the payments were simply rewards for past
    actions and thus gratuities. They were old friends, he
    argues; Meisch did not do anything he would not have
    done absent the payment. Anderson’s argument, however,
    suffers from a serious flaw: He focuses exclusively on the
    payments made to Meisch. Conspicuous by its absence is
    any reference to the bribe that Anderson and Meisch
    offered to Rieser. There is no shortage of evidence that
    the intent of this payment was to influence future action; it
    formed the basis of his § 666 conviction. Meisch
    approached Rieser immediately before Rieser was set to
    appear at an important meeting and asked him to vouch for
    the sufficiency of the offsite detention pond. It makes no
    difference that the money was not delivered before the
    action was taken; the intent was to influence Rieser’s
    action. See United States v. Griffin, 
    324 F.3d 330
    , 366 (5th
    Cir. 2003). The § 1343 conviction, which involved a tele-
    phone call in which this bribe was discussed, was in
    furtherance of the bribe and shares its corrupt purpose. In
    short, both convictions involved an attempt to influence
    official action.
    Anderson’s argument fails even if we focus on the
    payments made to Meisch. The sentencing judge found that
    10                                                No. 06-2205
    these payments were also bribes. Meisch took a series of
    actions, and he received a series of payments. It is unclear
    whether the payments were rewards for actions he had
    already taken or bribes for actions he had not yet taken. But
    the evidence was even more muddled in Agostino, and yet
    we upheld the district court’s factual finding that the
    conduct at issue involved an attempt to influence future
    action and was therefore a bribe. See Agostino, 
    132 F.3d at 1195
    . Anderson conceded at oral argument that a case
    could be made either for a bribe or for a gratuity. Contrary
    to what he suggests, this militates against a finding of clear
    error. 
    Id.
    This brings us to the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity
    applies when there are serious ambiguities in the text
    of a criminal statute. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 
    498 U.S. 103
    , 108, 
    111 S. Ct. 461
    , 
    112 L.Ed.2d 449
     (1990). Ander-
    son claims that the rule applies here because an argument
    could be made for the application of either § 2C1.1 or §
    2C1.2. But the rule does not apply when ambiguity is a
    result of an application of the Guidelines to a particular set
    of facts; that is, the rule does not apply to factual ambigu-
    ities. See United States v. McEntire, 
    153 F.3d 424
    , 438 & n.16
    (7th Cir. 1998). There is nothing ambiguous about § 2C1.1.
    See Agostino, 
    132 F.3d at 1195
    ; United States v. Cruzado-
    Laureano, 
    440 F.3d 44
    , 47 n.8 (1st Cir. 2006). So the rule does
    not apply here.
    B. The Calculation of the Benefit Received Under
    § 2C1.1
    We now turn to the most hotly contested issue in this
    case, which is the proper calculation of the “benefit
    received” in return for the bribe. See U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)
    No. 06-2205                                                  11
    (2003). The bribery provisions base the severity of punish-
    ment on the value of the bribe—the more valuable the
    bribe, the heavier the sentence imposed. See United States v.
    Sapoznick, 
    161 F.3d 1117
    , 1118 (7th Cir. 1998). But the value
    of the bribe is not always the sum offered by the defendant
    (in this case, $10,000). Instead, § 2C1.1(b)(2) instructs the
    sentencing judge to use “the value of the payment, the
    benefit received or to be received in return for the payment,
    the value of anything obtained or to be obtained by a public
    official or others acting with a public official, or the loss to
    the government from the offense, whichever is greatest.”
    U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2) (2003). Both parties agree that the
    value of the “benefit received or to be received” is the
    proper measure in this case, but they disagree on how it
    should be calculated.
    Anderson fixes the value of the benefit received at
    $41,131, while the Government fixes it somewhere between
    $1,000,000 and $2,500,000. Needless to say, these two
    calculations would have very different ramifications for
    Anderson’s sentence. So what explains the discrepancy?
    Basically, the dispute in this case is over whether Ander-
    son’s offense conduct should include convicted conduct,
    relevant conduct or both. Anderson believes that his
    offense conduct involves only the conduct that formed the
    basis of his conviction—that is, the bribe to Rieser. If
    Anderson is correct, the only profits included in the benefit
    calculation would be the profits from Eola Road, because
    only Eola Road was affected by the bribe to Rieser. The
    Government, however, does not believe that the bribe of
    Rieser was a one-time incident; it believes that bribery was
    Anderson’s modus operandi. Thus, it argues that Ander-
    son’s offense conduct should include not only the bribe to
    Rieser but also the payments made by Anderson to Meisch,
    12                                                No. 06-2205
    which could be found to be bribes for sentencing purposes.
