Rogers, David E. v. Baxter Int'l Inc ( 2008 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 06-3241
    DAVID E. ROGERS, et al.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.
    BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC., et al.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 04 C 6476—Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2007—DECIDED APRIL 2, 2008
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
    EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Plaintiffs are participants in
    the retirement plan for Baxter International’s employees.
    Each participant exercises some control over the invest-
    ments in an individual account in this defined-contribu-
    tion plan, though the plan and its trustees may limit what
    assets an account may contain and when trading may
    occur. In this suit under the Employee Retirement In-
    come Security Act, plaintiffs contend that Baxter and
    some of the plan’s trustees have violated §409(a), 29 U.S.C.
    2                                                 No. 06-3241
    §1109(a), in their capacity as fiduciaries. The defendants’
    failing, according to the complaint, is that they allowed
    participants to invest in Baxter’s stock, despite knowing
    that it was overpriced in the market and hence a bad deal.
    The complaint points to two episodes of decline in the
    price of Baxter’s stock. One occurred in July 2002,
    when Baxter announced second-quarter results that fell
    short of the firm’s projections and the price of its stock
    immediately fell from $43 to $32. The other occurred in
    July 2004, when Baxter announced that it would restate
    recent financial results to correct for a fraud at its Brazilian
    subsidiary; that announcement led to a drop of $1.48
    a share.
    Both of these episodes precipitated suits under the
    securities laws. With respect to the 2002 episode, Asher v.
    Baxter International Inc., 
    377 F.3d 727
    (7th Cir. 2004), held
    that the complaint could not be dismissed under the
    defense for forward-looking statements in the Private
    Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, see 15 U.S.C.
    §78u–5(c). Since then the district court has held that none
    of the plaintiffs is eligible to represent a class, see Asher v.
    Baxter International Inc., 
    505 F.3d 736
    (7th Cir. 2007), so
    that suit is limping along on behalf of a few individual
    investors. With respect to the 2004 episode, a class was
    certified in the district court, but Higginbotham v. Baxter
    International Inc., 
    495 F.3d 753
    (7th Cir. 2007), held that
    plaintiffs failed to satisfy the standard that PSLRA estab-
    lishes for pleading scienter. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2); Tellabs,
    Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 
    127 S. Ct. 2499
    (2007).
    PSLRA applies, however, only to the Securities Act of 1933
    and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. (Section
    §78u–4(b)(2), for example, applies only to a “private action
    arising under this chapter” of Title 17—the 1934 Act.) ERISA
    No. 06-3241                                                    3
    is a different statute, in a different title of the United States
    Code. Plaintiffs seek to use ERISA to recover for events
    that as a result of PSLRA could not support an action on
    behalf of shareholders at large.
    In order to pursue a claim under §409(a) of ERISA, the
    participants first need a private right of action. They in-
    voked §502(a)(2) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2), which
    says that suit may be brought “by the Secretary [of Labor],
    or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appro-
    priate relief under section 1109 of this title”. Relying
    on Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 
    473 U.S. 134
    (1985), defendants asked the district court to
    dismiss the suit. Russell holds that participants in a
    defined-benefit plan may use §502(a)(2) only when the
    loss is incurred by the plan as an entity. These participants
    suffered losses in their individual accounts; other partici-
    pants whose accounts did not contain Baxter’s stock
    were unaffected. The district court denied the motion to
    dismiss, 
    417 F. Supp. 2d 974
    (N.D. Ill. 2006), but certified
    the decision for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C.
    §1292(b), and we accepted the appeal. Proceedings were
    put on hold while Higginbotham was under advisement.
    Then, after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case
    that presented questions about the application of Russell
    to defined-contribution plans, we called for supple-
    mental briefs. Oral argument was held last fall, but we
    deferred action until the Supreme Court released its
    opinion. This appeal is at last ready for decision.
    LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 
    128 S. Ct. 1020
    (2008), holds that §502(a)(2), and thus §409(a), may be
    used by the beneficiary of a defined-contribution account
    that suffers a loss, even though other participants are
    uninjured by the acts said to constitute a breach of fidu-
    4                                                 No. 06-3241
    ciary duty. See also Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 
    489 F.3d 799
    (7th Cir. 2007). That pretty much disposes of this appeal.
    All that remains is defendants’ insistence that partici-
    pants not be allowed to use ERISA to get around limits
    added to the securities laws by PSLRA. Defendants are
    wrong, for two reasons.
    First, this is not a securities suit. It is an action against
    fiduciaries of a pension plan. To prevail, the participants
    must show that defendants breached the duties they owed
    as fiduciaries of pension funds, not whatever duties
    Baxter and its managers owed to investors at large. The
    sets of potentially responsible parties overlap only in-
    cidentally. The defendants in securities actions are those
    who made the fraudulent statements to the public or
    caused them to be made; the defendants in this action
    are those empowered to take decisions on behalf of the
    pension plan. Pension fiduciaries are liable, or not, depend-
    ing on what they know and what duties they have under
    trust law; that Baxter may have tried to deceive investors
    as a whole would not translate directly to liability
    for trustees of Baxter’s pension plan. Baxter itself is a
    defendant, and its liability in a securities action may
    depend on what its managers knew collectively, or what
    it is responsible for under 15 U.S.C. §78t(a); the rules
    for attributing knowledge under ERISA may or may not
    be the same, an issue that the parties have not addressed.
    Second, PSLRA does not amend or supersede ERISA. It is
    limited, as we have mentioned, to the securities laws.
    Unless one law expressly repeals or supersedes another,
    or the two create inconsistent demands, both must be
    enforced. See, e.g., Branch v. Smith, 
    538 U.S. 254
    , 273 (2003);
    J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,
    
    534 U.S. 124
    , 141–44 (2001); Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368
    No. 06-3241                                                
    5 F.3d 726
    (7th Cir. 2004). Nothing in the 1995 amendments
    to the securities laws either refers to ERISA or affects
    how trustees fulfil their duties under §409(a).
    All we hold today is that participants in defined-contri-
    bution plans may use §502(a)(2), and thus §409(a), to
    obtain relief if losses to an account are attributable to a
    pension plan fiduciary’s breach of a duty owed to the
    plan. Plaintiffs will need to establish that defendants
    knew the bad news in 2002 and 2004 and that, as a result,
    they had a duty under ERISA (which incorporates normal
    rules of trust law) to prevent participants from investing
    retirement funds in Baxter’s stock. One question will be
    whether pension fiduciaries are obliged to allow or pre-
    vent investments for blocks of weeks or months at a time
    (when Baxter or some other stock is “overpriced”),
    rather than making decisions based on long-run con-
    siderations. People who pursue a buy-and-hold strategy,
    one particularly appropriate for pension investments,
    are unaffected by the volatility in market prices that
    accompanies the announcement of particular pieces of
    good and bad news. (Although retirees who draw on
    their pension portfolio in the immediate wake of bad news
    may be injured, plaintiffs have not advanced any argu-
    ments directed to this subclass of all pension participants.)
    Plaintiffs maintain that defendants should not have
    allowed investment in Baxter’s stock at any time. That
    avoids the problem we have mentioned, but to recover
    on this theory plaintiffs must demonstrate that Baxter’s
    stock always is overpriced, and that defendants know
    it. That amounts to an assertion that pension fiduciaries
    have a duty to outsmart the stock market, a contention
    with little prospect of success. See Nelson v. Hodowal,
    
    512 F.3d 347
    (7th Cir. 2008). Anyway, if Baxter’s stock is
    6                                                 No. 06-3241
    always priced too high, pension participants will be the
    winners. Plaintiffs fear a collapse tomorrow, but if profes-
    sional investment managers can’t outsmart the stock
    market, judges can’t either.
