United States v. House, Adonis ( 2008 )


Menu:
  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 07-4043
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Plainitff-Appellee,
    v.
    A DONIS H OUSE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 06 CR 631-2—Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.
    A RGUED D ECEMBER 2, 2008—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 31, 2008
    Before C UDAHY, F LAUM, and S YKES, Circuit Judges.
    F LAUM, Circuit Judge. A federal jury convicted Adonis
    House of two counts of distribution of crack cocaine, and
    the district court sentenced him to 188 months in prison,
    followed by five years of supervised release. On appeal,
    House raises three challenges to his sentence. First, he
    contends that the district court improperly made a two-
    point adjustment to his base offense level under the
    United States Sentencing Guidelines for obstruction of
    justice. Second, he contends that the district court failed
    2                                               No. 07-4043
    to consider the disparity in sentences between crack
    cocaine and powder cocaine under the sentencing guide-
    lines. Third, he contends that the district court did not
    correctly apply the sentencing factors in U.S.S.G. § 3553(a).
    For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction
    and sentence of the district court.
    I. Background
    Adonis House was arrested and prosecuted as part of
    a broader federal narcotics investigation in Chicago.
    House’s involvement began in February 2005, when he
    met with Sylvester Avery, a man who claimed that he
    was looking to get into the cocaine trafficking business, at
    a barber shop on Madison Street on the west side of
    Chicago. Avery asked House if he knew of anyone who
    could sell him narcotics, and House apparently told
    Avery that he would try to find out who could supply
    him. What House did not know at this time was that Avery
    was working as a government informant pursuant to a
    cooperation agreement. Later, in March 2005, Avery
    introduced House to John D. Morton, supposedly a high-
    level dealer from Madison, Wisconsin, but in fact the
    undercover identity of Mark Horton, a Supervisory
    Special Agent with the FBI. During the course of the
    next month, Avery and House talked numerous times
    over the phone and met at the barber shop; eventually,
    they agreed that House would sell Avery and Horton
    four-and-one-half ounces of crack cocaine for $2600 to
    $2700.
    On April 5, 2005, Horton and Avery caught up with
    House at the barbershop for a prearranged meeting.
    No. 07-4043                                               3
    Horton gave House $2700 in cash to purchase four-and-a-
    half ounces of crack cocaine. House and Avery then
    drove to another location where they met with LaPriest
    Gary, who was supplying the crack cocaine. Gary, Avery,
    and House then went to a third location, where Gary
    obtained about four ounces of crack, which he ex-
    changed for $2350 from House and Avery. Gary then drove
    Avery and House back to the barbershop, where House
    gave Avery a white bag filled with crack cocaine. Avery
    waited for Horton to leave the barbershop, and the two
    then drove away in Horton’s undercover car (the crack
    cocaine was seized by the FBI at that time). Later, House
    met Avery and gave him $200 for setting up the deal.
    On April 11, 2005, Avery called House about setting
    up a second drug deal. House told Avery that he had
    another source for crack cocaine, but that the price
    would be higher. On May 20, 2005, Avery, Horton, and
    House met at the barbershop on Madison Street and
    discussed buying four-and-a-half ounces of crack. House
    told Avery and Horton that his source had that much
    available for purchase, and that he would only need to
    drive over to the supplier in order to get it. Horton then
    gave Avery $2900 for the purchase. When House told
    Avery and Horton he would need to take the money with
    him, Avery decided to go to the supplier’s location as well.
    House, Avery, and a third man, Frederick Young, then
    drove away from the barbershop. Avery gave House the
    $2900, and while Avery apparently did not witness an
    exchange between House and his supplier, House and
    Avery returned to the barbershop with crack cocaine,
    which was then turned over to Horton. Later that same
    4                                               No. 07-4043
    day, House met Avery and gave him $250 for setting up
    the second deal.
    Horton and House apparently spoke twice more, and
    they discussed the possibility of House supplying drugs
    for Horton’s operation. According to trial testimony,
    House speculated on the price for as much as nine ounces
    or a quarter kilogram of crack at a time. However, those
    discussions and agreements were not part of the
    charges brought in this case.