    These payments affected other properties, such as Grand
    Pointe Homes and (at least arguably) Misty Creek. Thus,
    their inclusion would significantly increase the benefit
    figure.
    The Government is correct here, at least in theory. It
    is well settled that the sentencing judge may consider not
    only the conduct that formed the basis of the conviction but
    also “relevant conduct.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (2003).
    Relevant conduct may include “uncharged conduct and
    even conduct that formed the basis of an acquittal,” as long
    as the judge makes factual findings based on the prepon-
    derance of the evidence. United States v. Schaefer, 
    291 F.3d 932
    , 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The judge,
    however, must make sure that the conduct forms a part of
    the “same course of conduct” or “ongoing series of of-
    fenses.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.9(B) (2003). Further, we
    have cautioned that when the benefit calculation is based
    largely on conduct for which the defendant was not
    convicted, the district court must be careful to explain
    exactly how the conduct factors into the benefit calculus.
    See Schaefer, 
    291 F.3d at 939
    . We are aware that benefit
    calculations cannot always be precise, and so we accept
    reasonable estimates based on the information available in
    the record. See U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3(c) (2003). To be
    rejected, a district court’s calculation must not only be
    “inaccurate but outside the realm of permissible computa-
    tions.” United States v. Peterson-Knox, 
    471 F.3d 816
    , 822 (7th
    Cir. 2006).
    Our analysis will thus proceed in three steps. First, we
    must determine which properties were affected by
    illegal bribes; only then can we determine which profits
    should be included in the benefit calculus. See Sapoznick,
    No. 06-2205                                                  13
    
    161 F.3d at 1119
     (discussing the “question of causation”).
    Second, we must determine whether the benefits derived
    from each of those properties can be reliably calculated
    and, if so, what those calculations are. 
    Id.
     (discussing
    the “question of quantification”). Ultimately, we conclude
    that only Eola Road and Grand Pointe Homes can be
    included in the benefit calculus; Misty Creek must be
    excluded. Because the profits from Grand Pointe Homes
    are impossible to quantify on this record, however, we
    include only the profits attributable to Eola Road and
    thus arrive at a benefit figure of only $82,362. We therefore
    agree with Anderson that the district court erred in
    its benefit calculation. This raises a third and final question:
    Was the error harmless? As we will explain, we believe that
    it was.
    1.   What Properties May Be Considered in the Benefit Calcula-
    tion?
    Both parties agree that Eola Road must be included in the
    benefit calculus because the bribe for which Anderson was
    convicted involved Eola Road. It goes without saying that
    a sentencing court may consider benefits that flow directly
    from the counts of conviction. This is undisputed; it is the
    “relevant conduct” that has created the controversy.
    The district court found that the payments made to
    Meisch for his help with Grand Pointe Homes were acts
    of bribery that related to the bribe of Rieser. While Ander-
    son insists that the payments were innocent, the record
    is replete with evidence that suggests otherwise. Anderson,
    Meisch and Zirk all testified that Anderson had paid
    Meisch money for his assistance with the Grand Pointe
    Homes project. Meisch would apply influence on behalf
    14                                                No. 06-2205
    of Anderson, and Anderson’s problems would conve-
    niently disappear. The district court knew that Anderson
    was highly sophisticated; this was evident from his deal-
    ings with Rieser. It was thus reasonable for the district
    court to conclude that Anderson either had bribed Meisch
    or had given Meisch money so that he could bribe the
    apropriate officials (as had been done with Rieser). It is also
    clear that Grand Pointe Homes benefitted from these
    bribes. Anderson turned to Meisch just as the project
    stalled in the City Council. Without Meisch’s intervention,
    the project may never have been approved. With Meisch’s
    help, it was not only approved, but approved with an
    even greater density than the original plan. Thus, the
    profits attributable to the project can be included in the
    benefit calculation.
    But even if the payments Anderson made to Meisch can
    be considered as relevant conduct, they cannot be con-
    nected to Misty Creek. Indeed, we could find only two
    pieces of evidence in the entire record that linked Misty
    Creek to these bribes: Misty Creek was mentioned at
    the first breakfast meeting between Meisch and Anderson
    in 2001, and Anderson admitted to the FBI that he had
    given Meisch a flatbed truck in the early 1990s for his
    assistance with Misty Creek. Neither of these facts
    was relied upon, or even mentioned, by the district court.