    This is not to say that the price of all well-followed stocks
    is efficient in the sense of being right; it is only to say that
    investment managers who lack inside information rarely
    beat the market consistently. See Burton G. Malkiel &
    John G. Cragg, Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices
    (1982). Perhaps the defendants in this litigation did have
    inside information, but could they use it for plaintiffs’
    benefit? Plaintiffs’ position seems to be that pension
    trustees are obligated to adopt a policy under which
    employees invest in a stock during periods of good news
    for the issuer but not during periods of bad news. The
    implication is that someone else (which is to say,
    investors at large) must bear the loss when bad news is
    announced, because the pension participants will have
    bailed out. Corporate insiders cannot trade on their own
    behalf using material private information, good or bad. See
    generally United States v. O’Hagan, 
    521 U.S. 642
    (1997);
    Dirks v. SEC, 
    463 U.S. 646
    (1983). In Harzewski we raised
    the question whether they may act on such information
    in their role as fiduciaries for pension 
    plans. 489 F.3d at 808
    . That question remains unanswered but must be
    resolved in plaintiffs’ favor if they are to prevail.
    AFFIRMED
    No. 06-3241                                                 7
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. David
    E. Rogers, a participant in Baxter’s defined-contribution
    retirement plan (the “Baxter Plan”), filed this class action
    under section 502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement
    Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). The
    class alleges that the fiduciaries of the Baxter Plan vio-
    lated their duties under ERISA, among other things, by
    selecting Baxter stock as an investment option when the
    fiduciaries knew or should have known that the stock’s
    price was inflated. See ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
    Baxter filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the Su-
    preme Court’s decision in Massachusetts Mutual Life
    Insurance Co. v. Russell, 
    473 U.S. 134
    (1985), prevented the
    class from suing under ERISA § 502(a)(2). In Russell, the
    Court held that, in the context of a defined-benefit plan,
    an individual plaintiff who does not sue to recover for
    a breach that harmed the entire plan may not use ERISA’s
    private right of action provision, ERISA § 502(a)(2),
    29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
    The panel opinion appropriately concludes that the
    Supreme Court’s recent decision in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg
    & Associates, Inc. et al., 
    128 S. Ct. 1020
    (2008), disposes of
    Baxter’s argument that Russell prevents this suit. In LaRue,
    the Court held that the concerns that it had expressed
    in Russell, a case which dealt with defined-benefit plans,
    do not apply in the context of defined-contribution plans.
    The Court held that, in defined-contribution plans,
    “[w]hether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets
    payable to all participants and beneficiaries, or only to
    persons tied to particular individual accounts, it creates
    the kind of harms that concerned the draftsmen of § 409.”
    
    Id. at 1025.
    8                                               No. 06-3241
    The majority’s opinion also correctly disposes of Baxter’s
    argument that the PSLRA1 prevents this action. As the
    opinion explains, this action is not a securities suit, and
    the PSLRA does not amend or supercede ERISA.
    The remainder of the panel’s opinion comments on the
    class plaintiffs’ theory of the case. As the panel frankly
    admits, this discussion is unnecessary to the disposition
    of the appeal before us. For that reason, I respectfully
    decline to join this discussion. This interlocutory appeal on
    a certified question is here on the denial of a motion to
    dismiss. We have affirmed the denial of that motion, and
    the case should now return to the district court where
    the lawyers ought to develop their case without any fur-
    ther counsel from judges of the court of appeals. The advice
    contained in the panel opinion is given without
    any adversarial briefing or oral argument and suggests
    strongly that no other view is possible or at least worthy
    of acceptance by the district court or by the other judges
    of this court. In my view, a more restrained prediction of
    what might develop in the course of this litigation is
    appropriate until the attorneys and the district court
    have had an opportunity to develop this case.
    1
    Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.
    No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4).
    USCA-02-C-0072—4-2-08