    On August 31, 2006, a grand jury in the Northern
    District of Illinois returned an indictment charging
    House with two counts of knowingly and intentionally
    distributing cocaine in the form of crack cocaine in viola-
    tion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. A jury trial
    in House’s case began on June 5, 2007, and on June 7, the
    jury found House guilty on both counts. Sentencing in
    the case was originally scheduled for August 29, 2007,
    but was continued twice, first until September 24, and
    then for November 13. Immediately before the Novem-
    ber 13 sentencing hearing, however, House moved to
    continue sentencing because he was also charged in a
    separate indictment before Judge Matthew Kennelly in
    the Northern District of Illinois, and House wanted the
    district court in this case to consider the pending charges
    as part of his relevant conduct for sentencing. The district
    court granted House’s motion, and held a sentencing
    hearing on December 13, 2007. The jury verdict in House’s
    trial included a special jury form to include a determina-
    tion of drug amounts, and based on the amounts in the
    present case as well as the separate indictment, the
    No. 07-4043                                                5
    district court calculated a base offense level of 34. The
    district court then imposed a two-level enhancement
    for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, finding
    that House had improperly attempted to influence
    Avery’s testimony in the case. Working from the new base
    offense level of 36, the district court sentenced House to
    188 months in prison, followed by five years of super-
    vised release. This appeal followed.
    II. Discussion
    House raises three issues in his appeal. First, he claims
    that the district court should not have imposed a two-level
    sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, as
    House only intended to confirm that Avery would testify
    at trial, rather than to obstruct justice by persuading Avery
    not to appear. Second, he seeks a remand so that the
    district court can consider the disparity between sen-
    tences for crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses in
    the sentencing guidelines. Third, House argues that his
    sentence was unreasonable, given that he has no criminal
    history, is not a threat to re-offend, and does not present
    a danger to his community.
    A. Whether the district court properly applied a two-
    level enhancement for obstruction of justice under
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
    House first argues that the district court improperly
    granted a two-level enhancement to his base offense level
    for obstruction of justice in violation of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
    6                                                No. 07-4043
    That portion of the sentencing guidelines instructs
    judges that:
    If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded,
    or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administra-
    tion of justice with respect to the investigation, prose-
    cution, or sentencing of the instant offense of convic-
    tion, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the
    defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant
    conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense, increase
    the offense level by 2 levels.
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The section requires, first, a finding that
    the defendant endeavored to obstruct or impede the
    administration of justice, and that the obstructive
    conduct related to the offense of conviction or a closely
    related offense. We review de novo whether the
    district court made adequate findings to support an
    enhancement for obstruction of justice, while we review
    the underlying factual findings for clear error. United
    States v. Carrera, 
    259 F.3d 818
    , 831 (7th Cir. 2001); see
    also United States v. Gage, 
    183 F.3d 711
    , 715 (7th Cir. 1999).
    The district court first learned of the alleged obstructive
    conduct in this case on the first day of trial, when the
    government informed the court that House had con-
    tacted Avery through Mary Brown, a friend of House’s
    from his neighborhood. A few months before House’s
    trial, he had learned through discovery documents that
    Avery was a cooperating witness with the government
    and was supposed to testify against him at trial. Sometime
    after that, Brown and her brothers encountered Avery at
    the scene of a traffic accident on Western Avenue in
    No. 07-4043                                                     7
    Chicago. According to the testimony of Anita Dunn, an
    FBI agent who investigated the incident after Avery
    reported it to the government in this case, Brown ap-
    proached Avery at the scene of the accident, asked if he
    was planning on testifying against House, and asked him
    not to testify. Dunn also claims that she spoke to Brown,
    who gave a similar account of events: “She said she
    confronted [Avery]. She asked him about testifying and, I
    believe, not to testify against Mr. House.” Sen. Tr. at 19.
    According to Dunn, this was all done at House’s instruc-
    tion: Brown approached Avery because “Mr. House
    asked her to locate Mr. Avery and ask him not to testify
    against him.” 