    There was no evidence to show that the Misty Creek project
    had encountered obstacles that would have required
    Meisch’s assistance; thus, we have no way to know what
    Meisch could have done to assist the project. Misty Creek
    was basically completed by the time of the earliest alleged
    bribes; the construction of homes was already
    well underway at that point. Even the district court
    judge seemed to accept Anderson’s arguments on this
    No. 06-2205                                                 15
    point. Sentencing H’rg Tr.167. Misty Creek must be ex-
    cluded.
    2. What is the Proper Net Benefit Calculation?
    We have made our preliminary determination: Eola
    Road and Grand Pointe Homes are to be included in the
    benefit calculus; Misty Creek is out. We must now calculate
    the benefit Anderson derived from these two properties.
    Because more than 90% of the district court’s net benefit
    figure reflects benefits derived from relevant conduct, we
    will scrutinize the numbers more closely. See Schaefer, 
    291 F.3d at 939
    .
    The intended benefit from the Eola Road bribe is clear: It
    is the market value of the land Anderson saved from
    the set-aside. Anderson argued that, because the property
    was eventually developed with a 9.45% set-aside, the
    intended benefit was 9.45% of the value of his share of
    the property. Anderson placed this value at $41,181 and the
    district court agreed. Anderson, however, made a simple
    mathematical mistake. Even if we accept Anderson’s
    methodology, the net benefit figure is at least $82,362, or
    twice the amount he claims. Anderson owned an undi-
    vided half-interest in Eola Road and his share of the prop-
    erty sold for $871,564. This figure should have been
    multiplied by 0.0945 but, instead, Anderson suggested that
    it be multiplied by 0.04725 to reflect his half-interest in the
    property. Sentencing H’rg Tr.167. Dividing the set-aside
    percentage in half was the equivalent of discounting
    Anderson’s ownership interest twice. The net benefit from
    Eola Road should have been at least $82,362.
    In the end, however, Eola Road accounted for only a
    small fraction of the total benefit calculation. The vast
    16                                                No. 06-2205
    majority of the calculated benefit figure was composed of
    profits that Anderson made from Grand Pointe Homes. The
    Government estimated that Anderson had earned nearly
    $1.1 million from Aurora LLC, the company created by
    Anderson and Pelock to develop Grand Pointe Homes and
    Misty Creek.2 We have concluded, however, that
    Misty Creek should be excluded from the calculus. This
    creates a serious dilemma because neither the Govern-
    ment nor Anderson submitted any evidence establishing
    the amount of profit that Misty Creek generated in contrast
    to Grand Pointe Homes. Apparently, in a crude effort to
    separate the profit on one project from the profit on the
    other, the district court said that it would “discount[ ]
    some aspects of Misty Creek.” Sentencing H’rg Tr.164-165.
    But there has been no reasonable basis presented for
    calculating the value of Misty Creek on the basis of a
    discount. One might assume that the profits contributed by
    Grand Pointe Homes and Misty Creek were roughly equal
    but Misty Creek may have been more profitable than
    Grand Pointe Homes. Grand Pointe Homes may even have
    lost money. On this record, we do not know. See Sapoznick,
    
    161 F.3d at 1119
     (“[T]here is nothing in the record to fill the
    void in our knowledge.”). This is a rare occasion in which
    the district court’s calculation is “outside the realm of
    permissible calculations.” Peterson-Knox, 
    471 F.3d at 822
    ;
    accord Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 597-98
    ; United States v. Rodriguez-
    2
    The Government estimated that Anderson had received
    approximately $7.1 million from Aurora LLC. This included
    cash distributions, future profits, and interest paid on Ander-
    son’s behalf. The Government subtracted from these proceeds
    the $6 million in real estate that Anderson had invested in
    Aurora LLC and concluded that the benefit received from the
    two projects was $1.1 million.
    No. 06-2205                                                17
    Alvarez, 
    425 F.3d 1041
    , 1045-46 (7th Cir. 2005); United States
    v. Skoczen, 
    405 F.3d 537
    , 549 (7th Cir. 2005). So we cannot
    determine a benefit attributable to Grand Pointe Homes
    and the total determinable benefit is limited to Eola Road.