    Id. House disputes
    this version of events, claiming that he
    only asked Brown to speak to Avery about whether he
    would testify because Brown herself was skeptical
    about Avery’s cooperation, and House believed that
    Brown could tell from Avery’s reaction to her question
    whether or not he really intended to appear in court. He
    also claims that his intent was only to confirm that Avery
    would in fact be testifying at his trial.1 On appeal, he first
    1
    The parties argue inconclusively about the plausibility of this
    second explanation for the confrontation. The government
    argues that Avery’s identity was firmly established in dis-
    covery documents and that this confrontation occurred shortly
    before trial when it was clear that Avery would testify. House
    argues that the time of the confrontation has never been estab-
    lished and so the confrontation occurred at a point when House
    was still identifying the government’s primary witnesses.
    (continued...)
    8                                                 No. 07-4043
    questions the reliability of the government’s evidence
    supporting the enhancement, as it was made on the
    basis of hearsay testimony from Dunn and neither Avery
    nor Brown appeared at the sentencing hearing to
    explain what happened. He next argues that the testi-
    mony on its own is insufficient to establish that he had
    the intent to obstruct justice. In support of this argu-
    ment, House points out that Dunn stated during her
    direct examination that Brown did not “believe that
    [House] wanted her to intimidate Mr. Avery,” Sen. Tr. at
    20-21, and during her cross-examination that Brown did
    not say that House asked her to speak with Avery in
    order to intimidate him.
    House’s first objection is misplaced. While it is true that
    Dunn’s recollection of her interviews with Brown and
    Avery was hearsay testimony, sentencing courts are
    allowed to consider hearsay testimony. United States v.
    Roche, 
    415 F.3d 614
    , 618 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Williams v.
    New York, 
    337 U.S. 241
    (1949)). Hearsay testimony is
    proper as long as it has “sufficient indicia of reliability to
    support its probable accuracy.” United States v. Otero, 
    495 F.3d 393
    , 402 n.5 (7th Cir. 2007). House is left to argue
    that while the testimony was properly admissible, it
    was presumptively unreliable. He claims that this circuit
    has previously held that “a very strong presumption of
    (...continued)
    Regardless of the timing of the confrontation, we conclude
    that the district court had adequate evidence at the sentencing
    hearing to support a sentence enhancement.
    No. 07-4043                                                       9
    unreliability attaches to statements that are: (1) given
    with government involvement; (2) describe past events;
    (3) have not been subjected to adversarial testing.” United
    States v. Jones, 
    371 F.3d 363
    , 369 (7th Cir. 2004). 2 Dunn’s
    interviews with Avery and Brown, House argues, meet
    all three characteristics and thus are not sufficiently
    reliable to form a basis for the sentencing enhancement.
    House next argues that even if this court finds that
    Dunn’s testimony was sufficiently reliable, it was insuf-
    ficient to establish his intent to obstruct justice. This
    circuit’s opinions on the intent requirements of § 3C1.1
    “make clear . . . that the burden is on the Government to
    establish that the defendant acted with specific intent to
    obstruct justice.” United States v. Dale, 
    498 F.3d 604
    , 609 n.4
    (7th Cir. 2007). Making any sort of statement to a wit-
    2
    This line of cases that House cites is not on point, however.
    Jones, which cited United States v. Ochoa, 
    229 F.3d 631
    , 637 (7th
    Cir. 2000), involved a co-conspirator’s hearsay statement
    admitted at trial, and which thus implicated the Confrontation
    Clause. 
    Jones, 371 F.3d at 369
    . Ochoa involved the same set of
    facts. 
    Ochoa, 229 F.3d at 637
    . The determination of presumptive
    unreliability is premised on the right of confrontation and upon
    the fact that it is a co-conspirator’s statement, given in a context
    in which the conspirator would be tempted to shift blame.
    However, this case is different both because Brown’s testimony
    was not a classic co-conspirator’s statement, and because the
    relevant standard for sentencing proceedings is not the Con-
    frontation Clause, but rather due process. We thus take
    House’s point that we should question the reliability of the
    statement, without attaching any presumptions of unreliability.
    10                                              No. 07-4043
    ness is not enough; rather, a defendant must make the
    statement intending for it to affect whether or not the
    witness will appear at trial. At the same time, this
    circuit’s cases hold that a mere attempt to influence a
    witness is enough, regardless of whether it succeeds.
    United States v. Wright, 
    37 F.3d 358
    , 362 (7th Cir. 1994).
    Moreover, the court will use an objective standard to
    determine whether a given action is an attempt to
    obstruct justice, rather than evaluating the subjective
    intent of the defendant. See United States v. Chatmon, 
    324 F.3d 889
    , 893 (7th Cir. 2003).
    House’s best argument in this respect is that Dunn’s
    testimony indicated at two points that Brown did not
    approach Avery with the intent to intimidate him, and
    that Brown did not believe that House wanted her to
    intimidate Avery. (He claims instead that he was
    simply determining whether he was going to testify, and
    that he was only trying to give his attorney accurate
    information about the witnesses in the case.) The sen-
    tencing guideline does not make attempts to “intimidate”
    the basis for an enhancement, however, but rather
    attempts to “obstruct or impede.” This is because the
    obstruction of justice enhancement is designed “not just to
    prevent miscarriages of justice but also to reduce the
    burden on the justice system.” United States v. Buckley, 
    192 F.3d 708
    , 710 (7th Cir. 1999). The enhancement thus
    covers not only threats or intimidation but also “otherwise
    unlawfully influencing” a witness. United States v. Johnson,
    
    46 F.3d 636
    , 638 (7th Cir. 1995). This circuit has previously
    held that “unlawfully influencing” a witness means
    intentionally engaging in conduct “having a natural
    No. 07-4043                                              11
    tendency to suppress or interfere with the discovery of
    truth.” 
    Wright, 37 F.3d at 362
    .
    Thus, House could be liable for an obstruction of justice
    enhancement merely because Brown asked Avery not to
    testify against House, provided the evidence estab-
    lished that House intended to have Brown ask Avery not
    to appear. The bare attempt to persuade a witness not
    to offer otherwise truthful testimony would indeed be an
    attempt to unlawfully influence the outcome of the pro-
    ceeding. The government emphasizes this aspect of
    Dunn’s testimony in their briefs to this court. The district
    court, in imposing the enhancement, likewise found that
    “just the attempt to influence or the attempt to persuade
    another to act in a certain way” was sufficient. Sen. Tr.
    at 26.
    This court’s review of the sentencing enhancement
    thus boils down to the question of whether House intended
    for Brown to ask Avery not to testify, which itself boils
    down to the ancillary question of whether the district
    court had sufficiently reliable evidence of House’s intent
    to justify imposing the sentencing enhancement. This is
    a factual question that this court reviews only for clear
    error. We note that the evidence of House’s intent was
    rather thin. According to Dunn’s testimony, when
    House spoke to Brown about Avery he asked her to ask
    Avery not to testify. Or at the risk of offering a more
    confusing formulation, Dunn said she believed that
    House asked Brown to ask that. There is thus only hearsay
    testimony from a single witness, and not the strongest
    hearsay testimony, on the crucial question of House’s
    12                                             No. 07-4043
    intent. Nor was Dunn’s testimony, which the district
    court decided to credit, the strongest case that the gov-
    ernment could have put on, given that it was hearsay
    testimony taken without giving the defense a chance to
    cross-examine either Brown or Avery about the encounter
    or, crucially, to cross-examine Brown about House’s
    intent with respect to that encounter. Nevertheless, this
    court will only disturb the district court’s factual
    findings when it is “left with the definite and firm con-
    viction that a mistake has been committed.” United States
    v. Christ, 
    513 F.3d 762
    , 775 (7th Cir. 2008). While this
    may not have been the strongest possible case for a sen-
    tencing enhancement, this court will not reverse the
    district court on clear error review merely because it may
    disagree with its decision. There is evidence from the
    sentencing hearing that Brown approached Avery at the
    behest of the defendant and asked him not to testify; and
    while there may not have been an attempt to intimidate
    Avery (nobody, at this point, argues that there was) there
    was an attempt to unlawfully influence his testimony.