    3. Was the District Court’s Error Harmless?
    We have found that the district court erred in its cal-
    culation of the benefit received. Before we remand the case,
    however, we must determine whether the error was
    harmless. See e.g., United States v. Saunders, 
    129 F.3d 925
    ,
    932-33 (7th Cir. 1997). An error is harmless if it “did not
    affect the district court’s selection of the sentence im-
    posed.” Williams v. United States, 
    503 U.S. 193
    , 203, 
    112 S. Ct. 1112
    , 
    117 L.Ed.2d 341
     (1992). So, knowing what we now
    know, would the district court have selected the same
    sentence? There is no need for speculation here. The district
    court stated explicitly at the sentencing hearing that it
    believed that seventy-two months was the reasonable
    sentence under § 3553(a), even if its benefit calculations
    were incorrect: “I will say for purposes of any appeal, the
    rulings I have made in applying the sentencing guide-
    lines—and I think I have made a good faith basis [sic] to do
    that—in the alternative I would reach the conclusion that
    the six-year sentence is the reasonable sentence under 18
    U.S.C. 3553, if another judge determines that my sentencing
    guidelines calculations were in any way made in error.”
    Sentencing H’rg Tr.184. Such “blanket” sentences may
    create problems in certain circumstances, but alternative
    holdings can prevent needless remands when district
    judges are faced with technical Guidelines calculations but
    where there are other Guidelines justifications. See United
    States v. Williams, 
    431 F.3d 767
    , 773-76 (11th Cir. 2005)
    (Carnes, J., concurring). Here, as we shall see, the district
    18                                                 No. 06-2205
    court would be justified for other reasons in imposing the
    same sentence in this case.
    On remand, the district court would be required to
    apply the current version of the Guidelines. See Demaree,
    
    459 F.3d at 795
    . The original sentencing took place in April
    2006 but the court used the November 2003 version of the
    Guidelines. The sections of the Guidelines at issue in this
    case were subject to important amendments in November
    2004 that made the penalties much more severe. As dis-
    cussed above, the benefit received in this case was at least
    $82,362. This figure, which may have seemed much less
    significant under the 2003 Guidelines, creates a much
    stiffer sentencing range under the amended Guidelines.
    The calculation under the new Guidelines would be as
    follows: Anderson’s base offense level would be twelve. See
    U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(a)(2) (2007). Two levels would be added
    for multiple bribes under § 2C1.1(b)(1). Four levels would
    be added because Rieser was a “public official.” See
    U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3) (2007). Finally, using our adjusted net
    benefit of $82,362, eight levels would be added for a net
    benefit of more than $70,000. Anderson’s total offense level
    would be twenty-six, which would yield a range of sixty-
    three to seventy-eight months. This is the same range the
    district court originally used, so the district court would be
    free to impose the same sentence on remand. Because it has
    clearly stated its intention to do so, any error in the calcula-
    tion of the sentencing range was harmless.3
    3
    Although the Government believes that the district court
    underestimated the benefit received, it did not cross-appeal the
    sentence.
    No. 06-2205                                               19
    C. The Reasonableness of the Sentence Under Section
    3553(a)
    Because the district judge would apply the same sen-
    tence, we now ask only whether it is a reasonable one.
    When the sentence falls within the Guidelines range, it
    is presumed reasonable. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 
    415 F.3d 606
    , 608 (7th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, however,
    the reasonableness of a sentence is determined in light
    of the § 3553(a) factors. See Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 596-97
    . Of
    course, the judge does not have to “write a comprehensive
    essay applying the full panoply of penological theories
    and considerations.” United States v. Dean, 
    414 F.3d 725
    , 729
    (7th Cir. 2005). We find the sentence in this case to
    be reasonable.
    The district court referred to a number of recent public
    corruption scandals, both in Illinois and elsewhere. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2)(A) (2007). The judge stressed the
    corrosive effect that corruption has on the public trust
    and expressed his belief that the scandals will not end
    unless they are treated “appropriately hard.” Anderson
    believes that the judge put too much weight on the
    public corruption scandals, but the judge was simply
    emphasizing the seriousness of the nature of the crime
    and discussing the need for general deterrence. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2)(B) (2007). The district court also be-
    lieved that Anderson had engaged in bribery before; thus,
    there was also a need for specific deterrence. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2)(C) (2007). The judge did acknowledge the
    defendant’s advanced age but this factor also may have
    worked against Anderson. The judge noted that Anderson
    was well off financially and could have relaxed and
    enjoyed his golden years. While many criminals commit
    crimes from lack of opportunity and desperation, Ander-
    20                                             No. 06-2205
    son had acted out of greed. Nevertheless, the judge refused
    to give a sentence in the higher end of the Guidelines range
    because Anderson is seventy-three years old and suffers
    from a serious kidney disease. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1)
    (2007). Given this explanation, we believe the sentence is
    reasonable and we will not disturb it on appeal.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Because we find that the sentence was reasonable and
    that any error in the calculation of Anderson’s Guidelines
    range was harmless, the decision of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    USCA-02-C-0072—2-28-08