    House presents no reason to question the accuracy of
    Dunn’s testimony aside from the weaknesses inherent in
    hearsay testimony. During a sentencing hearing, however,
    the judge only needs to find that the evidence is reliable;
    in this case, the district court found Agent Dunn’s testi-
    mony to be credible and used her report to conclude
    that House attempted to persuade Avery not to testify at
    trial. There was, consequently, an adequate factual basis
    for the sentencing enhancement.
    No. 07-4043                                               13
    B. Whether the case should be remanded to the district
    court to apply its discretion under Kimbrough v.
    United States to consider the 100:1 disparity in the
    sentencing guidelines for crack and powder cocaine.
    House’s next contention is that the district court did not
    exercise the discretion that the Supreme Court granted to
    district courts in sentencing proceedings to adjust the
    calculation of a defendant’s sentencing range in Kimbrough
    v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 558
    (2007). The Court’s decision
    in Kimbrough acknowledged the sentencing guidelines
    contained a disparity between sentences of persons
    charged with trafficking powder cocaine and those
    charged with trafficking crack cocaine: “a trafficker
    dealing in crack cocaine is subject to the same sentence as
    one dealing in 100 times more powder cocaine.” 
    Id. at 564.
    Concluding that district courts did not need to reflect
    this disparity in their sentencing decisions, the Court
    held that “it would not be an abuse of discretion for a
    district court to conclude when sentencing a particular
    defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sen-
    tence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s
    purposes, even in a mine-run case.” 
    Id. at 575.
      In evaluating the district court’s sentencing decision,
    this court reviews “both findings of fact and applications
    of the Sentencing Guidelines for clear error.” United States
    v. Stitman, 
    472 F.3d 983
    , 986 (7th Cir. 2007). When a defen-
    dant alleges that the district court made a procedural
    error in sentencing, such as a legal error in interpreting
    the guidelines or a failure to appreciate the advisory
    nature of sentencing guidelines, this court reviews the
    sentencing procedure de novo. 
    Id. 14 No.
    07-4043
    The district court held the sentencing hearing in this
    case shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its
    decision in Kimbrough. Before imposing sentence, the
    district court acknowledged its authority to adjust
    House’s sentencing range because of his conviction for
    trafficking crack cocaine. “And I’m sure you’re both
    aware of the Supreme Court case law that came down in
    the last two days . . . which enables me to take into
    account all the different characteristics under 3553 to
    move lower than these crack guidelines, if necessary.” Sen.
    Tr. at 34. House argues, however, that this statement from
    the district court was inadequate because it did not con-
    sider the 100:1 disparity between the guideline sen-
    tences for crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses, and
    thus was not a proper application of the core holding of
    Kimbrough.
    In support of his argument that this court should remand
    the case to the district court for resentencing, House cites
    several cases that this circuit remanded to the district court
    for resentencing because Kimbrough might have affected the
    district court’s sentencing decision. See United States v.
    Adefumi, 279 Fed. Appx. 401 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v.
    Padilla, 
    520 F.3d 706
    (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Smith,
    276 Fed. Appx. 497 (7th Cir. 2008). The sentencing proceed-
    ings in those cases, however, occurred before the Supreme
    Court issued its opinion in Kimbrough, and the district
    court was thus unaware of its new discretion. This circuit
    established a procedure for remanding sentencing deci-
    sions in light of Kimbrough in United States v. Taylor, 
    520 F.3d 746
    (7th Cir. 2008). In Taylor, this court determined
    that a limited remand would be appropriate where an
    No. 07-4043                                              15
    appeal from a sentencing decision was pending when
    Kimbrough was decided and the district court did not
    have an opportunity to consider its holding. 
    Id. at 747.
    Taylor also holds, however, that remand is not appropri-
    ate where the district court was aware of its power
    under Kimbrough but simply chose not to apply it. 
    Id. at 747-48.
       The government argues that the district court’s state-
    ment during the sentencing hearing indicated an aware-
    ness of its authority under Kimbrough to consider a lower
    sentencing range, but that the district court declined to
    exercise this discretion when imposing the sentence. This
    is correct. While the district court could have gone into
    more detail about Kimbrough, the statement from the
    record shows that it was aware of its discretion in light of
    that decision. The district court followed the correct
    sentencing procedure, and thus House’s sentence will
    be overturned only if the decision not to adjust the sen-
    tencing range downward was clear error. Because the
    sentence that the district court imposed is ultimately
    within the guidelines range and the court acknowledged
    its discretion to impose a lower sentence if it chose to do
    so, it was not clear error for the district court to decline
    to exercise that discretion.
    C. Whether House’s 188 month sentence is unreasonable
    in light of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
    House finally argues that his 188-month sentence is
    unreasonable in light of the factors contained in § 3553(a)
    of the sentencing guidelines. A properly calculated, within-
    16                                                No. 07-4043
    guidelines sentence is entitled to a presumption of rea-
    sonableness, and this court reviews such a sentence
    deferentially. United States v. Hurn, 
    496 F.3d 784
    , 790 (7th
    Cir. 2007) (citing Rita v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2462
    (2007)). Section 3553(a) requires a district court, before im-
    posing a sentence, to consider among other factors the
    nature and circumstances of the offense and the criminal
    history of the defendant, the need for deterrence, public
    protection, and rehabilitation of the defendant, and the
    need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.
    House cites four factors that justified a sentence below
    the guidelines range: his non-existent criminal record, his
    low risk of recidivism, his low need for deterrence, and
    his lack of danger to the community. With respect to the
    first of those four factors, the nature of the offense,
    House argues that the district court considered only the
    impact that drug dealing as a whole had on his neighbor-
    hood, rather than the circumstances of his specific of-
    fense. House also argues that he has positive personal
    characteristics, such as his lack of a criminal history, that
    the district court did not adequately consider. He also
    cites the fact that he is a young father as a reason why
    he does not need a long sentence to be deterred from a
    life of crime, and as a reason why he does not present a
    danger to his community.
    It appears from the record that the district court con-
    sidered the factors in § 3553(a) before imposing sentence.
    The court noted four letters written on House’s behalf
    by family members and friends. Sen. Tr. 30-31. Before
    imposing a 188-month sentence (the bottom of the ap-
    No. 07-4043                                               17
    plicable guideline range) the district court also con-
    sidered House’s culpability in both of the drug dealing
    transactions. While the court did discuss the impact of
    drug trafficking as a whole on House’s community, it
    related that discussion back to the nature and circum-
    stances of House’s convictions. “[I]t’s not just your role in
    brokering a deal or moving one drug to another. It is your
    role in setting that image that permeates your community
    and really robs the youth of your community of any
    role models to move forward and to break out of the chains
    of this poverty, this violence, and this drug dealing.” Sen.
    Tr. at 47. Further, the government’s evidence at trial
    indicated that House was highly culpable for the two
    offenses. “[W]hat [the evidence] presented was not a
    confused somebody who just happened to stumble
    upon drug dealing. It’s somebody who’s been a part of
    this fabric that’s ruining this community and keeping
    young men down in that community . . . .” Sen. Tr. at 48-49.
    The district court likewise noted the possibility of
    House’s rehabilitation in prison, his lack of criminal
    history, and the fact that he was not a threat to re-offend.
    See Sen. Tr. at 49. The district court thus considered the
    factors that House now stresses on appeal. They did not
    lead the district court to impose a sentence below the
    guidelines range, as he had hoped. Nevertheless, while
    House may argue that a lighter sentence may have
    been justified, all things considered, the district court
    did not err by sentencing House to a term at the low end
    of the applicable guidelines range.
    18                                          No. 07-4043
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence
    of the district court are A FFIRMED.
    12-31-08